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THE TRANSFORMATION OF ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN*
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

The pattern of international relations has always been in flux. The further we are removed from a period, the easier it is to discern its most salient features. So the fifteenth century now emerges as the time of the birth of the nation-state which was to become the key factor in international relations. Yet the supra-national church was not successfully challenged until the next century. Today it is clear that the French revolution completed the conversion of dynastic states into national states. In retrospect the 18th and particularly the 19th centuries are seen as the high point of the world expansion of Europe and the extension of its system of international relations. Now we realize that the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904–1905 marked the beginning of the counter-offensive against Europe. But what emerges sharply now was obscured then by a welter of incident.

Is the twentieth century the century of the ideological polarization of politics, or will it be the century of the end of ideology? At the end of the twentieth century will its first half seem to have been the period of world wars and its second half the period of peace? Fifty years from now it will be much easier to discern which features of the present international scene were transient, which permanent; now it is only possible to peer at the mass of events and try to make out some of the pattern. The hypothesis of this paper is that, first, the increased destructiveness of world war and the very small likelihood of its occurrence and, second, the establishment and expansion of a Communist state system have transformed the nature of international relations.

I. WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

The investigation will begin with an examination of the change in the conception of war as an instrument of policy, treating separately the periods before the First and Second World Wars and the period since the Second World War.

A. Pre-World War I

Before World War I statesmen believed, on the whole, that war could be profitable. Political leaders initiated wars, expecting gains commensurate with costs. The classic case comprised Bismarck's three wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, which achieved the unification of Germany at a cost probably no greater than expected.

The corollary to this assumption that some wars were worth the price was that some were not. Price was calculated not only in terms of prospective gain but also in terms of avoiding losses. Thus Great Britain reluctantly entered World War I pursuant to the guiding principle that no single nation—Germany in this case—should be permitted to dominate the European continent. Had any of the major powers before World War I foreseen its consequences, each would probably have been willing to accept greater shifts in the balance of power before engaging in war. The low tolerance for political loss in the European capitals of 1914 was a function of their underestimate of the cost of a general war.

B. Pre-World War II

For the victorious powers, the terrible, unexpected destructiveness of World War I produced a conception of war midway between that of 1914 and that of the present. Clausewitz's remark, made in a different context,[1] that "a conqueror is always a lover of peace," also applied to the Entente powers, since after 1918 a new war could bring them no great benefits. A profound anti-war spirit permeated all levels of British and French society. Consequently, in contrast with their position before World War I, Great Britain and France were willing to tolerate great and unfavorable changes in the balance of power before judging war to be necessary.

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* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

[1] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Modern Library, New York, 1943), p 332.

The defeated powers, on the other hand, in particular Germany after 1933, were too absorbed in the consequences of defeat to worry much about the possible hollowness of victory in a new war. The harsh, punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles had outraged practically all Germans who felt, at the very least, that guilt for the war was not exclusively theirs. (Increasingly this judgment on war guilt was shared outside the country, especially in Great Britain and the United States.) The more moderate elements in German society expected an eventual voluntary modification of the terms of defeat. The German right wing, however, scorned concessions from the victors and proposed to get, by an aggressive policy, and quickly, what they believed to be their due. The great depression that hit Europe in 1931 greatly enlarged the dissatisfaction and frustration in German society and two years later helped bring Hitler to power. Hitler promised radical solutions for Germany's external and internal problems. The Nazis were convinced and acted upon the conviction, that the Versailles Treaty should be revised only by force, or the threat of its employment. Hitler continued and hastened the rearmament of Germany begun, in part secretly, during the Weimar Republic. Finding himself unopposed by the West, he became more bold in throwing off the hampering restrictions of Versailles. Since Britain and France felt that war could only produce further national decline, while Germany felt that only the threat of war, and perhaps war itself, could restore the nation, retreat followed upon retreat until London and Paris were driven to choose reluctantly between the two extremes: to acquiesce in Hitler's aims—which was tantamount to complete defeat in war, though without fighting—or to face up to him, with ostensibly inferior armaments, at the grave risk of highly destructive general war. Either course seemed to promise only disaster, but war was finally accepted as the lesser evil.

In the 1930s Germany viewed war as an instrument of policy, as "have-not" nations have traditionally done. Hitler's strong desire for German expansion was coupled with a belief that his enemies could be beaten one by one. Had he foreseen how many, how powerful, and how united his enemies would be, he might have been slower to provoke war. Between the two world wars Great Britain and France followed the traditional policy of victors: they upheld the *status quo* established by the last war, eschewed agression for themselves and deplored its practice by others. Their attitude toward war as an instrument to prevent losses had become more cautious since 1914, for they feared that air bombing would make the next war a cataclysm of destruction.[2] Consequently, they tolerated great defeats in Europe before resorting to war and exposed themselves to further defeats in the early years of the armed conflict.

C. Post-World War II

Today, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has any goals commensurate with the expected cost of a nuclear war. Hence, given the present balance of military power, the initiation of total war is unacceptable. With the development of nuclear weapons, *both* major powers have now all but ruled out large-scale nuclear war as an instrument of policy.

In the past the initiator of a war seldom thought it would be a total war; he always hoped to control the arena and intensity of war so as to maximize his chances of victory. Today it is commonly believed that a possible consequence of a direct military confrontation between the two super-powers would be a rapid transition to total war accompanied by unprecedented destruction. Both sides now say they will, and presumably intend to, retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked with them on a large scale; but it is quite uncertain what lesser assaults, if any, would move them to nuclear war. Obviously both sides want to avoid such difficult decisions, and this is the basis of whatever mutual understanding exists. What differentiates the present situation from that preceding the outbreak of World War II is that *both* sides rather than *one* have rejected total war as an instrument of policy. Furthermore—in contrast to the situations preceding both world wars—the Soviet Union and the United States now have a very low tolerance for *any* changes in the balance of power in Europe. Since 1948 no changes comparable to those that took place in the periods 1904–1914 and 1933–1939 have occurred. The comparative rigidity of the present arrangements in Europe is to be explained, first, by the mutual awareness of the consequences of a nuclear war and, second, by the fear on both sides that any shift in the balance of power would cause the losing side to suffer further losses in rapid succession. Dominoes falling, has been the favored image. As early as December 1953, when the United States still enjoyed what was practically a monopoly in nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower stated the conviction that has dominated American attitudes ever since. By asserting that a nuclear war would mean the end of civilization, he implied that only the gravest threat to American interests could justify a decision to launch nuclear war. By maintaining American superiority in weapons, he reduced the likelihood that such threats would emanate from the Communist world.

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[2] Chamberlain, particularly, and even Churchill, expected that aerial bombing would produce far more casualties than it actually did. However, 50,000 British civilians died in German air raids, a figure that would have seemed horrible enough to the statesmen of 1938.

In the Soviet Union, as early as 1954, Malenkov said that a nuclear war would mean the destruction of world civilization. Khrushchev, who was soon to replace him as the head of the Soviet government, rejected that view. As long as the Soviets had no significant nuclear capabilities of their own, the victorious Khrushchev faction insisted that a nuclear war, undesirable as it might be, would mean the destruction of the capitalist part of the world, not of the whole of civilization; and that Communism would rise like a phoenix from the ashes. The Soviets probably feared that if they accepted a cataclysmic view of nuclear war, while only their opponents had the means to wage it, they would be inviting pressure from the West to yield political positions under the threat of such a war. However, after the Soviet Union itself gained acceptance for its claim to possess substantial nuclear capabilities, Khrushchev moved to Malenkov's position that a nuclear war would be a common disaster for all mankind. In fact some Soviet writers, referring to nuclear war, now deny the validity of Clausewitz's doctrine, adapted by Lenin, that war is the continuation of politics. In simple terms, they mean that nuclear war does not pay.

At present, the public Chinese Communist position is similar to that taken by the Soviet Union down to about 1958 or 1959, although somewhat more stridently expressed. The Chinese apparently are reluctant to admit that nuclear war would mean the end of the world while their enemies are the only ones in a position to wage such a war. The Soviet Union, they charge, has become a *status quo* power that sees more advantage in freezing present arrangements by agreement with its opponents than in a forward policy that entails some risk of conflict with them. Since the Chinese are willing to risk conflicts between the Communist world and its enemies—as an essential condition for altering the *status quo*—they cannot say that a total nuclear war would mean the end of mankind. The Chinese argue that the opponent is a "paper tiger;" that an aggressive joint Communist policy would produce concessions, not war, but that if capitalism initiated a war, it would be the tomb of that system. Communism, however, would survive. But the Soviet Union, with fewer unfulfilled aspirations than the Chinese, has put forward a much more apocalyptic view of nuclear war than the Chinese and has been less willing to take risks, especially to promote the objectives of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese have recommended that the whole Communist camp combine in pursuit of their objectives, but they have failed to impose their view on the others. In their consequent isolation, the Chinese have scrupulously avoided actions that might have provoked the United States to employ its nuclear weapons against them. Whether Communist China's policy will become bolder as it develops nuclear weapons, only time can tell.

Meanwhile, the two super-powers have rejected war as an instrument of policy because of their fear of its consequences. How this has influenced international affairs we shall shortly see.

II. IS WAR LIKELY?

Before World War I, wars were more frequent than today. More than a dozen regular wars were fought between 1870 and 1914, almost all bilateral, and many of them could have expanded into larger wars.[3] In addition, many international crises, almost all multilateral, threatened war. Since some of the wars of this period, including the two largest, the

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[3] The following is a partial list:

a. Franco-Prussian War, 1870.
b. Serbo-Montenegrin War against Turkey, 1876.
c. Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1888.
d. British-Afghan War, 1878.
e. The Zulu War, 1879.
f. War of the Pacific, 1879–1883.
g. British-Egyptian hostilities, 1882.
h. Serbo-Bulgarian War, 1885.
i. Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895.
j. Italo-Ethiopian War, 1896.
k. Greco-Turkish War, 1897.
l. Spanish-American War, 1898.
m. The Boer War, 1899–1902.
n. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905.
o. Tripolitan War between Italy and Turkey, 1911–1912.
p. The First Balkan War, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece against Turkey, 1912–1913.
q. Second Balkan War, Bulgaria against Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey, 1913.

Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War,[4] yielded benefits to the victor that were apparently commensurate with the sacrifices, the recurrence of similar wars was not "unthinkable."

At present the chances of a large-scale war with the most modern weapons seem small, certainly very much smaller than in say, 1913 or 1938. But the awful realization that the human race could be in jeopardy often dominates the imagination, obscures the reduced likelihood of war, and produces the emotionally based conviction in times of crisis, that war is likely, or inevitable in the long run unless radical changes are made in the international system. The truth, however, is that statesmen in the competing camps share a catastrophic view of the consequences of nuclear war, and this has made warfare *less* likely.

Not only general war, but apparently also wars on a smaller scale, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, have become less likely. Only a few years ago it was generally expected that limited wars would become more likely when the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear parity. With both sides in possession of nuclear weaponry, the reasoning went, either side, trading on the common fear of a general nuclear war, might conduct war on a lower scale with relative impunity.

The validity of this prediction has not undergone a genuine test, since the United States has maintained nuclear preponderance. Although the Soviet Union has disposed of a substantial nuclear capability for some years now, the United States has enjoyed a mutually recognized superiority. In this situation both sides have been concerned about the escalation of local conflicts and have sought to avoid them. Whether local wars would be more likely *if and when* the Soviet Union achieved rough nuclear parity, or when China achieves a real nuclear capability, can only be a matter for speculation.

III. THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

A. Pre-World War I

The great powers before World War I were organized in a balance of power system first systematically described by Machiavelli. A power shifted from one alliance to another, either to "balance" another power or a coalition which had become too strong, or to place itself in a position to gain territory at the expense of a former ally. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nations sought territorial alterations within Europe, competed for empire in Asia and Africa, jockeyed for positions of advantage in the expected demise of the Ottoman Empire. Some, but not all, of their goals were interchangeable. Thus Italy, by alliance with the Central Powers, increased its chances of getting the territories it claimed on the French Riviera, but thereby relinquished claims to *irredenta* in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And Bismarck tried, but failed, to compensate France for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine by holding out opportunities in Africa. But it was not only the prospect of gains that caused nations to shift from one alliance to another. Fear of loss could be equally, or more impelling. Thus, the German naval program of the turn of the century played a major role in persuading France and Great Britain that they had more to fear from Germany than from each other.

In contrast to the present, ideology was not an inhibition to diplomatic realignments (*renversements des alliances*). The ideological differences between Imperial Russia and Republican France and Liberal England were residual; for neither the Russians on the one hand, nor the French on the other, were intent on a political revolution within the other country (unlike the period from 1791–1815). These nations formed an *entente* which survived the crisis preceding the war, three years of war, and the democratic revolution of February 1917, only to collapse after the victory of the Communists in October 1917.

Great powers shifted their alignments rapidly and radically. For example, in 1898 in the Fashoda crisis, Great Britain and France were on the brink of war over competing ambitions in Africa. The crisis that erupted brought the two countries closer to war than they had been for many years. The French, for a combination of domestic and foreign policy reasons, yielded and war was avoided. The name applied to this easement was *détente*. Several years later, largely because of a changed perception of the danger from Germany, the two powers formed an *entente*—practically an alliance—first settling territorial disputes between themselves on a basis of give and take. Thus, they proceeded from the brink of war immediately to a *détente* and eventually to an *entente*. A *détente* sometimes developed into an *entente*; enemies sometimes became friends. How much, or how little, this has changed we shall examine shortly.

Remaining outside the alliance system was only possible for countries without territorial ambitions and against whom others did not have territorial claims. Even so, in time of war or imminent war, another power might invade for strategic reasons. Of course, distant and powerful nations separated by oceans, like the United States, could remain outside the system of alliances.

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[4] It is not generally appreciated that the Japanese, despite their naval victories, were staggered by the extent of their losses and probably would have soon taken the initiative in suing for peace, had not Russia done so because of the revolutionary situation in the latter country. I am indebted to Paul Langer for this realization.

B. Pre-World War II

By World War II the character of the system had begun to change in that the *status quo* and the revisionist groups were more firmly fixed in their positions. France, Great Britain, and the new states of Eastern Europe, created in part at the expense of Germany and of Russia, supported the *status quo*. Germany, especially after Hitler's rise to power, was revisionist, and the Soviet Union shunted between the two positions, although it was basically revisionist.[5] Neither the Soviet Union nor any other major power was able to remain neutral. Small powers like Austria, the Baltic States, and Finland, outside the major alliance systems, or secured only by bilateral nonaggression pacts, lost their independence to the revisionist powers. Even within the *status quo* alliance system, weaker powers did not enjoy genuine security. Although the great powers never formally renounced their obligations to Czechoslovakia, in essence they abandoned her to Germany. Before the First World War neutrality would not necessarily survive the outbreak of war; before the second, even membership in an alliance did not protect weaker powers from absorption before the inception of general war. How different the position of the weak and unaligned has become!

In the interwar period, the threat of internal revolution inhibited the formation of alliances. For example, the Franco-Russian treaty of mutual assistance signed in 1935 was never implemented by joint military arrangements as in the case of the Franco-Russian alliance whose negotiation was completed in 1894. Although the alliance proved abortive for more reasons than the ideological tension between Republican France and the Communist Soviet Union, ideology did play a major role.

C. The Present

1. General Character

Alliances now differ in three large respects: (1) political goals have superseded military; (2) the relative power and the number of participant states have altered significantly; and (3) ideology has become a major factor.

a. The primacy of political goals. The determination of the major powers to avoid war, noted above, has caused a qualitative change in international relations. The expectation that war can be avoided makes the primary purpose of alliances deterrence of war rather than preparation for its conduct. Although success in the former purpose is dependent on the latter, the primacy of deterrence is of great consequence. The great questions of war and peace are the almost exclusive concern of the Soviet Union and the United States; the secondary powers in both alliances benefit, or suffer, from the military balance produced by the rivalry of the two greatest powers. But the influence of secondary powers on the balance of power in comparison with their influence in earlier alliances is modest. The relations between the two greatest powers are increasingly conducted on the assumption that outstanding issues will be resolved only by political means. The secondary members of both alliance systems pursue their particular goals in the confidence that there will be no world war. Thus conflicts with the hegemonic power within each alliance involve only political and economic costs. The question of isolation and abandonment in a world war need hardly be considered. The Chinese Communists would hardly have permitted relations with the Soviet Union to deteriorate to the point of withdrawal of Soviet military aid if they had expected war with the United States; de Gaulle would not have presumed to challenge the American position in Western Europe if he expected a world war. Hence secondary powers, while less influential in alliance military arrangements, enjoy more freedom of action within the alliance. The consequences of this increased freedom of action are quite different for each system. They will be examined at the point where intra-alliance arrangements are discussed.

b. The increase in the number of participants in the international system and the change in their relative power. Since the Second World War the distribution of power within the international system has changed significantly. Earlier there were greater powers (more than two); secondary participants in alliances who, at the lower end of the power spectrum, merged with client states protected by a major power and without a genuinely independent foreign policy; and finally a great fraction of the world's population, largely non-European, lived in colonies or semi-independent political entities.

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[5] The Soviet Union was revisionist when Germany was weak, a defender of the *status quo* after Hitler came to power, and revisionist again in 1939 when it seized the opportunity to gain territory and remain neutral in a war between its foes. The *status quo* position of the Soviet Union at various times must be distinguished from that of Great Britain and France, for unlike them it had great expectations of radical favorable chances in the future. The Soviet Union favored the *status quo* when its relative weakness permitted no other course, but was prepared to shift when opportunities for aggrandizement offered themselves. Professor Vernon V. Aspaturion suggested this and other formulations.

At present there are two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. In time, probably, Communist China and, possibly, a united Western Europe will join the ranks of the super-powers. But now the gulf in power between the largest power in each alliance and the next largest is greater than ever before. Consequently, the very magnitude of the power of the two greatest states creates, despite their rivalry, some common concerns and common interests not shared by their allies.

By now almost all the former colonies and semi-independent states have become independent and have largely remained unaligned. The reduced likelihood of world war makes it possible for them to contemplate continued existence without becoming minor members of a diplomatic system. They no longer worry that their independence would constitute the victor's spoils in a new world war. From being the objects of international politics they have become active participants, adjusting and readjusting their relationships with each other and with the major powers. And client states, especially in Eastern Europe, as we shall see, are increasingly asserting some control over their own foreign policy.

c. Ideology. Soon after the conclusion of the Second World War it became a truism that ideology was the major determinant in international relations. But like many truisms it turned out to be a half-truth. As early as 1948 Yugoslavia, after ejection from the Communist camp, was able to survive as an "unaligned" nation. The Soviet Union failed to gobble up weak nations on its periphery and communize them on the model of the Eastern European nations largely because, both before and after it acquired nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union feared a large war that might result from aggression against a small country protected within the American alliance system. The American system of guarantees and alliances of the 1950s has been much criticized of late on the ground that the Soviet Union was really unaggressive and that the system extended American commitments beyond American strength and willingness to play a world role. But the success of the policy of the containment of Soviet expansion by superior military strength does not prove that containment was unnecessary. It was just because some countries joined in the effort to contain the Soviet Union that other countries could afford non-alignment and enjoy the freedom of a position between the two main antagonists. But whatever the origin of the present security of the smaller powers, the present reality is that both diplomatic and ideological non-alignment are realistic policies for the weaker nations in the international system.

After 1947 it was widely believed, on both sides, that the passage of a particular country from one camp to the other, regardless of its size, would precipitate a series of such changes. In the West this fear rested on the over-facile assumption that Western European nations, which had not been occupied by Soviet troops, were as much in danger of communization as the Eastern European countries had been. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, it was feared that the successful departure of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite system would be emulated. This fear lay at the basis of the brutal imposition of strict police controls in all the satellite states after 1948. Since then in Europe both sides have felt that any alteration of the *status quo* would produce a chain reaction.

But the very stability, caused in part by the mutually shared apprehension of the consequences of change, has produced a measure of relaxation. The conversion of some of the satellite states of Eastern Europe into client states with incipient independent foreign policies has been an embarrassment, and may presage serious losses; but it has not been a disaster for the Soviet Union. Castro's personal conversion to Communism, which (given his position) meant the communization of Cuba, caused great agitation in the United States. But it is now tolerated largely because of Castro's failure to spread the revolution, the relatively minor importance of Cuba, and the frustration of the Soviet attempt to make a major strategic change on the basis of a political victory in a small country.

In the overall balance of power, new Communist states, ideologically much diluted and little controlled by the largest Communist state or states, may become important. If, again, modernizing dictators adopt Communism and impose the new faith on their people like the pagan princes converted to Christianity, will it be an extension of the international power of Communism or a dilution of its strength? It all depends on what happens to such states. If some stumble and founder, then the pattern maintained since 1920 when Hungary ceased being a Communist state will have been broken—communization will no longer be irreversible, and each case can be separately assessed on its own terms. If on the other hand, each new regime consolidates itself (and no established regimes abandon Communism), then forceful measures to prevent what will seem to be permanent losses can be expected. Thus, ideology will play a greater role in international relations or a reduced role; the present situation seems to be transitional.

Very likely the importance of ideology in foreign policy calculations will persist longest in areas vital to the interests of the greatest powers. For example, it is difficult for the near and proximate future to imagine political changes in Europe in which ideology would not figure largely. Reckoning on the basis of power politics alone, the Soviet Union would have much to gain from the abandonment of the Communist regime in Eastern Germany. A serious proposal to Western Germany for reunification on the basis of demilitarized neutrality would have good chances of acceptance and at the very least would precipitate a major political crisis in Western Germany. Such a settlement, presumably including the settlement of the Polish (and Czech) western borders, would constitute a political settlement in Europe which would probably bring in its train major modifications of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The enormous saving in money would greatly ease the dilemma of resource allocation within the Soviet Union. This projection of future events seems unrealistic only because the ideological value of Eastern Germany cannot be exchanged for other values. But the reconversion of Castro, or the collapse of his regime would probably not be viewed as fraught with disaster by the Soviet Union.

2. Inter-Alliance Relations

a. As between the United States and the Soviet Union. Earlier the familiar point was made that the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. But beyond that common interest, rivalry is the keynote of the relationship. In that rivalry, relative military strength is crucial. At present both sides accept United States superiority in nuclear weapons, but Soviet acceptance followed upon efforts to create a balance more favorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union failed to convert its priority in ballistic missiles into a superiority in intercontinental forces, largely, probably, because of its industrial and economic inferiority. It also failed in its effort to alter the military balance by the expedient of putting medium and intermediate-range missiles into Cuba in the fall of 1962. For the Soviet Union, a test-ban treaty promised to, and has tended to, stabilize the weapons balance at roughly the present level, namely an inferior Soviet position in intercontinental nuclear weaponry. The Soviet Union probably accepted such a state of affairs for the interim, at least, because the alternatives might be worse. A continuation of the arms race at a faster pace might well produce no relative advantage. The economic cost, which the Soviet Union can ill afford, might well be paid without military and political improvements relative to the United States, perhaps even with a decline in the Soviet Union's relative position. The United States, on the other hand, enjoying a military superiority which it believes has contributed to the frustration of Soviet aims in Cuba, West Berlin, and elsewhere, is willing to continue the present situation. It is uncertain, of course, whether opportunities, especially in the technological sphere, to alter the weapons balance will emerge and be exploited by the Soviet Union. But at present the United States and the Soviet Union seem to accept roughly the present balance because the former finds it satisfactory and the latter can see no way to alter it significantly for the better.

An unusual feature of the treaty, and significant for the altered nature of international relations, was that both the Soviet Union and the United States knew that a major ally of each would refuse to sign it. The leading powers of the rival alliances thus agreed on a major issue concerning which, one differed with France and the other with Communist China—both disagreements being between allies. Furthermore, the conclusion of the treaty legally bound the signatories to resist their allies' demands for assistance in developing nuclear weapons. Whatever political costs were involved in opposing the wishes of their alliance partners the United States and the Soviet Union were ready to bear. Both major powers opposed the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the treaty represented a common resolve not to assist in such proliferation. It was generally recognized, however, that even without help France and Communist China could acquire nuclear weapons by their own efforts.

The corollary of the Soviet and American determination to reduce the danger of war by controlling nuclear weapons as much and as long as possible by themselves is the determination to avoid small-scale conflicts which could grow into larger ones, eventually threatening war. Most often this has meant the frustration of a secondary ally's desire to use force to his own advantage. The two super-powers, in a sense, have a tacit pact to keep the peace even if it frustrates an ally's ambitions. Thus the United States vetoed the Anglo-French-Israeli adventure in Suez, with the Soviet Union adding menace from the sidelines. Whatever the extent of Chinese desires in India in the fall of 1962, the joint—though not concerted—United States and Soviet support of India set limits on Chinese objectives. In both cases it was a non-aligned nation that was protected against an ally. As a consequence, the United States and Soviet partnership in keeping the peace reduces the policy alternatives traditionally enjoyed by secondary members of an alliance. Thus, not only the nuclear powers, but their weaker allies, also must pursue their foreign policy objectives with much less reliance on military force as an instrument to attain desired goals.

The recognition of an area of common Soviet-American interest, symbolized by the test-ban treaty, has been referred to as a *détente*. But unlike the traditional *détente*, the present arrangements cannot be converted into an *entente*, *i.e.*, the alliances cannot be reshuffled because several essential features are lacking.

First, the present situation is essentially bipolar, since as has already been remarked, the difference between the power of the strongest member of each alliance and the next strongest is unprecedentedly great. Traditionally, great powers shifted from one alliance to another because another power of the same size was perceived as threatening. Thus the British *Entente cordiale* with France in 1904 required the existence of a Germany. At present the Soviet Union and the United States have no peers in power.

Second, in most reversals of alliances at least one partner was revisionist, that is, considered territory held by another power as rightfully belonging to itself. Thus the Anglo-French *entente cordiale* of 1904 eventually brought Alsace-Lorraine back to France; the Italian shift from the Triple Alliance to the Triple Entente brought them Fiume, etc. Now *both* the Soviet Union and the United States, having been victorious in the last war, are essentially *status quo* powers. This generalization requires serious modification only when the present arrangements for Germany are challenged, but hardly at any other time.

Concerted action to keep the peace between two powers is not equivalent to common action to ward off a common threat from a third power, or to gain something at the expense of third powers. Unless and until the Soviet Union and the United States perceive a threat from a third power of equal rank, or both develop aggrandizing goals which can be achieved only at the expense of third powers of equal rank, the necessary basis for the conversion of *détente* to *entente*, for the reversal of alliances, does not exist.

Thus even if the ideological tension between the Soviet Union and the United States diminishes rather than intensifies, they can only become more friendly; they cannot become friends.

But from the point of view of secondary allies, this partial accommodation between the two super-powers has some of the features of a reversal of alliances, especially if the accommodation is in an area of vital interest to the secondary power. Thus, in the Chinese view, the Soviet accommodation with the United States on the peace issue has deprived the Chinese of practically every advantage which the alliance had afforded. But unlike the classic reversal of alliances, the Chinese do not find themselves in another diplomatic constellation. The improvement in the relations between the two super-powers does not lead to the reshuffling of alliances but to alterations within each alliance which will be considered subsequently.

b. As between a super-power and a secondary power in a rival alliance. On several occasions the United States and the Soviet Union have given limited support to a secondary power in the rival system in order to increase the leverage of that power in relation to the hegemonic power, with the object of reducing the cohesion of the rival system. American aid to Yugoslavia was an example of such a tactic—after the fact to be sure, but relevant nonetheless. After the increase in Poland's independence in 1956, United States aid to Poland was offered in the hope of consolidating that independence rather than out of any farther reaching community of Polish and American foreign policy interests. Recently, Rumania has taken first steps toward similar arrangements. Other East European Communist states may well follow suit. Thus far these measures have not caused departures from the Warsaw Pact, but have rather contributed to the process of desatellitization in Eastern Europe.

Similarly in Cuba, the Soviet Union offered Castro, then not yet a Communist, limited political and economic assistance with the purpose of reducing the cohesion of the American diplomatic system in the Caribbean. Castro, a modernizing *caudillo*, deemed it necessary to provoke sharp conflict with the United States in order to demonstrate that he was not merely another dictator, who after eloquent promises of reform would relapse into corruption. In order to guarantee continued Soviet support and also to control his own Communist Party, Castro declared himself and Cuba to be Communist. If Paris was worth a mass to Henry IV, Cuba was worth a party card to Castro. In contrast to the Russian and Chinese revolutions, which derived largely from internal impulses with subsequent effects on foreign policy alignments, the basic impulse in Cuba was in the realm of foreign policy with subsequent effects on domestic policy.

Attempts by both the United States and the Soviet Union to weaken the rival coalition by approaches to some of its members seem to be a permanent rather than a transitory phenomenon.

c. As between secondary members of rival alliance systems. The main purpose of cross-alliance relationships between secondary alliance members is to gain leverage as against the alliance hegemon, often on issues which are of secondary importance to the hegemonic power but of primary importance to the weaker power. For the United States, relations with Pakistan are important, but no more important than relations with a dozen other powers. For Pakistan nothing is more important than the Indian problem. Hence Pakistan's arrangements with China have as their main motive the improvement of her position *vis-à-vis* India.

The Franco-Chinese exchange of courtesies (*rapprochement* would describe more than has occurred), was motivated by considerations of lesser urgency than the Pakistani-Chinese gestures of friendship. The French desire a larger voice in allied policy in general, and in Southeast Asian policy in particular, but their national interest in that area can only be residual and sentimental. It is more a case of, "I will be heard." For the Chinese it represents a symbolic escape from the diplomatic isolation caused by the Sino-Soviet breach.

Recently, both the French and the Germans have sought to improve their relations with some of the Eastern European countries. In part the motive resembles that of the United States in seeking to stimulate the growth of the independence of these states from the Soviet Union, but in part it expresses the rivalry of France and Germany for dominance in Europe.

In these cases, to greater or lesser extent, the approaches of second-rank members of one alliance to second-rank members of another alliance have been un-ideological and represent an effort to satisfy desires thwarted by the hegemonic power. Thus Pakistan wants a settlement of the Kashmir dispute which the United States will not support; France wants to be the first power in Western Europe; the countries of Eastern Europe want to improve their bargaining power with the Soviet Union by establishing better relations with France and especially West Germany.

Since only the hegemonic power can satisfy the demands represented by these cross-alliance overtures between secondary powers, these overtures do not lead to switching alliances. After all, it is the United States, not China, to whom Pakistan must look for effective pressure for its solution of the Kashmir question. France wants American acceptance of its claim to primacy in Europe; Soviet or Chinese assent is meaningless. Poland and Rumania require Soviet acceptance of their desire for greater freedom in foreign policy. West Germany or France cannot satisfy that wish, they can only serve as instruments for its accomplishment. Therefore, these approaches to members of the rival alliance are really methods of improving negotiatory power against the hegemonic power. The basic impulse is from within the alliance, not from without.

d. As between non-aligned powers and alliance members. (1) Competition between members of rival alliances for influence with the non-aligned. In the immediate postwar period, only the Western alliance system drew non-aligned states to itself. These states fell into several categories: first, states against whom the Soviet Union or China had territorial claims or was presumed to have territorial ambitions (Turkey and Iran in the Near East). In the Far East, South Korea and South Vietnam were under threat when not under attack.

A second category of states entering the American mid-eastern and far eastern alliance systems comprised those who wanted American economic or political aid but were under no immediate threat from either the Soviet Union or China. Iraq, Pakistan, and the Philippines are the obvious cases. Most new states, however, perceiving no threat from the main Communist states, and hoping for economic support from both systems, have remained unaligned.

When it was realized that the Soviet Union had abandoned the policy of the absorption of contiguous states out of fear of the consequences, states in the tier beyond those immediately bordering on the Soviet Union and China dropped whatever ideas they had had of joining a Western defense system, thus putting a term to the Western process of alliance building.

Furthermore, beginning in 1955, the Soviet Union began to furnish military, and sometimes economic, support, especially to former colonies who were at odds with their former imperial masters. Indonesia and Egypt are the two most important in this category.

For the great majority of the non-aligned countries, national interest is best served by joining neither alliance system and being wooed by both. Above it was argued that the international tension produced by the communization of new states (the unaligned or underdeveloped, or both, being the most likely candidates) would not remain at its present level. It would either increase or decrease. If concern increases, efforts to draw unaligned countries into alliance systems would resume, with the leaders of the unaligned countries seeking to exploit the advantages of the middle position. In a period of intense rivalry for their allegiance, the leaders of non-aligned countries could combine appeals to magnanimity with the threat or promise to move from one camp into another. But this is a threat of limited utility, because all concerned know that the first choice for the unaligned is the medial position.

If fears for the definitive passage of presently unaligned (or loosely aligned) powers to one of the systems decline, the bargaining power of the unaligned will be sharply reduced. They will be reduced to a position commensurate with their power. They can appeal to the magnanimity of the great powers, but they cannot negotiate effectively because they have little to give or withhold.

The super-powers in their rivalry and mutual fear of war have permitted the birth of a host of new nations and have protected their independence. These now act on the international stage, but the political importance of any single one of these nations becomes a multiple of its true power only when it becomes an object of rivalry between the two super-powers.

(2) Competition between members of the same alliance system for influence among uncommitted states. The first area of Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in underdeveloped countries has been Southeast Asia. By the time of the Bandung Conference at the latest, it was clear that Sino-Soviet rivalry for the adherence of the unaligned was at least as important as Communist-capitalist rivalry.

Since the Soviet signature of the test-ban treaty, the Chinese have challenged Soviet influence wherever they could: in Africa, in the Near East, in Latin America, and even in Europe. This competition is really a function of intra-alliance dissension, to the examination of which we shall now proceed.

Competition within the non-Communist alliance for influence among the unaligned, by contrast, is of slight significance, because no conflict comparable to the Sino-Soviet conflict exists. Greek-Turkish rivalry in Cyprus, however sharp, is consequently localized; and French oil interests in North Africa, as against other European powers are not the occasion of NATO's troubles.

a. The non-Communist alliance system. The purpose of the non-Communist alliance system or, more correctly, systems, is the containment of the Communist states, This is a familiar goal in international diplomacy, namely, not allowing an opponent to grow too strong. Two novelties characterize this effort: its geographical scope and its duration. The French Revolution, in its time, also presented a threat to the established political order, but it was essentially confined to Europe, and conclusively contained in 1815, only a quarter century after its beginning. The Communist Revolution is almost half a century old and still presents challenges in many parts of the world.

The ideological character of the Communist system has impelled a search in the non-Communist alliance for a suitable ideological label for its system, but none has been found, for the internal regimes of the member nations are based on different principles. Outside of Western Europe, only in countries populated by settlers from Northwestern Europe, and in Japan, are societies based on a broad consensus. In most of Latin America, the Near and Middle and Far East, ruling strata are too narrow and middle classes too small to make representative democracy a genuine possibility at present. Although frequently deplored, this political diversity in the non-Communist alliance is a source of strength rather than weakness, as we shall presently see.

The non-Communist alliance system truly deserves the appellation of polycentric because it is a congeries of alliances with different purposes suited to the different threats posed by Communism in various parts of the world. In each of these alliances the hegemonic power, the United States, plays a different role.

In the NATO alliance, after setting into motion the economic and political restoration of Western Europe, the United States by the maintenance of nuclear military superiority has limited the options open to Communist expansion. Since 1948 when Czechoslovakia became a Communist country, the Communist state system has made no progress in Europe. Hence the anti-Communist purpose of the NATO alliance has receded into the background, and NATO's main task is to maintain a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union. Since this task has been successfully accomplished, its importance tends to be forgotten, except when the Soviet Union offers a challenge such as the Berlin crisis, or even more dramatic, the Cuban missile crisis.

With security against both internal and external threats seemingly assured, the nations of Western Europe can and do devote much of their energies to jockeying for favored positions, as against each other, and as against the hegemonic power of the United States. France has put herself forward as the claimant for leadership in Europe. Western Germany cannot compete for this position despite her greater economic resources, because the unresolved problem of unification makes her politically dependent on the United States. The issues on which the NATO allies differ are well publicized: the sharing of nuclear control in NATO, the terms of economic integration, support for Western Germany's position on the Berlin issue and what lies behind it—the political future of all Germany. Yet despite these very genuine differences, the system is not disintegrating, but is rather rearranging the relationship of its parts. After all, the economic integration of part of Western Europe goes forward; economically Western Europe and the United States are growing closer rather than apart. The basic stability of the NATO alliance can be explained on two grounds. First, no claimant for second place presents a genuine challenge to United States power. China may someday be a greater power than the Soviet Union, but neither France nor Germany can challenge the preeminence of the United States. Thus de Gaulle is claiming the position of the first among the secondary powers in the alliance, rather than the position of first in the alliance. Since goals are limited, the conflict does not pass beyond a certain point. Second, the modesty of NATO's goals makes of it an alliance which can withstand a great deal of turbulence. Since its main purpose is to prevent the spread of Communism and Soviet power in Europe, differences which do not threaten the accomplishment of that objective are not really subversive. If the purpose of NATO encompassed a common political direction of all Western Europe, or a common economic policy directed from the center, then NATO would be even more disrupted than the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. It is because the true purpose of NATO is *merely* anti-Communist that the alliance is capable of accommodating so much change.

A striking feature of the NATO alliance system is the limited power of the hegemonic partner. The Cyprus issue illustrates the increased independence of the weaker power within the alliance. In a traditional alliance system, both Greece and Turkey would have had to consider the consequences of defying the wishes of the hegemonic partner for peace in Cyprus. The Turks would have had to calculate that bad relations with the United States might encourage the Soviet Union to press its claims once again for *irredenta* in Eastern Anatolia. The Greeks, for their part, would have had to worry that bad relations with the United States would encourage Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, or both, to renew claims for Greek Macedonia. But neither Greece nor Turkey need concern themselves overmuch about such contingencies, because in a common desire to avoid territorial conflicts which might cause even greater conflicts, the Soviet Union and the United States have consistently avoided territorial conflicts in Europe in which both alliances were involved. The consequence has been to make territorial conflict within alliances easier.

The problems of the hegemonic power in the CENTO and SEATO alliances are very different from those in NATO. In the band of territory stretching from the Bosporus to the China Sea, the economic base for political institutions of the Western European type does not exist. Unresolved internal, political, and economic problems of varying intensity characterize every member of the CENTO and SEATO alliances. And in Vietnam, a situation exists which the Communists expected would be common to the majority of the former colonies.

The speed and relative ease of decolonization since World War II has come as a surprise to all. Communist theorists expected that the imperial powers and the colonies would have been involved in long armed conflict, during which the national liberationist movement would have been captured by Communist parties. However, only in Indo-China is the Communist Party engaged in active combat to become the successor to a colonial regime.

In Vietnam, therefore, the United States is trying in the midst of a civil war to create the political conditions in which democracy might be able to grow, and it is not an easy task. Had the British been as reluctant to face the necessity of liquidating empire as the French, Burma today might be in the position of Vietnam, rather than an independent and unified country.

In the CENTO and SEATO alliances the hegemonic power has two tasks: first to create the conditions for economic growth, which it is hoped will permit the establishment of broadly based governments of the West European type in which the internal threat is practically nonexistent; and second, as in Vietnam, to aid a regime actually engaged in a civil war with Communists.

The role of the United States as the hegemonic power in Latin America is again very different. Opposition to the extension of the Communist state system is a very different task in Latin America than in Europe or Asia. The geographical proximity of part of Latin America enables it to play a role in the military relationship between the two super-powers. The United States' successful opposition to the emplacement of missiles in Cuba was in pursuit of the goal of maintaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. As pointed out earlier, Soviet acceptance of this relationship is the condition of the existing *détente* between the super powers.

A second United States purpose in Latin America is to prevent the establishment of Communist regimes in these countries. The hegemonic position of the United States in this alliance is complicated, first, by the circumstance that the danger from Communism is internal rather than external. The United States and Latin America are in a very uneasy relationship because of their different assumptions about the nature of their relationship. Although Latin American countries display a very wide variety of stages of development, they share the belief that the United States plays a dominant role in the affairs of each country. For each country of Latin America the United States is the most important foreign power; for the United States, each Latin American country is only one of many. The natural consequence is resentment at neglect.

Second, the belief is almost universal in Latin America that United States policy toward Latin America is largely determined by American private investors in Latin America.

Third, any United States involvement in the internal affairs of Latin American countries awakens the suspicion that North American imperialism is again active.

Yet the very formulation of the problem necessitated active North American involvement in Latin American internal affairs. The operative theory in the United States is that the unresolved developmental problems of Latin America may create good opportunities for Communism, and that therefore it is in the interests of the United States to help Latin American countries develop their economies.

In Latin America, however, the danger of Communism from within is not perceived as so great, and the dominant feeling is that the United States *owes* Latin America assistance because of the profits that American business has made in the last century. Moreover, the United States, it is believed, owes such a debt even if the businesses of its citizens are confiscated.

The situation is further complicated by vacillations in the United States judgment as to the danger of Communism in Latin America. The Cuban conversion to Communism, at first seen as a pattern for the future, is now increasingly perceived both by the Soviet Union and the United States as unique. As the danger of Communism is perceived to diminish, quite naturally United States interest in Latin America declines.

The Rio Pact is not, then, a traditional alliance against a foreign threat but an agreement about United States economic and military assistance against internal threats, variously perceived by the signatories of the pacts. Is this a transitional or a permanent feature of the international scene? The answer seems to depend very much on the future prospects of Communism discussed above. If Communism loses as well as gains, then new variants of syncretic Communism in Latin America, if they emerge, will probably be viewed as reversible phenomena which might do world Communism more harm than good in the long run. If on the other hand, Communism continues to gain, the pressure for intervention before and after the fact of conversion will be high.[6]

b. The Communist alliance system. The members of the Communist alliance system share with the members of the non-Communist alliance system the security from war which results from the common interests of the two super-powers in keeping the likelihood of war low. But beyond this the resemblance ceases. The major distinguishing features of the Communist alliance are the following: (1) It is a fragmented system meant to be universal. (2) It is divided into revisionist and *status quo* powers. (3) Its members have territorial and economic claims against each other.

The greatest difficulty in the Communist alliance system to is establish a common agreement on its goals. As we have seen in the non-Communist alliance system where the purpose is essentially to contain Communism, the alliance system is divided into different parts in accordance with the nature of the task, with the United States being the hegemonial power in each of the sub-alliances. No such satisfactory solution is possible in the Communist alliance because its goals go far beyond containing the opponent; they encompass, eventually, overwhelming him. It has not been possible to reach agreement on how to do so safely in a world full of nuclear weapons.

For a long time the Communist camp could preserve the fiction of the existence of a correct political and military strategy to be discovered by divination from the entrails of Marxism. While the *pontifex maximus* was established in Moscow, the question of variant interpretations never arose. But just as the United States and the Soviet Union finally succeeded in establishing the security of their respective allies from attack, the primacy of Moscow was challenged from within the Communist alliance system by China, and the leadership of the United States within the Atlantic Alliance was sharply disputed by de Gaulle. The protected secondary powers challenged the hegemon, but the consequences were much more serious for the Communist system.

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[6] These lines, like the rest of the paper, were written in March 1965. No changes have been made in the text to accommodate subsequent events like the Dominican crisis.

For one, the main challenger, Communist China, was potentially a greater power than the Soviet Union, which lent a special bitterness to the conflict. Second, the problem of mutual economic aid is much more severe in the Communist camp than in the other. In the non-Communist system, in each of the sub-alliances, economic demands have been made only on the hegemon, that is, the United States. In Western Europe economic assistance is no longer necessary; in other areas the extent of economic assistance is under continous assessment. But in the Communist camp the direction of demands has been reversed. The Soviet Union at one time exploited Eastern Europe, but since 1956 it has responded to demands upon itself from Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union also exploited China by reasserting Tsarist rights in the Treaty Ports and on the Manchurian railroad. Moreover, as has been revealed since, the Chinese Communists had to pay for Soviet military aid during the Korean War. After Stalin's death the flow of demands was reversed until 1960, when the Soviet program of military and economic assistance came to an end.

These reversals in the flow of economic wealth are profoundly disturbing to the Communist camp because a critical goal for all its members, including the hegemonic power, is the attainment of the standard of living of the advanced Western capitalist countries. Since the United States has already attained this goal, offering assistance to its allies does not mean postponing the achievement of the aim of an adequately fed and clothed population.

A further cause for division in the Communist alliance is the existence of *status quo* and revisionist powers. These claims are not only against members of the non-Communist alliance, but against each other.

The Soviet Union, being a victor in the last war, is essentially a satisfied power territorially. Communist China is not, having active claims to Taiwan and inactive but not abandoned claims in Southeast Asia. A common policy of pressing these claims would produce gains for China, not the Soviet Union, and what is more, the costs to the Soviet Union are higher. Soviet support of Chinese territorial claims could cause conflict with the United States, but even if that were avoided it would most probably produce a new phase of the arms race with the attendant economic embarrassment of the Soviet Union. Since China is too far behind the United States in weapons to be in competition, this cost does not enter into her calculations.

Thus in the Communist alliance, agreement cannot be reached on a common policy of promoting the expansion of Communism, nor on some scheme for sharing economic resources to build Communism in each country. The frustration produced by these differences is so high that Communist China has raised her territorial claims against the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia and has encouraged Rumania to raise the question of Bessarabia obliquely. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have not claimed the territory they lost to the Soviet Union, but these demands are just beneath the surface.

Originally, in the Communist system the tendency was for each country's internal institutions to be pressed into conformity with those of the Soviet Union; but since Stalin's death diversification rather than *Gleichschaltung* has been the trend. This aggravates internal political problems in the Soviet Union. For example, the freedom of action of Soviet leaders in domestic agricultural policy is limited by the existence of a Poland without collective farms.

Within the Western system the necessity to maintain uniformity in the political regimes of all its members has never been felt, and centrifugal tendencies do not create pressures for domestic reforms. As the originally looser system becomes more so, there is little feedback in internal politics. As the rigid system loosens, however, the feedback is significant and, what must be deeply disturbing, of dimensions difficult to foresee and assess.

Thus it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe as anything but much altered ten years from now and Western Europe as remaining essentially the same. Paradoxically, it seems that the cohesion of the Communist alliance system, once pressed into a rigid mold, will suffer much greater disintegration than the always loose non-Communist system. And the multiplication of ideological variants of Communism probably will eventually attenuate the ideological force of Communism.

Perhaps the second half of the twentieth century will indeed be the time of the end of ideology and a time of peace.

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS: FACTOR ANALYSIS OF *A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY*[*]

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Since the publication of David Easton's *The Political System*,[1] it has become increasingly common for political scientists to speculate as to the basic factors which may be common to all political systems and which, in their varying manifestations, determine the unique styles of political behavior within each. Efforts to identify the basic political phenomena and their complex relationships have generated a variety of cross-national conceptual schemes and propositions. Some authors speak of structural and functional requisites, some refer to equilibrium conditions for system maintenance.[2] Others, employing more traditional concepts, refer to power, legitimacy, ideology, instability, consensus, influence, and bargaining. Regardless of the form these efforts assume, they all posit the existence of factors or dimensions which are common to all political systems.[3] Such attempts at cross-national theory raise two questions. If basic dimensions can be said to underlie the complex behavior within political systems, how can the dimensions be identified? And, what set of concepts have the greatest empirical relevance for describing the dimensions?

I. THE EMPIRICAL SEARCH FOR BASIC "DIMENSIONS"

This kind of theory construction and these questions are not a unique outgrowth of political science. Psychologists began grappling with similar problems sixty years ago. Anthropologists, sociologists, economists and political scientists, who are plagued by more complex units of study, have been struggling along behind.

What is unique to political science is the near absence of systematic empirical tests of the many propositions about basic dimensions. In addition to entertaining such propositions, the other social sciences have begun testing them. The psychologists, led initially by Spearman and later by Thurstone, have developed a statistical technique, factor analysis, for testing hypotheses as to the basic dimensions of intelligence and personality.[4] In discussing the particular relevance of factor analysis for identifying basic dimensions and organizing concepts in the social sciences, Thurstone says:

> A factor problem starts with the hope or conviction that a certain domain is not so chaotic as it looks. . . . If no promising hypothesis is available, one can represent the domain as adequately as possible in terms of a set of measurements of numerical indices and proceed with a factorial experiment. The analysis might reveal an underlying order which would be of great assistance in formulating the scientific concepts covering the particular domain. . . .
>
> The exploratory nature of factor analysis is often not understood. Factor analysis has its principal usefulness at the border line of science. It is naturally superseded by rational formulations in terms of the science involved. Factor analysis is useful, especially in those domains where basic and fruitful concepts are essentially lacking and where crucial experiments have been difficult to conceive.[5]

In spite of this ground work by psychologists the broader potential of the method was largely ignored until 1949, and even then a psychologist led the way. In a seminal article, the psychologist Cattell adapted the technique to the measurement of common dimensions of cultural organization.[6] Subsequently, Berry introduced geographers and economists to factor analysis.[7]

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[*] We are indebted to Professor Karl F. Schuessler for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] New York, 1953.

[2] For an attempt to integrate the structural and functional approaches with the systems approach, see Almond's introductory essay in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3–64.

[3] The terms "factor" and "dimension" are here used as equivalent, non-technical concepts. Henceforth the former will be employed in reference to the mathematical result (the columns of variables' loadings in the factor matrix) of the factor analytic calculations; the latter will refer to the phenomena of the real world which the factor delineates.

[4] For a brief history of factor analysis, see Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 3–11.

[5] L. L. Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis: A Development and Expansion of the Vectors of the Mind* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 55–56.

Rummel's 1963 study, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," was the first cross-national application of the technique in political science.[8] A year earlier, Schubert had published a factor analysis of Supreme Court voting patterns.[9] More recently, Alker has published a similar analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly.[10] Both Rummel and Russett are currently conducting factor analyses which in part replicate Cattell's measurement of the dimensions of cultural organization within nations.[11]

Even though a growing number of political scientists are employing factor analysis, none have used the technique to address the questions: "What are the basic dimensions of political systems and what concepts best describe them?" One major obstacle has been a lack of variables with which to tap the phenomena of political institutions across all nations. Publication of *A Cross-Polity Survey* represented, in part, an effort to remedy this deficiency.[12]

The *Survey* data are particularly relevant to questions about the common dimensions of political systems and their organizing concepts because the variables operationalize many of the concepts and categories used in recent attempts at cross-national theory. The authors, after canvassing the existing literature, "attempted to select and adopt—experimentally at least—every possible raw characteristic that gave promise of being workable and analytically powerful."[13]

II. THE RESEARCH PURPOSE

Given a relevant domain of data and an appropriate statistical technique, this paper seeks to answer the following questions:

(1) What factors emerge when the *Survey* data are factor analyzed?
(2) What dimensions can be inferred from these factors?
(3) What relevance have these dimensions for cross-national study?
(4) What specific propositions about conflict behavior are suggested by the findings?

The first question is straightforward and is answered with the factorial results. The second question is answered by inferring from the factors the existence of dimensions or "latent variables" which give rise to the intercorrelation of variables within the independent clusters.

The third question is more complex and requires elaboration. Once a dimension is identified and named, the label used becomes a concept which is operationalized by the factor. In this sense the labels are highly significant concepts, for theoretical purposes, because of their lawful (statistical) relationships with all the other variables included. Thus the interrelationships among all the variables are explained by their relationships to a limited number of concepts. In other words, the factor labels comprise a set of concepts with high generalizing power for cross-national study.

The fourth question is answered by examining the factorial results for the relationships of the conflict variables with the factors.

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[6] Raymond B. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Culture Patterns by Factorization of National Characters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 44 (October, 1949), pp. 443–469.

[7] Brian J. L. Berry, "Basic Patterns of Economic Development," *Atlas of Economic Development*, ed. Norton Ginsburg (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 110–119 and "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development," *Essays on Geography and Economic Development*, ed. Norton Ginsburg (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 78–107. For a collateral, but less ambitious study by a sociologist, see Leo F. Schnore, "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics*, Vol. 37 (August, 1961), pp. 229–245.

[8] Rudolph J. Rummel, in *General Systems Yearbook*, Vol. 8 (1963), pp. 1–50.

[9] Glendon Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (March, 1962), pp. 90–107.

[10] Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (September, 1964), pp. 642–657.

[11] Rudolph J. Rummel, Harold Geutzkow, Jack Sawyer, and Raymond Tanter, *Dimensions of Nations* (forthcoming); Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions" *Empirical Studies in International Relations*, ed. J. David Singer (New York, the Free Press, forthcoming).

[12] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1963). A somewhat related effort is Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). The compilers of the *Handbook*, however, set themselves the task of assembling a large number of interval-scaled data series which are ecologically relevant to political research, but which are not, in the main, substantively political in character.

[13] Banks and Textor, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

III. THE DATA

The present study is based on a factor analysis of the political component of *A Cross-Polity Survey*. The input data comprise 68 variables, all but five of which were derived from the 57 polychotomous characteristics of the *Survey*.[14] We omitted 16 *Survey* characteristics of an essentially ecological character, since we wished to analyze relationships *within* the political domain itself, rather than *between* the political system and its environment.[15]

In addition to the 16 non-political characteristics, three additional characteristics, 41 (Party System: Qualitative), 47 (Vertical Power Distribution), and 56 (Character of Legal System), were deleted from the factor analysis for distributional reasons.

Of the remaining 38 *Survey* characteristics, 27 were ordinal-scaled and 11 were nominal-scaled. Each nominal-scaled characteristic was "decomposed" according to its attribute components, as may be seen in Table I.[16] In order to examine the relationship of conflict to other political phenomena, we included five non-*Survey* ordinal variables: System Stability, Demonstrations, Domestic Killed, Expulsion of Ambassadors, and Foreign Killed. All but the first of these are taken directly from Rummel's work in conflict behavior.[17]

The System Stability variable is of a composite character. Standard scores were calculated for the domestic conflict factor scores appearing in Rummel, and then weighted on the basis of his figures for percent of common variance. Standard scores were also calculated for an "Executive Stability" index derived largely from data appearing in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*.[18] The latter scores were weighted on the basis of twice the mean of the weights assigned to the Rummel-based scores. The four weighted scores were then summed into a composite stability index which, for present purposes, was dichotomized into "high" and "low" components.

The range for each of the ordinal variables is either 2 or 3. The range for each nominal variable component (as it appears in Table I) is, of course, 2.

IV. THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE: FACTOR ANALYSIS

Technically speaking, factor analysis is "that branch of multivariate analysis which deals with the internal structure of matrices of covariances and correlations."[19] More simply, it is a technique by means of which a large number of variables may be clustered on the basis of their intercorrelations, each set of which is presumed to reflect a single dimension which is "causing" the association within the set of variables. In the context of the *Survey* data, the factors which emerge summarize the major components of variation among the 68 variables.

Scoring and Correlation Procedure. The first step in the factor analysis was to construct a correlation matrix of the *Survey* data. The original data were in the form of polychotomous characteristics. For this study they were collapsed into two and three place variables which were then correlated using the product moment coefficient. This procedure, which, in effect, consists of assigning interval values to non-interval data for correlation purposes, is not wholly orthodox. We adopted it on the pragmatic ground that it provides a measure of the relationships among the *Survey* variables from which the major clusters can be factored out.

The suitability of various scoring and correlation techniques in factor analysis has been extensively debated by the psychologists. Thurstone advances the following argument corroborating our position:

> The factorial methods are sufficiently powerful

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[14] Since each of the *Survey* variables is discussed in the *Survey* itself, it seems unnecessary to provide a set of definitions for purposes of the present article. For those unfamiliar with the *Survey*, one variable that appears in Table I may, however, require specification. "System Style" refers to the degree of "mobilization" (to attain political or social objectives) present in the system.

[15] In an earlier factor analysis involving all 57 polychotomous characteristics of the *Survey* and an eleven-factor solution, four non-political factors ("Economic Development," "Size," "Population Density," and "Religion") emerged. The remaining seven factors closely resembled those reported on below. The four nonpolitical factors correspond to factors identified by Berry, *op. cit.;* Rummel *et al.*, *op. cit.;* and Russett, *op. cit.*

[16] The numbers in parentheses in Table I indicate the *Survey* raw characteristics from which the variables have been derived. Thus variables 22–24 are all derived from *Survey* Raw Characteristic 26 (Constitutional Status).

[17] Rummel, *op. cit.*

[18] Russett *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–104.

[19] D. N. Lawley and A. E. Maxwell, *Factor Analysis As a Statistical Method* (London, Butterworths and Co., 1963), p. 1.

TABLE I. ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

	Factor							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	h^2
1. East European Areal Grouping (1)	−.58	.22	.26	−.06	.36	.00	−.24	.64
2. Advanced Western Areal Grouping (1)	.45	.25	.66	−.13	−.11	−.17	−.01	.76
3. Latin American Areal Grouping (1)	.21	.31	−.59	−.49	.17	.12	−.14	.78
4. *Asian Areal Grouping* (1)	−.16	.13	−.24	.55	−.06	.22	.00	.46
5. African Areal Grouping (1)	−.05	−.90	.02	−.05	−.10	.06	−.16	.86
6. North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping (1)	−.06	.17	−.08	.31	−.20	−.25	.50	.49
7. Freedom of the Press (13)	.80	−.22	.17	−.17	.08	.13	−.13	.79
8. Date of Independence (19)	.06	.66	.29	−.36	−.33	−.05	−.27	.83
9. Westernization (20)	.32	.60	.50	−.30	.16	−.12	−.13	.86
10. Ex-British Dependency (21)	.27	.14	.35	.69	.01	−.01	−.14	.71
11. Ex-French Dependency (21)	−.39	−.51	.10	−.13	−.15	.04	.49	.70
12. Ex-Spanish Dependency (21)	.10	.54	−.47	−.71	.09	−.01	−.24	1.08
13. Early European Political Modernization (22)	.37	.17	.45	.07	−.19	.06	−.06	.42
14. Later European Political Modernization (22)	−.04	.46	−.07	−.67	.32	−.16	−.22	.85
15. Non-European Political Modernization (22)	−.17	.21	−.02	.12	−.50	.15	−.13	.38
16. Developed Tutelary Political Modernization (22)	−.09	.14	−.26	.70	.06	.01	.39	.73
17. Undeveloped Tutelary Political Modernization (22)	−.01	−.93	.01	−.11	.03	.07	−.05	.89
18. Political Modernization—Periodization (23)	.03	.76	.30	−.10	.16	−.15	.18	.75
19. Developmental Ideological Orientation (24)	.00	−.83	−.25	−.02	.12	.07	.29	.86
20. Conventional Ideological Orientation (24)	.73	.46	.29	−.20	.02	−.01	−.10	.87
21. System Style (25)	−.74	.11	.13	.14	.37	.14	.19	.79
22. Constitutional Regime (26)	.93	.02	.11	−.08	.28	.04	.05	.96
23. *Authoritarian Regime* (26)	−.32	−.18	−.36	.13	−.70	−.06	.04	.77
24. Totalitarian Regime (26)	−.81	.21	.26	−.07	.39	.05	−.18	.96
25. Governmental Stability (27)	.15	.10	.89	−.01	.01	.07	−.03	.83
26. Representativeness of Regime (28)	.85	.15	.05	.02	.27	−.02	−.08	.83
27. Electoral System (29)	.94	.22	−.01	.12	.04	−.08	−.15	.98
28. Freedom of Group Opposition (30)	.92	.16	−.04	.00	−.01	−.11	−.04	.89
29. Political Enculturation (31)	.33	.21	.54	−.08	.13	.22	−.02	.52
30. Sectionalism (32)	.02	−.09	−.07	.41	−.23	−.01	−.15	.26
31. Articulation by Associational Groups (33)	.63	.54	.27	−.13	.06	−.04	.09	.79
32. Articulation by Institutional Groups (34)	−.83	.01	−.36	.21	−.03	−.10	.02	.86
33. Articulation by Non-Associational Groups (35)	−.28	−.58	−.33	.52	−.24	.05	.06	.85
34. Articulation by Anomic Groups (36)	−.43	−.17	−.51	.35	−.16	−.08	−.10	.63
35. Articulation by Political Parties (37)	.68	.20	−.16	.00	.03	−.55	−.16	.85
36. Aggregation by Political Parties (38)	.06	−.10	.34	.12	.01	.82	.20	.85
37. Aggregation by Executive (39)	.19	−.48	.15	.00	.18	.46	.61	.90
38. Aggregation by Legislature (40)	.73	.38	.28	−.07	.08	−.32	.05	.87
39. One-Party System (41)	−.77	−.23	.26	−.14	.13	.23	.24	.86
40. One Party Dominant System (41)	.14	−.24	−.24	−.02	.08	.15	−.02	.16
41. Two-Party System (41)	.43	.20	.15	.17	.00	.50	−.19	.57
42. *Multi-Party System* (41)	.47	.22	−.18	−.09	.08	−.69	−.06	.78
43. Stability of Party System (43)	−.12	.14	.84	−.03	.19	.28	.08	.87
44. Personalismo (44)	.00	−.08	−.66	−.22	−.34	−.12	−.09	.63
45. Elitism (45)	−.70	.41	−.18	.03	−.17	−.01	−.41	.90
46. Charisma (46)	−.33	−.37	−.04	.20	−.21	.29	.44	.60
47. Horizontal Power Distribution (48)	.86	.29	.19	.02	.20	−.07	−.08	.92
48. Presidential System (49)	.01	−.26	−.59	−.47	−.03	.21	.21	.72
49. Parliamentary-Republican System (49)	.27	.04	.20	.13	.08	−.35	.15	.28
50. Parliamentary-Royalist System (49)	.47	.01	.28	.33	.01	.02	−.35	.53
51. Status of Legislature (50)	.87	.01	.29	.02	.10	−.01	.03	.84
52. Unicameral Legislature (51)	−.49	−.51	−.03	−.11	.28	−.19	.04	.63
53. Bicameral Legislature (51)	.49	.51	.03	.11	−.28	.19	−.04	.63
54. Status of Executive (52)	−.82	−.18	−.11	−.03	−.21	.14	.13	.80
55. Modern Bureaucracy (53)	.52	.22	.65	−.01	−.10	−.25	.06	.81
56. Semi-Modern Bureaucracy (53)	−.29	.54	−.46	−.10	.47	.22	.01	.87
57. Post-Colonial Transitional Bureaucracy (53)	.00	−.92	−.05	.01	.05	.00	−.06	.85
58. Traditional Bureaucracy (53)	−.22	.11	−.10	.21	−.80	−.02	−.04	.74
59. Military Interventive (54)	−.03	.18	−.60	−.06	−.15	−.28	.04	.50
60. Military Supportive (54)	−.77	.19	.16	.12	−.12	.00	−.08	.69
61. Military Neutral (54)	.73	−.32	.34	−.07	.21	.20	.05	.84
62. Role of Police (55)	−.75	−.06	−.45	−.11	−.16	−.11	.10	.84
63. Communist System (57)	−.71	.25	.26	.06	.40	.04	−.16	.82
64. System Stability	.20	.03	.82	−.09	−.02	.05	−.09	.74
65. Demonstrations	.24	.00	−.39	−.05	−.11	−.21	.06	.27
66. Domestic Killed	.05	−.06	−.62	.21	−.06	.06	−.01	.44
67. Expulsion of Ambassadors	−.06	.09	.03	−.12	.20	.00	.51	.32
68. Foreign Killed	.00	.01	−.33	.21	−.03	.06	.49	.40
Percent of Total Variance	24.6	13.5	13.2	6.4	5.4	4.7	4.3	72.0
Percent of Common Variance	34.1	18.7	18.3	8.9	7.4	6.6	6.0	100.0

> that one can take considerable liberties with the raw scores without seriously affecting the results. If we take a factor analysis in which several fundamental and meaningful factors have been clearly identified, it would be instructive to subject the factor methods to a severe test by radical changes in the original raw scores. . . . The correlation coefficients to be analyzed would then be markedly different from those used in the original analysis, but it seems quite likely that the same basic factors would be identified. This demonstration has not been made,* but it probably would be successful in showing the power of the factorial methods in isolating the underlying order among the test variables and the basic factors that determine the individual differences.[20]

In the context of the present study, this position is substantiated by correspondence between our factors and those identified by Berry, Rummel, and Russett in three independent factor analyses. (See the section below, entitled "Interpreting and Naming the Factors.")

Factorial Procedure. The next step was to factor analyze the product moment correlation matrix. Unities were inserted in the principal diagonal of the matrix. The principal-factor (or principal-component) technique was selected over competing methods on the ground that it yields a mathematically unique solution in which the first factor accounts for the maximum amount of variance within the data, while each succeeding factor extracts the maximum of the remaining unexplained variance.[21]

In order to identify the most invariant factor structure, we rotated the principal-factor solution. Using the inflection point criterion for practical significance, we selected the first seven factors for rotation. Each of these factors accounted for more than 4.0 per cent of the total variance, and the seven, when summed, accounted for 72.0 per cent of the variance. The factors were rotated to an orthogonal and to an oblique solution using Kaiser's varimax and Carroll's oblimin biquartimin criteria respectively.[22] The orthogonal solution best fulfilled the simple structure criteria and was selected for presentation.[23]

Interpreting and Naming the Factors. The interpretation and naming of the factors involve further methodological considerations. However, by including the entire population of nations in the factor analysis, we have avoided one issue. We are not faced with the problem of estimating the significance of inferences from a sample to a larger population.

One important consideration is whether to adopt the *descriptive* or the *inferential* approach in interpreting the meaning of the factors.[24] The former considers a factor to be a set of coefficients which conveys only descriptive information about the clustering of variables on a factor. The inferential school takes one step further and assumes that the factor indicates the presence of a basic dimension or "latent variable" which "causes" the array of variables along the factor. The composition of the variables loaded by the factor and the percent of total variance which the factor explains determine the appropriateness and strength of the inferential interpretation.

In the light of these criteria, we first employ the descriptive and then, when appropriate, the inferential approach for interpreting the *Survey* factors. Thus, in the discussion that follows, we first present the extreme clusters of each factor (all are bimodal) and interpret them descriptively as opposite types. We then consider what basic dimension might be inferred. When each variable's rank can be interpreted as representing more or less of a phenomenon common to all of the variables in the extremes, we label the factor with the appropriate ordinal concept. The inferences implied by the labels are, of course, weaker when the factors account for small portions of the total variance.

The next consideration is the *validity* of the factors. If our factors identify basic phenomena operating within political systems, they will also be delineated by other factor analyses. Even though no comparable political study has been completed, we found partial correspondence between our factors and those of independent studies by Rummel, Russett, and Berry. Rummel's and Russett's factor analyses of social, economic, and political variables yielded the following five factors: "Economic Development," "Communism," "Intensive Agriculture" or "Density," "Size," and "Catholic Culture" or "Religion." [25] These factors correspond to five of eleven which we calculated in an earlier factor analysis of the social and economic in addition to the political variables of the *Survey*. The remaining six factors closely resemble the political factors reported on below. Berry's study of economic data identified three factors ("Technology, Demography," and "Size"), which also correspond to factors calculated from the *Survey* data.[26]

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[20] Thurstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67. The asterisk refers to the following footnote in the revised edition of Thurstone's original work: "Since this chapter was written, the demonstration has been made, and is described in Chapter XV."

[21] This technique is explained by Harman, *op. cit.*, in ch. 9, "Principal-Factor Solution."

[22] Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation in Factor Analysis," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 23 (September, 1958), pp. 187–200; John B. Carroll, "Biquartimin Criterion for Rotation to Oblique Simple Structure in Factor Analysis," *Science*, Vol. 126 (29 November, 1957), pp. 1114–1115.

[23] Calculations were performed by the Indiana Research Computing Center's IBM 709. The MESA-3 program employed was developed by John B. Carroll at Harvard, coded by R. A. Sandsmark at Northwestern, and revised by Norman Swartz with the assistance of Gary Flint at Indiana.

[24] Sten Henrysson, *Applicability of Factor Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences* (Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1960), pp. 86–88.

From this convergence, we conclude that the earlier *Survey* factors are valid measures of the dimensions suggested, including one that is political in character. More importantly, the earlier results encourage the expectation that future factorial studies will add to the validity of the political factors yielded by the present study.

A further consideration is raised by the communality value 1.08 for the variable "Ex-Spanish Dependency" in Table I. This high communality (the normal range is zero to one) was caused by missing data.[27] We did not estimate values for missing data, therefore the number of cases entering into each correlation is not the same. As a consequence, the correlation matrix does not exhibit Gramian properties, and the variances and communalities in the factor matrix are slightly inflated. With this consideration in mind, we rely on the relative, rather than absolute, values of the factor loadings and communalities in interpreting the factors. Also, we adopt a high value, ±.50, for identifying the significant variable loadings. This value is safely above the ±.30 generally suggested by factor analysts.

V. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Before examining Table I in detail, the single most important implication of the factor matrix should be noted, *viz.*, that the *Survey* data are highly structured along factors largely independent of each other.

The seven factors account for 72 per cent of the total variance among the 68 variables, *i.e.*, an average of 72 per cent of the variance of each variable. Of the 68 variables, only seven failed to be loaded higher than ±.50 by at least one factor, while only three were loaded higher than ±.50 by more than one factor. Hence, except for three overlapping variables, the solution employed yields mutually independent factors.

These findings indicate that the political phenomena measured by the data do not occur randomly from one polity to the next; they occur in highly associated patterns or dimensions. In other words, basic dimensions do underlie the complex behavior within political systems.

In the following sections these factors are interpreted and the dimensions are inferred. It must be remembered, when hypothesizing with regard to dimensions, that the inferences are made with varying degrees of confidence. The large proportions of total variance accounted for by each of the first three factors (24.6%, 13.5%, and 13.2%) support strong inferences. The smaller amount of variance explained by the last four factors (6.4%, 5.4%, 4.7%, 4.3%) sustain successively weaker inferences.

Factor I: Access. Table II displays the highly loaded variables comprising the extreme portions of Factor I, which accounts for a large portion, 24.6 per cent, of the total variance. In examining these variables, the following dichotomies emerge: hierarchical as opposed to competitive bargaining processes; consolidated as opposed to distributed authority and force; executive and single-party politics as opposed to legislative and group politics; totalitarian restrictions as opposed to institutionalized openness of political channels. The dichotomies refer generally to restrictive as opposed to permissive institutions and interaction. Or, to use Truman's concept, Factor I reflects *the degree of access to political channels*.[28]

This conclusion is further substantiated when we examine the rank order of the areal groups on the factor (Table III). The high loadings of the Western, Latin American, and East European groups correspond to documented fact. The low loading of the African group reflects political channels which, due to their variety, absence, lack of differentiation, and newness are randomly rather than systematically distributed in terms of access. For

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[25] Rummel *et al., op. cit.* and Russett, *op. cit.*

[26] Berry, *op. cit.*

[27] Due to an artifact of coding procedure taken over directly from the *Survey*, the variable "Ex-Spanish Dependency" exhibits an unusually high missing data component. For this variable, in addition to normal missing data attrition, only ex-colonial dependencies were assigned substantive codings, some 40 countries being regarded as "irrelevant" to the coding category.

[28] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1955), p. 264 ff.

TABLE II. FACTOR I: ACCESS

Factor Loading	Variable
.94	Electoral System
.93	Constitutional Regime
.92	Group Opposition
.87	Status of Legislature
.86	Horizontal Power Distribution
.85	Representativeness of Regime
.80	Press Freedom
.73	Aggregation by Legislature
.73	Military Neutral
.73	Conventional Ideological Orientation
.68	Articulation by Parties
.63	Articulation by Associational Groups
.52	Modern Bureaucracy
	.
	.
	.
−.58	East European Areal Grouping
−.70	Elitism
−.71	Communist System
−.74	System Style
−.75	Role of Police
−.77	One-Party System
−.77	Military Supportive
−.81	Totalitarian Regime
−.82	Status of Executive
−.83	Articulation by Institutional Groups

similar reasons, the random distribution of North African and Middle Eastern nations is not surprising.

Specialists in political development, consensus, and conflict will note that these phenomena are not highly associated with degree of political access.

Factor I yields empirical evidence supporting the widespread use of measures of constitutionalism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and representation in comparative and theoretical work. In addition, the factor suggests a need for more precise measurement of the quantity and quality of restrictions imposed on competition for control of political channels.

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL GROUPING VARIABLES ALONG THE ACCESS FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.45	Advanced Western Areal Group
.21	Latin American Areal Group
−.05	African Areal Group
−.06	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Group
−.16	Asian Areal Group
−.58	East European Areal Group

TABLE IV. FACTOR II: DIFFERENTIATION

Factor Loading	Variable
.76	Political Modernization—Periodization
.66	Date of Independence
.60	Westernization
.54	Articulation by Associational Groups
.54	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.54	Ex-Spanish Dependency
.51	Bicameral Legislature
.46	Later European Political Modernization
.46	Conventional Ideological Orientation
.41	Elitism
.38	Aggregation by Legislature
	.
	.
	.
−.37	Charisma
−.48	Aggregation by Executive
−.51	Ex-French Dependency
−.51	Unicameral Legislature
−.58	Articulation by Non-Associational Groups
−.83	Developmental Ideological Orientation
−.90	African Areal Grouping
−.92	Post-Colonial Bureaucracy
−.93	Undeveloped Tutelary Political Modernization

Factor II: Differentiation. Table IV rank orders the variables loaded heavily by Factor II, which accounts for 13.5 per cent of the total variance. The extremes of the factor contrast late stages of modernization against undeveloped tutelary modernization, conventional against developmental ideology, semi-modern against post-colonial bureaucracy, and aggregation by legislature against aggregation by executive. Note that the extremes do not contrast the westernized democracies with traditional monarchies. The factor does not, therefore, measure the full range of phenomena which could properly be interpreted as "political development." In the light of these findings, we interpret the factor to reflect a dimension of *differentiation of political institutions within former colonial dependencies.*

Factor II lends empirical support to the comparative and theoretical focus on measures of institutional differentiation and specialization within the ex-colonial nations. It also indicates the need to develop more sophisticated typologies than presently exist for the classification of transitional political systems. For example, the two polity groups most directly involved in the variable extremities of this factor (the Latin American and the African) are classified according to quite different sets of typological criteria in Almond and Coleman.[29] Thus, while the negative loadings might be regarded as according with one or more components of the "Almond-Shils" schema (*e.g.*, "Tutelary Democracy" or "Terminal Colonial Dependency"), it is evident that no element of the same typology applies to the set of high positive loadings for Factor II.

The latter extreme loads characteristics of older ex-colonies whose political institutions have *at least in a structural sense* been substantially westernized. The other extreme loads characteristics of recently dependent territories which have yet to become accommodated to other than rudimentary institutions of self-government. While one might expect polities exhibiting high positive scores for this factor to be more democratic, more stable, and more consensual than those exhibiting high negative scores, variables indexing these phenomena are, by and large, conspicuous by their absence.

We hypothesize, therefore, that this factor measures what may be termed the political counterpart to social differentiation. This is to suggest that if a large number of variables indexing social structure had been included in the present study, a "social differentiation" factor would undoubtedly emerge and many of the high loading Factor II variables might also be expected to load heavily on such a factor.

Certain of the positive loading Factor II variables may also represent, or suggest, necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a stable democratic political system in a highly differentiated social and economic *milieu.* Indeed, the presence of a moderate degree of elitism, when coupled with articulation by associational groups and legislative aggregation does not appear to be inconsistent with this hypothesis when viewed in the context of Kornhauser's theses as to the preconditions of democracy and totalitarianism, respectively.[30]

Factor III: Consensus. The extreme loading variables of Factor III, which accounts for 13.2 per cent of the total variance, are presented in Table V. Examination of the variables reveals the following dichotomies: personalistic party politics as opposed to party system stability; governmental stability as opposed to military intervention; overall system stability as opposed to domestic killed; political enculturation as opposed to articulation by anomic groups. These dichotomies reflect agreement as opposed to dissent with regard to the basic channels and institutions of political participation. Factor III seems to tap *the degree of consensus and cooperation among participants* as to the rules governing political activity. Note that the negative pole of the factor reflects not only dissent and opposition, but direct, physical conflict.

TABLE V. FACTOR III: CONSENSUS

Factor Loading	Variable
.89	Governmental Stability
.84	Stability of Party System
.66	Advanced Western Regional Grouping
.65	Modern Bureaucracy
.54	Political Enculturation
.50	Westernization
	.
	.
	.
−.51	Articulation by Anomic Groups
−.59	Latin American Areal Grouping
−.59	Presidential Legislative-Executive Structure
−.60	Military Interventive
−.66	Domestic Killed
−.66	Personalismo

The rank order of the areal groups on the factor (Table VI) adds further substance to this interpretation. The positive loadings of the Western and East European nations are as

TABLE VI. DISTRIBUTION OF AREAL GROUPING VARIABLES ALONG THE CONSENSUS FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.66	Advanced Western Areal Grouping
.26	East European Areal Grouping
.02	African Areal Grouping
−.08	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping
−.24	Asian Areal Grouping
−.59	Latin American Areal Grouping

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[29] Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 522–567.

[30] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Chicago, 1959).

expected. The low correlation of the African nations reflects a widespread lack of consensus as to the structure of political institutions in the area. However, this lack of consensus is not typically accompanied by a high incidence of open conflict (domestic killed and military intervention) between opposing groups. Lack of consensus in Latin American and Asian countries, on the other hand, gives rise to open dissent, coups, and conflict. This contrast raises the question, "What are the forms and causes of open opposition when political consensus is absent within a nation?"

The emergence of this dimension supports the comparative and theoretical use of concepts bearing on agreement, consensus, cooperation, dissent, opposition, and conflict. Most of these phenomena fall within that area of the discipline now focusing on political culture and attitudes. The findings suggest that in addition to measuring attitudes of consensus and dissent researchers should more systematically explore the overt behavior resulting from these attitudes.[31]

TABLE VII. FACTOR IV: SECTIONALISM

Factor Loading	Variable
.70	Developed Tutelary Political Modernization
.69	Ex-British Dependency
.55	Asian Areal Grouping
.52	Articulation by Non-Associational Groups
.41	Sectionalism
.35	Articulation by Anomic Groups
	.
	.
	.
−.36	Date of Independence
−.47	Presidential Legislative-Executive Structure
−.49	Latin American Areal Grouping
−.67	Later European Political Modernization

TABLE VIII. FACTOR V. LEGITIMATION

Factor Loading	Variable
.47	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.40	Communist System
.39	Totalitarian Regime
.37	System Style
.36	East European Areal Grouping
.32	Later European Political Modernization
	.
	.
	.
−.50	Non-European Political Modernization
−.70	Authoritarian Regime
−.80	Traditional Bureaucracy

Factor III also serves to substantiate the usefulness of typologies delineating clusters of characteristics that contrast "stable" with "unstable" political systems.

Factor IV: Sectionalism. The fourth factor, accounting for 6.4 per centof the total variance, is only one-fourth as strong as the first and one-half as strong as the second and third, and therefore provides a weaker basis for inference. For this same reason, inferences based on factors five, six, and seven cannot be made with the high degree of confidence earlier expressed.

The extremes of the factor (see Table VII) contrast colonial developmental characteristics in much the same manner as does Factor II. An important difference is that the earlier set of ex-French, African characteristics is here replaced by an ex-British, Asian configuration. The extreme loading variables are, however, less amenable to interpretation than in the case of Factor II. The ex-British dependencies are, in certain respects, more "developed" than their ex-French counterparts, yet the internal developmental cleavages between social sectors are obviously more pronounced. This is reflected in the loadings of sectionalism and anomic group activity. For want of a better term, we therefore interpret this factor as tapping a specific *pattern of institutional differentiation occurring in a political system exhibiting high sectionalism.*

Factor V: Legitimation. The extremes of Factor V, as exhibited in Table VIII, contrast totalitarian regimes against authoritarian regimes, semi-modern bureaucracies against traditional bureaucracies, and later European political

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[31] Rummel has initiated an examination of "causes" of domestic conflict but has encountered a lack of relevant survey data. See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Testing Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *Proceedings of the Peace Research Society,* Vol. 1 (1963). A useful pilot study in this regard is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

TABLE IX. DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES REFLECTING PHENOMENA OF LEGITIMATION AND AUTHORITY ON THE LEGITIMATION FACTOR

Factor Loading	Variable
.47	Semi-Modern Bureaucracy
.40	Communist Regime
.39	Totalitarian Regime
.37	System Style
.28	Constitutional System
.27	Representativeness of Regime
.21	Military Neutral
.20	Horizontal Power Distribution
.12	Developmental Ideological Orientation
−.02	Conventional Ideological Orientation
−.12	Military Supportive
−.15	Military Interventive
−.16	Role of Police
−.17	Elitism
−.21	Charisma
−.24	Articulation by Non-Associational Groups
−.34	Personalismo
−.70	Authoritarian Regime
−.80	Traditional Bureaucracy

TABLE X. FACTOR VI: INTEREST

Factor Loading	Variable
.82	Aggregation by Political Parties
.50	Two-Party System
.46	Aggregation by Executive
	.
	.
	.
−.32	Aggregation by Legislature
−.35	Parliamentary-Republican
−.55	Articulation by Political Parties
−.69	Multi-Party System

modernization against non-European political modernization.

Most of these variables reflect the source and distribution of authority within political systems. More specifically, they refer to *the means by which political authority is legitimized.* As demonstrated by the rank order of variables in Table IX, they can be construed as falling along a continuum between the classical Weberian ideal types of rational-legalistic legitimation and traditional legitimation. In examining the variable positions, the characteristics of rational and legalistic authority fall at one extreme, while the characteristics of traditional and charismatic authority occupy the other.[32]

Factor VI: Interest. The extreme loading variables of Factor VI are exhibited in Table X. In addition to contrasting two-party and multi-party systems, this factor identifies the role which political institutions assume in *patterns of interest circulation.* It should be stressed that this factor is typological in that it contrasts patterning rather than the amount of interest circulation. The Access factor, which contrasts systems with large numbers of interest articulation points against systems with few access institutions, measures the volume of interests processed by the system.

Also, it is significant that this factor does not measure all components of the Almond-Coleman articulation-aggregation schema.[33] It identifies only the distinctly political institutions for handling interests injected into the system, rather than the full range of interest-bearing groups.

This factor highlights the importance of the channels of interest circulation in the political process. It also provides support for the generalizing power of typologies of party systems.

Factor VII: Leadership. Factor VII loads only 4.3 per cent of the total variance and does not exhibit the pronounced bimodal configuration of the others. The positive extreme of the factor loads variables which reflect *strong executive leadership in both domestic and foreign affairs.*

TABLE XI. FACTOR VII: LEADERSHIP

Factor Loading	Variable
.61	Aggregation by Executive
.51	Expulsion of Ambassadors
.50	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping
.49	Foreign Killed
.49	Ex-French Dependency
.44	Charisma
	.
	.
	.
−.41	Elitism

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[32] *Cf.* Leonard Binder's neo-Weberian typology in *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 44–45.

[33] Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 33 ff.

This dimension calls attention to the need for systematic studies of executive rôles and leadership style in both comparison and theory. The random distribution of other leadership variables along this factor indicates the complexity of the phenomena in question. The relatively low strength of the factor indicates that its typological value is limited.

Unexplained Variables. The factor structure accounts for less than 50 per cent of the communalities (h^2) of the variables exhibited in Table XII. However, as indicated by the factor loadings in parentheses, six of these variables correlate above .50 with one of the factors. In other words, at least one major source of variation for each of these six variables is identified by the factor matrix. We conclude, therefore, that only five exhibit variation substantially independent of the factors identified.

Of the regional groupings, the North African, Middle Eastern and the Asian display considerably less explained total variance than do the others. In short, political phenomena in these countries are not highly structured along the dimensions discovered. These areas may, of course, exhibit characteristics that structure themselves along other dimensions, possibly religious or cultural, that the present study is not designed to tap.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: RELEVANCE OF THE FINDINGS FOR CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

In the preceding sections, we have proposed the following answers for the first two research questions: the *Survey* data are highly correlated along a relatively limited number of factors; these factors provide evidence for inferring seven basic political dimensions—Access, Differentiation, Consensus, Sectionalism, Legitimation, Interest, and Leadership.

Theory and Research. The third question asks, "What is the relevance of these dimensions for cross-national study?" The dimensions have impact in the following areas: theory and research, comparison, and typology construction. First, they suggest a basic set of concepts around which *theory construction and research* should proceed. According to our findings the seven underlying dimensions are systematically related to ("cause") a wide variety of manifest political behavior. In this sense, the concepts naming the dimensions are theoretically significant; they are lawfully related to much political behavior and therefore can be used as basic concepts within a large body of interrelated generalizations. And this is the first step toward empirical theory. However, to facilitate their use in theory and research, the concepts need to be operationalized by simple definitions rather than by elusive factors. This is done by devising variables which correlate highly with each of the factors. If future factor analyses yield similar factors and a set of corresponding variables is devised, theoreticians and researchers will have advanced an enormous step toward an important goal—empirical theory.

Comparative Study. Second, the seven factors can be used as composite scales for *comparing political systems.*[34] For example, the political system of Great Britain has a higher score on Factor I (which measures the degree of political access) than does that of Poland.[35] By

TABLE XII. VARIABLES LEAST EXPLAINED BY THE SEVEN FACTORS

Highest F. L.	Variable	Communality
−.24	One Party Dominant System	.16
.41	Sectionalism	.26
−.39	Demonstrations	.27
−.35	Parliamentary-Republican System	.28
(.51)	Expulsion of Ambassadors	.32
(.55)	Non-European Political Modernization	.38
(.51)	Foreign Killed	.40
.45	Early European Political Modernization	.42
(−.62)	Domestic Killed	.44
(.55)	Asian Areal Grouping	.46
(.50)	North African, Middle Eastern Areal Grouping	.49

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[34] Russett, *op. cit.*, develops a very useful method for applying the factors as comparative scales.

[35] We have not actually calculated factor scores in order to compare nations on the factors. The loadings of the areal grouping variables do, of course, provide insight as to what nations might

knowing the scores of a nation on all seven factors, we are in a position to make statistical predictions as to the probabilities with which phenomena measured by the 68 variables of Table I will occur within the political system in question. This capability seems especially useful with regard to phenomena indexed by variables such as government stability, articulation by anomic groups, stability of party system, military intervention, demonstrations, and the like.

Typology Construction. The findings have import in a third area of cross-national study—*typology construction.*[36] The latter approach seeks a middle ground between the powerful but scarce results of theory and the multitudinous but mundane yields of comparison. Instead of focusing on the dimensions common to all systems, it involves the construction of a small set of categories which will adequately describe the *range* of relationships across a variety of systems. Generally, the elements of a typology are a set of definitions mixed with propositions, each of which is assumed to describe a cluster of phenomena that is highly recurrent (predictable) in each of the system types specified.

The usefulness (generalizing power) of a typology depends on the number of characteristics and political systems which it can explain. For example, Aristotle's three-type classificatory scheme (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) seems to have described adequately all political systems of the classical Greek period with reference to a single set of characteristics having to do with authority structure. In a somewhat similar manner, Almond and Coleman's basic typology (traditional, transitional, modern) is useful as a means of categorizing contemporary political systems with reference to a set of characteristics centering on specialization of political structure.[37]

The objective of the approach is to develop the most parsimonious set of categories that will serve as the basis of generalization about the greatest number of political systems. Success depends on delineating the most frequently recurring types which are mutually independent and not simply disguised mutations. In this sense, the underlying assumptions and criteria of typology construction and factor analysis correspond. Both endeavor to delineate sets of variables which are highly associated across many cases. When only the highest loading variables on each factor are considered, they reflect a small cluster of phenomena occurring simultaneously in a specific set of nations. The simple structure criterion guarantees that the cluster and the set are mutually exclusive of all others along their respective factors. In this way, factor analysis utilizes systematic methods for identifying sets of variables that are analogous to typological constructs.

Therefore, the results of this factorial study provide information as to what clusters of characteristics will yield types of greatest inclusiveness and generalizing power. Table

TABLE XIII. MAJOR CLUSTER TYPES OF *SURVEY* VARIABLES

Survey Factor	Loading	Cluster Type
I	Positive	Polyarchic System
I	Negative	One-Party Totalitarian System
II	Positive	Westernized Democratic System
II	Negative	Undeveloped Democratic System
III	Positive	Stable System
III	Negative	Unstable System
V	Negative	Traditional Authoritarian System
VI	Positive	Two-Party System
VI	Negative	Multi-Party System
VII	Positive	Modernizing Authoritarian System

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be expected to correlate most strongly with the various factors. However, the loadings of the areal grouping variables lose their meaning when the nations are quite heterogeneous with respect to the dimension that the factor taps. On this point, see Lawley and Maxwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–92.

[36] For an excellent discussion of the methodological status of typologies in the social sciences, see the remarks of Carl G. Hemple in "Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," *Science, Language, and Human Rights* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), I, 65 ff.

[37] Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 33 ff.

XIII displays the cluster types suggested by the *Survey* factors.[38]

These categories, inductively derived from the *Survey* data, provide confirmation for many types which political scientists currently employ. For example, the *Survey*-derived type, "One-Party Totalitarian System," exhibits the same characteristics that Friedrich and Brzezinski label "Totalitarian Dictatorship."[39] The types "Two-Party System" and "Multi-Party System" substantiate many of the propositions that Duverger sets forth in his party system typology.[40] The *Survey* types "Westernized Democratic System," "Undeveloped Democratic System," "Traditional Authoritarian System," and "Modernizing Authoritarian System" add support to Shils' and Almond's types, "Political Democracy," "Tutelary Democracy," "Traditional Oligarchy," and "Modernizing Oligarchy."[41] "Polyarchic System" encompasses most of the characteristics which Dahl subsumes under the label "Polyarcal."[42]

Conflict Propositions. The final research question posed asks, "What specific propositions about conflict in political systems are suggested by the findings?" Examination of the conflict variables (Demonstrations, Domestic Killed, Expulsion of Ambassadors, and Foreign Killed) leads to the following propositions:

(1) The political dimension, *leadership*, which accounts for foreign conflict does not account for domestic conflict.
(2) The presence of strong executive *leadership* is frequently accompanied by both diplomatic and violent foreign conflict.
(3) *Access* to political channels, *differentiation* of political institutions, *sectionalism* within developing systems, kind of *legitimation*, and type of *interest* circulation tend to be unassociated with violent and diplomatic foreign conflict.
(4) The political dimension, *consensus*, which accounts for most of the domestic conflict does not account for diplomatic conflict, but is moderately associated with violent foreign conflict.
(5) An absence of political *consensus* is associated with violent domestic conflict.
(6) An absence of political *consensus* is moderately associated with non-violent domestic conflict.
(7) The degree of *differentiation* of political institutions, kind of *legitimation*, and type of *leadership* tend to be unassociated with violent and non-violent domestic conflict.

These propositions, in large measure, substantiate those advanced by Rummel and Tanter in their conflict research.[43] In addition, they identify the two political phenomena (lack of consensus, strong executive leadership) which are most frequently associated with domestic and foreign conflict, respectively.

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[38] We have not named those factor clusters which are not readily interpreted or which duplicate other clusters.

[39] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 9–10.

[40] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York, 1963), p. 203 ff.

[41] Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–55.

[42] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 63 ff.

[43] Rummel, "The Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," p. 24; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955–60: Turmoil and Internal War," *Proceedings of the Peace Research Society*, Vol. 3 (1964).

A SCALE ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING RECORDS OF SENATORS KENNEDY, JOHNSON AND GOLDWATER, 1957–1960

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This article reports the results of a scale analysis of the votes cast by three prominent senators, two Democrats and a Republican, on legislative measures pending during the second term of the Eisenhower administration. My method employed the Guttman scaling technique[1] to identify the ideological issues presented in the roll calls and to rank the senators according to the positions they took on these issues, looking separately at their records in the 85th and the 86th Congresses. My purpose was twofold: first, to distinguish objectively the differences in the public postures the three men assumed as they voted; and second, to look for movement in the stance of each as the 1960 campaign approached.

John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater came to the Senate at different times, with different backgrounds, by different routes, from different constituencies; they held different committee assignments and stood in different relationships to both the formal and informal structures of the Senate. Since 1960 their fates have taken equally diverse paths. Nevertheless, during the interval from 1957 to 1960 they had at least two relevant things in common: as senators together they were called upon to vote on the same succession of bills, amendments and motions; and they had their eyes on a nomination for the presidency.[2] Hence, their selection for this study. Of the three, Johnson, as majority floor leader, had the largest party responsibility for the legislative record on which—or against which—the presidential race would be run.

Guttman scaling, applied to a sufficient number of cases, enables a student to sort a set of roll call votes so as to eliminate systematically those that are only ambiguously related—or not related at all—to one or more governing ideological variables. And it identifies the variables at the same time that it produces a rank ordering of the senators' overall positions with respect to each. Accordingly, it is possible to delineate individual combinations of stands on distinct issues, as well as to note shifts that may occur with the march of events, as purposes or strategies alter.

The study on which this report is based analyzed all roll call votes in the Senate during the 85th and 86th Congresses covering the four years from 1957 through 1960.[3] Of the 729 roll calls, 171 were dropped because of near unanimity, leaving 558. Of these, 393, or 70.4 per cent, were sufficiently clear in their ideological meaning to form items of twenty scales, ten for each Congress.

The number of scales is in itself significant. If American politics revolved around a single major cleavage, for instance a liberal-conservative cleavage, then roll call votes would by definition form one single scale or rank ordering of the senators from the most consevative to the most liberal. Analysis would be easier but life would be different. The senator who is pro-foreign aid, however, is not necessarily pro-labor or pro-civil rights. Consequently, an accurate estimate of the ideological positions of any senator requires analyzing his position on each of a number of scales.

Of particular interest for comparing Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater are the scales that represent continuing conflicts in American politics. Five such scales in the 85th Congress, and five also in the 86th, form pairs covering very similar content. Together they contain roughly two-thirds of the scale data. These continuing issues are: (1) Domestic Economic Welfare; (2) Agricultural Price Supports; (3) Civil Rights; (4) Military Foreign Aid; and (5) Internationalism.

Where did Kennedy, Johnson, and Goldwater stand on these persistent questions, and how did they rank in relation to each other and the rest of the Senate? Did their positions remain the same from one Congress to the next?

I

The Domestic Economic Welfare Scale of the 85th Congress deals predominantly with

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[1] For Guttman scaling, refer to Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton University Press, 1950).

[2] So did Nixon, the Republican nominee in 1960, as the event proved, but he could not make a voting record in the Senate over which he presided; so did Humphrey, but he had not the resources to put hinself in the same league with Kennedy and Johnson as aspirants.

[3] Charles Howard Gray, *Coalition, Consensus and Conflict in the United States Senate* (1957–1960), Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado, 1962.



FIGURE 1. Domestic Economic Welfare Scales

issues that have separated economic liberals from economic conservatives since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, especially labor regulation and public housing. Their importance can be seen in the fact that sixty roll calls, more than the next three largest scales combined, fit this scale. The major labor issue (culminating in the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959) was the effort of the conservatives to turn the reports of union corruption into legislation that would restrict union officials in the management of union funds and the conduct of union elections. Kennedy and Johnson both voted consistently with the liberals against such restrictions while Goldwater was equally consistent on the side of the conservatives. On one issue of interest to labor, Kennedy and Johnson differed: Kennedy voted for the extension and liberalization of the Unemployment Compensation Act while Johnson opposed it. On one public housing vote, an effort to increase the number of low-rent housing units, Johnson also favored the conservative position in opposition to Kennedy. Their differences on these two votes were sufficient to place Kennedy on the edge of what might be called the strong liberals and Johnson among the moderate liberals. From the pro-labor, pro-housing, liberal end of the scale Kennedy ranked 16th among the 96 senators, Johnson 34th and Goldwater 81st.

These relative positions on the major liberal-conservative scale changed only slightly in the 86th Congress. Issues of interest to labor were again dominant though of somewhat different content: minimum wage, unemployment compensation, aid to depressed areas and jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Housing loomed as somewhat more important than in the 85th Congress, with numerous votes on public housing and urban renewal. The relatively new issue of medical care joined the list that marked the traditional liberal-conservative split.

In the overwhelmingly Democratic Senate of the 86th Congress, Kennedy, if anything, became more liberal while Johnson moved closer to the middle, and Goldwater voted with the most extreme conservative group. These small changes put Johnson and Kennedy further apart. Though Johnson voted on the liberal side over 80 per cent of the time, he broke with Kennedy and the liberals on four roll calls that dealt with a withholding tax on income from interest and dividends, an increase in welfare authority of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a limit on the investigating powers of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and an increase in funds for urban renewal. In addition, it seems plausible to infer from the scale pattern that his absence from a vote on the unemployment compensation act could have been politically motivated. These differences produced a voting pattern placing Johnson at rank 38.5 in contrast to Kennedy's 12.5 and Goldwater's 92.

Johnson's relatively stable pattern as a liberal moderate is in sharp contrast to the marked shift of most Southern Democrats between the 85th and 86th Congresses. While twenty of the twenty-two Southern Democrats voted at least as liberally as Johnson in the 85th Congress, fourteen voted much more conservatively in the 86th Congress.

This extreme shift on a scale representing the major cleavage in American politics—corresponding as it does with a change from Republican to Northern Democratic pressure on civil rights—suggests that a sizeable portion of the Southern Democrats were modifying their votes on labor, housing, and welfare measures according to who supported their opposition to civil rights. This tactical switch does not apply to Lyndon Johnson who held to a moderately liberal position in both Congresses.

Figure 1 shows the scales indicating the liberal-conservative rank of the three senators relative to the rest of the Senate. The voting pattern as shown is simplified in that neither the absences nor the approximately 5 per cent of the votes that were inconsistent with the major pattern are included.[4] Following statistical custom, when a number of senators had equal voting patterns, their ranks were averaged and the average was assigned to each. The number of senators whose ranks were so averaged is indicated in each case by a bracket.

II

A much smaller but persistent economic issue in the Senate which does not fit the liberal-conservative continuum is the question of agricultural price supports. On this scale Kennedy voted with those favoring high supports, Johnson took a moderately pro-position, while Goldwater voted with those seeking to cut or eliminate the program. Though this is not true of the Senate as a whole, the relative positions of the three senators are quite similar to their positions on the labor-housing-welfare scales. Figure 2 indicates their ranks on the Agriculture scales in the 85th and 86th Congresses.



Figure 2. Agricultural Price Support Scales

III

The growing battle over civil rights produced the second largest set of scales, accounting for 18 roll calls in the 85th Congress and 38 in the 86th. Contrary to popular belief, a senator's voting position on civil rights bears no strong relationship to his position on the liberal-conservative continuum; *i.e.*, labor-housing-welfare issues will not form a common scale with civil rights. Striking evidence of this fact is seen in the 85th Congress where most Republicans, including Goldwater, ranked closer to the apparent pro-civil rights end of the scale than either Kennedy or Johnson. Actually, Kennedy's position seemed somewhat ambiguous. On one vote he deviated from his general pattern by trying to save the provision of the Civil Rights Bill that would have allowed the Attorney General to institute civil actions for preventive relief in civil rights cases under the 14th Amendment. In general, however, he joined a majority of the Northern Democrats in shunning any but the mildest

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[4] Space does not permit a detailed description here of the roll calls fitting this or subsequent scales used in this report. Such a description, and the ranks of all senators, may be found in the study cited in the previous footnote.



FIGURE 3. Civil Rights Scales

civil rights proposals. His position may have been part of a strategy aimed at getting votes for a cloture motion.[5] The civil rights issue was entangled with the filibuster issue.

Goldwater was only slightly less hostile to strong measures. He did not join the Republican leadership in championing civil rights and so found himself temporarily in the odd company of Northern Democrats, his usual enemies.

Johnson, perhaps because of his anxiety to get a bill that could pass against a filibuster, took the most anti-civil rights stand of the three, though he broke with the hard core of the South and voted for the much weakened final bill and against Southern efforts to prevent its consideration.

The passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act was only the opening round for the great civil rights debate of 1960 which consumed more hours of Senate time than any issue since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. The major issue was the extension of the federal government's authority to guarantee voting rights. The influence of this major question probably produced the highly correlated voting pattern on some of the other issues which also fit the common scale—election reforms, the cloture rule, and Hawaiian statehood. A civil liberties issue, the loyalty oath required of students seeking funds under the National Defense Education Act, also fits the Civil Rights scale—whether by accident or because of an underlying ideological unity, cannot be determined by scale analysis.

Positions of the parties and of the three senators changed more radically on this scale than on any other between the two Congresses. In the campaign year of 1960 the Northern Democrats took over as the champions of civil rights while most Republicans moved into the position just above the Southern Democrats.

The most dramatic shift was made by Kennedy, who with twelve other senators voted pro-civil rights on every roll call. While Kennedy moved from a moderately *anti* position to a strong *pro* position, Goldwater moved, from about the same starting point but in the contrary direction, to a spot just above the most die-hard Southerners. He differed from them by favoring statehood for Hawaii and in opposing efforts to block consideration of civil rights completely. Johnson, on the other hand, moved up the scale to the lukewarm position from which Kennedy and Goldwater had departed in opposite directions. Though voting in favor of the milder civil rights proposals, Johnson opposed most efforts to strengthen the federal government's hand in protecting voting rights. He also opposed invoking the cloture rule, and he differed from Kennedy on the loyalty oath question by opposing efforts to free students from the requirement of filing affidavits that they did not belong to specified subversive organizations. In all, Johnson differed from Kennedy on seventeen of the thirty-eight votes on the Civil Rights scale. The average ranks of the three senators and the changes between the two Congresses can be seen in FIGURE 3.

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[5] For a detailed account of the struggle over the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and the strategies of the contestants, see the I. C. P. case study, *Eisenhower, Brownell and the Congress* (University of Alabama Press, 1964).

IV

Like civil rights, foreign policy votes do not fit the liberal-conservative scale. In fact, within the foreign policy field quite different voting blocs are produced when the issue shifts from foreign trade to military aid to support for international organizations. The latter two issues formed separate scales in both Congresses. The larger scale in both cases was one embracing primarily military foreign aid programs and to some extent reciprocal trade extension, the U. S. Information Agency, and the Antarctic and international atomic energy treaties.

On these issues Kennedy and Johnson took identical stands in both Congresses. They were moderately pro-foreign aid in the 85th Congress and both moved toward a stronger *pro* position in the 86th. Goldwater, on the other hand, generally favored large cuts in aid. He also voted against extension of the reciprocal trade program, thereby placing himself at the extreme anti-aid end of the scales.

In both Congresses most Republicans backed the Eisenhower Administration on foreign military aid, and in both Congresses most Southern Democrats opposed it; the 86th Congress alliance of Southern Democrats and Republicans on labor and civil rights issues did not extend beyond domestic affairs. The Military Foreign Aid scales are shown in FIGURE 4.

V

Forming distinct scales, separate from the



FIGURE 4. Foreign Military Aid Scales



FIGURE 5. Internationalism Scales



FIGURE 6. Public Power Scale; 83d, 84th, 85th Congresses

military aid program, were various votes concerning the American commitment to internationalism. In the 85th Congress this scale was composed of roll calls on the Food for Peace program, a permanent U. N. police force, the U. N. emergency force in the Middle East, an international development authority, and an ambassadorial nomination. Kennedy supported the internationalist position on every vote and Johnson deviated from this pattern only on the seemingly peripheral issue of Scott McCleod's nomination as ambassador to Ireland. In contrast, Goldwater's straight nationalist stand was modified only by the fact that he was absent from three of the votes.

The content of the internationalism scale in the 86th Congress varied somewhat from that of the 85th, though the Food for Peace program was common to both. Other items included contributions to the World Bank, international development funds, support of a convention of private citizens of NATO countries, and military support aid to Spain. The internationalists on this scale voted against aid to Spain, a stand consistent with the long association of anti-fascist and internationalist movements.

In the 86th Congress Johnson joined Kennedy to support the internationalist position on every vote, while Goldwater voted with equal consistency for the nationalists. FIGURE 5 shows the senators' ranks on these scales.

VI

Thus far we have dealt only with ideological issues that were prominent in both the 85th and 86th Congresses. An issue which, though not salient in both these Congresses, has frequently recurred in American politics is the controversy over private or public power development. Using somewhat similar scaling techniques, Francis Carney has obtained a Public Power scale covering the 83d, 84th, and 85th Congresses.[6] This scale included votes on TVA, and the Niagara, Hell's Canyon, and Columbia River power projects. Of the 71 senators who served throughout this period, Kennedy had an average rank of 21.5 from the pro-public power end of the scale; Johnson, differing from Kennedy on one vote, ranked 28.5; and Goldwater, voting against public power on every occasion when he was present, ranked 61.5. These ranks are shown in FIGURE 6.

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[6] Francis M. Carney, "Ideological Groupings in the United States Senate, 1953–1958, as Indicated by Scale Analysis," unpublished monograph, University of California, Riverside.

From the foregoing analysis John Kennedy as a senator emerged as a strong supporter of liberal labor, housing, and welfare programs, a moderately strong backer of public power programs, an advocate of high agricultural price supports, an active though recent convert to civil rights legislation, a moderately strong backer of foreign military aid, and a firm internationalist.

Barry Goldwater appears the exact antithesis to Kennedy on the labor-housing-welfare scale, and on the farm price support, public power, and internationalism scales. He also strongly opposed the foreign military aid program. On civil rights he moved from a moderate negative position to one just slightly above the hard-core Southerners.

Lyndon Johnson, though between Kennedy and Goldwater on the domestic economic scales, was much closer to Kennedy, emerging in 1960 as a moderate liberal. In the area of foreign policy, Johnson moved from a moderate to a strong internationalist position equal to Kennedy's. In the area of civil rights, however, Johnson was closer to Goldwater though he moved toward a moderate position in the 86th Congress.

In the role of president, Kennedy seems to have acted quite in accord with the positions he adopted in his last two years in the Senate. This does not justify a prediction that any other senator, if he became president, would necessarily do the same. The vastly different demands on the president, his national responsibilities and constituency could easily modify the ideological image he developed as a senator. It is an old adage that a platform is something to get in on, not to stand on; and an ideological posture may be adopted calculatingly as well as compulsively. The scaling and ranking data presented above indicate pretty clearly that the lure of the presidency exerts a magnetism, as the time for nominations approaches, capable of altering the public stands that senators, *qua* senators, have previously taken on issues with an ideological content.

AN APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE AND ITS CLIENT AGENCIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

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This paper presents an effort to adapt techniques of content analysis and measurement to the study of relations between a House appropriations subcommittee and the agencies whose budget estimates it reviews. Since Arthur Macmahon's pioneering work on the topic observers have depended on interviews and impressionistic readings of the published record for their evidence.[1] They have identified a variety of attitudes on the part of the committee members, ranging from the obsequious to the pugnacious. And they have noted various techniques of committee control and agency compliance or evasion. They have also expressed varying opinions about the efficacy and utility of congressional oversight.

The existing literature leaves at least one question partially unanswered: how does the subcommittee divide its supervisory and control efforts among the agencies within its jurisdiction? This study deals with this question, and illustrates a method that may have wider application in the systematic study of legislative-executive relations. Limitations of my own confine it to a sample consisting of a single subcommittee—headed by Congressman Fogarty (D., R.I.)—four agencies under its jurisdiction, and a span of budget years from 1949 to 1963.[2]

I. SUBJECTS

Experience with an earlier study identified the Fogarty Subcommittee as a body that shows a high regard for compiling a "complete public record" about its annual review of agency budget requests. Although the subcommittee members do not rely solely on the hearings for their information about agency operations, they try to collect for the record all the information they consider pertinent to their budget decisions.[3] In this way, they say, they hope to make it relatively easy for other congressmen and interested members of the public to evaluate the subcommittee's budget recommendations. Much of the information the members elicit at the formal hearings they have already reviewed independently. Moreover, the members also show some genuine dependence on the annual hearings as a source of information. Subcommittee and agency staff aides report that members generally confine their administrative-oversight activities to the period of the hearings. Between the passage of one appropriations act and the next year's hearings there is little direct contact between subcommittee members and agency officials. The subcommittee staff maintain contact with the agencies during the year, but much of this is in preparation for the formal hearings. Because most of the data for this study come from the published record, the "records orientation" of the Fogarty Subcommittee was an important factor in its selection.

The Fogarty Subcommittee has a reputation for being generous in granting funds to the agencies within its jurisdiction,[4] but this may not bias the relationships with the agencies that are the subject of this study. There is no necessary connection between generosity in appropriations, and a posture of laxity or severity in the subcommittee's supervision and control over agency operations. Also, a comparison of Fogarty subcommittee members with other members of the Appropriations Committee over the 1949–63 period indicates that the subcommittee members are not atypical in two respects that might affect their supervisory and control efforts. Their *skills* for the tasks of supervision and control—as measured by their pre-congressional occupations and length of service both in congress and on the Appropriations Committee—and their *positions on political issues*—as measured by their voting record on the *New Republic*'s index of domestic liberalism[5]—score much the same as those for the Appropriations Committee as a whole.[6]

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[1] Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58 (June and September, 1943), pp. 161–190; 380–414. See also Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling *et al.*, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1–266; Edward Banfield, "Congress and the Budget: A Planner's Criticism," this REVIEW, Vol. 43 (December, 1949), pp. 1217–1228; Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950); Seymour Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 25 (August, 1963), pp. 526–551; Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston, 1964); Richard Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 310–324.

[2] Calendar years 1948 to 1962. A given budget (or fiscal) year (*e.g.*, 1963) begins for the subcommittee with the opening of hearings in the early months of calendar 1962. Dates in this study are in terms of budget years.

[3] For a member's comment to this effect, see House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, *Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1959: Hearings*, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, G.P.O.), p. 201.

[4] Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

The four agencies that provided the sample for this study are the Children's Bureau (CB), the Office of Education (OE), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Howard University (HU). These agencies have remained within one administrative unit (at first, the Federal Security Agency, then the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) over the 1949–63 period, and they represent various phases of H.E.W. activity. CB and OE are disseminators of grants-in-aid, concerned with health and welfare, and education respectively. FDA is a regulatory agency concerned with health. HU is one of the units in the Department that has special status as a "Federally Aided Corporation." The sample agencies also differ greatly in the amounts of their recent appropriations requests, in increases in requests over the past decade, and in demonstrations of independence toward the supervisory and control efforts of the subcommittee.[7] Each of these characteristics may have an impact on subcommittee-agency relationships.

The sample agencies are entirely civilian. Secrecy was not a significant obstacle to an observer's reliance on published records, as it might be in the case of agencies involved with military or international activities.

II. MEASUREMENTS

This study relies almost exclusively on an analysis of subcommittee hearings, subcommittee *Reports* and agency budgets. Interviews served only a secondary role, as a means for clarifying and checking relationships perceived in the published records. Some distinct benefits derive from such a heavy reliance on published materials. The raw data are widely available in federal depository libraries for any student who wishes to test the findings on the same data, or on similar data about the behavior of other actors. Furthermore, problems of rapport between interviewer and informant do not bias the data collection. Although faulty schemes of classification may bias the use of published records, the basic materials remain unmarred, and the student can reclassify them as he proceeds.

The primary task in analyzing quantitatively the contents of published documents is their reduction to units that "make sense" as valid indicators of certain behavioral traits. This may be a formidable task. The records relevant to the present study include monetary data, workload data, prose statements, questions and answers. No single codification could meet all the analytical needs. The literature on content analysis provides some guidance in the development of techniques, but it contains little beyond some general principles, and highly specialized operations useful only in a limited number of problem areas. Since one of the cardinal principles states that the nature of the research problem and the available data are crucial in determining the techniques that are fruitful and feasible, a great deal is left to the inventiveness of the student.[8]

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[5] See Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World,* (New York, 1960), pp. 276–78.

[6] On the basis of pre-congressional occupations, the members of the Fogarty subcommittee appear somewhat less able, on the average, to deal with complex technical and political matters than other members of the Appropriations Committee. During the 1949–63 period, only 70 per cent of the subcommittee members came from occupations that would suggest a high level of relevant skills (*i.e.*, law and other professions, journalism and politics), while 81 per cent of all Committee members came from these fields. The difference in skill-potential disappears, however, if long experience in Congress or on the Appropriations Committee can make up for an unimpressive occupational background. Subcommittee members have had more experience in both areas: 78 per cent of them in the 1949–63 period entered Congress before 1950, while only 63 per cent of all Appropriations Committee members entered so early; and 60 per cent of the subcommittee members joined the Appropriations Committee before 1950, in comparison to only 51 per cent of the entire committee.

During the period of the study, subcomittee members voted in accord with the *New Republic*'s conception of domestic liberalism 48 per cent of the time, while the full committee voted that way 42 per cent of the time.

[7] In the last year of the study's time span, the agencies' requests were: OE, $598 million; CB, $80 million; FDA, $28 million; HU, $13 million. Over the period 1951–63, the percentage increases in budget requests were: OE, 2120; FDA, 565; CB, 335; HU, 280. A comparative study of the agencies' budget strategies *vis à vis* the subcommittee revealed that OE was generally the most aggressive toward the subcommittee, HU was generally least aggressive, while CB and FDA fell in the middle range. See Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and An Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

The concept of "administrative oversight" has many facets and it is necessary to devise measures that will accommodate its components. Subcommittee supervision may vary in the *attention* paid to agency operations, in the *thoroughness* of supervision and in its *incisiveness.* Variations may also be observed in the efforts of subcommittee members to make *independent investigations* of agencies—as opposed to inquiries that rely on the cooperation or cues of agency officials. Among types of formal control efforts—publicly recorded—subcommittee adjustments of appropriations may be distinguished from the directives written into committee *Reports.* Measures can be defined that indicate the variation in each of these factors shown by subcommittee behavior *vis à vis* particular agencies. The product of the analysis accordingly will be a profile of overt administrative oversight, showing the relative severity of supervisory and control efforts directed at each agency.

(1) A count of individual questions directed at witnesses from each agency provides a gross measure of the *attention* the subcommittee members devote to the affairs of each agency. A "question" is defined here as a unit of discourse that includes one inquiry. At times, a sentence ending in a question mark may include several inquiries. In making this analysis, each distinct inquiry was regarded as a separate question. Also, some statements not followed by a question mark were so defined when they seemed to be treated as such by the participants in the hearing, *e.g.*, when they elicited a reply from a witness, or when a following statement indicated they were meant to be inquiries. The score for each agency in Table I represents the mean number of questions asked by subcommittee members during hearings in the odd years from 1949 to 1963.

(2) The proportion of agency activities covered by subcommittee questioning provides a measure of the *thoroughness* with which the subcommittee supervises each agency. Making this measure operational involved two complex tasks: (a) defining the field of activities encompassed by each agency; and (b) defining a level of questioning that is "minimum coverage" of an activity.

The *Annual Reports* of the agencies, budget statements read at the opening of each year's hearings and *New York Times* articles about the agencies provided a list of their activities. A preliminary effort to code the members' questions into their subject-matter categories resulted in a redefinition of this list. It became evident that some closely related categories could be combined, while some additional categories were necessary to accommodate distinctions in the minds of legislators and administrators.[9]

Plainly, Congressmen cannot question thoroughly every agency activity during each year's hearings. In measuring "coverage," therefore, it is necessary to use a double standard that considers an item to be covered if it receives either frequent attention at a fairly low level of intensity, or less frequent attention at a higher level of intensity.[10]

While coding the questions, it became evident that individual inquiries may have a latent, as well as a manifest content.[11] That is, the context of some questions suggests that they might have several meanings to either the interrogator or the respondent. Congressmen frequently leave qualifying nouns or adjectives out of their verbiage, making it necessary

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[8] See Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communications Research* (Glencoe, 1952); Robert C. North, *Content Analysis* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963); Harold Lasswell, ed., *Language of Politics* (New York, George Stewart Press, 1949); and Ithiel de Sola Poole, ed., *Trends in Content Analysis* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1959).

[9] For a list of the categories used, see Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and An Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Relations," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1964, ch. 3.

[10] This study defines an item as "covered" if it received mention in 5 per cent of the questions directed at the agency over the odd years 1949–63, or in at least 10 per cent of the questions in one year's hearings. Admittedly, "coverage" of an activity is a rough measure of thoroughness. It does not mean that the subcommittee members give their attention to every issue and ramification related to an item.

[11] See Alexander L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Poole, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 7–32.

TABLE I. AGENCY SCORES ON MEASURES OF SUBCOMMITTEE SUPERVSION AND CONTROL

Measure	Agency Score			
	OE	CB	FDA	HU
1. *Subcommittee attention:*				
Mean number of questions asked each agency, odd years 1949–63	321	159	123	104
2. *Subcommittee thoroughness:*				
Percentage of items receiving "minimum coverage," odd years 1949–63	45	58	57	64
3. *Subcommittee incisiveness:*				
(a) Percentage of questions asking witnesses to justify activities, odd years 1949–63	39	29	37	22
(b) Percentage of questions asking witnesses about cost, odd years 1949–63	21	24	18	44
4. *Independence of supervision:*				
(a) Difference between mean percentage of questions about items highlighted in cues and the mean percentage of questions about all agency activities, 1951, 1957, 1963	+3	+6	+8	+10
(b) Ratio of questions asked department to questions asked agency, 1961, 1963	1:4	1:6	1:8	1:9
5. *Control over expenditures:*				
Median difference between original agency requests and subcommittee recommendations, 1959–63 (in millions)	−$31	−$1	−$9	−$5
6. *Control via Committee Report:*				
Number of directives about agency affairs in Committee *Reports* of 1951, 1957, 1961	17	5	2	9

to infer their referents from the surrounding context. Questions that could refer to several items accordingly were coded into as many categories as their contents—manifest and latent—seemed to require. This appeared safer then attempting the doubtful procedure of deciding what was "uppermost" in the minds of the actors.

(3) The frequency with which subcommittee members ask agency witnesses to justify their activities, and the frequency with which they ask about the cost of agency operations provide two crude measures of the relative *incisiveness* with which the members supervise agencies. Each of these question-types are probes. Justification questions call on agency officials to go beneath the surface to explain the need or utility of specific budget requests, while cost questions impose the discipline of calculation on administrators. The data in Table I represent the percentage of questions asked in odd years 1949–63 that were "justification questions" and "cost questions."

(4) Two measures provide indices of the relative *independence* with which the subcommittee supervises each agency: (a) the frequency with which members avoid a reliance on agency cues while fashioning questions at the annual hearings; and (b) the frequency of questioning about agency affairs directed at witnesses outside the agency itself. The significance of an inquiry into the subcommittee's independence derives from the realization that members are hard pressed for time and staff assistance to be used for administrative oversight. Because of this, they frequently rely on the agencies themselves to provide cues about the items worthy of questioning. The items that tend to attract members' attention are those highlighted in agency budget documents, and in the opening statements read by the lead-off agency witness. By questioning an item that is expensive, or that has changed markedly in cost from the previous budget, or one that is featured in an oral statement,[12] subcommittee members can

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[12] Agency officials as well as subcommittee members perceive these as cues that will elicit Congressional questioning. Agency budget officers write the opening statements for the hearings, knowing that these are the final communications legislators will receive before questioning agency witnesses. And they know that large items, or items showing a marked change from the previous budget tend to attract attention. One of the considerations in requesting funds for an activity

feel they are examining something that is "important" in some sense. An index of subcommittee non-reliance on agency cues to items worthy of questioning should stand as an indication of the members' independence in going beyond a superficial examination of the agency's presentation. In order to construct this index, it was first necessary to list the activities given prominence in the agency presentations.[13] The difference between the mean percentage of questions referring to the items highlighted in agency statements or budgets, and the mean percentage of questions asked about all activities was then computed. The greater the incidence of questions directed at items emphasized in the agency's presentations, the less is the subcommittee's independence.[14]

An index of the subcommittee's attention to non-agency sources of information about agency affairs gives another indication of the legislators' independence in going beyond a superficial examination of the agency's presentation. While it is not practical to measure the subcommittee's attention to each non-agency source of information, it is possible to gauge the relative attention to non-agency witnesses who testify at the annual hearings. These include the Department Secretary and his aides, interest group spokesmen and other congressmen not members of the subcommittee. The best available measure of subcommittee attention to outside sources of information is the ratio of questions about each agency directed at the Department Secretary and his aides, to the questions directed at the agency witnesses during the same year's hearings. This measure is suitable because subcommittee members have an opportunity to question the Secretary and his staff at length about each agency. In contrast, the members have little opportunity to question interest group spokesmen, or non-subcommittee congressmen about the agencies that attract few or none of these witnesses.[15]

(5) A comparison of each agency's request for funds, and the appropriation recommended by the subcommittee provides a measure of the legislators' attempts to impose controls over agency operations by means of adjusting the level of expenditures. In this study, the measure is defined by the median difference be-

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is, "How will it look?" If a request might appear out of place, it may be postponed in part, or divided into smaller pieces and distributed among inconspicuous budget headings. See Wildavsky, *op. cit.*, ch. 3.

[13] This study considers an item to be emphasized in the opening hearing statement of an agency if it is mentioned in at least 10 per cent of the statement's lines. An item is of "large absolute magnitude" if it is at least 20 per cent of the agency's total request. An item has shown "significant change" if it has shown an absolute increase or decrease of $200,000 since the last budget, or a percentage change amounting to 10 per cent of the total change in the agency's budget.

[14] For example, suppose that the items emphasized in the budgets and statements of each of two agencies received mention in a mean 10 per cent of the subcommittee's questions, and that in the case of one agency, all its activities—both those emphasized and unemphasized—received mention in a mean 5 per cent of the questions. The index of subcommittee non-reliance would then be 10 minus 5, or 5. If in the second agency's case all activities received mention in a mean 8 per cent of the subcommittee's questions, the index of subcommittee non-reliance would be 10 minus 8, or 2. The congressmen would be showing less reliance on the cues of the second agency. The data for this analysis came from the hearings of 1951, 1957 and 1963, chosen because they fall near the beginning, middle and end of the period studied.

[15] Because the Department Secretary and agency officials share an identity with the Administration, it might be said that the Secretary and his staff are not sufficiently independent of the agencies to be considered "non-agency" sources of information. Yet there are significant budget disputes between agency and departmental personnel. Department officials report in formal hearings and in interviews that agencies typically demand more funds than the department can allow them. From the agency view, the department is a brake against desirable expansion. Over the 1959–63 period, the department budget office reduced the requests of our sample agencies by $290.8 million, or 11 per cent of the agencies' original requests. In the hearings, departmental witnesses have been critical of agency operations. In contrast, none of the interest groups or non-subcommittee congressmen testifying in the odd years 1951–63 criticized agency operations. They either supported agency requests, or urged the replacement of budget cuts made by the department Budget Office or the Bureau of the Budget. The data for the analysis of subcommittee questioning of non-agency witnesses came from the hearings of 1961 and 1963, chosen because it has only been in recent years that the legislators have paid significant attention to non-agency witnesses.

TABLE II. AGENCY RANKINGS ON MEASURES OF SUBCOMMITTEE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

Measure	Agency ranking			
	OE	CB	FDA	HU
1. Subcommittee attention	1	2	3	4
2. Subcommittee thoroughness	4	2.5	2.5	1
3. Subcommittee incisiveness				
(a) Justification questions	1	3	2	4
(b) Cost questions	3	2	4	1
4. Independence of supervision				
(a) Non-reliance on agency cues	1	2	3	4
(b) Questioning non-agency sources	1	2	3	4
5. Control over expenditures	1	4	2	3
6. Control via Committee *Reports*	1	3	4	2
Mean ranking	1.6	2.6	2.9	2.9

tween the agency's request and the subcommittee's decision over the years 1959–63.[16]

(6) The subcommittee includes in its *Reports* directives about each agency's operations. A count of these provides a measure of control efforts by means of verbal instructions. The *Reports* used for this analysis are those written in 1951, 1957 and 1963.[17]

Table I provides the raw scores for each agency on the measures covered in the foregoing discussion. Table II provides the rankings for each agency on the various measures. In each case, the top rank of (1) indicates that an agency has been the subject of the most severe supervisory or control efforts.

Table I demonstrates the substantial differences in severity that mark the supervision and control efforts of subcommittee members toward agencies within their jurisdiction. However, Table II suggests that the subcommittee is not consistent in the degree of severity it maintains with respect to each agency. For instance, the Office of Education tends to receive a generally more severe treatment than the others dealt with—as defined by the mean rankings—but this is the only distinction among the agencies that is prominent across several measures. Somewhat less prominent is the finding that the Children's Bureau is treated more severely than the Food and Drug Administration and Howard University.

The Office of Education may receive greater attention than the others because its budget is substantially greater and has increased more rapidly. Or, the attention paid to OE may come as a result of its record of being more adventurous than the others in its disregard for subcommittee directives. A comparative study of agency behavior established that OE, among those covered, was most likely to evade questions asked by subcommittee members at the hearings, and most likely to disobey specific prohibitions that Committee *Reports* and appropriations acts imposed on policy. The subcommittee devoted a secondary level of supervisory and control efforts toward CB, and this agency scored second to OE in budget magnitude and aggressiveness *vis à vis* the subcommittee.[18]

The greater attention shown to OE and CB may not represent a conscious decision by the subcommittee members, so much as a subtle attraction to the affairs of agencies that are more prominent than others in the public eye. Just as the legislators are most likely to question items that are salient in the agencies' budgets or their witnesses' statements, so they may gravitate without design to more severe supervisory and control efforts for prominent agencies that spend much money and receive much political attention. My comparative study of agency activities demonstrated that more interest groups and non-subcommittee congressmen testify on behalf of OE than the other sample agencies, and that budget statements of the Department Secretary and the President devote more space to OE activities than to those of other units. CB was in second place on each of these measures. An analysis of representative news media might also reveal that they pay more attention to the affairs of OE and CB than to the others.[19]

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[16] It was only in these years that information about the agencies' original budget request to the Department Budget Office was included in the hearings record.

[17] These years were chosen because they fall near the beginning, middle and end of the research span.

[18] Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," *op. cit.*

Another finding indicated by Table II is that each of the sample agencies receives the brunt of rather severe supervision on some dimension of subcommittee activity. The Children's Bureau scores second highest in the average number of questions and cost questioning; the Food and Drug Administration scores second highest in justification questioning, and Howard University scores highest in the proportion of items covered by questioning, and in cost questioning. This may suggest that subcommittee members try to probe all agencies in at least some respect. They may be "fishing" for instances of errant administrative behavior, or trying to put the fear of discovery into the minds of any administrators who might contemplate a deviation from subcommittee wishes.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This study provides some systematically collected data about the behavior of an appropriations subcommittee in its dealings with four agencies. Evidently, the legislators vary their oversight activity among agencies. They devote more than the average amount of supervisory and control efforts to the agencies that spend the most money, whose requests have increased the most rapidly, and whose behavior toward the subcommittee has deviated most frequently from subcommittee desires. In a sense, they allocate their time and staff assistance to agencies most "in need" of supervision and control. If disproportionate attention to this type of agency is typical of legislative-executive budget relations, then it may be said that the legislators maximize their resources for oversight.

Beyond these specific conclusions, the study has shown the practicality of using content analysis of appropriations hearings to devise indexes of Committee behavior—crude indexes, to be sure, but sufficient to support objective rankings along various measures of attitudes and activities.

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[19] *Ibid.*

CONSENSUS AND CLEAVAGE IN BRITISH POLITICAL IDEOLOGY*

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One of the most perplexing questions to students of politics since the mid-1950s has been whether western societies are now approaching, or have reached, a condition called "the end of ideology." Numerous answers have been propounded, both by those who regard such a development as desirable and by those who view it with disquietude. But difficulties have arisen because exponents of one view or the other have had recourse to markedly different, and often shifting, concepts of the terms "ideology" and "end." If this important controversy is to be saved from sterility, social scientists must both reflect more upon the nature of the terms employed and descend from the level of sweeping cultural generalizations to examine the condition of ideology in particular political settings.

It is my purpose here to try to shed some light on the debate by surveying the state of political ideology in present-day Britain from the standpoint of two different uses of the term. My position is that if we adopt one view of ideology, we find that British politics are profoundly non-ideological; but if we define the concept in different but still meaningful terms, we discover that in fact it does play an important role in the British system. In other words, by compressing extant concepts of ideology into two distinct molds we may be able to fashion tools for judging the ideological condition of countries such as Britain. These I will designate the *Weltanschauung* and the "attitude structure" versions of the term.[1]

The first refers to the more traditional meaning of ideology, the alleged decline of which has occasioned the debate of the past decade. It has been characterized as a "comprehensive, consistent, closed system of knowledge, to which its adherents turn to get answers to all their questions, solutions to all their problems."[2] Its connotations are familiar: commitment (both intellectual and emotional), orientation toward action, distortion or simplification of reality, hostility to critics and opponents, and goal-orientation (often of the millennial variety). Perhaps its best-known paradigms are classical Christianity and classical Marxism.

The conception of ideology as attitude structure is more difficult to set forth because it falls short of the total belief system and tight logic of a "world view." Like a *Weltanschauung*, it partakes of a generalized view of man; it has moral and normative content; it "places" the individual in relation to his fellows; and it calls forth commitment and points to desirable actions. It consists of many separate but related attitudes which function to relate, and give meaning to, the different political events experienced by the individual. On the other hand, this concept of ideology is less apt to provide its holders with a total explanation of life or a full vision of human destiny. It is more earthbound, culture-bound and diffused, both in its sources and its scope. Ideology in this sense refers to a more or less institutionalized set of beliefs about man and society.[3] It is likely to be a composite of prevailing generalized views of man, the goals that he does and should seek, the means he uses to achieve them, the outlook for progress under present or alternative institutions, and so forth. Because such an ideology may have many sources, it is less likely than the "big" world views to be intellectualized, comprehensive, systematic or consistent, and more likely to be fragmentary, limited, even inconsistent. Yet when political man operates with reference to this organized bundle of views, he may derive from it some of the certainty and security that accompany a commitment to fuller, better articulated ideologies. While undoubtedly many would reject this use of the term, it is noteworthy that most of those who have attempted to measure the presence and effects of ideology in the Anglo-American polity have favored this definition, or one similar to it.[4]

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* A paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September, 1964.

[1] For discussion of the varieties and uses of the concept, see David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (November, 1961), pp. 317–31, and Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, 1962), ch. 1.

[2] Herbert J. Spiro, *Government by Constitution* (New York, 1959), p. 180.

[3] Milton Rokeach *et al.*, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York, 1960), p. 35.

[4] Among them Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), ch. 9; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in

Without attempting here to defend my preference for viewing ideology in this two-fold way, I would assert that an awareness of the distinction is necessary for any exploration of the state of ideology in Britain today. In addition, I make two other assumptions that need to be stated explicitly. First, I am assuming that the pertinent kind of ideology for this discussion is one with a fairly direct *political* implication, *i.e.*, one which relates to questions involving the relations of rulers and ruled and the principles of goverance. While these aspects of ideology may be torn from a larger context (general belief systems), no attempt will be made to delve into such related problems as the psychological functions served by the holding of ideologies.[5] Second, I proceed on the assumption that a country's ideology is not wholly concentrated among its intellectuals and political leaders, but in a participant political culture like the British also operates in and is expressed by the lives of "average people." For this reason, it will be necessary to examine (in Lane's terms) both *forensic* ideologies—the articulated, differentiated, well developed political arguments put forth consciously by the elite—and *latent* ideologies—the loosely structured and often unreflective statements of the common man—and to see how they relate to each other.

I. THE REJECTION OF TOTAL IDEOLOGY

The kind of ideology associated with a complete world view emerged and flourished under certain historical and social conditions. Many of these conditions were indeed present during the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the so-called "age of ideology,"[6] just as they appear to be present today in a number of the new developing countries.[7] Ideology in this sense seemed to flourish especially in societies that experienced the upheavals of modernization in violent and concerted forms—that pitted classes and religious groups against each other in passionate struggle, that aroused a strong sense of deprivation among underdogs and losers, and that fragmented the community into subcultures alienated from the value patterns of the dominant political system. Put another way, total ideologies were most likely to gain ground in societies with political systems that failed both the test of effectiveness (success in solving the problems put onto them) and the test of legitimacy (widespread agreement on their propriety).[8] Where these conditions are lacking, or disappearing, it has been argued, ideology of this variety cannot really flower. Recent critics have extended the argument to read that when a society achieves modernity (seen as a matter of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, economic prosperity, middle class expansion and working class access to political power), then the passionate attachment to total ideology not only subsides, but becomes dangerously dysfunctional to the system.[9]

I have no desire to put an oar into the choppy seas of this latter controversy. My point is simply that Britain has not provided the conditions favoring the growth of this kind of ideological thinking. The British have shown a marked disinclination to take up total ideologies for a host of reasons, many of which are familiar and only a few of which can be mentioned here.[10] In the past three hundred years

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American Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (June, 1964), pp. 361–82; Robert E. Lane, *op. cit.;* and S. E. Finer, H. B. Berrington, and D. J. Bartholomew, *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955–59* (Oxford, 1961), chs. 2–3. *Cf.* Bernard Crick, *In Defense of Politics* (Chicago, 1962), p. 50: "Politics is an activity and so cannot be reduced to a system of precise beliefs or to a set of fixed goals. Political thinking is to be contrasted to ideological thinking . . . the idea of an ideology of freedom is a contradiction in terms."

[5] For an example, see M. Brewster Smith *et al., Opinions and Personality* (New York, 1956).

[6] Frederick M. Watkins, *The Age of Ideology—Political Thought, 1750 to the Present* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964).

[7] Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., *The Ideologies of the Developing Countries* (New York, 1963).

[8] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960), chs. 2–3.

[9] Notable examples are Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, 1960); S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93 (Winter, 1964), pp. 271–303, and *Political Man*, pp. 403–17; Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," *Social Research*, Vol. 24 (1957), pp. 127–56; and Mark Abrams, "Party Politics After the End of Ideology," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 56–63.

[10] "The term 'ideology' is not in very good odour in serious political discussion in this country, except in purely historical or descriptive connections. The grounds of the distaste for the term centre around the feeling, perhaps, that an ideology is something totalitarian in tendency, or at least involves an uncompromising fanaticism inappropriate to liberal democracy of the British type." Bernard Williams, "Democracy and Ideology," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 32 (Oct.–Dec. 1961), p. 374.

Britain has avoided, or seriously blunted, the traumatic revolutions that many other countries have undergone, and the main changes in its political, economic and social systems have occurred gradually. The mounting demands of disadvantaged groups have been met in a piecemeal way, with the result that with the exception of the Irish (whose fate was finally settled by truncation) no major group has failed to be integrated in some way into the political system. As is well known, neither the communists nor the fascists have gained substantial followings or political leverage. The non-revolutionary character of the British working class is equally well known; and while a distinct working class subculture may exist, as Williams and Hoggart have argued, it does not involve working class alienation from the values of the *political* system.[11] Social mobility in Britain may not be as great as elsewhere, but it has always been present and visible, and with the postwar changes in the educational system and the rapid expansion of white collar occupations, most Britons see it as increasing.

Another explanation for the lack of enthusiasm for total ideologies is imbedded deep in British political culture: it is the much-cited attachment to precedents and usage in preference to the logic of rational blueprints. In a system where there is widespread agreement on fundamental institutions and on a considerable range of current policies, it is possible to operate without continual reference to eternal verities, large schema, or articulated belief systems. The tendency to settle issues on the basis of accepted usages and through the means of implicit "understandings" is indeed great, to the frustration of those who plump for a fuller rehearsal of arguments or an enlightening confrontation of basic doctrine. Whether the source of this political style is the common law tradition, the evolutionary character of the British constitution, the norms of parliamentary and bureaucratic behavior, or the social homogeneity of the ruling elite is impossible to ascertain, and really beside the point. Political styles develop from many sources. They are bound to be both causes and effects of other phenomena. What can be asserted is that British political leaders have become habituated to thinking in terms of concrete problems and familiar responses; and that this—when coupled with a general complacency toward the outputs of such behavior—serves as a barrier, a disincentive, to the adoption of total ideologies. Thus, however circular the logic may seem, the British tend to be immune to extreme ideological views because they have not been used to thinking along these lines, and they have no strong motivation to abandon the habit.

The point can be put more strongly. Pragmatic norms in Britain have been elevated into something approaching a national cult—so much so, I would argue, that we can speak without sophistry of an ideology of pragmatism, which serves as a foil to the ideology of total ends. For many Britons pragmatism is not simply a descriptive term for the way they approach or grapple with political problems; it is also a particularly British virtue and an object of pride, which they would not trade for what they consider to be the inflexible, irrevocable, and inhumane (in the sense of denying the variety of human nature) qualities of this or that "world view." Thus pragmatism easily becomes imbued with nationalistic affect, and preference for it is supported by other values into which Britons are socialized. The content of this socialization is both positive and negative in character: positive in the sense that Britons learn, both from formal teaching and from informally picking up the views of those around them, that the success and stability of the British parliamentary system is due in large part to the pragmatic frame of mind displayed by its practitioners; and negative in the sense that they also learn that the turbulent, unstable and often grotesque pattern of Continental politics derives from the European habit of looking at the world through the distorting spectacles of total ideologism. What they have learned may be a caricature, but it has had consequences. It has, for example, affected the British Labour Party's relationship with the European socialist movement; it has been partly responsible for the lack of enthusiasm for venturing too fully into experiments in European integration, and undoubtedly it has helped strengthen Britain's relationships with the United States and the older Commonwealth—peoples reputed to be fellow pragmatists under the white skin.

These conditions, and many more, add up to a general climate in which the total ideological structuring of politics is difficult to achieve. The skeptic might counter that the case has yet to be proved, that these generalizations are no more than the accumulated clichés of historians and journalists, who have selected their examples to suit their preconceived case. Fortunately, political scientists have begun to amass more empirical data bearing on the subject and tending to confirm these assertions. Thus far, to be sure, no one has made a comprehensive, systematic exploration of the distribution of ideological propensities among the British people or the political elite. We have, for example, no British counterparts of the extensive surveys of political attitudes made by the Michigan Survey Research Center and by McClosky, Prothro and Grigg, or of the intensive psychoanalytical probing by Lane into the political ideologies of a handful of east coast residents.[12] Nevertheless, in the past several years a small number of rigorous empirical studies of the character and distribution of British political attitudes have appeared, and in an indirect way they offer evidence as to the role of ideology in contemporary British political thinking, both at the mass level and among political activists.

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[11] Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (London, 1961); Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, 1957).

If it can be shown that the mass of Britons are not alienated from the system in which they live, that they look tolerantly on those who hold different political beliefs, and that they tend not to be polarized on policies presumed to be highly charged with ideological affect, then we can reasonably conclude that total ideology has not taken hold of them. And if we can demonstrate further that this same pattern prevails among the political elite as well, we will have further confirmation of the generalization.

Data on Alienation. In an ambitious cross-national survey carried out in 1959, Almond and Verba found that the British ranked comparatively low on social and political alienation and high on willingness to trust and cooperate with other people. For example, 84 per cent of the British sample agreed with the statement, "Human nature is fundamentally cooperative," compared to 80 per cent of the Americans, 58 per cent of the Germans and 55 per cent of the Italians. Another query designed to measure generalized trust ("Most people can be trusted") drew affirmative replies from 49 per cent of the British, 55 per cent of the Americans, 19 per cent of the Germans, and five per cent of the Italians.[13] Almond and Verba not only find in the United States and Britain a widespread belief that people are basically cooperative, trustworthy and helpful; they also show that in these countries social trust is translated into politically relevant trust, thus reducing the alienation of people from the system. From spontaneous and unstructured responses to another survey question designed to test emotional attachment to certain aspects of the nation, the same investigators found that the features mentioned as objects of pride most frequently by Britons were their country's governmental and political system (46 per cent), its social legislation (18 per cent), and its position in international affairs (11 per cent). (Only three, one and two per cent, respectively, of the Italians who were asked the same question named these areas as objects of pride. They chose instead the physical attributes of their country [25 per cent], contributions to the arts [16 per cent], and "nothing" [27 per cent].)[14] These are admittedly fragments of indirect evidence, but they seem to point to the presence in Britain of the kind of social and emotional climate in which total ideologies are not apt to flourish.

Intensity of Partisanship. A related consideration is the strength of partisan feeling that runs through a country. If we assume that in the modern state the political party is likely to be a major channel for the expression of ideological thinking, then one would expect to find in countries characterized by *Weltanschauung* politics a high degree of hostility among one party's followers toward rival partisans. Here again, recent surveys of British attitudes show this to be far from the case. While the images of their own and the opposite party's supporters held by Britons are somewhat sharper and more polarized than in the United States, they fall far short of intense hostility. Almond and Verba did find that 28 per cent of Conservative party supporters, and 29 per cent of Labour party supporters, believed that "selfish people" support the opposite party; that nearly one-fourth of the Conservative respondents viewed Labourites as "ignorant and misguided," and that 10 per cent of the Labour respondents characterized Conservatives as "militarists and imperialists." On the other hand, almost no followers of either party (three per cent in each case) accepted the view that the followers of the other were "betrayers of freedom and welfare."[15] Furthermore, when asked the hypothetical question, "How would you feel if your son or daughter married a supporter of the Labour (Conservative) party?", only 12 per cent of Conservatives and three per cent of Labourities expressed displeasure at the thought of intermarriage, and 87 and 97 per cent, respectively, professed indifference.[16]

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[12] Campbell *et al., op. cit.;* Herbert McClosky, *op. cit.;* Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (June, 1960), pp. 406–27; James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 22 (May, 1960), pp. 276–94; Lane, *op. cit.*

[13] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963), p. 267, Table 4.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 102, Table 1.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 126, Table 2.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 136, Table 8.

An even stronger indication of the tolerance of the British electorate toward political opponents is found in the results of the survey made in 1960 by Mark Abrams for *Socialist Commentary* magazine. On the basis of that poll, Abrams reported that

> . . . between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of Labour supporters thought that the Conservatives could do as well as their own party in standing for the nation as a whole, in giving fair treatment to all races, in respecting British traditions, and in working for world peace and against nuclear war. Of those who opposed Labour, at least 40 per cent were prepared to describe Labour as equally qualified with the Conservatives in giving fair treatment to all races, working for peace, and opposing nuclear war.[17]

The same survey revealed that supporters of both parties, as well as uncommitted voters, when asked to choose the characteristics they looked for in a good party leader, picked identical traits in the same order and nearly the same degree—the top three being strong leadership, willingness to make unwelcome decisions, and honesty and sincerity.[18]

Policy Attitudes. This tendency toward doctrinal flexibility within the electorate can also be demonstrated by referring to policy attitudes which, in view of their historical importance to the parties, are apt to be imbued with considerable ideological affect. Consider the concept of nationalization, which for many years was linked by the Labour movement with the ideas of economic rationality and social equality, and which was painted by Conservatives as the epitome of economic tyranny and socialist inefficiency. The *Socialist Commentary* poll found "no homogeneous, blanket attitude toward public ownership," and concluded that "views on this subject are apparently not the outcome of either blind faith or blind rejection."[19] When asked to assess the condition of the nationalized industries, Conservative and Labour voters made practically identical judgments, discriminating mainly on the grounds of performance rather than ideology. For example, among Conservatives favorable attitudes toward public ownership exceeded unfavorable ones for four of the industries (electricity, gas, atomic energy and the airlines), while more Labour supporters termed the nationalization of coal and the railways a failure than a success. Eighty-four per cent of Conservatives and 58 per cent of Labourites expressed themselves as opposed to any further nationalization. Finally, when asked more generally how much government regulation of industry they thought was necessary, 10 per cent of the Conservatives and only 18 per cent of the Labourites chose "a good deal," while at the other pole 25 per cent of the Conservatives and 10 per cent of the Labourites replied "practically none." Majorities in both parties accepted the need for a fair amount of regulation, and within each there was goodly support for the "wrong" ideological position on this issue.[20]

Low tension between party supporters also tends to characterize foreign policy attitudes. This is borne out by the analysis made by Davis and Verba of British mass opinions during the period 1947–56 on selected foreign policy issues, many of them presumed to be vested with ideological affect. The polls they examined dealt with respondents' orientations toward the following issues: internationalism, armament, colonialism, the choice between the United States and the Soviet Union, European alliances, the Far Eastern policy.[21] On only 13 per cent of the questions was there a low degree of interparty agreement, as compared with 59 per cent high agreement; and had the Suez crisis not been included, the interparty differences would have virtually disappeared. Davis and Verba conclude that "for the most part adherents to any one political party generally express the same sorts of opinions on international issues as adherents to another party; and a high degree of unity within a party is not so much evidence that the party tends to unify the sentiments of its supporters as that it expresses the sentiments of a highly unified nation."[22]

Insofar, then, as the attitudes of the mass public reveal the extent of ideological modes of thinking, these varied data show not only that a good deal of pragmatism does prevail, but also that the conditions associated with the politics of total ideology—distrust of and hostility to opposing views, a considerable alienation from societal values, and marked polarization on policy questions—are not characteristic of contemporary Britain. It is still conceivable, of course, that these attitudes are not shared by the elite among political activists, and we must now turn briefly to an examination of this possibility.

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[17] Mark Abrams, Richard Rose, and Rita Hinden, *Must Labour Lose?* (Harmondsworth, 1960), p. 19.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 35–36.

[21] Morris Davis and Sidney Verba, "Party Affiliation and International Opinions in Britain and France, 1947–1956," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (Winter, 1960), pp. 590–604.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 601.

Again it must be noted that full and systematic data on the basic beliefs of British political leaders are lacking.[23] Nevertheless, several important studies of elite opinion in Britain have appeared recently. They indicate that ideological views at this level too, while more substantial and coherent than within the general public, are not especially prevalent and tend to keep conflict within manageable bounds. The studies that I shall cite here are those of constituency party attitudes and backbench opinion in the House of Commons.

For some time it has been assumed that the real seat of ideologism in the British political system is the parties' constituency associations. The argument runs something like this: while the top parliamentary leaders of the major parties must blunt any ideological tendencies they might have, for electoral reasons as well as because they are dealing with the realities of governing, the activists who man the local parties are not under these constraints and thus are more likely to be involved in politics for reasons of ideological principle. They work zealously for their party not to advance their own careers, but to further the abstract principles in which they believe passionately. They are more likely to be purists or extremists, more reactionary than the national leadership if they are Conservatives, more radically socialist than the national leadership if they are Labourites. Several demonstrations of this pattern appeared in the 1950s, notably the continuing support for Bevanism in the constituency Labour parties and the stiff punishment meted out to leftward deviating Conservative M.P.s by Conservative associations when their Members failed to support the government on issues such as capital punishment and Suez.[24] These gave the impression that the constituency parties are apt to be composed of die-hard, dogmatic, irresponsible ideologues, who are neither representative of grassroots partisan thinking nor, unless they are kept at arm's length from policy-making, assets to responsible party leadership.

This argument has some validity, although a closer look at the local parties shows it to be quite exaggerated. In a painstaking study of resolutions sent by local parties to the annual conferences from 1955 to 1960, Rose has shown that the image of local parties "as a force constantly pressing extremist views upon national leaders" is overdrawn.[25] He found, for example, that the total proportion of resolutions containing ideological elements was 54 per cent, while the remaining 46 per cent dealt with nonpartisan questions of little ideological content—expressing mainly views derived from general cultural values or specific interest group demands. Furthermore, most of the resolutions Rose classifies as ideological were simply in line with the standard programs of the parties (*e.g.*, concerning support for or opposition to the present organization of secondary education, the need for or danger of more economic planning, and so on) and were a far cry from the categories of total ideology. Rose also analyzed the resolutions for their "extremism" content, *i.e.*, whether they deviated markedly from the prevailing doctrine of the party in the direction of purism. He found that in the period in question 66 per cent of Conservative and 38 per cent of Labour associations had submitted no extremist resolutions whatever; while in 11 per cent of Conservative and 18 per cent of Labour associations, over half the submitted resolutions were of this variety.[26] Rather than finding these attitudes to be geographically concentrated in a few constituency parties, however—which might function as party subcultures—Rose determined that they were randomly distributed around the country. So he concluded that there is much less hot partisanship in the local parties than has been thought, and that the supposed doctrinal differences between these parties on the one hand, and either rank and file party voters or parliamentary leaders on the other, are really not great.

We have also recently been given a glimpse of the attitude structure of the House of Commons in the research of Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew of Keele University.[27] Recognizing that strict party discipline and caucus decision-making have made it virtually impossible to penetrate behind the unified ranks of the Division List into the real attitudes of individual M.P.s, the Keele group turned instead to an analysis of another expression of parliamentary opinion—the Early Day Motion—which is both publicly available and amenable to statistical treatment. Motions of this type can be made by any M.P. and customarily are signed by those who agree with their expressed sentiments—occasionally as many as 300 Members. They are rarely debated, and support for them is not subject to the party whip. By tradition they are never signed by the Government or its Whips, and seldom by members of the Opposition front bench; hence their description as "spontaneous unwhipped backbench manifestoes." Obviously any study of these motions is subject to the difficulty that these expressions are often casually made and are not always representative of total parliamentary attitudes. Still, when examined in quantity they afford a rough-and-ready profile of one type of leadership attitudes.

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[23] Herbert McClosky's studies of the ideological differences between political leaders and the electorate in the United States, for example, have no British counterpart. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *loc. cit.*

[24] Leon D. Epstein, *Britain—Uneasy Ally* (Chicago, 1954), chs. 5–7; Epstein, *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* (Urbana, 1964), ch. 6; and Nigel Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London, 1958).

[25] Richard Rose, "The Political Ideas of British Party Activists," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), p. 364.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 366.

[27] S. E. Finer *et al.*, *Backbench Opinion*, *op. cit.*

The Keele study focused on nearly 300 Early Day Motions signed by Labour and Conservative M.P.s from 1955 to 1959. They included 111 cross-bench motions and 178 motions signed by members of a single party, again revealing the absence of watertight exclusiveness among dedicated partisans. On the Labour side, the study showed—both in the subject of the motions and in the extent of their support—a fairly unified set of concerns and positive correlations between different attitudes. Thus on the seven sets of attitudes which the authors group as "the syndrome of socialism"—humanitarianism, civil liberties, foreign policy, welfare, cost of living, health and education—all attitudes were correlated, on the average, to the degree of .267.[28] But when examined separately, as pairs, these attitudes showed marked differences in their distribution among various types of M.P.s (such as trade-union sponsored, cooperative sponsored, and constituency-party supported Members). In particular, a group of about fifty Labour M.P.s consistently supported all the motions with maximum zeal, forming "the permanent core of the otherwise fluctuating Left." In the judgment of the Keele group, the data from the Early Motions bear out the view that British socialism, at least as represented by Labour backbenchers, does not repose on a single coherent universalistic body of doctrine but instead is better described as "a set of propositions or attitudes, which when all or many of them are simultaneously held, constitute socialism."[29]

The Keele group's data for the Conservatives tend to confirm the impression that it is extremely difficult to find clear-cut ideology or even persistent left-center-right factions in this party. While positive correlations were established among a few issues (*e.g.*, attitudes toward Suez policy and penal reform, social progressivism and concern for civil liberties, devotion to national sovereignty and attachment to the Commonwealth), numerous ideological inconsistencies emerged: *e.g.*, many Conservatives displayed enthusiasm for both social reform at home and militant policies abroad, for both world government and intervention in Suez. In contrast to the attitudes of Labour backbenchers, those of the Conservatives did not scale statistically and could only loosely be termed a syndrome. If these data are persuasive, then apparently the average Conservative M.P. does not approach his tasks from a prepared emotional or intellectual position, but rather, as the Keele group has put it, "the Conservative party acts or thinks as unrelated, *ad hoc* groups of Members, groups whose members join together to contend for one specific objective, and then fall apart once the goal has been attained or has been by-passed by events."[30]

II. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSENSUS AND CLEAVAGE

If Britain lacks the normal concomitants of the politics of total ideology, she is not altogether free of the pull of ideology in the second sense that I have used the term. The British political system manifests certain important beliefs which, though they do not add up to a *Weltanschauung*, nevertheless embody values and principles of action connected to larger views of man, society and the state. These attitudes, however general, affect the functioning of political institutions, and substantial changes in them, when they occur, are likely to be reflected in the balance of the political order. I have mentioned a few of them in the preceding section, in the context of an effort to deny the grip of sterner doctrines on the British people. For example, it seems quite clear that two ideological elements which facilitate democratic politics—a relatively optimistic and trusting view of human nature, and a measure of toleration of political opponents—have a firm place in present British attitudes. In this section I will discuss briefly several more of these elements and show not only some of their consequences for politics, but also some recent additions to more firmly established, historic beliefs. Finally, I will attempt to give the character and flavor of various recent challenges to this bundle of attitudes. No attempt can be made here to present a comprehensive inventory of such beliefs, or to offer empirical evidence of their distribution, salience or intensity.

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

My argument is not only that certain attitudes in Britain fulfill the functions of an ideology; it is also that they serve as forces making for a balance between consensus and cleavage in the political system. Obviously these attitudes may be deeply held by some Britons and only casually by others. But the overall effect is the maintenance of a moving balance between general agreement on some values and well distributed disagreement on others—the conditions Parsons refers to as a "limited polarization of society."[31]

Consensus. To illustrate both the persistence and changing character of the political belief system, four ideological elements will be cited as fundamentally consensual in nature: the conception of governmental leadership, devotion to procedures, "pragmatism," and the "new feudalism." The first three have been constants in British thinking for many decades, while the last-named has entered the consensual stage only recently.

Britons are widely agreed that the principal duty and task of government is to govern: however important it may be in this age to couple the authority of government with a substantial measure of mass participation, the more populistic elements should not be allowed to paralyze the powers of the Crown. This attitude is a mixture of predemocratic attachment to the notion of a natural ruling class and a recognition that democratic government requires stable and responsible leadership, on the one hand, and a commitment to mass participation and the control of governmental experts and elites by amateurs and non-elites, on the other hand. Its importance as an attitudinal underpinning of political behavior cannot be overestimated. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the modern British parliament is its provision and maintenance of a stable majority that permits the government to rule legitimately. Numerous informal institutions which facilitate the conduct of parliamentary business, such as Cabinet hegemony, party discipline and the circumscribed powers of backbench M.P.s, can be linked directly to a general acceptance of the need for strong leadership. This is not simply the ideology of the political elite, for the norm pervades British society in a wider sense. For example, respondents to *Socialist Commentary's* 1960 poll, when presented with a list of 15 possible characteristics of a good party leader, opted most for "strong leadership" (56 per cent) and "strength to make unwelcome decisions" (47 per cent). Conservative and Labour supporters showed no significant difference in their preference for these qualities.[32] No evidence suggests any weakening in this attitude in recent years; on the contrary, if anything it seems to be increasing in its pervasiveness.

The flavor of ideological commitment attaches also to the place of procedures in the British polity. Whereas they may display flexibility and a willingness to bargain over the content of public policy, the British often show an unbending dogmatism in regard to the process by which policy is established. As Eckstein has aptly observed, " . . . the British invest with very high affect the procedural aspects of their government and with very low affect its substantive aspects; they behave like ideologists in regard to rules and like pragmatists in regard to policies."[33] Numerous examples of this disposition might be cited. The intricate fabric of rules, formal and informal, that bear on the conduct of Parliament has shown amazing resistance to reform, despite the enlarged scope of governmental activity and the agitation for more efficient methods coming from both inside and outside Westminster. Many of them have developed their own mystique and are approached by M.P.s of almost every stripe as akin to absolute values. Interest groups are likely to refuse to accept policies affecting them if they have not been consulted during their formulation. The parties have shown themselves willing to examine critically, and often to abandon, a number of their historic policies; but almost invariably they have held firm in their attachment to time-honored procedures, which are seen as fundamental agencies of legitimation. Thus, the closer it came to actual power, the more the Labour Party divested itself of its radical system-reformers and stressed its adherence to the traditional rules of the game. Conceivably it was their acceptance of the ideology of parliamentarism as much as their growing middle class character that made Labour leaders palatable to large numbers of non-socialists in the electorate.

When important procedural questions on occasion become mixed with arguments over the substance of policy, the temperature of politics rises appreciably; or, alternatively, disputes over procedure tend to elbow out those over content. The heated Commons debates at the time of the Suez crisis are a case in point. A sitting of the House had to be suspended by the Speaker because of an uproar caused by the refusal of the Prime Minister to answer what Labour M.P.s believed to be a legitimate parliamentary question (whether the country was or was not at war with Egypt),[34] and almost as much criticism was leveled at Eden for allegedly not consulting with his own parliamentary supporters and the leader of the Opposition on government plans as was directed against the wisdom of his decision to take military action.[35] A concentration and fixity of dogmatic concern tend to attach to this one aspect of the political system, then, even if they do not carry over into other areas equally.

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[31] "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 92.

[32] *Must Labour Lose?, op. cit.*, p. 25. These were multiple responses.

[33] Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 30–31.

A third component of this ideological structure, also deeply embedded in British political culture and high in affect, is the concept of pragmatism, already noted. It has come to be shorthand for the belief that sweeping change is unnecessary and dangerous, that effective change is that which comes gradually and builds on, rather than obliterates, previous forms and practices. The test of any institution or any policy, accordingly, is not its esthetic form or logical consistency but its success in performing the fairly immediate task for which it is designed. Anomalies and loose ends are no problem. The rhetoric of British politics is filled with tributes to this mode of thinking (*e.g.*, "Britain is ruled not by logic but by Parliament" [Disraeli]; "Logic is a poor guide compared with custom" [Churchill]), and no description of the working of basic institutions, from the City of London to the University Grants Committee, seems complete without the proffered explanation that "It may seem odd to you, but it works."[36] Pragmatism is bred into the bones of modern Britons by a self-conscious celebration of its virtues and an insistence that it serve as the most suitable guide to political decision-making.

The attachment to larger principles may often be modified or supplemented by an equally intense belief that translation of these principles into practice should take pragmatic form. The policies adopted by the two major parties toward nationalization and colonialism are illustrative of this tempering. Not only did Labour go slow in implementing the social ideal of public ownership when the party came to power in 1945; it also devoted much of the 1950s to a reappraisal of the place of nationalization in its program, with the resultant de-emphasis—but not extinction—of the older ideal. Conversely, traditional Conservative opposition to nationalization did not prevent the party when in power from retaining in the public sector most of the industries nationalized by its predecessor. Again, though dedicated to ending colonialism and raising the remaining outposts of empire to self-governing status, the Labour Government began gradually by concentrating on the Asian flank, and left to succeeding Conservative governments the continuation of the process, step by step, in Africa and the Caribbean. The defense of these actions, as with nationalization, has been largely in terms of the kind of pragmatic outlook that Britons understand and approve.

Pragmatism, then, is closely related to other basic beliefs—in stability, in peaceful solutions, in mixed institutions, and in the legitimating effect of gradual change. It serves as a brake on rapid, root-and-branch societal transformation. In practice, it may also have the effect of reinforcing a preference for amateurs (who are presumed to be more pragmatic in their outlooks) over specialists and technicians (who are thought more likely to be narrow dogmatists—in Keynes's famous jibe, "slaves of some defunct economist"). As I will show very shortly, critics may be found to argue that pragmatism has been raised into a dangerous cult which the country can no longer afford to perpetuate; but of the pervasive hold of pragmatism on British political thinking there can be little doubt.

These three elements of consensus—belief in leadership, attachment to procedures, and pragmatism—have been present in British political culture for many years. Nevertheless, the composition of the bundle of attitudes that comprise the ideology is not static or immutable. As society changes and the role of government is modified, basic attitudes are also likely to undergo transformation. One of the most important recent ideological adjustments involves changing attitudes toward the private and public spheres of British life. These newer attitudes, sometimes referred to as "the new feudalism," parallel ideologically the development of the welfare state and the highly controlled economy. They are attitudinal adjustments to the new balance of social forces created by corporatist developments in the polity, which have given to many private groups what amounts to veto power over public policy. The vast responsibilities now thrown onto government can be carried out only if important affected groups in society agree to go along. By withholding capital, talents or cooperation such groups could make a shambles of any government's program. The requirements of this quasi-corporatism evoke the danger that Britain might reach what Samuel Beer has called the point of "pluralistic stagnation."[37] One reason why this has not yet materialized is that, as Beer has noted, the Keynesian revolution in economics succeeded after the Second World War in altering popular ideas about the role of government and the pursuit of unlimited private gain. In particular, the almost complete acceptance of the neo-mercantilism associated with Keynesian doctrine, which gives to government the role once played by Adam Smith's "invisible hand," provides new standards for judging group values, demands and behavior. In a sense the ethic of bargaining has displaced what has remained of the ethic of competition, and personal acquisitiveness has given way in large measure to the search for security guaranteed by the community. Put another way, despite the powers of blackmail inherent in the position of interest groups in British society today, the potentialities of this power have generally been held in check by a consensus derived in part from the recognition of governmental responsibility for maintaining the economic equilibrium and in part from the decline of acquisitiveness in favor of the more medieval standard of just rewards. The acceptance of a national incomes policy, for example, depends upon the pervasiveness of this attitude.

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[34] 558 *House of Commons Debates* 1620–25 (Nov. 1, 1956). For more discussion of the significance of the procedural aspects of the crisis, see Richard Rose, *Politics in England* (Boston, 1964), pp. 232–33.

[35] Epstein, *British Politics in the Suez Crisis, op. cit.*, ch. 5; Robert T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, 2d ed. (London, 1963), pp. 585–89.

[36] Anthony Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain* (London, 1962), *passim*.

Cleavage. Along with these consensual elements, other basic attitudes divide the British community and foster some degree of ideological tension. Some of the forces making for cleavage are built into the political party system; others are less organized and function as generalized outside pressures. Broadly speaking, this constitutes the distinction between party competition on the one hand and intellectual criticism on the other. I shall deal first with ideological differences between and within the two main parties and second with the challenges to the prevailing ideology from the outsiders.

In spite of the growing trend toward interparty agreement on many policies, the Conservative and Labour parties continue to espouse somewhat different conceptions of human nature, society and the state. Their ideological centers of gravity are distinct, and to the extent that activists and supporters are socialized into the historic norms of the parties, significant differences between them will remain. Even when they are forced to support similar programs, it is often for basically different reasons. The ideologies of the parties do not function solely as symbols and myths; they are potentially operative (so long as they have not atrophied completely), and on occasion they fix the boundaries and direction of policy decisions. For Conservatives, the belief in the naturalness and usefulness of inequality, the inevitability of hierarchy, and the positive values of nationalism and empire may have been muted by the necessities of Britain's contemporary situation, but it has not been abandoned in favor of a wholly different value system. Similarly, Labour's attachment to the values of equality, social democracy, classlessness and pacifism, while also tempered by the exigencies of the moment, has remained fairly fixed. As a motivation and a standard for political action, it has not declined to the level of cynical rhetoric. So long as this ideological gap between the parties continues to be perceived by their partisans—and I believe that at the moment it still is—talk of the politics of Tweedledum and Tweedledee is premature.[38]

In addition, each party has within its ranks militant individuals and groups concerned with preserving the party's doctrinal purity and historic values. The persistence of such forces, which may or may not take the form of factions, cannot be disregarded as strictly of nuisance value, for they often represent ideological cleavages within the electorate as well. As ideological pressure groups within the party's structure they may serve to set limits beyond which the leadership ventures at its peril. The Labour Party has long been beset by internal doctrinal cleavages, which not only affect the struggle for leadership but create an image with the electorate. During the 1950s and early 1960s, for instance, the party was almost constantly engaged in internecine disputes between left-wing factions and the dominant right-wing leadership. The splits that occurred over the Bevanite view of socialist priorities, over German rearmament, over the status of the commitment to nationalization, and over nuclear disarmament are familiar examples. In each case the disagreement turned at least in part on the question of how strictly the party should adhere to the historic body of doctrine known as "socialism" and "socialist foreign policy." And while the Attlee-Gaitskell forces were usually successful in fending off the left-wing accusations that they had betrayed the fundamental tenets of the Labour movement, the leadership could not afford to be wholly impervious to the substantial body of opinion represented by the Beavanites and their successors. Nor, as the disputes over the party's constitution and over nuclear weapons revealed, was the moderate leadership able to subjugate the radical wing so completely as to foreclose the possibility of a resurgence of doctrinaire opinions within important sections of the party. When Gaitskell attempted after the 1959 election defeat to persuade the party to amend Clause IV of its constitution in the direction of virtually eliminating the commitment to nationalization, he was set upon not only by the left but also the center of the party, and forced to beat a hasty retreat. The controversy over Clause IV showed convincingly that the ideological reflexes of the party are not atrophied, and that electoral calculation has not completely replaced them as the mainspring of Labour's program.[39]

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[37] "... the extent of group power ... means that the country has gone so far as to reach the point of moving with unanimity or not at all." Samuel H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this Review, Vol. 50 (March, 1956), pp. 15–16.

[38] One study asserts that only a decided minority of the electorate seems to be able to appraise the ideologies of the parties in any meaningful way. Donald E. Stokes, "Ideological Competition of British Parties," paper given at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1964.

The Conservative Party is much more homogeneous than Labour in its social composition, its relation to outside groups, and its public loyalty to its leadership. But it is not altogether free of ideological dissension. It has its stalwart and reformist elements, who occasionally succeed in moving the party in one direction or the other, often on the basis of very different views of man and society. These forces are apt to take a rather different form from their counterparts on the Labour side. Whereas in the Labour Party the usual instrument of ideological dissension is the faction, a stable set of politicians organized for political activity, the more common form among the Conservatives is what Rose refers to as a "tendency," a stable set of attitudes expressed in Parliament by less organized, more fluctuating groups of politicians. Thus as the Keele study of backbench opinion made clear, the Conservative leadership has encountered significant internal party opposition on a number of issues invested with ideological affect, such as crime and punishment, colonialism, and the maintenance of free enterprise (*e.g.*, public vs. private television). However, the M.P.s who pressed dogmatic views on these issues did not form a stable group but tended to fall apart and regroup along different lines when other controversies arose. Single issues, such as the Suez crisis, may split Conservatives into right, left and center groups, with strong ideological disputation between the extremes; but continuing factionalism, with the risk of intra-party polarization, runs counter to the traditional Conservative belief in loyalty to the chosen leadership. The Conservative Party, like Labour, shows both consensus and cleavage on ideological questions. Unlike the pattern in the Labour Party, the Conservative balance is skewed strongly in the direction of consensus, with ideology generally secondary to more tangible interests.

The overall picture of the condition of ideology in Britain shows, therefore, a continuing mixture of consensus and cleavage, of attitudes making for stability and attitudes fostering change. These attitudes are not distributed uniformly through the population or within the political system; but neither are they polarized in separate groups, and they coexist at almost every important level of political structure. In sum, the process of government rests upon a combination of strong commitment and low-temperature pragmatism. "If too much principle can kill a government," Eckstein has observed, "so can the lack of principle at all . . . what is wanted is 'programmatic' government, and this must of necessity blend principle with pragmatic adjustment."[40] The prevailing distribution of attitudes in Britain goes some distance to satisfy this condition.

Critics. The content of British political attiudes has not escaped criticism, especially in the era of the Common Market. If the 1950s were the heyday of the angry young men of letters, the early 1960s spawned a number of critics concerned with the condition of the nation's political values. Some of them, notably the so-called "New Left" and the marching and squatting foes of nuclear weapons, are in the long tradition of radical protest in Britain. Although their targets are contemporary, their moral and social values are not markedly different from those of the 1930s.[41] Rather than focusing on this fairly familiar pattern of outgroup protest, I shall concentrate on another group of critics whose concern is less single-minded and whose methods are less spectacular than the "angries" of the traditional left, but whose belief that the nation's values are dangerously outdated is equally strong. I refer to those intellectuals who are devoted to exposing the alleged loss of Britain's *élan vital* and to pleading for the modernization of basic attitudes as well as institutions.

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[39] For further examples, see Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain," *Political Studies*, Vol. 12 (February, 1964), pp. 33–46.

[40] Harry Eckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 33. In a sophisticated analysis bearing on this point, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., has distinguished between parties and compromises based upon the concepts of consensus and program. "Party Government and the Settlement of 1688," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (December, 1964), pp. 933–46.

This unorganized group of critics, whom Henry Fairlie has termed disdainfully "State of England" writers, is difficult to fit into ready-made political categories. It numbers, among others, several right-wing Labour M. P.s, a couple of leftish Oxford economists, a few mildly left-of-center journalists, a professor of government known mainly for works on France, the industrial editor of the *Financial Times*, and Arthur Koestler.[42] What they have in common is a reformist outlook, born of disillusionment with the tenacity of certain historic British attitudes in the postwar world. This has led them to strike out without discrimination against left and right alike—in Crosland's phrase, "the conservative enemy," wherever found. Because they share this motivation, their chief ideas can be lumped together for convenience without serious distortion, so long as it is remembered that what follows is a composite of themes scattered in many writings.

Underlying these critics' attack is the non-Marxian assumption that what ails Britain is not so much its material conditions or its new place in the world as its cultural attitudes. "We are faced," Koestler writes, "with a 'functional' rather than a 'structural' disorder. Structural diseases have objective, material causes, functional diseases have subjective, psychological causes."[43] It is a lack of dynamism, of incentives (in more than the pecuniary sense), of social discipline bred by a sense of community, that lies at the root of the *malaise*. The aftermath of empire, the decline of Britain's power in world affairs, the effects of the welfare state, the challenge of new Europe—all are but proximate causes; the real sources of the present difficulties lie deeper, in attitudes toward society and government which stretch back into British history. Paradoxically, it is said, it has been the almost unbroken character of British development, its vaunted evolutionary stability, that now holds back the creation of the types of modern attitudes so badly needed. Having been spared the upheavals of radical social revolution, the interruption of its political regime, the destruction of its land and economy, and the psychological trauma of invasion and alien rule, Britain has not been forced to agonize over, or to reconstruct, its fundamental values. In the view of many of these critics, the very traits so much admired by outside observers—the blending of the pre-industrial and the modern, the conscious preservation of aristocratic institutions, the taste for new wines in old bottles—have unfitted the country for the tasks of survival in a rapidly changing world.

It is hardly surprising that one of the targets of this line of criticism is the alleged historicism of the British, their compulsive fixation, as one writer has put it, on either the glories or the miseries of the past. The consequence in both cases is a retreat into unreality, frustration and passivity. All too many Britons remain, it is asserted, who hanker after the day when Britannia was top-dog and could solve any problem by sending a gunboat. While Suez was supposed to be their lesson, they have refused to hearken to it. More important, others refuse to believe that Britain can learn anything from the rest of the world, in particular from the political and economic experiments now under way in western Europe. Thus Henry Fairlie:

> I am extremely doubtful whether we have anything to learn from either the Fifth Republic in

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[41] For the views of these groups see Norman Birnbaum, "Great Britain: The Reactive Revolt," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York, 1962), pp. 55–68, and Henry J. Steck, "The Re-emergence of Ideological Politics in Britain," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (March, 1965), pp. 87–103.

[42] Thomas Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante," in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *The Establishment* (London, 1962), pp. 72–115; Brian Chapman, *British Government Observed* (London, 1963); C. A. R. Crosland, *The Conservative Enemy* (London, 1962); "Suicide of a Nation?," *Encounter*, July, 1963, especially the articles by Albu, Altrincham, Cole, Shanks, and Shonfield; Anthony Sampson, *op. cit.;* Michael Shanks, *The Stagnant Society* (Harmondsworth, 1961); and John Vaizey, *Britain in the Sixties: Education for Tomorrow* (Harmondsworth, 1962).

[43] Arthur Koestler, "The Lion and the Ostrich," *Encounter*, July, 1963, p. 8.

France or the Federal Republic in West Germany about the manner of ordering and sustaining a free society; I am not even sure whether we have much to learn in the matter from the French and Germans as peoples . . . for the moment, I am prepared to wager fairly heavily that our own social and political arrangements will outlast theirs. Any takers?[44]

Still others, it is maintained, are mesmerized by the ancient rituals and dominant values of Oxford and Cambridge—"fairylands in the heart of modern Britain"—the essence of whose magic is that it is pre-industrial.

This satisfied, even complacent, immersion in the British past is coupled, usually at the other end of the social scale, with the equally corrosive tendency of Britons to view the present in terms of the miserable and insecure days of the 1930s, the period when so many leaders of the Left came of age. Here the prime target is usually the trade unions: their restrictive practices, their security-mindedness, their suspicion of innovation, their unwillingness to adopt business unionism and provide their leaders with adequate powers, their division of the industrial world into "Them" and "Us," and their "I'm All Right, Jack" response to their own rising affluence. Again, though the causes of this *malaise* are recognized as partly structural, it is argued that at the base of the problem are attitudes derived from situations and days long past. The result of conservatism in this major area of British life is that the unions are proving themselves "the natural allies of the forces of stagnation and conservatism in industry—and not those of expansion and dynamism."[45]

From this target it is but a short step to another: the alleged cult of amateurism and pragmatism. These seemingly valuable traits, it is argued, have been transformed into fetishes in contemporary British usage. The amateur has become not the curious and adaptable all-rounder, but the dilettante; and pragmatism, rather than being synonymous with the experimental outlook, has shrunk to cautious, narrow tinkering. Teleology has given way to functionalism, the spirit of inquiry to the norms of adjustment and conciliation. Not surprisingly, the institutions most under fire for the inculcation of these attitudes are the educational system and the civil service, which at their higher levels are seen as extensions of each other. Hence the claim that the dominant humanist tradition of the top public schools and Oxbridge, while perhaps suitable for the days of laissez-faire and empire, is now hopelessly out of keeping with the requirements of industrial society and positive government. The defense of the prevailing values of British education in terms of training the generalist for the tasks of policy-making is really a deception. In the civil service, as in industry and Parliament, the domination of those possessed of (in Balogh's phrase) the "crossword-puzzle mind, reared on mathematics at Cambridge or Greats at Oxford," is inimical to the kind of rational, comprehensive, long-range planning that British society now requires.

The prevailing low esteem for science, technology and business enterprise particularly agitates the critics, who attribute to it much of Britain's slow economic growth, the "brain drain," and the nervous ambivalence toward the Common Market. This attitude, they argue, is one of the negative residues of aristocratic values in a democratic age. Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the progress of technology and the promise of economic growth were the special ideology of the business class in its struggle with the land-owning aristocracy, over time the ideology faded out as the rising masters of technology and entrepreneurial power gave in to the tempting possibility of emulating the life of the landed squire. "The combination of a sharply divided class society—and the possibility of rising from one class to another held in greater esteem—meant that the ambition of the sons of many manufacturers was to leave their family businesses and to become landowners (or, at least, 'professional men')."[46] Business, manufacturing and applied science continue to exist, but top creative talent refused to associate with these activities, and their controllers became increasingly docile, unadventurous and apologetic. In the view of the non-socialist wing of this school of critics, the reforms needed to achieve greater efficiency and expanded production have been stymied by the unwillingness of Britons to put these values above those of short-run group security and "fair play." "We are unwilling to advance if it means that anybody is going to get hurt. . . . This is in many ways an admirable trait, but it is a sure recipe for national decay."[47] What these writers call for, then, is a reorientation of basic values in the direction of recognizing that whatever may have been the contributions in the past of aristocratic, unspecialized and humanistic standards of performance, the new Britain requires the upgrading of those attitudes which will foster technological innovation and organizational efficiency. Such a reorientation hinges upon the ability of Britons to sublimate, and finally eliminate, the class-bound attitudes of the past, which have stood as barriers not only to a democratic life, but also to national growth.

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[44] Henry Fairlie, "On the Comforts of Anger," *ibid.*, p. 12.

[45] Michael Shanks, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

[46] Austen Albu, "Taboo on Expertise," *ibid.*, p. 46.

[47] Shanks, "The Comforts of Stagnation," *Encounter*, July, 1963, p. 31.

These cries are also echoed by critics of the process of government, especially those who view with misgivings the increased corporatism of policy-making. A notable example is Brian Chapman, whose slashing broadside, *British Government Observed,* significantly is subtitled "Some European Reflections." Although Chapman is critical chiefly of what he believes to be the archaic, nineteenth century character of the machinery of government—its "rich Byzantine structure"—he attributes much of this condition to the lack of doctrinal value attached to the concept of public service in Britain. In contrast to the trends in Continental countries, he asserts, British government remains in the grips of the luxuriant amateurism of centuries past and has not developed a genuine pluralism based upon the sentiment that public office carries with it public responsibility. Its pragmatism is a mask for weak-kneed, expensive abdication to whatever pressures happen to be brought to bear. Thus public policy is "simply equated with finding the least controversial course between the conflicting interests of vociferous private groups. It is not a doctrine of government; it is a doctrine of subordination."[48] Other critics sharing these views have added the argument that a system that acts as much on the basis of "understandings"—unarticulated, unstructured, implicit responses to new situations—does not encourage bold solutions or positive action.

This small sample of the expanding literature of discontent testifies to the survival of ideological concern in Britain today. True, these particular critics are not of a single mind, and few of them present fully drawn prescriptions for reform (aside, perhaps, from a common emphasis on the need to reconstruct the educational system). But they do share two strong interests that have influenced their analysis and their prescriptions. First, they are impressed by many of the recent developments occurring on the Continent, and they would shake Britain out of its traditional belief that nothing positive can be learned from that quarter. Thus they would seem to pin their hope of change in part on the prospects of closer union with Europe, if only because this might jolt the country out of its complacent ways. Second, they believe that the primary force making for attitudinal change will be the rising power of the newer, more modern and classless elements in British society—the managers, scientists, technicians and white collar workers—who have reaped the benefits of the 1944 Education Act, and whose occupational skills and roles have removed them from the attitudes of the older England. In this sense, but not in others, these critics would agree with the diagnoses of the "end of ideology" writers.

None of this cluster of critics offers a new "world view" ideology to the British, but most of them are concerned with the reordering of basic political attitudes in the second sense that I have used the term "ideology." While acknowledging the need to retain many of the historic values associated with the British polity, they would nevertheless adjust the equilibrium of ancient and modern values in the direction of modernity. This can be achieved, they believe, in the best British tradition, without resort to cosmic theories or to the intolerance of closed systems.

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[48] Chapman, *op. cit.,* p. 61. For a challenge to this interpretation, see D. N. Chester, "British Government Observed," *Public Administration,* Vol. 41 (Winter, 1963), pp. 375–84.

SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: SOME SOVIET AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COMPARISONS

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It is hardly surprising that most investigations of Soviet bureaucracy have emphasized the unique aspects of that system rather than its relation to broader problems of administration.[1] Yet the importance of Soviet experience makes a beginning in comparative analysis highly desirable. The purpose of this article is to identify some (by no means all) of the ways in which Soviet administrative behavior resembles or differs from administrative behavior in Western Europe, which is assumed here to be the norm of administration in a politically and economically modernized society.[2] Where Soviet and Western European administrative behavior coincide, it is assumed that the behavior arises from requirements of the economically modernized societies which prevail in both the USSR and Western Europe *at present*. Where administrative behavior differs in the two areas, tentative explanations are sought in (1) the circumstance that the Soviet economy has become modernized more recently and more rapidly than the economy in Western Europe; and (2) the difference between the Communist political system and the pluralistic systems prevailing in Western Europe.[3]

Materials on the structure and functioning of Soviet administration, as on so many other features of Soviet society and government, have been very scarce. The present analysis depends heavily upon previous studies of various aspects of the Soviet bureaucracy, but I found it essential to augment such data by systematically interviewing Western European administrators who in recent years have had direct personal contact with parts of the Soviet administrative apparatus.[4] The data I obtained in this manner consist, of course, of the perceptions of outsiders; but this fact makes them especially valuable for comparative purposes, for the Western Europeans were able to compare the administrative behavior they observed in the USSR with their experience of their own systems, for which they qualify as expert informants. Reliance on interviews (especially in view of unavoidable time limitations binding both interviewer and informant) restricted the examination to certain salient features of the Soviet bureaucracy which visitors could observe. As a consequence, the most sensitive political structures (Party, police, and military) cannot be analyzed directly. Many important features of bureaucracy, such as centralization *vs.* autonomy, personnel selection and socialization, rules formation, responsiveness to publics, participation in policy formation and involvement in power conflicts, are scarcely touched upon. Focus upon the contemporary period of foreign contact limits consideration of the dynamic elements of bureaucratic development, though these could be treated briefly in some contexts. Within these limitations, however, it is possible to present a series of interrelated propositions which may serve as hypotheses for future investigation as more data become available.

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[1] I use "bureaucracy," "organization," and "administration" in the sense employed by Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott in *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco, 1962), pp. 7–8; since the formal organizations I deal with are highly bureaucratic and engaged in administration, the terms are frequently interchangeable.

[2] I make the distinction between economic and political modernization which Joseph LaPalombara clarifies on pp. 37 ff. of "Bureaucracy and Political Development" in the book which he edited on *Bureaucracy and Development* (Princeton, 1963).

[3] Obviously a different set of assumptions about the relation between the Western European and the Soviet political systems would have produced a different model leading to a different approach to the problem.

[4] During 1963–64, I interviewed twenty-seven German, twenty-four British, and twenty French administrators who had either visited the USSR for professional or business purposes or who (in a small minority of cases) had dealt extensively with Soviet administrators in Western Europe. The wide commercial and official contacts of Western Europeans (in comparison to Americans) with Soviet administrators made these informants especially valuable. While it was not feasible to select a "sample" of the Western Europeans, I was careful to secure a distribution that was broadly representative of the European government officials and private businessmen and of welfare as well as "line" or industrial administrators within the official group. The interviews were open-ended, but highly structured, so as to cover a fairly standardized range of topics yet to permit intensive probing of informants who turned out to have made unusually significant observations of Soviet administration. I intend to deal more fully with the backgrounds of the informants in a subsequent article which will treat the differences in role perceptions of the various types of Western European administrators. At this point I should express my gratitude to the American Council of Learned Societies and the Graduate School and the International Studies Program of the University of Wisconsin, which provided the grants for extensive interviewing in Europe and a brief visit to the USSR.

I. FORMAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET COMMAND STRUCTURE

A. In comparison with Western European administration, *departures from hierarchical principles in the formal structure of Soviet administration are greatest in spheres concerned with human welfare.*

Western European informants who were administrators of welfare or service agencies (social security, public health, and education) were almost unanimous in feeling that hierarchy was replaced by multiple chains of command in the Soviet counterparts of their agencies. For example, a school system director pointed to the formal subordination of local school administrations in the USSR to higher school authorities and to the local soviets (legislative bodies). He believed that the education committees of the Soviets occupied a significant role in the supervision of the schools and that teachers deliberately played off the committees against their hierarchical superiors. Similarly, a highly placed social security administrator was aware that local social security officials in the Soviet Union are legally subordinate both to the Union Republic ministry of social security and to the local soviet. When he visited the USSR he asked how possible conflicts of authority were resolved. He was informed that in case of conflict the social security director resigned; but the visitor remained unconvinced that any simple solution to the problem of dual subordination was possible.

Nearly all of the Western European welfare administrators believed that their own agencies were, in contrast, basically hierarchical in organization: *i.e.*, that they conformed essentially to Max Weber's "ideal type" in which each administrative official is subordinate to a single superior. Without overlooking the importance of informal relationships in welfare agencies,[5] one can hypothesize that, in Western Europe at least, hierarchical relationships (closely related to rules specificity and impersonality) have prevailed to a great extent in agencies administering service affairs which have traditionally been the concern of government. As a recent study suggests, "government by law is the most bureaucratic of all institutions because to a greater extent than other institutions it feels bound by its own rules."[6] In the USSR, on the other hand, administration of schools, social security, and health—"administration of people" in contrast to "administration of things"—has always had a high political content. The totalitarian ideology demands that every administrative action concerning people be carefully fitted to the political aims of the regime. Consequently, dual subordination, with frequent intervention of "mass organizations" like the soviets, directed by the Communist Party, is essential. In the welfare agencies which Western European informants could observe this indeterminacy in the command structure apparently permitted some leeway to "grass-roots" pressures as well. Nevertheless, the general concept is in close accord with studies of more highly politicized elements of the Soviet administrative system. For example, the extremely politicized wartime partisan movement (in contrast to the regular Red Army) had a very indeterminate command structure.[7] In the higher political structures examined by Barrington Moore, "because of the need for means to check up on the execution of policy decisions there apparently exists a vested interest in confusion, and particularly confusion in the allocation of authority."[8] Similarly, Merle Fainsod, in his study of the Soviet political structure notes that

> The leaders of the regime guard their power jealously. They are willing to forego the advantage of a single, clearly defined administrative hierarchy, and they blur lines of authority by multiplying

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[5] Peter M. Blau's *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1955) is, of course, concerned with just such relationships in an American welfare agency.

[6] Marshall Dimock in Robert K. Merton *et al.*, ed., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), p. 399.

[7] John A. Armstrong and Kurt DeWitt, "Organization and Control of the Partisan Movement" in John A. Armstrong, ed., *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison, 1964), pp. 133–34.

[8] *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 286.

controls at every point of the government structure.[9]

As the passages just cited suggest, Communist doctrinal insistence on an extreme degree of political control may involve a certain sacrifice of efficiency. Welfare administration is evidently less crucial politically than administration in the higher echelons of Party and government. To a regime which places first priority on economic modernization welfare administration is also less important than industrial directions. Other differences between welfare and economic administrators which appear to be definite consequences of the emphasis on modernization will be noted later. At this point, it is important to suggest that the differences between Soviet and Western European administration in the welfare sphere are due not only to the communist ideology but to the relative deemphasis of governmental welfare functions which rapid economic modernization—in contrast to political modernization—entails.

B. *In Soviet industrial production and foreign trade, departures from hierarchical command principles are similar* to those in the same administrative spheres in Western Europe.

This observation runs counter to the conclusions of some studies of Soviet administration, which have tended to generalize the principle of indeterminacy in the command structure to include economic management as well. Nevertheless, the consensus of Western European informants is overwhelming on this point. Perhaps the earlier studies, viewing the Soviet system in isolation, tended to exaggerate the comparative importance of departures from hierarchical principles in its formal economic administration. Businessmen, regardless of the size or nature of their own firms, were convinced that the agencies they dealt with in the USSR were as much under "one-man management" as their own. So were most Western European government administrators in "line administration" or in state industrial management. The only exception these men made to their generalized view of the hierarchical formal structure of Soviet administration was the influence of the Communist Party; but they could rarely specify the nature of this influence. One businessman did note that the director of *Sovsudoimport* (the agency concerned with purchasing ships) also occupied a high Party post, which seemed to endow him with an unusual degree of authority in the agency.[10]

It would appear (as several informants spontaneously noted), that a considerable measure of adherence to hierarchical administrative principles is necessary to the highly modernized economies which now prevail in both Western Europe and the Soviet Union. The command structure need not, and for the sake of efficiency should not, be rigid in either system.

C. *In Soviet industrial administration, the principal departure from hierarchical principles in the formal command structure consists of the authority acquired by staff or functional agencies through their power of reporting directly to the top of the command structure.*

Informants who observed foreign trade agencies saw little if any evidence of departures from formal subordination to a single superior. The advantages of maintaining at least the appearance of unity of command for the Soviet side in trade negotiations is obvious. Businessmen and government officials who were able to penetrate to the production agencies in the USSR obtained a somewhat different conception of the Soviet administrative system. But it frequently took considerable probing to unearth their observations, for the type of divergence from hierarchical principles described below did not strike the Western European administrators as unusual in the light of their experience with their own administrations.

The most interesting line of inquiry concerned relations between the state committees and the councils of national economy (*sovnarkhozy*), which in 1957 had replaced the central ministerial apparatus for directing industry. Formally, the state committees were made responsible only for research and design; in other words, they were staff or functional agencies. Implementation of state committee proposals, often even at the experimental stage, however, depended on the cooperation of line agencies—the *sovnarkhozy* and the industrial enterprises under them. Though none of the Western European informants spontaneously noted the significance of this relationship, several had made extensive observations of state committee-*sovnarkhoz* interaction. One (a civil servant) believed that formal committees set up to coordinate relations between the agencies were effective. Nearly all informants agreed, on the other hand, that harmony had not been attained by this device. Instead, the state committees had to resort to pressures exerted through top-level bodies such as the Council of Ministers.

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[9] *How Russia Is Ruled,* 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 245.

[10] As indicated below, the informants were fully convinced of the the operation of *informal* mechanisms such as *tolkachi* (expediters) which circumvented the *formal* structure of the agencies they dealt with, but they denied that these mechanisms were sanctioned by the rules or ideology of the system.

Apart from the overloading of vertical communications and the friction between line and staff officials which the *sovnarkhoz*-state committee relationship entailed, it resulted in delays which the Soviet administrators openly regarded as intolerable. One businessman with intimate contacts in the USSR was told that the proposed remedy for these deficiencies was to transform the state committees into *khozraschet* (profit-and-loss) agencies. They would then perform eighty percent of their research operations on contract with production agencies, or would independently develop processes for licensing to factories. Since Khrushchev's ouster, this solution has apparently been abandoned; instead, a partial return to the ministerial system of centralized control of development and production appears likely. It is entirely clear, however, that the independent chains of command of development and production agencies were too inefficient to be maintained in a modern industrial economy. In the view of the Western European administrator, such a failure in an administrative experiment is not unique to the Soviet system, but the emphasis on centralized control aggravated the situation in the USSR. While the nature of the Soviet-type economy poses special difficulties, the informants were inclined to believe that no insuperable ideological barriers stood in the way of a solution.

D. *Friction between line administrators and staff officials is somewhat greater* in the Soviet economic administration than in Western Europe.

The sources of the friction have already been noted in the previous section. The line (industrial direction) administrators feel a compulsion to respond, at least in part, to "suggestions" of the staff agencies because the latter have independent channels of communication to the top authorities.[11] This forced responsiveness is not, however, based on informal cooperative mechanisms, but emphasizes divergent organizational interests, leaving a residue of antagonism.[12] The immediate aim of the industrial director is short-run production, which is the criterion by which his effectiveness is judged. The experimental innovations of the state committee specialists are almost certain to disrupt production in the short run, however fruitful they may later turn out to be. Informants who had observed personal relations between Soviet staff officials and industrial directors were almost unanimous in detecting friction. A high-ranking Western European planning official found that Soviet plant directors—nearly all engineers by training—became noticeably more cordial when they learned that he was also an engineer by background rather than (as they had assumed) an economist, as are many Soviet planners. An official of a steel firm found production men referring contemptuously to "long-haired researchers." "Practical" industrial managers looked down on research specialists as "theoreticians" and on foreign trade specialists as "grocers" who did not understand the real needs of production, according to a businessman who speaks Russian fluently. None of these observers found this kind of friction unusual in comparison to their Western European experience, though it was more intense. Nor was it surprising that the production directors were more aggressive in expressing their dissatisfactions. Here again the Soviet experience appears merely to reproduce in somewhat aggravated form the frictions common to modern administrative systems.

II. COMMUNICATIONS

A. In comparison with Western European administrative systems, *vertical communication channels are overloaded in Soviet administration.*

As was indicated above, overloading of vertical communication channels is partly a result of the tendency, even in industrial direction, to allocate independent reporting channels to staff agencies. This tendency, which apparently springs from the doctrinal desire to maintain centralized control, is even more noticeable in aspects of the administration which lack production goals but which are more immediately sensitive from the political standpoint.[13] It is reinforced by the fear of subordinates of being harshly punished for "mistakes"—*i.e.*, exercises of their own judgment that turn out badly—and their consequent tendency to pass the buck by asking for permission or instructions before making *any* move. The whole question of communication channels in the Soviet administration is a crucial one, but it is extremely difficult to observe their actual functioning. Consequently, the discussion of this subject must be limited to a few principal points.

B. *Formal communication is relatively inefficient* in the Soviet administration.

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[11] *Cf.* Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1961), p. 168.

[12] *Cf.* John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959), p. 96 ff.

[13] See especially Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

Nearly all the Western European informants believed that formal communications in the Soviet agencies they had observed were grossly inadequate. One industrial manager with unusually broad experience in the USSR asserted that the Soviet administrators were under pressure to make ten times as many reports as their counterparts in his very large industrial firm. Furthermore, he added, the European firm had a special section constantly concerned with reducing routine reports, while such an agency was unknown in the USSR. As a result the reports continued to pile up, but were neither informative nor readily available. A French exporter even warned his compatriots that they must not expect their publicity materials to be distributed to the Soviet agencies which could effectively utilize them.[14] Most information concerning the formal communications system was elicited in response to questions concerning the extent to which telephone calls were used by Soviet administrators in lieu of writing. My original hypothesis was that Soviet administrators resort to telephoning (or other oral communication) because administrators in a totalitarian system fear to commit themselves in writing. Most informants rejected this explanation. Instead, they believed that the major reason for extensive telephoning (not all agreed that it was *more* extensive than in Western Europe) is the extremely poor clerical facilities available to the Soviet administrator. Office space is limited and poorly arranged, with file cases crowding the corridors even in such a high-level agency as the skyscraper headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("the Smolenskaya"). Relatively simple items of equipment, such as typewriters and carbon paper, are in short supply and poor in quality. Most important, the ratio of secretaries, typists and file clerks to administrators is very low. According to a calculation recently made by the British economist Alec Nove, there were only 130,000 stenographers and typists in the USSR (about 1960) ,as compared to 559,000 in Great Britain in 1951.[15] He writes

> . . . there are remarkably few clerks in the Soviet Civil Service, and this, one suspects, is generally true of their way of doing business. Visitors to large Soviet enterprises have often noticed the smallness of the offices. Much more seems to be decided by more senior staff, and by word of mouth, by personal dealings or at meetings. . . . Far fewer cases are handled by correspondence in Government offices. The administrative pyramid is much narrower. This explains why so much time is wasted by officials and others in the waiting rooms of various institutions, waiting to see some senior official (this is a traditional feature of Russian administration).[16]

Similarly, a businessman remarked to me that he frequently met Soviet administrators in the corridors of their office buildings; this convinced him that Soviet administrative organization was poor, for, he said, in a well-run organization administrators are in their offices dealing with the flow of properly channelled written communications rather than running back and forth for personal consultations.

Seeking the reasons for the inefficiency of Soviet clerical assistance, one encounters a peculiar combination of tradition and ideology. As Nove suggests, reliance on oral communication and neglect of correspondence is traditional in Russia; in a sense the present situation represents simply the failure of a modernizing regime to overcome cultural lag. But Leninist doctrine aggravated the situation. Lenin stressed the primacy of production work as contrasted to clerical and record-keeping operations, and his successors, while constantly adding to the burden of paper work, have maintained this emphasis.

C. There is *strong internal pressure for improving formal communications* in the Soviet administration.

The waste inherent in an inefficient system of formal communications was perhaps tolerable as long as the Soviet economic system was not fully modernized, but the present system calls for much more careful allocation of administrative as well as other resources. Recently a spate of articles in the Soviet press has urged the need for improving clerical services and "restoring" the role of the business letter, which, one writer complains, has "lost its force, the force of an obligation assumed in making a personal promise or in a telephone conversation."[17] Another writer refers obliquely to the continuing detrimental influence of the ideology by pointing out that "when workers in these [clerical] categories are nevertheless cut down, their duties are usually shifted over to production personnel, who are as a rule more highly paid."[18] In at least two instances Soviet managers have explicitly sought systematic advice on office procedures from Western European business management sources.

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[14] M. Bonnier, Directeur Général Adjoint, Société Bénoto, "L'Expérience d'Exportation d'une Entreprise de Construction de Matériel d'Equipement," *Hommes et Techniques*, Vol. 15 (July–August 1959), pp. 687–89.

[15] *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics: Or Was Stalin Really Necessary?* (New York, 1964), p. 276.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 269, 275.

[17] "The Director's Time," *Pravda*, June 2, 1964, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XVI, No. 22, pp. 25–26. *Cf.* similar articles, *ibid.*, XVI, No. 13, pp. 17–18; No. 31, pp. 11–12; No. 46, pp. 14–19.

An even more sweeping change may be introduced into the flow of communications by the introduction of modern electronic data processing and computing machinery. In recent years the regime has admitted the relevance of cybernetic theory, which had been banned during Stalin's lifetime. Two informants who are experts in that field and in computer techniques found virtually no evidence of the use of data processing machines or computers for management control—as contrasted to manufacturing control—during visits about 1960, but Soviet interest in management applications was intense. One of these informants remarked that the administrators who were concerned with installing the new equipment were all young, recent graduates of technical higher schools who generally formed a group apart from the older bureaucrats. It is possible, therefore, that the introduction of new methods of communicating information will proceed hand in hand with a turnover in generations in the Soviet administration. Such a "computer revolution" may enormously increase the effectiveness of formal communication channels. This in turn may permit a considerable increase in centralized control. It is quite possible therefore that modernization of communication may have the paradoxical effects of forcing the abandonment of the Leninist ideological exaltation of production at the expense of clerical work at the same time that it actually enhances totalitarian control by making a fully centralized network of administrative communications channels really feasible.

III. INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. While *informal relationships are highly important* in Soviet administration, they *are not much more so than in Western European administration.*

Theoretical considerations would lead one to expect that a bureaucracy like the Soviet, where the formal communication system is weak, would be strongly influenced by informal relations. Most treatments of Soviet administration have fully recognized this aspect. As David Granick writes, "with this absence of formal clarity, it is natural that emphasis has always been placed on the need for the closest ties and a comradely atmosphere between the management and the plant's Party organization."[19] Other students of Soviet administration have stressed the importance of "protective family circles" and pull.[20] The general tendency of these analyses has been to view informal relations as dysfunctional from the standpoint of the Soviet system, as the following passage by Barrington Moore indicates:

> It does not appear that this pattern [of exerting pressure on managers through indeterminate command structures] is in general the product of deliberate creation, although some sophisticated individuals at various levels of the bureaucratic hierarchies are undoubtedly aware of some of the principles by which it operates. As might be anticipated on the basis of the preceding information, there is a tendency within the bureaucracy for informal groupings to spring up and serve as defense against the competitive pressures induced by the system.[21]

Certainly the prevalence of informal relationships, the decision of cases on the basis of personal associations rather than strictly impersonal rules, violates a cardinal principle of the traditional bureaucratic model. But, as Peter Blau notes, "Weber's decision to treat only the purely formal organization of bureaucracy implies that all deviations from these formal requirements are idiosyncratic . . . [and] that any deviation from the formal structure is detrimental to administrative efficiency." Blau goes on to point out that this approach is misleading, for "informal relations and unofficial practices often contribute to efficient operation."[22]

Most of my informants definitely shared the view that informal relations in the Soviet bureaucracy were not very different in degree from those prevailing in Western European administrations, and therefore made little difference in the relative efficiency of the organizations. For example, one businessman reported that a very high Soviet official had told how, when he directed one of the major steel plants in the Urals, he had maintained special agents (*tolkachi*—though he did not use the term) to carry on informal negotiations with the railways when he encountered difficulties in obtaining boxcars. But only one Western Europe administrator believed that Soviet Communism had advanced far enough toward its ostensible goal of creating the "new man" to have overcome the "general" propensity of administrators to resort to informal mechanisms.

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[18] "For Flexible Economic Management of Enterprises," *Pravda*, August 17, 1964, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XVI, No. 33, pp. 13–15.

[19] *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR* (New York, 1954), p. 229.

[20] Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*, p. 92; Joseph Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 204.

[21] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

[22] *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York, 1956), pp. 35–36.

B. *Informal relationships* in Soviet administration *are based,* far more frequently than in Western Europe, *on career contacts.*

Most informants were very strongly impressed by the fact that the Soviet administrators whom they had observed had formed almost all of their friendships in the course of their careers. Many interviewees, while strongly impressed by the extent of informal relationships in the Soviet system, argued that physical circumstances prevented intimate social contacts away from the place of work. The most important factor, many informants believed, is the extreme pressures upon the successful Soviet administrator that virtually preclude his cultivating interests outside his work. This observation is in accord with previous discussions based on Soviet publications.[23] Few meeting places of a non-institutional nature—like cafés—are available for informal meetings outside the places of work. The very small apartments assigned even to major officials make private social gatherings highly inconvenient. Lack of space prevents the official from carrying on most hobbies or avocations at home, while "clubs" at the place of work provide special facilities for many such activities (sports, photography, etc.). As a result, according to one informant, even adult members of the same family are apt to be separated during a considerable portion of their off-duty time.

These observations cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that residential proximity could form the basis for informal relationships. Nevertheless, in view of the important trend in the United States and some parts of Western Europe toward dormitory suburbs inhabited by families of homogeneous income levels—resulting in considerable informal contact among administrators holding equivalent status in diverse organizations—one should not neglect the possibility of a similar Soviet development. In earlier years, such a development was precluded in many Soviet areas by the fact that major industrial enterprises provided apartments for their administrative personnel; in view of the extreme housing shortage the administrators from a single organization were obliged to live together as well as to work together. This situation appears to prevail to a considerable extent in provincial Soviet cities even today. In Tula, according to one informant, coal mine trust directors lived in the same quarter of that relatively small city and frequented a neighborhood restaurant. Even in Volgograd (a city of nearly a million inhabitants) a Russian-speaking Western European administrator found that his Soviet counterparts from a given enterprise lived in a single apartment building. On the other hand, a businessman who had visited numerous factory sites in the provinces in connection with the installation of equipment his firm was supplying found that the managerial staffs lived in scattered locations. The information available on Moscow tends to bear out the official position that new apartments are assigned without regard to the place of work of the applicant, except insofar as he requests an apartment in a quarter of the city near his job. Even then, due to the immense size of the city and the scope of construction, no concentration of employees of a single agency results.

A few informants thought that the Soviet regime deliberately restricts private housing facilities to loosen family and friendship ties, but a majority inclined to the belief that construction priorities rather than totalitarian objections to uncontrolled associations are a sufficient explanation. Similarly, the extreme degree to which the successful administrator must be absorbed in his job seems to be a concomitant of the intense emphasis upon work rather than the direct result of a desire to prevent outside activities.[24] On the other hand, communication between officials which is not related at least ostensibly to the performance of their duties is suspect, and, if it has political connotations, can easily give rise to the charge of "fractionalism," which Leninist doctrine has always regarded as a most heinous offense. On the whole, therefore, it appears that the restriction of informal relationships to career associations is primarily the result of the pressures of modernization, though these are greatly enhanced in the Soviet case by the "work ethic" of Leninism.

C. *Persisting associations between former classmates form the basis of informal relation-*

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[23] I advanced this hypothesis in *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite,* p. 11.

[24] However, as I argued, *ibid.,* the regime does frown upon the development of hobbies and avocations which do not indirectly improve an official's work ability.

ships in Soviet administration to a degree comparable to that existing in Western Europe.

The observation that informal relationships in the Soviet administration center about career associations, is, of course, only the starting point in the search for sociological factors which tend to promote such relationships. While the outsider is especially limited in his opportunity to observe these factors, the subject is so important that it was a central concern in my interviewing. One possible factor is common educational experience. The importance of the "old school tie" (in rather diverse forms in different countries) in Western European elite associations hardly needs emphasis. Some studies of the Soviet bureaucracy have found evidence of the development of similar ties. In some cases Party apparatus officials retain associations originally based on distinctive training in different branches of Party schools.[25] Joseph Berliner noted (after interviewing administrators who had left the USSR during World War II) that "one hears remarks oddly reminiscent of 'the old school tie'."[26] Even so, it was surprising to hear one of the first interviewees spontaneously remark that he had encountered several Soviet administrators who explained that their affairs were expedited when they were dealing with their former classmates in higher technical schools. Few subsequent informants could provide definite corroboration for this phenomenon, and some regarded it as improbable. But indirect confirmation came from the observation (noted earlier) that young administrators trained in computer technology maintained a group feeling and from two separate reports that coal mine directors in the Tula and Donets fields are in each case almost without exception graduates of local schools of mines. In fact, there seems to be—contrary to Karl Deutsch's hypothesis that high geographical mobility is an index to modernizing tendencies[27]—a strong tendency for the lower and middle levels of Soviet administrators to originate and to be trained in the regions where they work.[28]

The persistence of school ties is undoubtedly contrary to Soviet ideology, but it is probably to some extent an indirect result of the highly competitive system marked by extraordinary suspicion which developed during Stalin's lifetime. It is reasonable to suppose that ties formed at an impressionable age would influence administrators to trust each other more than colleagues whom they had come to know only in the heat of career rivalry—which was often literally a struggle for existence. At the same time, it seems likely that the stress on technical education in any modern social system will tend to form permanent associations among the products of its higher schools. The stress on technical education in the USSR—higher education there is almost always rigidly directed toward forming specialists—probably enhances this tendency. School comrades have shared narrow curricula (in the case of administrators, usually in some branch of engineering), which constitute direct preparation for the first stages of their careers. While their career activities may diverge somewhat in subsequent years, it is likely that the common professional outlook fostered by their training is as important in perpetuating associations as is mutual trust—and indeed may be a source of trust.

D. As compared to Western Europe, *certain kinds of ethnic solidarity are more important* in forming the basis for informal relationships among Soviet administrators.

While some Western European observers detected no indications of ethnic differences among Soviet administrators, many—including nearly all those who traveled extensively or who knew Russian—found evidences not only of differing backgrounds but of ethnic solidarity. Observations on the peculiar role of Armenians were most definite. It is, of course, relatively easy to identify Armenians (their surnames nearly always end in "-yan"), but many informants who were sufficiently knowledgeable to make other ethnic identifications insisted that the Armenians formed much the most distinctive group of non-Russian administrators. Armenians occupy many important posts in trade organizations. One businessman reported that he had found many Armenian fiscal officers, and had the impression that Armenians preferred handling money to production assignments. Another businessman, disagreeing on the latter point, noted that the deputy director of *Sovsudoimport,* with major responsibilities for industrial procurement, was an Armenian. A businessman with extensive contact in Soviet chemical manufacturing had encountered numerous Armenian factory directors in this field.

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[26] Berliner, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

[27] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (September 1961), pp. 495 ff.

[28] An analysis of the backgrounds of industrial Party secretaries (to appear in *Soviet Studies*, Jan. 1966) suggests that these officials—dealing with the most modernized sector of the Soviet economy—have exhibited only half as much geographical mobility during their careers (during and since higher education) as Party secretaries of the same status and age group supervising the less modernized (agricultural and political) sectors.

Mildly anti-Armenian jokes are common such as the frequent use in official circles of the derisory term "Armenian broadcast" to mean rumors. A current joke, "Sir Humphrey Trevelyan is one of the two most influential Armenians in Moscow" is a play on the termination of the British Ambassador's name. The other "influential" is, of course, Mikoyan, but most informants doubted that Mikoyan had deliberately insinuated his fellow countrymen into high administrative posts during the course of his long and varied career. Of course, some tendencies toward ethnic differentiation of administrators are almost inevitable in the complex multi-national Soviet society, as compared to the relatively homogeneous Western European societies. But the Armenians, at least, do seem to meet special needs of the administrative system. Their "southern" warmth and approach-ability makes them more flexible in human contacts —a notably deficient side of Soviet administration—and these qualities are intimately related to Armenian skill in trade negotiations. Armenians also possess to an unusual degree the propensities for education, geographic mobility, and adaptation to urban environments, needed in a newly modernized society. Traditionally, Jews provided these qualities in a relatively traditional Eastern European economic system, but anti-Semitic prejudices limit (without by any means wholly eliminating) their role in contemporary Soviet administration.[29] Quite possibly many rapidly modernizing societies will provide special roles for minority ethnic groups which have traditionally developed skills in human relations, but have not completely succumbed to the overpowering production ethic which tends to make the majority ethnic elite inflexible in human relations. Certainly the peculiar role of the Armenians is entirely contrary to Leninist prescriptions, and is wholly unrecognized by official Soviet sources. Here the pragmatic needs of modernization seem to have won a small but definite victory over Communist doctrine.

IV. MOTIVATIONS

A. As compared to Western European production administrators, *Soviet production administrators exhibit intense career achievement orientation.*

At several points in the preceding discussion I have assumed that the Soviet system, by some means or other, has imbued most of its administrators with a very strong production ethic. The extent and nature of such a motivating ethic, of course, make an extraordinarily difficult subject of study in any culture; evidence concerning the Soviet elite is particularly hard to obtain. Crude though the approach necessarily was, it seemed worthwhile to secure Western European administrators' observations on this topic, for they had had unusual opportunities to observe their Soviet counterparts in informal situations. A large majority of the informants were convinced that Soviet administrators were more intensely involved with their work and exhibited a stronger drive for promotion than Western Europeans. This consensus coincides with the extreme achievement orientation which Fainsod found in examining the Smolensk archives.[30] It also agrees with Berliner's contention that even in Stalin's day few managers were obsessed by fears of getting into trouble or wanted to "live peacefully," for men with such propensities were eliminated at an early stage from the fierce competition for advancement.[31] The most extensive examination of this question has been conducted by Inkeles, Bauer, and Kluckhohn, who note the "persistence of goal striving" of the elite and its acceptance of the Party's stress on unlimited achievement.[32] Increasingly, success in the USSR has been defined, as in the United States, as advancement along the occupational ladder, and, especially at higher levels, satisfaction is correlated with intrinsic qualities of one's job.[33]

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[29] Informants found ample evidence of discrimination against Jews in administration. While one German businessman was told by a Soviet official that the presence of Jews in the Ministry of Foreign Trade proved that there was no anti-Semitism in the USSR, another was told jokingly, "all of our Jews have been sent to their own province in Siberia." Other informants encountered more sharply anti-Semitic jokes, especially when the Soviet administrators had been drinking. An informant of Russian parentage overheard a young Russian woman remarking that she refused to dance with his superior (in a Western European administrative delegation) because he was obviously Jewish. It seems evident that Jews in Soviet administrative positions are subject to uncomfortable pressures, but it is not so clear that they develop a defensive solidarity. Some informants (but by no means all who commented on the ethnic situation) believed that Ukrainians in the administration also tended to stick together.

[30] *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*, p. 92.

[31] Berliner, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

[32] Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 58.

One further line of inquiry tended to confirm the impression of the persistence of an unusually strong career achievement orientation among Soviet administrators. A possibly crucial test of a man's devotion to his calling, as contrasted to more or less fatalistic acceptance of his circumstances, is his occupational aspirations for his children. Inkeles and Bauer have suggested that the post-1941 generation of non-manual workers in the USSR shows a slight tendency toward greater emphasis on self-expression as contrasted to achievement goals for its children.[34] Some current reports by travelers to the USSR have also suggested that better educated parents may dislike the thought of their children marrying bureaucrats or entering bureaucratic careers. Instead, parents prefer strictly "intellectual" careers for their children. Such a development would be analogous to the nineteenth-century capitalist's effort to buy his children's way into the aristocracy or the liberal professions or the eighteenth-century French merchant's effort to secure a magistrate's post for his son. Most of my informants had never discussed children's prospects with their Soviet counterparts. Those who had, found that Soviet fathers who were administrators placed enormous emphasis upon their children—especially their sons—obtaining higher educations, and were willing to pull strings (in complete violation of the ideologically proper attitude) to get them assigned to superior secondary schools (outside their neighborhoods), or to enable them to avoid the work assignment interruptions required during 1958–64. Since students in the natural sciences frequently were not required to take work assignments, while engineering students were, administrators who were engineers by training sometimes advised their sons to become research scientists—despite the line administrator's aversion to "long-hairs." Most administrators, however, seemed sincerely glad to have their sons get the *type* of higher education that the regime indicated was desired. For example, a trade official indicated that he was happy that his son was studying chemistry, because Khrushchev had said that there lay the career of the future. With one exception, fathers were glad that their sons were studying engineering and similar technical subjects that are, in the USSR, the most common preparation for administrative careers. This does not necessarily mean that administrators definitely wish their sons to become administrators, but the fathers must have envisaged this possibility with equanimity.

B. *Performance criteria tend to replace eschatological criteria as the production administrator's motivations.*

If the evidence is strong that striving for achievement in one's career is prevalent in the USSR, what are the motivations? Obviously this is a case where multiple causation is highly likely. Several Western European administrators contended that a certain proportion of men in any society must find outlets for their ambitions in striving for advancement. The Soviet regime has stressed the principle "to each according to his work" for over four decades; administrators, especially in industry, are highly rewarded in comparison with members of other occupations. Hence it is scarcely surprising that most informants indicated material rewards as a major motivating factor, at least as strong as in Western Europe. High status, extraordinarily closely related in the USSR to superior occupational attainments, was also cited. A few informants thought that sincere belief in the vision of a Communist society was a major motivating factor among production administrators. A businessman had suggested to a very high Soviet official (whose primary career was in industrial direction, who had traveled abroad extensively, and who spoke a Western European language fluently) that professional technological interests might form a stronger bond than Communist eschatology. The Soviet administrator rejected this suggestion vehemently.[35] But most informants—including several whose Soviet experiences go back to the 1930s—felt that ideology in the sense of conscious concern with Leninist doctrine, particularly in its eschatological aspects, had atrophied.

While some informants saw traditional Russian patriotism as the major motive replacing Communist ideology, more defined contemporary Soviet patriotism as a kind of amalgam of traditional Russian sentiment and belief in the Soviet system. One businessman volunteered the suggestion that the main motivating factor is that people have seen their own careers progress in accordance with the growth of Soviet strength. Similarly, a school administrator remarked that most Soviet administrators started life as peasants, and in their present relatively exalted posts naturally believe that the Soviet system has accomplished great things.[36]

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[33] Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959) pp. 96 ff. 120.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 226–27.

[35] *Cf.* the very similar quotation from the Stalin-period press in John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1961), p. 182.

In believing that the Soviet system ought to be furthered because its success has been correlated with his own personal success rather than because Communism promises a glorious future for mankind, the administrator is replacing an eschatological by a pragmatic performance criterion. Probably this is a concomitant of economic modernization, since the highly upwardly mobile individuals tend to identify with the successful system. There is an apparent paradox here, however, for we have already noted that economic modernization requires intense achievement orientation; yet this orientation is, according to the preceding analysis, motivated by identification with a successfully modernized economic system. A more dynamic model, based on historical study,[37] would indicate that the initial impulse toward achievement orientation did come in large measure from Communist doctrine (sometimes regarded as a surrogate for the Protestant ethic), but that in the recent system (as, perhaps, in the contemporary United States) achievement motivation is, for the time being, derived from secondary phenomena. In other words a modernized society, whether Soviet or Western, tends to maintain its achievement momentum—though perhaps not indefinitely—whereas the crucial question for a modernizing society in its early stage is how the achievement ethic is to be inculcated.

C. As compared to Western European welfare administrators, *Soviet welfare administrators are lower in career motivation.*

While the number of informants was far too small to provide conclusive evidence, this is one of the most striking suggestions advanced by the Western European administrators who were in close touch with their Soviet counterparts. Visiting Western European school officials who were impressed by the Soviet school system in general, nevertheless found that Soviet educational administrators in particular seemed to be low both in ability and in motivation. Many apparently owe their posts to political reliability rather than educational criteria. The better teachers, on the other hand, tend to avoid promotions to administrative posts in order to remain in truly educational work. It is particularly noteworthy that these remarks were all made by Western Europeans who were themselves committed to careers in educational administration; similar views were expressed by social security and public health officials concerning their Soviet counterparts.

To a considerable extent, this situation is a result of the low priority placed upon welfare administration as compared to production by Communist ideology, for this priority inevitably results in less capable people being drawn into welfare administration, and in their having slighter prospects of career rewards. On the other hand, the "new man" in Communist society, (if he were really achieved) should not be influenced by such considerations. In fact, as indicated above, the more capable candidates tend to reject welfare administrative posts because they prefer technical activities to involvement in a *politicized* administration. These considerations seem at least in part a result of economic modernization, which has at the same time encouraged greater concern with personal values and choice of occupation and weakened ideological motivation. In a sense then, welfare administration in a modernizing totalitarian context would seem subject to a vicious circle of deterioration, in which the administrators (but not the practitioners) tend to become constantly lower in quality. Obviously the evidence is too slight to sustain a long-term projection, however.

D. *Eschatological criteria are more important for Soviet welfare administrators* than for Western European welfare administrators or Soviet production administrators.

This finding is almost a corrollary of the previous proposition; it is also borne out by more direct observations. Welfare administrators were prepared, usually, to argue doctrinal points more than were production officials. For example, a Western European social security administrator noted that despite the very evident problem of alcoholism, Soviet health administrators contended that the need for psychiatric treatment had drastically declined because Communism has eliminated alcoholism and prostitution. As suggested in section IV. B, above, however, this greater conviction of the validity of Communism's millenial promises is not incompatible with a belief (among school administrators) in the concurrent success of the system and the individual. To the extent to which the Soviet political and social system is less modernized than the economic system, one would expect welfare administrators and other more politically involved officials to be the more eschatologically motivated group.

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[37] See Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in LaPalombara, *op. cit.*

E. *An engineering approach or technocratic approach toward human problems* is more characteristic of Soviet than of Western European administrators.

A subject holding a peculiar fascination for many Western European informants was the possibility of a tendency toward technocracy in the USSR. While some disagreed on the meaning of this term, a fairly broad consensus prevailed that it implied a social system in which numerous highly skilled technical experts disposed of great material resources without notable political interference. To some informants, the strength of the ideological motivations described above precluded the Soviet administrator's rejecting political direction. To others, it was precisely the ability to dispose of vast resources which constituted the appeal of the Soviet system for administrators of engineering background. Such an appeal is understandable. Social theory notes that some groups, such as corporation management in Western societies, tend to adopt a single aspect of another group's ideology—in this case the engineer's approach to broader problems.[38] It would hardly be surprising if Soviet administrators, so many of whom were trained as engineers, unconsciously accepted elements of the "engineering" approach to human problems.

To some informants, the Soviet administrator's engineering approach to human problems appeared to be a source of callousness. A director of a Western European civil service training school was dismayed by the lack of human feeling in Soviet administrators (trained as engineers), their readiness to pass judgment upon others, and their unwillingness to admit sociological and psychological causes for delinquencies. There is no necessary contradiction between these harsh attitudes in interpersonal relations and the tendency, which a Western European planning official found very prominent, for high Soviet planners to be aware of and concerned with broad problems arising from developments like automation. There is a general trend, apparently, for really first-class administrators to become less parochial in outlook and more concerned with the broad problems of their society as they rise higher in the bureaucratic scale.[39] A modernized economic system both encourages and requires such administrators. But the values they bring to these broader concerns do not usually transcend those stressed by the ideology in which the administrators have been indoctrinated.

V. RECAPITULATION

Western European and Soviet administrative behavior are essentially similar in the following characteristics:

- I. B. The extent of departures from hierarchical command principles in industrial production and foreign trade.
- III. A. The importance of informal relationships.
- II. C. Persisting associations between former classmates.
- IV. B. Replacement of eschatological by performance criteria as motivations.

In addition, the following, though accentuated in the Soviet administration, do not present very marked differences from Western European administrative behavior:

- I. C. The authority acquired by staff or functional agencies through their power of reporting directly to the top of the command structure.
- I. D. Friction between line and staff administrators.

Following the assumption that Western Europe represents the norm of administration in a politically and economically developed society, and that a modernized economy now prevails in the USSR, one can tentatively conclude that the above characteristics are requirements of an economically, but not necessarily a politically modernized society.

It is more difficult to separate the factors of Communist doctrine and the requirements of economic modernization in explaining the differences between Western European and Soviet administrative behavior, since no direct detailed comparison of the Soviet administration and that of a non-totalitarian modernizing system has been made. Both factors probably influence most of the differences, but one can attempt an analytic differentiation. The influence of doctrine seems to be the prime determining factor for:

- I. A. Departures from hierarchical principles in the formal structure of Soviet welfare administration.
- I. C. The authority acquired by staff agencies through their power of reporting directly to the top of the command structure.
- I. D. Friction between line and staff administrators.
- II. A. Overloading of vertical communication channels.

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[38] Vernon K. Dibble, "Occupations and Ideologies," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 68 (1962), pp. 229–241.

[39] *Ibid.*

II. B. Inefficiency of formal communication.[40]
III. B. Basing of informal relationships on career contacts.
IV. C. Lower motivation of welfare administrators.
IV. D. Higher ideological motivation of welfare administrators.

All of the above characteristics are also heavily influenced, directly or indirectly, by the factor of recent and rapid economic modernization, except (to a large extent) I. C. and I. D. which are precisely the characteristics which represent the least difference (in this group) between Western European and Soviet administrative behavior. The following characteristics, on the other hand, appear to be primarily determined by the extent to which modernization has been rapid and recent, though they are all heavily influenced, directly or indirectly, by Communist doctrine:

II. C. Internal pressures for improving formal communications.
III. D. Ethnic solidarity as a basis for informal relationships.
IV. A. Intense career achievement orientation among production administrators.
IV. E. An engineering or technocratic approach toward human problems.

If these latter characteristics are really due to rapid and recent modernization, they should, of course, decline in importance as the Soviet economy becomes fully modernized—though the fruition of II. C. depends on overcoming political barriers. Consequently, apart from the difficulty of obtaining confirmatory data, they should be relatively easy to test. Whether or not these characteristics actually apply to all administrations in societies with rapidly modernizing economies can, of course, be tested only by extensive comparative studies. The second group of propositions, on the other hand, despite a certain measure of incompatibility with economic modernization, will prevail unless political modernization takes place—*i.e.*, unless Communist doctrine ceases to be a significant force. That question, of course, requires consideration in a far broader context than the study of comparative administration.

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[40] Russian tradition is a third factor influencing at least this characteristic.

IDEOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF RIGHT WING POLITICAL ALIENATION IN MEXICO*

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Evaluations of single-party democracy in Mexico have yielded a substantial literature from the researches of contemporary scholars.[1] Their primary subjects of treatment have been the institutionalized agents of moderation and compromise that have made Mexico one of Latin America's more stable political systems. In prosecuting these studies, however, only scant attention has been given to political groups outside the officially sanctioned "revolutionary family" of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*. The PRI has maintained a virtual monopoly of elective and appointive offices since 1929 and traditionally has been thought of as affiliating to itself the *only* politically relevant groups in Mexico.

Modern Mexican political life has always had its "out groups" and splinter parties. Mostly, they have come and gone, leaving little or no impact upon the political system which they have attempted to influence. Howard Cline has contended that opposition groups in Mexico find it impossible to woo the electorate away from the PRI and thus feel forced to adopt demagoguery and other extreme postures which serve only to reduce their popular appeal.[2] Cline writes further, "in nearly every case, the dissidents return quietly to the PRI ranks, without prejudice or reprisals."[3] The historical accuracy of these contentions goes unquestioned here. Rather, I seek to explore, using modern analytic techniques, the possibility that Mexico is becoming a less rigid single-party authoritarian system, that it may be moving instead toward a cooperative two- or even three-party system surrounded by a number of alienated but relevant satellite groups.

I undertake this with due deference to the works just cited, whose authors have told much of the Mexican story and told it well. In addition, I respond directly to Merle Kling's recent dictum that it is time to "assume the risks of creating and testing hypotheses, formulating generalizations and theories" about the nature of change in contemporary Mexican politics.[4] This cannot be done if potentially relevant "out groups" continue to be neglected. Kling refers to "risks." One is surely the chance that the Mexican "out groups" selected for study are not indeed politically relevant. My criteria for relevance, stated below, are intended to obviate that difficulty. Perhaps a more severe risk is conservative resistance to the very suggestion that groups outside the "revolutionary family" may be gaining political relevance within the Mexican system. But to offer such a suggestion is my prime purpose.

I

When the Mexican Revolution was scarcely one year old, the following challenge was hurled against its leader:

> Mexicans: Consider that the cunning and bad faith of a man are shedding blood in an outrageous manner because of his incapacity to govern . . . we turn arms against him for having betrayed the Revolution . . . (Emiliano Zapata et. al., *Plan de Ayala*, 1911, as quoted in Heriberto Garcia Rivas, *Breve Historia de la Revolución Mexicana*, México, Editorial Diana, 1964, p. 112)

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[1] *Cf.* L. Vincent Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-Evaluation," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (Dec., 1957) pp. 995–1008; Martin C. Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," *ibid*, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp 308–312; Philip B Taylor, Jr , "The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol 13 (Sep., 1960), pp. 722–744; Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959); Howard Cline, *Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940–1960* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962); William P. Glade and Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Mexico* (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963); David T. Garza, "Factionalism in the Mexican Left: The Frustration of the MLN," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 447–60.

[2] Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 8 (September, 1964), p. 10.

Those words were voiced in outrage over a promised land reform that had not materialized. After a half-century of equally inspiring promises, and of progress along many lines, one still hears words faintly reminiscent of those above.

> Citizens: by means of the vote you can once and for all put an end to the lies, exploitation and fraud of those who would profiteer from the Revolution. With no other arms than your honorable and clean vote, citizens, National Action is confident of victory. (From a speech by José González Torres, presidential candidate of *Partido de Acción Nacional*, as printed in *La Nación*, 17 mayo, 1964, p. 32)

Both expressions are examples of political alienation, but there is an important difference in degree. The one is a call to armed rebellion; the other acknowledges the silent force of popular challenge in an honestly counted vote. Measurement of such contemporary political alienation in Mexico is the immediate task of this paper. Political alienation is one element in a larger theoretic formulation that I have described elsewhere as an analytic approach to the study of stability and instability in the Latin American political culture.[5] In Mexico, political alienation will be understood to mean a specific and identifiable syndrome of ideology and behavior which is manifest in support for, sympathy toward, or participation in political extremism. This, in turn, is defined (for Mexico) as advocacy of violence, advocacy of a conspiratorial interpretation of Mexican political life (including the doctrine that the political system is manipulated by hostile foreign powers or by a treasonable internal cabal), advocacy of turning the government of Mexico or its major subdivisions over to private enterprise or to the Roman Catholic Church, or advocacy of the total abandonment of constitutional government. This definition was designed with right wing alienation in mind but a modified version of it could prove suitable for left wing alienation as well.

Before coming to the present scene, let us look back briefly over the development of right wing ideology in Mexico. One sees it nurtured in the Querétaro Club of 1810 that produced Hidalgo and Allende and in the subsequent rebellions against the *gachupines*. Reactionary ideology thrived during the regimes of Iturbide and Santa Anna, and burst forth in the clerical opposition to Lerdo, Juarez, Ocampo and to the Liberal Constitution of 1857. Ultra-conservative thought was rejuvenated for thirty-five years by the *cientificos* during the *Pax Porfiriana*, and passed thereafter into the hands of the *cristeros* who fought Calles and Vasconcelos who unsuccessfully opposed Ortiz Rubio. Ultimately, it was crystallized in the organized popular reactions to Lázaro Cárdenas's reform era during the 1930s. The latter period is particularly important for this study since it included the genesis of two groups that are of chief concern here.

Especially bitter targets of reactionary attack were Cárdenas's sweeping nationalizations of industry, accelerated distribution of agricultural lands via the usufructory device of *ejidos*, and stricter enforcement of the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917. Those who organized against Cárdenas and his political predecessors embraced an ideological outlook that persists in Mexico today and is gaining political relevance. I shall term it "restorationism." Mexico's restorationists are those who would return to the Church its political and financial privileges, to the great families or *abolengo* the land, and to the unhampered forces of the marketplace business and commerce.

They are, to some extent, those whose aspirations for socio-economic advantage are thwarted by restricted access to places of influence within the governing single-party system. In short, the revolutionary machinery has not accommodated itself adequately to the psychological and material requirements of *all* relevant and active political sectors in Mexico. True to the prototype of France's experience following 1789, the Mexican Revolution scored a violent dislocation of the political *status quo*, radically changed the social structure, but preserved seeds of potential unrest by its failure to supplant entirely the reactionary right. Today, Mexico's restorationists have two principal organized forms, *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* and *Partido de Acción Nacional*.[6]

The term *sinarquismo* is a corruption of two words, *sin anarquiá*, without anarchy—or in better English, with order. Order, *órden*, as the name of its official journal implies, is the hallmark of *Unión Nacional Sinarquista*. It is an order of Christian democracy, first under God, then under a God-fearing state. UNS members are ardent practicing Roman Catholics, disciplined soldiers of a theocratic faith. The movement was born (according to official doctrine) amid an explosion of enthusiasm, faith, and courage.[7] The basic committee that proclaimed UNS from León, Guanajuato in 1937 consisted of José Antonio Urquiza, José Trueba Olivares, Manuel Zermeño, Juan Ignacio Padilla, Rubén and Guillermo Mendoza Heredia. So intense was the local popular frenzy in response to their declarations that the Governor of Guanajuato, an appointee and puppet for President Cárdenas, drove the committee from his state, whereupon they established offices in Mexico City and began publication of a mimeographed *El Boletín* in an effeort to develop a national organization.[8]

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[5] Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (September, 1964), pp. 432–446.

[6] Several lesser groups that have been variously affiliated with PAN and UNS are *Acción Católica Mexicana* (which cannot legally call itself a party because of the constitutional prohibition against use of religious titles in political organization), *Unión Nacional de Padres de Familia*, and *Partido Nacionalista de México*.

Although José Antonio Urquiza is most often called the Founder of UNS, its first national chief to hold working office was José Trueba Olivares who still lives as a retired attorney in his native León. Soon after taking office, Trueba resigned for "economic reasons" and was followed by Manuel Zermeño.

The assassination of José Antonio Urquiza in 1938 was the first of many crises for UNS. Its stepped-up counter-offensive against an alleged Communist design to liquidate it produced a period of ambiguous rioting and bloodshed about the country, which lasted throughout the war years in the 1940s and which the *sinarquistas* stubbornly blame on the political left.[9] The same disorders were blamed by the Cárdenas regime on fascist elements within *sinarquismo*.

It is fair to say that the *sinarquistas* did cause a great amount of trouble for Cárdenas and for his successors. But since the labor riots around the time of the 1958 presidential succession (blamed officially on both leftists and rightists), *sinarquismo* has tended to function as a pacific, although not passive, civic opposition.[10] As an ideology that is essentially restorationist, *sinarquismo* finds little likeness between its own image of the ideal state and the political realities of contemporary Mexico.

The second major political group in Mexico that reflects a restorationist ideology is the *Partido de Acción Nacional*. PAN was founded two years later than UNS, as a distinct part of the conservative reaction to Cárdenas. *Sinarquistas* are quick to point out that they antedate PAN and that it was formed out of splinter elements from their own group. Although many *panistas* deny this, enough agree with it to make the contention plausible. Most scholars of Mexican politics have agreed that PAN is the only serious opposition to the official PRI.

PAN emerged as a political party in September, 1939, at a convention held in Mexico City, and claims as its founder Manuel Gómez Morín, an attorney who is still active in the party's national organization. Unlike UNS, PAN has always considered itself a political party and, except in 1940 and 1946, has offered congressional, state, and presidential candidates throughout Mexico. In its appeals, PAN carefully avoids direct attacks upon those institutions which are traditionally *mexicano* and are important symbols of nationhood. Thus the Constitution of 1917 (except for Article 3) is upheld as a basis for freedom and equality among Mexicans. PAN charges the PRI with "bastardization" of this great work through administrative abuses of liberty. Principal foci of the PAN attack are the anti-clerical provisions of the Constitution[11] and the extension of state capitalism into the traditionally private sector. Today's *panistas* include the *abolengo,* old established families whose wealth and position have been reduced or threatened, certain of the *nouveaux riches* who aspire to greater places, many of the upwardly mobile middle class who "never quite made it," and an uncertain base of peasants and artisans whose susceptibility to clerical propaganda has placed them within PAN ranks. Philip Taylor correctly observed that PAN claims a heavy female membership.[12] Having never been able to claim more than 12 percent of the officially reported vote in a presidential election, PAN carries the image of a weak and ineffectual alternative to PRI.

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[7] Juan Ignacio Padilla, *El Sinarquismo* (2d ed., Ediciones UNS, México, 1953), p. 25.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] On July 11, 1939, in Celaya, Guanajuato, a woman *sinarquista*, Teresita Bustos, was murdered while performing in a UNS rally. As a symbolic gesture of unity each outgoing national president of UNS delivers to his successor the flag which she was carrying at the time of her death (*Orden*, 31 de mayo, 1964, p. 2). The ceremony is repeated annually in the main plaza of León, Guanajuato, where the *sinarquistas* hold a mass pilgrimage, normally during March. *Sinarquista* leaders wear armbands bearing a geographic shape of Mexico. They march in a semi-military fashion that has given *sinarquismo* the largely erroneous appearance of being Fascist- or Nazi-oriented. Use of a Hitler-type hand salute reinforces this image. In an earlier work, Howard Cline developed the theme of fascism in *sinarquismo*, *The United States and Mexico* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. 320. My own experiences in interviewing and knowing UNS members indicate that it could be easy to mistake religious vehemence and anti-semitism for a full-scale commitment to Nazi or Fascist doctrine. I take issue with Cline only in suggesting that branding this group as a "fascist type organization" does not give the *sinarquistas* credit for the truly progressive civic spirit which I have known them to demonstrate. See footnote 10, below.

[10] *Sinarquistas* and their sympathizers have been instrumental in a number of civic protest movements throughout Mexico. Three recent examples are: *Asociación Cívica de Usarios de Servicios Públicos de Chihuahua* (formed in 1962 to protest unfair property taxation and public service scandals); *Agrupación de Iniciativa Privada Pro-Morelos* (formed in Cuernavaca during 1962 in protest over fiscal mismanagement of state funds); *Unión Cívica Defensora de los Intereses del Pueblo* (formed in Tepic, Nayarit to protest abuses in meter reading and collection of water charges by the municipal government during 1964).

II

Few contemporary observers will deny that *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* and *Partido de Acción Nacional* represent bodies of alienated political sentiment. But are they politically relevant and, if so by what criteria? Politically relevant alienation must be of sufficient magnitude to pose a threat (latent, incipient, or actual) to the stability of a political system. The threat can be judged by the adaptive responses it is able to force upon the operative power structure, upon the incumbent custodians of the political *status quo.* Merely to direct frustration and aggression against the state is not enough. The stewards of political power must actually see an organized group as a threat to system stability and condition their behavior to that belief; *i.e.,* they must react adaptively or defensively. Thus a recent study by David Garza points to the low political efficacy of fragmented leftist groups in Mexico that are associated with the *Movimiento de de Liberación Nacional.*[13] It is questionable whether these formations are politically relevant in the Mexican system, since they are not so viewed by the *status quo* regime. In the light of recent events surrounding the 1964 presidential succession, however, there is a strong basis for arguing that Mexican rightist alienates are coming to be viewed as politically relevant.

Elsewhere, I have described in some detail the machinations of political groups during the 1964 presidential campaign.[14] The evidence I have to present in support of the contention that UNS and PAN are viewed as politically relevant by the *status quo* regime may be shortly summarized here. Several months prior to the voting in July, *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* entered into a coalition agreement with a nearly defunct splinter party, the *Partido Nacionalista de México.* The latter, PNM, enjoyed official recognition by the *Secretaría de Gobernación* and was to be placed on the official ballot as a registered opposition party. When word of the UNS-PNM alliance became public, the *Secretaría de Gobernación* cancelled the PNM registration, ostensibly on the ground that the party lacked the legally required membership of 75,000. Confidential sources in PAN, UNS, PNM, and even in PRI itself admitted that the cancellation was a reaction to the threat of a large *sinarquista* vote for PNM candidates for the *Cámara de Diputados.* UNS spokesman claimed it could muster a popular vote somewhat in excess of one million. Under Mexico's new electoral law, this could place up to twenty *sinarquistas,* or their sympathizers, in the Congress.[15] Moreover, I was informed that the original demand for the cancellation came from the national committee of *Acción Nacional* which feared loss of its own "privileged" status as the "official opposition party."[16] This testimony came from highly placed sources in the groups involved, whose confidence I had cultivated over the past several years, and whose testimony could be viewed as reliable.

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[11] Article 3 of the Constitution of 1917 prohibits priests, ministers, and ecclesiastics generally from participating in primary or secondary religious instruction. The Revolutionary regime has interpreted this to include the teaching of religion in public schools as well. Under the López Mateos regime (1958–64) a program of gratuitous distribution of textbooks was initiated by the national government. The *texto único* has preoccupied much of the right-wing attack on officialdom because it deliberately does not mention religion or the name of God.

[12] Taylor, *op. cit.,* p. 741.

[13] Garza, *op. cit.,* passim.

[14] See my "Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," *The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal,* Vol. 2 (May, 1965), pp. 155–63.

[15] The reformed electoral law was a major issue in the campaign and was stressed by PRI candidate Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and incumbent President Adolfo López Mateos as the Revolutionary party's guarantee of an honest and "clean" election (*Novedades,* 12 de junio, 1964, front page). The new law provided a "mixed system" of proportional representation for the *Cámara de Diputados.* A registered party could win either electoral districts or deputies at large known as *diputados de partido,* or both. For deputies at large, the party would have to win at least 2.5 per cent of the total national vote for deputies, a means of

We may say, therefore, that the incumbent regime's defensive reaction to the threat of a UNS-PNM alliance is an indicator of the potential, if not actual, relevance of that combination in the Mexican system. By coopting PAN as its official opposition, PRI recognized the relevance of that group as well. Maintenance of a favored opposition party may be an instrument for periodic legitimizing of what still remains a single-party democracy. Significantly, and for the first time in post-revolutionary Mexican politics, an opposition candidate publicly admitted honest defeat without disparaging the election and was warmly thanked by the winner for this gesture of "political maturity."[17] This points to an important fact that was independently corroborated in confidential interviews. The upper hierarchy of PAN is no longer as acutely alienated toward the single-party system as it was in recent years.[18] The main body of severely alienated sentiment that can be properly attributed to the Mexican right wing, therefore, continues to be the *sinarquistas* and lower echelon *panistas* who do not see themselves as beneficiaries of deals—"sweetheart contracts," in the terminology of labor relations—such as the recent *rapprochement* of PAN and PRI.

If working relationships exist between PRI and PAN there is little sympathy for them in the lower echelons of *Acción Nacional.* It became patently clear in interviewing *panistas* that many have defected out of disgust for alleged deals betweeen the rival parties, even at the local level. A number of former PAN members were found working in the context of UNS, boycotting the 1964 election, or casting ballots for independent rightist candidates. Repeatedly, I found rank and file PAN members harboring intense resentment and hatred toward developments in their political arena. These restorationists, along with many of their *sinarquista* counterparts, frequently volun-

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eliminating parties which contested in only a few states. Winning the 2.5 per cent vote meant an automatic receipt of five deputy seats. Then, one additional seat would be awarded for each one-half per cent of the national total, up to a limit of twenty seats. PRI, *Primera Reunión Nacional de Programación* (México, 1963), pp. 292–293.

[16] In return for its guaranteed status as an "official opposition," PAN leaders gave its pledge to support the official election returns. As an additional bonus, PAN was guaranteed twenty *diputados de partido*, less those elected from districts. Two *panistas* were declared district winners in Chihuahua and León and the total national vote for PAN candidates was sufficient to guarantee the remaining eighteen deputies. According to informed sources in both PRI and PAN, the official returns of the election were reported honestly but the official regime was prepared to keep its commitment to PAN regardless.

[17] *Novedades*, 11 de julio, 1964, front page. On June 15 the same periodical carried a cartoon whose caption wryly summarized the plight of PAN as follows: *"hay algo peor que no ganar . . perder, sin fraude."* [There is something worse than not winning . . . losing without fraud.]

[18] The 1958 presidential campaign period was marked with severely alienated pronouncements by PAN's leadership. Luis H. Alvarez blamed all the ills of Mexico and of the world on the PRI. He cursed his defeat as an enormous fraud leaving strained relations between the two parties. There was certainly a great amount of fraud in the 1958 election, but not enough by itself to have taken the presidency away from Alvarez. However, the election was conducted in a tense atmosphere that involved the murder of one PAN campaign worker and several attacks on Alvarez himself. This writer interviewed Luis H. Alvarez after the election and did not find him to be the demagogue that Taylor pictured him, *op. cit.*, p. 741. The violence of the opposition to his presidential candidacy undoubtedly accounted for much of PAN's extreme alienation in 1958. None of these misfortunes were visited upon José González Torres in 1964, which—in all likelihood due to the *rapprochement* of PAN and PRI—made the most recent campaign appear much less antagonistic. Significantly, the campaign's only reported violence of serious proportions was directed against the PRI. An attack by stone-throwers on Díáz Ordaz in Chihuahua city (see *Índice*, 7 de abril, 1964, front page) and a frustrated dynamite attempt in Nuevo Casas Grandes (see *La Nación*, 26 de abril, 1964, p. 11) were officially blamed by the regime on the leftist splinter group *Frente Electoral del Pueblo.* One of their leaders, Braulio Maldonado Sández (a former governor of Baja California Norte) was deported as a result of the incident. Similar happenings during the 1958 campaign were blamed exclusively (and in many cases unfairly) on *Acción Nacional* and the *sinarquistas.*

teered the belief that violence of 1910 proportions would again be an ultimate necessity in restoring true democracy to Mexico.

On the basis of the preceding observations, it will be the major contention of this paper that *Partido de Acción Nacional* has been partially coopted into the Mexican single-party system and that *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* now serves as the principal catalyst for articulation of alienated restorationist sentiment in Mexico. It is contended further that ideological differences between UNS and PAN are amenable to empirical verification and measurement.

Quantitative techniques for multivariate analysis were utilized in order to examine these contentions and to isolate correlates of political alienation among Mexican rightists. On the basis of the author's previous fieldwork, the state of Guanajuato was selected as a research site. Guanajuato offered the advantage of being relatively compact, with all major urban centers accessible by bus. It is also the symbolic home of *sinarquismo* and a traditional stronghold of the *Partido de Acción Nacional.* The author and a graduate assistant arranged a series of interviews with UNS and PAN leaders in the four principal cities of the state, León, Irapuato, Guanajuato, and Celaya. Their cooperation was secured for purposes of distributing a measuring instrument to key members of each group.

UNS and PAN have an overlapping membership. Because neither group would divulge its total membership list it was impossible to draw two independent samples. Definition of the proper universe for which population parameters would be generalized was handled, therefore, on the basis of an exhaustive sample of what might here be called the "esoteric" members of each group. In practical terms, this meant the basic municipal committees for both UNS and PAN in each of the cities specified above. Between twenty-five and thirty intensive interviews were held with group leaders who in turn promised to distribute the questionnaires to *all* of their municipal committee members. A return of ninety-six percent was secured by mail and later by personal follow-up. Although the sample is not necessarily adequate for generalization about the total Mexican universe of UNS and PAN members, the results of processing the data using standard tests of significance yield strong inferences that, in all likelihood, do represent Mexico's restorationist ideologues.

Although, as just stated, it was not possible to draw two completely independent samples of UNS and PAN members, the responses were sorted on the basis of answers to question thirty-four which asked the respondent to state which political party or group he preferred to see gain political power during the next five years. This item discriminated the respondents into roughly equal groups, and so provided a basis for statistical comparison. The questionnaire consisted of forty items including standard SES and attitudinal variables together with scalogram items of the Guttman-Himmelstrand type.[19] Most of the correlations were without major statistical significance. Those that achieved significance appear in Table 1.

From these data it is apparent that the *sinarquistas* have a much more instrumental orientation to concrete human problems (such as unemployment) than do the *panistas* in this sample. The UNS respondents seem geared for concrete action while more of the PAN respondents are willing to take refuge in an emotive "resort to principle" approach. The *sinarquistas* are decidedly less optimistic about their future chances for improvement in status. This corroborates the general impression I have gathered in knowing and interviewing members of both groups. PAN members scored much higher on the SES index than did the UNS members. Although the *sinarquista* scores on social gregariousness point toward withdrawal, at least in terms of discussion outside the primary group, it is well to remember that *sinarquismo* is something of a large primary group in itself and it would be possible, therefore, for members to see themselves as operating within esoteric confines. The incidence of *sinarquista*-led pressure movements throughout Mexico that was cited earlier is adequate testimony to the fact that UNS members do not generally feel that they lack political efficacy as a result of their being denied overt participation. Finally, and significantly, the *sinarquistas* took a decidedly jaundiced view of public morality while *panistas* expressed a more laudatory evaluation. This finding lends weight to the contention that *Acción*

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[19] The questionnaire represented this author's second pilot attempt to devise an instrument for attitudinal measurement for use among a specialized Latin American clientele. The scalogram components yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .63 in the instrumental items but failed to scale at all in the emotive or "High L" items (*cf.* Ulf Himmelstrand, *Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Processes*, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1960). While insufficient to be reported here, these findings did provide insight into the problem of instrument construction in the Spanish vernacular.

TABLE I. ALIENATION CORRELATES OF PAN AND UNS MEMBERSHIP

Item	Partido de Acción Nacional (N=45)		Unión Nacional Sinarquista (N=52)		p under H_0 that $x \geq$ chi square
	%	N	%	N	
R's participation in organizations that seek to solve such community problems as unemployment					
often	32	15	33	17	
sometimes	27	12	48	25	
rarely or never	41	18	19	10	.05
It's easy to make up my mind about solving the unemployment problem. It's just a matter of principle.*					
agree	28	13	21	11	
undecided	42	19	25	13	
disagree	30	13	54	28	.05
R's optimism as to his own chances for socio-economic mobility					
high	36	16	17	9	
medium	39	18	28	15	
low	25	11	55	28	.01
R's discussion of social and economic problems with persons outside the primary group					
often	35	16	18	9	
sometimes	42	19	23	12	
rarely or never	23	10	59	31	.001
R's view of change in the morality of Mexican public officials during the past twenty years.†					
improved	27	12	10	5	
the same	48	22	21	11	
worse	25	11	69	36	.001

* This was one of the Himmerstrand-type items which produced a statistically significant correlation with group partisanship. In an earlier work I suggested the hypothesis that "High L" political actors may be the most acutely alienated toward the political system (*cf.* "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," *op. cit.*) The data above do not at all confirm that hypothesis.

† Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in the second response category for this item. It could be argued that answering "the same" meant "the same old immorality" to the PAN and UNS respondents.

Nacional is gradually being coopted into the single-party system.

III

The foregoing results of an attitudinal survey in one Mexican state are insufficient to call into question Philip Taylor's assessment in 1958 that Mexico seemed to be a "smoothly running authoritarian regime."[20] The potential threat to the stability of the system that is represented by restorationist ideologues is not at the moment large enough to justify alarm. If PAN is being coopted into the "revolutionary family," other rightist formations may come to be similarly blessed, especially under the conciliatory new regime of Gustavo Díaz

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[20] Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 729.

Ordaz. Thus we could expect to see an enlarged brotherhood of *revolucionarios* dividing eventually into a smoothly running multiparty system. Then, UNS and its leftist counterparts would no longer occupy satellite positions. The probabilities of such a development are difficult to calculate.

The nexus between political alienation and potential instability must not be forgotten, however, and the direction taken by such relevant "out groups" as *Unión Nacional Sinarquista*, either toward or away from integration into the national political life, will be critical for any effort to hypothesize the broad outlines of Mexican political change. Continued rightwing political alienation of the restorationist variety could have serious implications for stability within the Mexican political system.

Mexican restorationists view social conflict as the product of a sinister design engineered by political cabals. Their ideology does not embrace a rationalized concept of human misunderstanding and error. Restorationists feel they are denied both political participation and equality of socio-economic opportunity. Competitive material consumption, which Robert E. Lane found to be a stability factor for American political ideologies,[21] does not operate to reduce ideological polarization in Mexico. In fact, the *sinarquistas* and some *panistas* moralize their demands for status and deference to a degree that encourages polarization and political cleavage. The Mexican restorationist does not "morselize"[22] his conceptual approach to political issues but rather looks beyond the day-after-tomorrow issues in life to an ethereal vision of the perfect future. Estranged from the main thrust of Mexican revolutionary ideology, the restorationist hoists the spectre of his martyred heroes and withdraws his support of the political *status quo.* He expects the system to respond only to his minimal needs of personal security, not to his aspirations for mobility and achievement. Protest movements against established government policies, therefore, are designed more to dramatize evil and injustice than to bring about a constructive redress of grievances.

Is the system just? Indeed not, in the minds of Mexican restorationists. Unintentionally, but poignantly, the spirit of their dilemma was captured by Carlos Fuentes in these lines from *La Muerte de Artemio Cruz:*

> It is a sin, a very grave sin against the Holy Spirit to refuse to receive the gifts of heaven . . . everyone should go forth to farm the land, to harvest the crops, to deliver the fruits of the earth to their legitimate landlord, a christian landlord who pays for the obligations of his privilege by promptly delivering a tenth to Holy Mother Church. God punishes disobedience.
>
> —And justice, father?
>
> —Final justice is imparted up there, son. Do not look for it in this vale of tears.[23]

There can be no felt sense of justice in this life, say the *sinarquistas,* when the political system which governs them is manipulated by one or all of several protean cabals. No one cabal will do for every occasion. Jews, Masons, Communists, *gringos,* all are believed to interact concertedly in a voracious web of planned aggression against the Mexican nation.

The practical implication of this evaluation can be stated briefly. Conspicuous supporters of the official regime will be, and are, targets for the wrath of alienated "out groups." Accurately or not, United States Ambassador Fulton Freeman was quoted as having endorsed the candidacy of Díaz Ordaz in May, 1964. In a rare moment of affinity between left and right, the allegation brought outcries from editors of PAN and UNS publications as well as from a leading left wing publication (*Política*) with strong marxist leanings.[24] Ambassador Freeman was likened to former ambassadors Poinsett and Wilson, two damaging symbols of influence in Mexican-American history. Such an event takes on added significance if, although momentarily, it forces opposing "out groups" into a negative coalition of anti-Americanism.

More common are the cases of defensive adaptation by the *status quo* regime in the face of restorationist pressure. A dramatic example of this occurred during February, 1963, when the official regime in San Luis Potosí seized and destroyed the first printing of a restorationist-oriented book that exposed local government corruption.[25] Later that year, PAN and UNS came out openly together protesting electoral fraud in the municipal elections of Apaseo el Grande, Guanajuato.[26] More recently in the same state, *sinarquistas* were jailed after a public protest meeting at Celaya.[27]

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[21] Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (Glencoe, 1962) p. 80.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 346–363.

[23] Carlos Fuentes, *La Muerte de Artemio Cruz* (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962), p. 46.

[24] *Política*, 1 junio, 1964, p. 19.

[25] Antonio Estrada M. *La Grieta en el Yugo* (2d ed., México, no publisher cited, 1963). The first edition was destroyed and the press that produced it wrecked by the government of San Luis Potosí. The work is a crude tabloid but contains photographs of documents and detailed accounts of events in San Luis Potosí which were largely corroborated by independent observers interviewed by this author.

Mexico's right wing alienates are not yet ready to launch a violent revolution. But they say that they desire one and are building the social and ideological base for it. Finding no external promise of psychic security in a *gemeinschaft* society of spiritual brotherhood, they take solace in an ideological view that promotes cleavage in the body politic. Excluded from effective involvement in a political system that offers few gestures toward immediate change, the restorationists have constructed an apocalyptic view of eventual salvation and relief. We must place the restorationists at the negative end of the allegiance-alienation continuum. The future of their ideology and behavior, indeed perhaps of political stability in Mexico, will be determined by the direction of change and flexibility in the single-party system.[28]

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[26] Based on interviews in Apaseo el Grande and on handbills and other printed propaganda bearing the insignia of both PAN and UNS that are currently in the author's possession.

[27] Based on confidential communications recently received from informants in Celaya. A founder of *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* and currently an important member of its national executive board, Juan Ignacio Padilla, was reportedly kidnapped from a public street in Ensenada, Bcfa., at gunpoint by members of that state's judicial police (see *La Suegra de la Cotorra*, 29 de noviembre, 1964, front page). There is little doubt that harassment of political restorationists continues throughout Mexico.

[28] The only other published effort to measure political attitudes among Mexican rightists is included in the recent work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1963). Almond and Verba did not include UNS within their sample and they do not isolate alienated nuclei within the Mexican system. They do make the interesting broad contention that Mexicans *generally* are more alienated from governmental output than respondents of the other four nations (not Latin American) surveyed in their study (p. 495).

MAKING THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A FURTHER LOOK

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American scholars generally take a dim view of the 1946 Constitution of Japan. Because it carries the imprint of a foreign political philosophy and, more particularly, because it was allegedly imposed through the willful and covert action of an American field commander, that instrument, they feel, is off key and should be rewritten. Their case was well stated some years ago by Harold S. Quigley, in these words:

> . . . the SCAP draft Constitution . . . has been regarded widely in Japan as a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions. . . . [It was] written hastily by men without adequate knowledge of Japanese civilization and with little regard . . . for the national right of self-determination. . . . The decision to prepare a constitution was made by General MacArthur, who interpreted directives from Washington liberally. These directives . . . did not require SCAP to write a new constitution. . . . they specifically laid down . . . that the new government should be established "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Moreover . . . "any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure . . ." were to be "issued only following consultation and the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission."[1]

Quigley partisans cling to the basic tenets of this case despite the presentation of new and strong counter-evidence by an official Japanese study mission, sent to the United States in late 1958 to obtain additional information on the origin of the new Constitution. The investigation conducted by this group, according to its leader, Professor Kenzo Takayanagi, "resulted in the explosion of a number of erroneous and harmful surmises."[2] The Takayanagi party found, as Quigley relates to the detriment of his own case, that the Supreme Commander in drawing up a model constitution "merely desired that the Japanese Government prepare a draft similar in fundamental principles and basic forms"; that the MacArthur draft was advisory, not mandatory; that it did not contravene the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 creating the Far Eastern Commission; that MacArthur's action "was still following the policy of his home government" for establishing a new political system "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people"; and that "The surmise that it was the intention of SCAP to impose an American type constitution . . . loses sight of the Allied pressure on SCAP."[3] But Takayanagi, as we shall see, did not give MacArthur—as distinguished from the United States government—a completely clean bill of health.

Notwithstanding these findings by agents of the country presumably adversely affected, Quigley refused to give ground. He remained "concerned . . . with the propriety and possible consequences of exerting great influence upon the process of constitutional reform in another state," and he repeated that "this concern was felt by the Far Eastern Commission."[4] Thus he continued to believe essentially that Japan was saddled with an ideologically incompatible constitution by the arbitrary action of an American general; and because of this belief, he forecast "a conservative-minded revision . . . [which] would reflect the view of those who characterize the present instrument as alien in authorship and idiom, destructive of the traditional status of the dynasty, disruptive of the family system and restrictive of military power."[5]

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[1] "Revising the Japanese Constitution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1959), p. 140. The Far Eastern Commission, created at Moscow in December 1945, supposedly to make Allied occupation policy, was composed of four veto powers (U. S., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., China) and nine other members (Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, and —after November 1949—Burma and Pakistan).

[2] Kenzo Takayanagi, "Making the Japanese Constitution: What Really Happened," *Japan Times*, March 16, 1959.

[3] Quigley, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 144. Quigley based this prediction on the probability of a Socialist Party split which subsequently occurred.

Although Quigley's argument is persuasive on first reading, on further examination it is found wanting in certain respects. For instance, it is not entirely consistent in its approach to the naturally conflicting aims of the United States and Japan's conservative leadership regarding the question of constitutional reform. When dealing with the U. S. side, it concedes that much is to be said for the way MacArthur handled a very complex and thorny problem; but on turning to the Japanese side, it tends to interpret MacArthur's part in the drama as being imperious and pernicious. It is partial to the Japanese side.[6]

Then, too, Quigley's argument treads on shaky ground by giving Americans concerned with Japanese affairs at that time a *de facto* classification of "bad guys" and "good guys." GHQ in Tokyo is composed of the former and the American home government—meaning the small "Japan Crowd" in the State Department—of the latter.[7] Ignored is the fact that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, and the American press and public did not interpret MacArthur's actions on governmental reform as in contravention of U. S. policy, disobedience of orders, or disregard of the will of the Japanese people. It follows from this that if governmental change in Japan had taken a course to satisfy the Quigley school of thought, most segments of the American scene would have viewed the results with alarm, and MacArthur would have been denounced for dereliction of duty.

In other respects the Quigley case does not stand up well under close scrutiny. It fails, for example, to give enough weight to the fact that the Japanese side strongly supported MacArthur's approach to the problem of governmental reform; that the Japanese people, having lost faith in their traditional system of government, showed enthusiasm for a democratic basic law; that the ruling classes which controlled the Cabinet, the Privy Council, the Imperial Household, and the Diet, being realistic, subscribed—not surprisingly with some resistance at first—to the United States government's reform program as presented to them by MacArthur.[8] Furthermore, it offers no alternative procedure to the one followed by MacArthur for accomplishing the paramount political aim of the United States; it makes no attempt to explain how the Far Eastern Commission, with State Department coaching, or the Japanese, acting alone without some kind of a primer on democracy, could ever have fulfilled this requirement.[9]

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[6] Ardath W. Burks reflects this ambivalence by writing, on the one hand: " . . . Yoshida Shigeru . . . feels that [the new Constitution] is well designed for modern Japan. Dr. Takayanagi . . . denied . . . that the constitition was . . . imposed. . . . Had the MacArthur Constitition been presented . . . as a sharp break with tradition . . . it might possibly have been accepted and have been acceptable." But on the other hand: " . . . the historic fact [is] the constitution represents alien authorship, in that it was imposed . . . by SCAP. . . . it is safe to predict that public opinion will steadily mobilize behind the movement for limited revision." Ardath W. Burks, *The Government of Japan*, 2d ed. (New York, 1964), pp. 17–30.

[7] To suggest that GHQ arrogated to itself a function which the State Department's Office of Far East Affairs had intended to perform through the instrumentality of the Far Eastern Commission, Hugh Borton writes, relative to the obstinacy of the Japanese government against proposing fundamental constitutional changes: "This situation resulted in the Government Section of SCAP taking steps to make sure that it would play the dominant part in the revision of the Constitution." F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton and B. R. Pearn, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946: The Far East, 1942–1946* (London, 1955), p. 329. In a slightly different manner, Theodore McNelly suggests that MacArthur usurped the constitutional revision role: "[Inasmuch as] 'any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure . . . will be issued only following . . . agreement in the Far Eastern Commission' . . . it would appear that constitutional reform in Japan could not be unilaterally carried out by the American occupation authorities." Theodore McNelly, *Contemporary Government of Japan* (Boston, 1963), p. 29.

[8] " . . . The final draft . . . as . . . approved by GHQ . . . contained much that the Cabinet as a whole could not bring itself to agree to, particularly regarding the position of the Emperor. . . . when it had been ascertained that His Majesty had been heard to say that . . . there seemed to be nothing particularly wrong about the definition in it of the position of the Emperor. . . the conclusion was reached . . . to accept the final version sent to us from GHQ. . . ." Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs—The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Boston, 1962), p. 135. "After the draft . . . had been completed, it was submitted for discussion to the Privy Council, the Lower House of the Diet and the House of Peers, the members of which official assemblies included Japan's foremost authorities on law and administration. . . . therefore, it is correct to say that the best informed elements among the Japanese people had a hand in shaping it, a point which is in these days too easily and too often ignored." *Ibid.*, p. 145.

In any event, Quigley and other scholars insist on two categorical prerequisites for making fundamental changes in the Imperial Constitution: consent of the Far Eastern Commission and approval by the Japanese people. Since in their opinion these conditions were not met in drawing up the 1946 Constitution, that document is *ipso facto* an alien imposition and should, therefore, be amended. But cause for amendment would not exist, according to this reasoning, if fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure had been made by the proper procedure, that is, following agreement in the Far Eastern Commission and approval by the Japanese people.

It is significant that these writers subordinate the substance of the new Constitution to the method by which it was drafted and adopted, *i.e.*, to its legitimacy. By narrowing the discussion to the procedural side of constitutional reform they place blame for an alleged injustice done Japan on the shoulders of a soldier in the field and thereby avoid pointing the finger at the United States as a whole. Thus, however unintentionally, they pillory MacArthur without establishing his guilt and, more important, hint at a remedy on the presumption of his culpability that could generate misunderstanding between the American and Japanese people.[10] For this reason alone we are justified in looking further at the major premises of their version of the origin, composition and adoption of the new Constitution of Japan.

This paper proposes, therefore, to call in question generally accepted assumptions regarding governmental reform in Japan, to challenge specifically the premises that the Supreme Commander: had a major part in devising either the substance or the procedure of the radical plan for incorporating the political philosophy of the West in the new Japanese Constitution, schemed to violate the Moscow Agreement *vis-à-vis* the prerogatives of the Far Eastern Commission, prepared a model constitution without authorization to do so, and imposed a new form of government on the Japanese people against their will.

I

To begin with, neither the plan nor the procedure for revising the Imperial Constitution of 1889, as Quigley and other writers imply, originated with MacArthur. On the contrary, MacArthur was explicitly instructed by the United States government to perform major surgery on that charter; and to do so by one of three methods. The full details were spelled out in a 14-page paper entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" which was sent to the Supreme Commander in draft form on December 4, 1945, and in final form on January 9, 1946. This document is identified as SWNCC 228 after the interdepartmental State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, under whose auspices it was prepared. On December 18, 1945, in SWNCC 228/1, a two-page annex, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on a draft of SWNCC 228, recommended inclusion in that paper of what the JCS conceived to be the short-term and long-range objectives of the occupation, points that will be elaborated below. A copy of SWNCC 228/1 was sent to MacArthur on December 28, 1945.[11]

Although SWNCC 228 is the master key to an understanding of what happened to the Meiji Constitution, this singularly important Washington policy paper appears to have been examined by no more than a half-dozen scholars and comprehensively treated by none of them. The first published reference to it was made in 1953 by one of its authors, George H. Blakeslee; in 1955 Hugh Borton, another of its authors, gave Washington credit for suggesting to MacArthur the principles to be incorporated in the new Constitution—disclaiming Washington responsibility, however, for the no-war clause.[12] Ardath Burks and Theodore McNelly in more recent studies on Japanese government and politics, like Blakeslee, quote a single sentence from SWNCC 228 to prove that MacArthur's method of revising Japan's Constitution was contrary to the spirit if not the letter of Washington's orders;[13] but they do not mention the passage which definitely authorized him to employ that particular method. The missing passage had been supplied in a provocatively unique earlier study by Professor Robert E. Ward, whose major interest in SWNCC 228 was that it faced up to the Allied commitment to establish a form of government in Japan "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." He subordinated the determination of the United States to establish a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" in Japan to "the problem of the ultimate Japanese reaction to such a stand." He feared that the Japanese would interpret the "freely expressed will" proviso "as an absolute guarantee, and the United States' stand in SWNCC 228 as evasive, legalistic and essentially immoral. . . ."[14] The legalistic and moral aspects of American policy are not questioned by other writers.

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[9] Though not a member of the Quigley school, John M. Maki is bold enough to mention, but not explain, three novel and impractical alternative solutions to the problem of constitutional reform: indefinite continuation of the contradictory situation between the occupation reforms and the Imperial Constitution; suspension of that Constitution to eliminate the contradiction; step-by-step development by the Japanese of their own basic law under occupation tutelage. John M. Maki, *Government and Politics in Japan —The Road to Democracy* (New York, 1962), p. 78.

[10] When Premier Nobuske Kishi proposed in 1957 to discuss restoration of the Emperor's status to that of "Head of State"—which, he pointed out, would not change the functions of the Throne—the *New York Times* commented: "It would, however, give some emphasis to the way in which Japanese thought is moving. Any such discussion will be closely watched by the United States." *New York Times*, March 17, 1957.

[11] The Department of State made available to the writer the contents of the SWNCC 228 folder.

A sixth scholar who uses SWNCC 228 to prove a particular point is Takayanagi, referred to above. Chairman of Japan's 39-member Commission on the Constitution which recently completed a seven-year study on the origin and propriety of that country's organic law, he, too, directs special attention to the familiar line in SWNCC 228 about Japanese initiative to prove that MacArthur deviated from the Washington-prescribed procedure for effecting constitutional revision. On the basis of this one sentence, 31 of the 39 members of the Commission on the Constitution take the stand in the 5,600-page final report submitted to Premier Hayato Ikeda on July 3, 1964, that "the postwar constitution was forced upon the country by the occupation authorities . . . and should therefore be replaced by a document based upon the free will of the Japanese. . . ."[15] Takayanagi makes MacArthur responsible for what happened by reasoning as follows:

> It was . . . the policy of the American home Government that the constitutional revision necessitated by the Potsdam Declaration . . . be effected by the Japanese voluntarily. . . . This policy is clearly stated in . . . SWNCC 228 . . . . SCAP followed that policy . . . until . . . February 1946. . . . [Then] Gen. MacArthur ordered the Political Section to make a draft. . . . This extraordinary step was taken without the knowledge of the American home Government. . . .[16]

To leave no doubt about the meaning of this 1959 statement, Takayanagi repeated in 1964: "The policy of the American home government as shown by SWNCC 228 was to make the Japanese draft revision of the Meiji Constitution, subject to SCAP review, and not for the Supreme Commander to suggest any concrete plan to the Japanese as a model. From this angle . . . [MacArthur's action] seems to be an 'extraordinary step'. . . . "[17] In other words, had GHQ not prepared a constitutional guide for the Japanese but instead followed Takayanagi's construction of SWNCC 228 for revolutionizing Japan's political system—that is, awaited voluntary action by the Japanese—no "extraordinary step" would have been taken and hence no reason given the majority of the Commission on the Constitution for favoring revision now. What Takayanagi does not say is that SWNCC 228 specified two other procedures for MacArthur to fall back on in the event the Japanese did not voluntarily effect the constitutional revision necessitated by the Potsdam Declaration.

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[12] George H. Blakeslee, *The Far Eastern Commission—A Study in International Cooperation, 1945–1952* (State Department Publication 5138, Dec. 1953), p. 45; Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York, 1955), note 5, pp. 423–24.

[13] Burks, p. 26; McNelly, p. 39; Blakeslee, p. 45.

[14] Robert E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (December 1956), pp. 990–91. In this 30-page article, Ward is highly critical of the U. S. government for demanding drastic revision of the Meiji Constitution and of the Supreme Commander for doing the bidding of his government. He holds that the Allied powers and the Supreme Commander could favor and support but not impose a democratic form of government on Japan. Appreciating why both the United States and Japan, for somewhat different reasons, opposed participation of the Far Eastern Commission in constitutional revision, he complains nevertheless because that international body was not permitted to perform this function. Forgetting that in August 1945 Japanese Cabinet members "sobbed loudly" on accepting the terms of surrender (Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the "Missouri"* [New Haven, 1950], p. 253), he notes that members of the Shidehara Cabinet in February 1946 tearfully endorsed, at MacArthur's urging, a U. S. plan for democratizing Japan's traditional form of government in fulfillment of the terms of surrender. Notwithstanding Japan's remarkable progress under the new Constitution, he insists that the Japanese electorate is in a state of shock from conducting governmental affairs by an alien political philosophy. Conceding that the Supreme Commander was under orders to carry out a radical governmental reform plan, he damns MacArthur and his staff for doing the job in an inelegant and overly thorough manner. *Ibid.*, pp. 980–1010.

[15] *New York Times*, July 4, 1964. This report is summarized and also made the subject of a lengthy editorial in the *Japan Times Weekly*, Vol. 4, No. 28, International ed., July 11, 1964.

[16] Takayanagi, *Japan Times*, March 16, 1959.

It would be extremely difficult for anyone to read SWNCC 228 in its entirety and not conclude that Japan, whether from the Supreme Commander or from the Far Eastern Commission—both Allied creations—was to receive a Western-style basic law, and in a form not at all compatible with Japan's traditions. SWNCC 228 begins by stipulating the democratic reforms "which the occupation authorities should insist be carried out in Japan": a responsible government based on wide suffrage, an executive branch responsible to the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body, a legislature with full budgetary controls, guarantee of fundamental civil rights, provision for popular amendment of the constitution. Next in SWNCC 228 appears the oft-quoted sentence said to prove that MacArthur violated his orders: "Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future."[18] This injunction is amplified in the following paragraph of SWNCC 228 which cautions the Supreme Commander not to proceed with the job of revision piecemeal and head-foremost. "The effectiveness of governmental reforms in preventing the resurgence of military control in Japan," it pontificates, "will depend in a large measure upon the acceptance by the Japanese people of the *entire program*. In the *implementation* . . . the Supreme Commander must take into account the problems of *sequence and timing*, as well as the measures which might be adopted to *prepare the people* to accept the changes, in order to insure that the reforms are lasting in strengthening representative government in Japan."[19]

What Washington meant, and what the above-mentioned scholars, excepting only Ward, thought too insignificant to point out, is elucidated in SWNCC 228, Appendix B, "Discussion." The first paragraph of this section defers dutifully to the "freely expressed will" commitment and then gets down to brass tacks thus: " . . . the Allies . . . are fully empowered to insist that the Japanese basic law be so altered as to provide that . . . the government is responsible . . . and that the civil is supreme over the military branch. . . . "[20] Devoting the next five paragraphs to an exposition of governmental shortcomings that should be remedied, the Discussion in paragraph 7 directs the Supreme Commander to insure constitutional reform in one of three ways. First, according to this paragraph, the necessary changes "should be initiated and carried into effect by the Japanese Government out of a desire to eliminate elements of the national structure which have brought Japan to the present pass and to comply with . . . the Potsdam Declaration. [Second,] Failing such spontaneous action by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should indicate the reforms which this Government considers necessary . . . . [Third,] Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued . . . specifying in detail the reforms to be effected."[21] Until the beginning of February 1946, as Takayanagi indicates, MacArthur followed the first of these alternatives. But then, when he became convinced that the Japanese leaders would not or could not initiate and carry into effect a far-reaching constitutional reform program, far from taking an "extraordinary step" he simply turned to the second alternative of indicating—graphically, to be sure—the reforms Washington considered necessary. The third alternative of issuing a formal instruction to the Japanese government was held in reserve and never used.

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[17] Personal letter from Professor Takayanagi to the writer, December 8, 1964. He opposes those in Japan who have "the idea that since the new Japanese Constitution was one imposed by force on the Japanese, it might be thrown overboard whatever its contents, and that they ought to write the Constitution anew themselves. This smacks of a political strategy of accelerating revision by stimulating nationalist (or xenophobic) sentiment. I do not approve of the strategy." *Ibid.* On this point the late Kazuo Kawai wrote: "The reactionaries . . . obviously want to discredit the present constitution in order to make way for a return to the past." Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago, 1960), p. 69. "Significantly enough," writes Edwin O. Reischauer, "the charge of foreign origin has been repeatedly leveled . . . by those who wished to see it changed." Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, rev. ed. (New York, 1957), p. 254. According to Quigley, the old Liberal Party, as of 1954, "would come close to restoring the Meiji Constitution." Quigley, p. 145.

[18] SWNCC 228.

[19] *Ibid.* Italics added.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

MacArthur's obedience to the spirit as well as the letter of his orders on constitutional reform is further confirmed by the degree to which his action harmonized with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on this matter. A powerful body in shaping American foreign policy during and for some time following World War II, the JCS dispatched all official orders to MacArthur; and MacArthur, with an ear ever tuned to the locus of power, was particularly deferential to it. Consequently SWNCC 228/1 which reflects the attitude of the JCS toward the substance of SWNCC 228 is of more than passing importance. As indicated above, it offered suggestions on two points, long-range and short-term military interests. "The principal short-term military interest," it says, "is the possibility that the implementation of the proposed reforms may foment unrest in Japan to such a degree as to require increases in the occupation forces."[22] This put MacArthur on notice that it was his responsibility to accomplish a difficult political and diplomatic mission without giving rise to violence, civil war, and chaos.

From the long-range military point of view, the major concern of the JCS as stated in SWNCC 228/1 was that "no nationalistic or military clique or combination should again be able to dominate that country and lead it into a war of aggression."[23] How effectively this objective would be achieved, MacArthur was told, "will depend in large measure upon acceptance by the Japanese people of the *entire program*."[24] This thought, it will be recalled, is incorporated in SWNCC 228. A military man with less of MacArthur's penchant for personalizing his actions might have interpreted such emphatic language as a mandate to devise and espouse, as the Supreme Commander and Premier Kijuro Shidehara actually did,[25] the famous no-war clause of the Constitution. Whatever else may be said of Article 9 renouncing war as a sovereign right, there is no denying that it accomplished, at least for a generation, the long-range aim of the occupation as defined by the JCS. Moreover, JCS insistence in SWNCC 228/1 that the Supreme Commander, in the process of reforming the government, should destroy for all time Japan's potential for military aggression casts serious further doubt on Takayanagi's finding that the American home government expected MacArthur merely to review a Japanese draft revision of the old Constitution without taking the liberty, if necessary, of making concrete suggestions for the Japanese to follow. Such a hands-off course would have been totally at variance with the rationale by which the occupation of Japan was conducted in the winter of 1945–1946. Whether by MacArthur or by others, military or civilian, a drastic change was to be made in the Meiji Constitution and, as in the case of surrender some six months before, it simply could not be made painlessly. All that can safely be said is that the operation might have been monumentally botched if it had been performed by fits and starts on the advice of the delegations of eleven different nations residing in Washington.

What does this add up to? Simply that the United States government's unalterable objective, with three optional procedures for accomplishing it, was to democratize Japan's traditional form of government. Naturally, for both military and political reasons, a maximum of Japanese popular support for the new form of government was desirable. But such support, to repeat, was not mandatory. The "freely expressed will" proviso was, as every student of the subject knows, inserted in the Potsdam Declaration without enthusiasm and only at the last minute, not to accord the right of full constitutional self-determination to the Japanese, but rather, in line with Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew's urging, to facilitate Japan's surrender by opening the prospect that the monarchy might be retained.[26] If Japan's new Constitution is in fact, as Quigley describes it, "a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions," that circumstance must be attributed not to any "extraordinary step" taken by MacArthur but to its democratic character as prescribed by the American home government in SWNCC 228. How suitable any democratic constitution would be for Japan and whether the existing one should be amended are not questions at issue here.

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[22] SWNCC 228/1.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.* Italics added.

[25] The collaboration of MacArthur and Shidehara on this point is explained in Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 77 (September 1962), pp. 350–78. According to MacArthur himself: " . . . I knew that it was exactly what the Allies wanted at that time for Japan. They had said so at Potsdam and they had said so afterwards. . . . " Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York, 1964), p. 304.

[26] Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1952), II, ch. 36. In this chapter Grew writes: "If it had not been for [Secretary of War Henry

II

If MacArthur's Washington orders gave him sufficient procedural latitude to assist in revising the Meiji Constitution, he obviously had no reason to harbor a scheme of his own for achieving that purpose. Yet on the books stands a heretofore uncontested charge that he proceeded surreptitiously with the reform of Japan's governmental system. Used to prove that MacArthur contravened United States policy, the charge was initially made by onetime United States officials who might have been unduly concerned with the prerogatives of the Far Eastern Commission. Little consideration need be given the Far Eastern Commission, for that international body never made and was not intended to make an impact on American policy toward Japan. This was confirmed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes himself who wrote in 1947 regarding the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan:

> At the time the commission and the council were established, I stated that the authority of General MacArthur should not be obstructed by the inability of the commission to agree on policy or of the council to agree on advice for carrying out that policy . . . . events have proved that the two bodies have not interfered with MacArthur's administration. He and his staff have continued to carry out their difficult task with an efficiency that has won the plaudits of the people in other Allied nations besides the United States.[27]

Not from any action of the Far Eastern Commission, then, but rather from a Tokyo visit of members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, predecessor of the Far Eastern Commission, arose the allegation of GHQ deviousness.

What are the facts? At one of the early GHQ briefings of this group in January 1946, as George H. Blakeslee recalls, MacArthur explained that he had held frequent personal conferences with Japanese state ministers to clarify to them Allied policy on constitutional reform "as interpreted in more specific form by the American Government." At another session on January 30, just before their return to the United States, he told them that constitu-

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L.] Stimson's wholehearted initiative, the Potsdam Conference would have ended without any proclamation to Japan being issued at all. But even Mr. Stimson was unable to have included in the proclamation a categorical understanding that unconditional surrender would not mean the elimination of the dynasty if the Japanese people desired its retention." In a footnote he quotes a psychological warfare expert to the effect that "the analysts [of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of War Information] thought that the Emperor might be turned to good use in lowering resistance if the enemy were told that the decision regarding his fate after an Allied victory would be up to the Japanese themselves." Henry L. Stimson puts it this way: " . . . Some maintained that the Emperor must go. . . . Others urged that the war could be ended much more cheaply by openly revising the formula of 'unconditional surrender' to assure the Japanese that there was no intention of removing the Emperor if it should be the desire of the Japanese people that he remain as a constitutional monarch. This latter view has been urged with particular force and skill by Joseph C. Grew. . . . " Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), p. 626. " . . . we made a clear bargain. . . . American lives for an emasculated monarchy." Reischauer, p. 261.

[27] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), p. 218. The U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy approved by President Truman on September 6, 1945, states: " . . . in the event of any differences of opinion among [the Allies], the policies of the U. S. will govern." Jones, Borton and Pearn, *op. cit.*, Appendix 10. The Far East subcommittee of SWNCC recommended on October 16, 1945, that the U. S. hold to its position of maintaining final authority in the control of Japan, and the President, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Office of Far East Affairs in the State Department supported the recommendation; "but . . . certain of the European experts in the State Department favored additional concessions to the British and Soviet proposals." Blakeslee, p. 13. " . . . the Japanese constitution . . . is probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation. . . . I am certain that it would never have been accomplished had the occupation been dependent on the deliberations of the Far Eastern Commission—with the Soviet power of veto!" MacArthur, p. 302.

tional reform "had been taken out of his hands by the Moscow Agreement."[28] Having had up to this point neither an opportunity nor a compelling reason to explore fully the implications of the newly created Far Eastern Commission, MacArthur's comment on that occasion was at best a horseback opinion; presently he would reverse himself, as was his right, but not until he had taken a hard look at the overall situation.

The sincerity of MacArthur's assurance to the Commisioners that he was not then planning to effect changes in the Imperial Constitution has been sharply challenged by two scholars who had been members of the United States delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. One of these, George H. Blakeslee, puts it this way: "Two days after General MacArthur had stated to the members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission that he had ceased to take any action in regard to the revision . . . he felt forced to take vigorous measures."[29] Another United States delegate, Hugh Borton, writes: "Prior to their return . . . [the Commissioners] had been told by General Whitney that the problem of constitutional reform was a matter for the Japanese to consider and that no work was being undertaken by SCAP."[30] The implication is, of course, that MacArthur and members of his staff deliberately misrepresented the situation.

Both the innocence of the accused and the misjudgment of the accusers can be substantiated in this instance by the minutes of a meeting held in the Government Section on January 17, 1946, when the Far Eastern Advisory Commission visitors sat down to discuss occupation affairs with seven Army and four Naval officers, a group that included Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the section, and his deputy, Colonel Charles L. Kades. The proceedings on that occasion were recorded in a 41-page paper written the same day,[31] which discloses what GHQ's thinking on constitutional reform really was, and was not, at the time. It leaves no doubt that MacArthur, as he informed the Commissioners, was following the first Washington-prescribed procedure of giving the Japanese every opportunity to initiate the desired changes; and it disposes of the conspiracy theory.

Kades opened the meeting by reading a prepared statement which reflected GHQ's attitude. "Conforming to the policy . . . that the Japanese Government be permitted to initiate its own reorganization to the greatest extent practicable," he said, reading from the paper, "the Government Section . . . makes every effort . . . to encourage the Japanese to correct defects in their governmental system through their own administrative reforms." The paper ended on this revealing note: "The [civil rights and purge] directives of 4 October [1945] and 4 January [1946] will accomplish politically what has already been achieved militarily. . . . the election of a new Diet by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people from candidates untainted with militant nationalism will be a long step toward establishment of the peacefully inclined and responsible government in Japan contemplated by the Potsdam Declaration."[32] If this position paper erred, it was in the too complacent assumption that the Shidehara Government's draft revision of the Meiji Constitution, soon to be completed and submitted to GHQ, would incorporate as a minimum the occupation-induced political reforms of the previous four months.

Then followed a question and answer period which included this dialogue:[33]

> Q. Mr. Thomas Confesor [Philippines member]: Are you considering amendments to the Constitution?
>
> A. Col. Kades: No. The Government Section has understood that that is a long range problem concerning fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure which is within the province of your Commission.
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> * * *
>
> Q. Mr. Thomas Confesor: I do not understand . . . why constitutional revision is not part of your work.
>
> A. Col. Kades: Because formal revision of the written document would constitute a fundamental change in the Japanese constitutional structure, and as such be within the Commission's jurisdiction.
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> * * *
>
> Q. M. [Francis] Lacoste [French member]: I think that the alterations in the Japanese governmental system which are being carried out under the guidance of the headquarters are in fact con-

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[28] Blakeslee, p. 44.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[30] Borton, note 7, p. 424. "Whatever faults may be inherent in the military character, evasive misrepresentation has never been one of them." MacArthur, p. 287.

[31] "Government Section Report to the Far Eastern Commission," dated January 17, 1946. A copy is in the writer's personal files.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] *Ibid.*

stitutional changes which should be ultimately in a revision of the written Constitution.

* * *

Q. Sir George Sansom [U. K. member]: . . . Have you made any formal studies on this?
A. Col. Kades: No, Sir George, we have not.

Although Kades' answers were an open admission that GHQ had not done its homework on the implications of the Far Eastern Commission, they definitely disprove the charge that GHQ was holding in reserve a plan of its own for revising Japan's Constitution.

What, then, was MacArthur's thinking on constitutional reform? As of January 1946 he assumed on the basis of oral instructions he had previously given Japanese leaders that the Shidehara Cabinet would in good time produce a suitable preliminary draft of a democratic constitution for GHQ consideration within the framework of United States policy. MacArthur's crystal ball had not revealed that the character of the Cabinet revision plan to be laid before him in early February 1946 would completely change the constitutional picture and require a different procedural approach to governmental reform within the context of SWNCC 228.

Nor had the Supreme Commander anticipated the necessity of having the Government Section assist him in preparing a model constitution for the guidance of the confused and unresponsive Japanese leaders. Because the qualifications of Government Section personnel to perform such a task have been questioned, it is in order to examine briefly the part they actually played.

III

An appraisal of the role of the Government Section involves answers to three questions: Was it necessary to prepare a model constitution to implement SWNCC 228? If so, did it have to be prepared on short notice? Were the Government Section people competent to do that part of the job entrusted to them?

By coincidence, as already indicated above, the answer to the first of these questions was supplied by the Japanese government within a day or two of MacArthur's final meeting with the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on January 30. That answer consisted of the "unacceptably reactionary" constitution revision plan drawn up by State Minister Joji Matsumoto's Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee during the previous three months and submitted to GHQ on February 1, 1946.[34] Matsumoto's revision, found by GHQ to be "no revision at all,"[35] served notice that the conservative forces of Japan, without the help of an Allied blueprint of some kind, would never be able to reach a consensus on the reform program they had been told repeatedly by MacArthur to initiate and carry out. It demonstrated that Japan's leaders were no more willing to curtail the prerogatives of the Emperor in January 1946 than they had been in August 1945 when they were contemplating surrender; and without taking this drastic step, it would have been utterly impossible for them to comply with the unheard-of and unsuspected SWNCC 228. Still the best evidence that they had no intention of incorporating Western concepts in the Meiji Constitution as demanded by Washington is that supplied by Tatsuo Sato, member of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau who worked more intimately with both GHQ and the Japanese government on the new Constitution than any other Japanese. He wrote in 1957 concerning the real intention of his superiors regarding revision:

> The Potsdam Declaration did not mention any explicit obligation to revise the Meiji Constitution . . . in the subconscious minds of the Cabinet members there was some expectation that the Potsdam Declaration could be executed even under the Meiji Constitution, if the application of the supreme law were improved.[36]

This avenue to constitutional reform bore no resemblance to that envisaged by the authors of SWNCC 228 who seemed to favor abolition of the Throne but were willing to settle for a constitutional monarchy with a figurehead Emperor.

At first MacArthur reacted to the Matsumoto draft by instructing Whitney to prepare a detailed answer rejecting it.[37] After further consideration, however, not only of the

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[34] Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1955), p. 249.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[36] Tatsuo Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution," reprinted from *Contemporary Japan*, Vol. 24 Nos. 4–6 and 7–9 (Tokyo, 1957), p. 2. The Matsumoto Committee draft, according to Maki, "clearly revealed the unwillingness or, perhaps, complete inability of the Government and its leaders to respond to the challenge." Maki, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–79

[37] Report of Government Section, SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, 2 vols. (Washington, n. d. [1949]), I, 102. Cited hereafter as *Political Reorientation.*

Matsumoto submission but of all aspects of the situation—Japanese, American, international —he came to the conclusion that a different tactical approach to governmental reform was required if the objectives of the occupation were to be achieved satisfactorily, in an orderly manner, and within a reasonable period of time.[38] MacArthur's own recollection of the Matsumoto affair, which he recorded only months before his death in April 1964, stresses the time element:

> I was now confronted with a time problem [he wrote]. Earlier, at my suggestion, the legislative body had revised the election laws, giving those who had been disenfranchised the right to vote. With this new law in effect, the government had called for a general election on April 10, 1946. I had expected that the new constitution would be finished by then and that the voting would, in fact, be a plebiscite. The way things stood after Dr. Matsumoto finished his work, the people would be voting on whether they wanted to keep the old constitution or one just like it. Accordingly, I directed my staff to assist . . . in the formation of an acceptable draft.[39]

Other courses were open to MacArthur but they all appeared to be less desirable than the one he took within the context of his instructions. He was acutely aware of the abrupt confrontation between the aims of the American government and those of the Japanese government. With Japan's conservative leaders angling to salvage the Meiji Constitution and the United States—not to mention other Allied powers—determined to make sweeping changes in that instrument, MacArthur was not privileged to arrive at a leisurely decision in an ivory tower. He was confronted with a fast-moving situation.

Once persuaded of "the prime importance of immediate constitutional revision,"[40] MacArthur switched to the second SWNCC 228 alternative of indicating to the Japanese in more specific form the nature of the changes to be made in the existing structure of government. This he did in full realization that time was running out. Crucial to the success of the move was complete understanding and prompt sponsorship of the reforms by the Japanese government. MacArthur's popularity in Japan and elsewhere was now at its peak. With his reputation as a civil administrator at stake, and the advice of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the JCS not to take a leap in the dark fresh in mind, he characteristically planned this step carefully, taking into account the many tricky domestic and international factors involved. This done, he unfolded the entire plan before the Japanese on the assumption that from enlightened self-interest alone they would decide to cooperate. "I did not . . . try to force an American version of a Japanese constitution," he recalled, "and then order them to adopt it. The revision had to be made by the Japanese themselves and it had to be done without coercion."[41] The Shidehara Government opted to sponsor the new Constitution—aware, among other things, that if it did not do so it might not outlast the stepped-up cry throughout Japan for immediate and genuine constitutional changes, which reached a crescendo immediately following the *Mainichi Shimbun's* February 1 exposure of the innocuous Matsumoto revision plan.[42] Shidehara like Premier Higashi-Kuni before him might have chosen to say no and resign. But had he and the Emperor and the Japanese people not backed the Supreme Commander at this critical stage of the occupation, "the results," MacArthur informed Takayanagi years later, "would have been catastrophic."[43]

It seems strange that anyone would question the competence of the Government Section staff to perform the modest chore of incorporating in a model constitution the elementary democratic principles set forth with great clarity in SWNCC 228. Specially selected for their qualifications to deal with problems of government in Japan, the officers of this section were fully capable of comprehending the plain language and equally plain intent of the

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[38] Whitney, p. 248. Pertinent here is Government Section's Feb. 1, 1946, memorandum on "Constitutional Reform," in *Political Reorientation*, II, 622–23.

[39] MacArthur, p. 300.

[40] *Political Reorientation*, I, 90.

[41] MacArthur, p. 299.

[42] Sato, p. 8; *Political Reorientation*, I, 101; Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan: The Second Phase, 1948–1950* (New York, 1950), p. 3; Douglas G. Haring, ed., *Japan's Prospect* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 301; Whitney, pp. 283–84; Yoshida, pp. 134–36.

[43] Takayanagi, *Japan Times*, March 16, 1959. MacArthur has this to say regarding the part played by the Emperor: " . . . I always explained carefully the underlying reasons for occupation policy, and I found he had a more thorough grasp of the democratic concept than almost any Japanese with whom I talked . . . . his loyal cooperation and influence had much to do with the success of the occupation." MacArthur, p. 288.

Washington planning experts who prepared that document.

The Supreme Commander himself, nevertheless, was unwilling to give Government Section personnel a free rein in preparing a draft constitution. Because of his own heavy responsibility, he personally controlled with a firm hand the brief and delicate task of drawing up a democratic model for the Japanese to imitate. To insure complete conformity with the basic principles contained in SWNCC 228, MacArthur personally dictated the parts of the draft bearing on sovereignty, demilitarization, and feudalism. On these and other points he counseled and advised constantly with Whitney, who in turn kept the situation in hand through his own Steering Committee composed of Kades, Commander Alfred R. Hussey, and Lt. Colonel Milo E. Rowell, all, like Whitney, experienced lawyers.

How the Government Section acquitted itself during the eight-day "constitutional convention," so-called, beginning February 5, has been disclosed partially in published writings of some of the participants;[44] but the more incisive details have been concealed for years in a secret Government Section "Memorandum for Record," written the following year.[45] This 7,000-word paper, prepared from notes jotted down during the "debates," reveals how MacArthur with the help of Whitney and the Government Section Steering Committee directed the proceedings. The Steering Committee, of which Kades was chairman, vetoed all proposals of staff members that were not in accord with SWNCC 228. Steering Committee differences were appealed to Whitney for settlement by MacArthur. For example, on February 8,[46]

> . . . A sharp and fundamental difference of opinion developed . . . in the discussion of Article IV, that asserts that no future Constitution . . . shall limit . . . the rights guaranteed in this Constitution, or subordinate . . . democracy to any other consideration.
>
> Col. [Pieter K.] Roest defended this Article by premising that . . . we must guarantee for all time the social and moral advances made up to the present. Mr. [Harry Emerson] Wildes expressed the belief that the omission of Article IV inevitably opened the gates to Fascism in Japan. . . .
>
> No satisfactory compromise could be reached. It was decided to submit Article IV to General Whitney for decision. . . . (In the final draft of the *document, this Article was omitted.)*

Also on February 8, agreement could not be reached on proposals giving "detailed orders for the establishment of social welfare, public health, free education, orderly adoption and child labor laws in Japan." According to the memorandum:[47]

> . . . Col. Rowell objected that . . . these provisions might cause so much resentment that the Japanese Government might reject our constitutional draft in toto. Mr. Wildes answered that we do have the responsibility to effect a social revolution in Japan. . . .
>
> * * *
>
> No compromise solution could be found. . . . General Whitney recommended that the minutia of social legislation be omitted and a general statement made that social security shall be provided.

In the final Government Section review of the draft on February 12, the Steering Committee made at least 16 additional changes, some of major importance. It changed, for instance, a February 8 compromise amendment vesting executive power "in the Prime Minister as head of the Cabinet" to read: "The executive power is vested in a Cabinet." But help from outside was needed to settle a week-long dispute between Kades and Hussey. Hussey insisted on language in the Preamble to the effect "that this Constitution draws its sovereignty not only from the will of the people but from the principles of universal morality." Kades protested that "political morality and sovereignty have nothing to do with each other." Whitney entered the discussion, listened to Kades' recapitulation of the opposing arguments, and sided with Hussey.[48]

Thus was fashioned in conformity with SWNCC 228 a working paper to help the

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[44] *Political Reorientation*, I, 101–05; Whitney, p. 249ff.; Harry E. Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath* (New York, 1954), ch. 4.

[45] The Government Section, SCAP, "Memorandum for Record," dated December 16, 1947, prepared by Ruth Ellerman. A copy is in the writer's personal files.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.* Wildes wrote later: "Some of the more radical officers favored . . . an elective president, the initiative and referendum, social insurance, a compulsory eight-hour working day, and proportional representation; but, as this received no support outside Socialist ranks, it was dropped." Wildes, p. 44.

[48] Government Section, "Memorandum for Record."

Japanese write the democratic philosophy of the West into their country's organic law. Without a sample showing in graphic detail what was meant by such expressions in the Potsdam Declaration as "responsible government," "democratic tendencies," and "fundamental human rights," Japan's conservative leaders would not have been able to reach agreement on the revolutionary governmental changes demanded of them.

IV

Finally, a brief look should be taken at the question of Japanese acceptance of the new Constitution. The Potsdam Declaration promised that the occupation forces would be withdrawn when a responsible government had been established. As between a responsible government taking the form of a republic and one taking the form of a constitutional monarchy, the Japanese were free to choose. But the choice did not extend to a form of government that was not responsible to the electorate.[49] On the safe assumption that the ruling forces of Japan preferred a constitutional monarchy to a republic, MacArthur's model constitution retained the Emperor but only as a symbol. After recovering from the shock of MacArthur's reform program, and after considering the even more disagreeable alternative of a republic of some kind, Japan's leaders, impressed by the sincerity and good will (if not by the rhetorical flourishes) of top Government Section staff,[50] elected to string along with MacArthur. The individual Japanese leader who left an indelible trace through his part in converting the ruling classes to the idea of a constitutional monarchy was Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida like Shidehara was able to perceive that the mass protests against the constitutional revision plan of the Matsumoto Committee at the beginning of February 1946 might become so intense as to cause the downfall of the existing conservative government and the establishment of a people's republic. With this in mind, and with a helpful nudge from the Emperor himself, Yoshida concluded—however reluctantly—that, on balance, it would be in Japan's best interest to accept the SWNCC 228 program in some such form as MacArthur recommended.[51] The most stubborn convert to the new Constitution thus became its greatest champion. As Premier he sponsored legislation for revising the Imperial Constitution which required approval by the Privy Council and both houses of the Diet.

It now became Yoshida's responsibility, not MacArthur's, to win Diet support for the Government's Draft Constitution Bill. As Yoshida saw it, Japan's foremost authorities on law and administration were in the Diet, and "despite the fact that the nation was . . . under foreign Occupation, these men were able to give free expression to their opinion without any restraint whatsoever."[52] GHQ, he said, "maintained in general an attitude of watchful silence throughout the discussions in the Diet, but . . . did intervene once or twice."[53] He noted that the "Occupation authorities carefully studied the reports of the discussions in progress. . . ."[54] How GHQ managed to study these reports, and in what way such study contributed to the Diet's freedom of debate, Yoshida did not say; but since there was a close connection between GHQ's exact knowledge of Diet proceedings and GHQ non-intervention in the normal legislative processes, this gap in the story of the making of the Japanese Constitution should be closed.

Mindful of the long record of Japanese resistance to any change in the Meiji Constitution, and still dubious of the real intentions of Japan's conservative leaders regarding fundamental reform, MacArthur kept a watchful eye on Diet discussions by means of special Government Section memoranda on deliberations of the 90th Diet, which examined the

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[49] Grew, II, ch. 36.

[50] Yoshida, pp. 133–37, 141–46. " . . . at the time of its initial drafting . . . General MacArthur's headquarters did insist, with considerable vigour, on the speedy completion of the task, and made certain demands in regard to the contents of the draft. But during our subsequent negotiations with GHQ there was nothing that could properly be termed coercive or overbearing in the attitude of the Occupation authorities towards us. They listened carefully to the Japanese experts . . . . and in many cases accepted our proposals . . . they would often adopt the attitude that we were perhaps too steeped in the ways of the old Constitution . . . . we might at least give their suggestions a trial . . . . if they did not work, we could reconsider the whole question at the proper time and revise the necessary points. And they meant it." *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–36; Harold Wakefield, *New Paths for Japan* (New York, 1948), pp. 131–32, 136–37; *Political Reorientation*, I, 101. "It is now . . . apparent that the Japanese leaders at the time saw eye to eye with SCAP, far more than we had previously believed possible . . . . " Burks, p. 28.

[52] Yoshida, p. 145.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[54] *Ibid.*

Draft Constitution Bill from late June to early October 1946. Prepared under the personal and completely autonomous direction of the writer[55]—from continuing interviews with Diet leaders and from thoroughly reliable information furnished systematically and expeditiously by Japanese officials covering Diet activities—the original of each Government Section memorandum, or "Diet Report," by command of General Whitney, was hand-carried to MacArthur's office, and only then were copies distributed to Whitney himself and his top staff.

Through these special Diet reports, GHQ's initial doubts concerning Yoshida's integrity and true intentions were substantially mitigated if not totally erased. The reports depicted a forthright and commanding figure who earnestly defended the principles incorporated in his own Draft Constitution Bill. He pulled no punches as he told the Japanese repeatedly that the substance of the new Constitution was required under the terms of surrender. As one of the earliest of the Diet reports brought out, Yoshida in addressing the House of Peers showed his insight into the situation by calling for " 'sincere and prudent consideration . . . with exact understanding of international and internal circumstances, as the draft was made with due consideration of these circumstances.' "[56] This meant that Yoshida and his associates had been well briefed by MacArthur and the Government Section staff on the purport of SWNCC 228 and on the fluid and highly uncertain international situation, facts that would be established later by the Japanese Commission on the Constitution.[57] It meant, also, that Japanese public support for the new form of government was won by Yoshida's power of persuasion, not by MacArthur's fiat.

Only in relation to the discussion of national sovereignty, or "national polity," were Yoshida and his chief assistant on the Constitution, Tokujiro Kanamori, called into conference by GHQ officials. With SWNCC 228 insistence on a responsible government in mind, MacArthur became disturbed over an issue growing out of charges made in the House of Peers that the new Constitution downgraded the Emperor and thus changed the fundamental character of the state. Out of deference to Japanese sensibilities on this subject, Premier Yoshida answered: "The spirit of the revised constitution is 'absolutely consistent' with the idea of the fundamental character of the state."[58] How the matter was resolved to the satisfaction of both the Yoshida Government and the Supreme Commander was related in a July 28 Diet report which, typically, omitted mention of a recent informal conference between representatives of Yoshida and MacArthur to clarify the burning sovereignty issue, but signified nevertheless that the matter had been resolved in that manner. The report said in part:

> The Constitutional Sub-Committee [of the House of Representatives] agreed yesterday to state in the Preamble . . . that 'sovereignty rests with the people.' This statement is thought to be clearer than 'sovereignty of the people's will.'[59]

The revised statement insured establishment of a government that would be responsible to the people as prescribed in SWNCC 228.

To guard against future misunderstanding between GHQ and the Japanese government on this basic issue, as a Diet report of August 2 informed MacArthur, the House Sub-Committee's final recommendation on the Draft Constitution Bill, before going to the parent Special Committee, "will be submitted to SCAP for examination."[60] This was not an indication of GHQ coercion but rather a measure of the spirit of cooperation between the two sides. It revealed GHQ's part as that of referee allowing the Japanese the widest latitude under the basic rules prescribed by Washington.

Unlike its reception in the House of Representatives, whose members had been recently elected, the Draft Constitution Bill was not enthusiastically received in the House of Peers. Speaking freely for the record while shutting their eyes to the realities of Japan's predicament, an articulate minority of the scholars and intellectuals in that body of noblemen and distinguished citizens, representing neither the Japanese government nor the Japanese voters, bitterly attacked Yoshida and his constitutional revision plan. In a five-page Diet report to General MacArthur on August 31, the following excerpts from replies of Kanomori and Yoshida to Peers' interpellations recapitulate the Government's case for the new Constitution and suggest why GHQ's doubts regarding Yoshida's sincerity were removed:

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[55] Government Section, SCAP, "Diet Report" series. Eighty-five such reports were prepared on deliberations of the 90th Diet. Similar reports were prepared on the proceedings of subsequent Diets until the end of the occupation. The writer has copies of these reports in his personal files.

[56] Government Section, "Diet Report," No. 7, June 23, 1946.

[57] Theodore McNelly, "The Japanese Constitution: Child of the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (June 1959), pp. 187–89.

[58] Government Section, "Diet Report," No. 12, June 28, 1946.

[59] *Ibid.*, No. 37-A, July 28, 1946.

[60] *Ibid.*, No. 40-A, August 2, 1946.

> Mr. Kanamori. . . . The Meiji Constitution and its lax enforcement caused the downfall of this country. There is no way out . . . except by adopting the democratic system. . . . The Potsdam Declaration provides that the political system of Japan shall be decided by the free will of the people. . . .
>
> Mr. Yoshida. . . . Although the international situation predominantly overshadowed the drafting of the Constitution, the demands of the people have not been denied.[61]

Thus the Supreme Commander kept track of how the Premier persuaded his countrymen to approve the new Constitution. Satisfied, in part by these special reports covering Diet deliberations, that the Japanese leaders were acting in good faith, MacArthur reciprocated by respecting the democratic right of the Diet to carry on its deliberations in an atmosphere of complete freedom. And because the Japanese people through their Representatives openly and freely accepted the entire SWNCC 228 program as incorporated in the Draft Constitution Bill, thanks to the statesmanship and leadership of Premier Yoshida, General MacArthur, in consonance with the views of the United States Government, acknowledged publicly that Japan had fulfilled the requirement of the Potsdam Declaration.[62]

V

What is said in these pages is intended to place in better focus the making of the Japanese Constitution. Unavoidably, issue is taken with those American scholars who feel that this instrument is bad, that it is bad because it is alien in philosophy, and that it is alien in philosophy because it was imposed by an American military man in violation of his orders and in contravention of the policy of his government. Issue is also taken with the finding of the Japanese Commission on the Constitution that MacArthur forced a constitution on the Japanese against their will, in that his approach to the matter did not conform to a specific procedure prescribed by the United States government; Washington's thought, reasoned the Commission, was to have the Japanese conduct the excercise without any GHQ coaching from the sidelines.

The effect of these interpretations, it seems, is to cast that epochal event in a narrow mold of ulterior motives and subjective judgments, rather than in the broader context of the changing post-World War II situation where it belongs. Looked at in the latter setting, the 1946 Constitution appears to have served its purpose reasonably well.[63] The alien philosophy embodied in it is Western democracy, which the Japanese people warmly embraced. Instead of being imposed, this philosophy was approved by the Japanese government when it accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.[64] Instead of taking unilateral action, MacArthur was obeying both the letter and the spirit of his orders when he showed the Japanese by example how to fulfill their commitment to establish a "responsible government." Instead of contravening United States policy by not leaving constitutional reform to the Far Eastern Commission, the Supreme Commander adhered strictly to the set resolve of President Truman "that MacArthur would be given complete command and control . . . in Japan," that "We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific."[65]

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[61] *Ibid.*, No. 60-A, August 31, 1946.

[62] Fearey, *op. cit.*, p. 3; *Political Reorientation*, II, 765.

[63] From a study of the Commission on the Constitution's 5,000-page stenographic report on public hearings held throughout the country, " . . . the richest single source of information on the thoughts and feelings of a representative group of Japanese about the state of their society under constitutional democratic government," Maki concludes: " . . . the longer the people live under a fundamental law that has yielded them desirable benefits and has revealed no basic defects . . . the less they will consider it in need of change . . . ." Maki, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–12. When the Commission's final report was submitted to the Japanese government in early July 1964, Japan's leading English language newspaper commented in its weekly edition: "[it] cannot be said that there has been anything like a popular demand for constitutional changes. . . . " *Japan Times Weekly*, July 11, 1964.

[64] See the Aug. 25, 1946, memorandum by Government Section's Judge Alfred C. Oppler on "Powers of the Diet with Regard to Constitutional Amendments under the Meiji Constitution," in *Political Reorientation*, II, 662–66.

[65] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. One, *Year of Decision* (New York, 1955), p. 412.

Without a model of some kind for their guidance, the Japanese demonstrably could not have complied with the Potsdam Declaration requirement, as amplified by SWNCC 228, to establish a democratic form of government. The United States government has consistently regarded the present Constitution of Japan as satisfactory compliance with the Potsdam Declaration on this point. What Robert A. Fearey, a State Department official, wrote in 1950 still holds good in 1965: "It is doubtful whether SCAP and the U. S. Government should have acted differently if the events of the past four years could have been foretold. . . . By and large . . . it is doubtful if the democratization program would, or should, have been carried out much differently from the way it has been."[66]

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[66] Fearey, pp. 97–100.

REASON AND REVELATION IN HOOKER'S ETHICS

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This essay has two complementary purposes. It seeks principally to clarify the basis of the political philosophy of Richard Hooker, the great Elizabethan divine, and, in so doing, to clarify as well certain of the limits of political speculation itself. We hear quite often now that reports of the death of political philosophy have been greatly exaggerated. If this is indeed a time of its resuscitation, it is important that its limits be recognized and that inquiry be liberated from doctrines which cannot be based on unassisted reason alone. The ancillary purpose of this study is a contribution to such a disentanglement.

Hooker's political thought itself also repays the attention of modern political scientists, if only as a remarkably comprehensive model of pre-modern or "traditional" society. Hooker wrestles with one of the difficulties which had much to do with ending "traditional" society in Europe and in those places Europe has influenced: the bitter and conflicting claims of church and state, and especially of various churches. Hooker's is a revealing endeavor to solve the political problems inherent in revealed religion, without abandoning—as his "enlightened" successors did—Christianity as a decisive constituent of politics or Aristotle as the secular guide of politics. Hooker's thought is thus a peculiarly revealing combination of Christian revelation and Aristotelian political philosophy.

This essay does not explore the whole range of Hooker's political philosophy, however, but only the views which constitute its basis: his ethics. Hooker's view of what is good for man decisively conditions the core of his political views, the common good for man. In fact his ethics determines the very status of politics in his political philosophy. What follows will show by a comparison of Aristotle's and Hooker's ethics the manner in which the theologian subtly reshaped a philosophic ethic to comply with a doctrine of Christian salvation, thereby necessarily displacing politics from its Aristotelian status.[1]

To begin with, Hooker surely follows Aristotle in the broad defining principles of his ethics. That cannot be gainsaid. It is impossible to follow those who see Hooker as partly modern, as having one foot in the camp of such great modern critics of Aristotle as Machiavelli and Locke. Thus Hooker agrees with Aristotle in holding that man inclines by nature to a twofold perfection, speculative and moral. Philosophy and moral virtue are the two goods most appropriate to man, bringing to fruition the best that may be in him. "Speculation of truth" and "exercise of virtue," Hooker says, are the activities "beseeming man's excellency."[2] And of the two philosophy is the finer, most reflecting man's distinctive rationality. Philosophy, Hooker says, is that "wherein the excellency of his kind doth most consist."[3] Still, Hooker remains consistent with Aristotle in holding that moral virtue is also a genuine perfection of man, if not quite measuring up to philosophy. There is such a thing as moral virtue, that is to say, an excellence of human character apart from the unequivocal excellence of the reason's theoretical activity.

If the stature of moral virtue in Hooker's teaching resembles that in Aristotle's, the general shape of moral virtue is similar as well. The ethics of each can be divided into two parts or levels. There is a minimal level and a higher level. The first consists of those necessary duties or acts which must be performed by all men. And the second comprises the finer moral dispositions, the virtues proper, which distinguish the character of the peculiarly fine man. One might say (what I am not the first to say) that the ethics of Hooker no less than that of Aristotle is bounded by natural necessity on the bottom and natural excellence on the top. It is as if Hooker says " . . . you can lay down a flooring of acts required by necessities of human nature, and known by man generally, and a ceiling of finer dispositions which the best inclinations of human nature call for, and of which only the finer men are aware. Everything between depends in good part on circumstance. Presuming that you perform the things which necessity requires, you should try to be as excellent a fellow as circumstance permits." But the interesting questions concern what are to be regarded as the moral necessities of men and what as their excellences. I shall consider the first at disproportionate length, contenting myself with a brief consideration of the latter, since the necessary duties of man assume a great and even preeminent importance in Hooker's teaching, for non-Aristotelian and theological reasons.

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[1] For very helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay I wish to thank several friends, especially Thomas S. Schrock of Chicago and Walter F. Murphy of Princeton.

[2] Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, in *The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker*, arranged by John Keble, revised by R. W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888), Bk. V, ch. lxxvi, sec. 3; hereafter cited V lxxvi 3.

[3] I x 12. See also I v 3, I xi 1, 3, 4, I viii 5 (end).

I. THE LAW OF REASON

The necessary flooring of Hooker's ethics comprises those moral duties encompassed under the prescriptions of the "law of reason," as Hooker calls his equivalent to Aristotle's natural justice. Hooker's definition of this law is succinct. " . . . the nature of Goodness being . . . ample, a Law is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the Law of Reason or human Nature is that which men by discourse of natural Reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions." These things so commonly required are common indeed, a kind of lowest common moral denominator. The Law of Reason prescribes only things of "so mean a degree of goodness,"[4] as Hooker puts it, that all men can perform them.

The conspicuous importance Hooker attached to the law of reason itself indicates a variation from Aristotelian thought. Aristotle's single thematic discussion of natural justice occupies but a slight and, it must be said, obscure page in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. The discussion occurs in the context of the chapter on political justice. Hooker's elaboration of his "law of reason," however, occupies a most conspicuous place in Book I of his *Laws*, a book whose theme is not political but divine justice. Both the laws of reason and of political society appear as but manifestations of God's government of His creation. With minor exceptions, the context of the law of reason resembles the deductive theology of Thomas and not the apparently unschematic ethics of Aristotle.

Perhaps it is not so obvious that revealed religion determines the character as well as the context of reason's law. To one who reads lightly chapters v through x of Book I, it may seem that reason's law is what its name proclaims—the product of unassisted reason, not of revelation. In those central chapters where Hooker lays his "new foundation" for an ecclesiastical polity, he seems to draw his laws of reason from calculations based on human nature alone. In chapter viii Hooker expressly holds the law of reason knowable "without the help of Revelation supernatural and divine," and generally he cites the pagan philosophers profusely. "A law of reason," he writes, is a rule "whereunto by the light of reason men find themselves bound in that they are men."[5]

Whatever might be the appearance of an appeal solely to unassisted human reason, however, Hooker's true appeal is ultimately to revelation. His religious bent shows itself in a simple qualification. By "reason" in its fullest sense, Hooker means perfect reason in the Christian sense—reason unspotted by original sin. Only by such an intelligence is the law of reason to be fully understood. Signs of this view appear to the careful reader even as Hooker deduces his law of reason. In chapter vii, for example, he would not "be understood" to say that "man's natural understanding" can "rightly perform its function as oft as we cause God in his justice to withdraw." A more explicit remark occurs in later manuscript comments on his Puritan critics' *Christian Letter:* "Reason can find every necessary good when it is supported by divine aid, but none at all without it. It has in itself sufficiently all good by which it can prove itself to a man who is painstaking and diligently pays heed. But our sloth [the effect of original sin] turns us away in other directions until the Holy Spirit stirs up zeal for virtue."[6]

This understanding implies that reason is subject to revelation. For original sin is known only by revelation. The point may be made in another way. No man's reason has been free of original sin since the "first foundation of the world." Reason as men without revelation have possessed it—as all pagans including the philosophers knew it—is then inferior to that perfected reason portrayed by revelation. It is no accident that, in the later or supernatural sections of Book I, Hooker concludes that sacred scripture is the final authority for determining doubtful parts of the law of reason. In short, the natural foundations of the early chapters are dependent upon doctrines of reason discernible only in the unspotted supernatural light shed by the later. Equipped with this sketch of the basic principle underlying Hooker's argument, we may proceed to consider the way in which the developed principle is reflected in the law of reason's details. First we will consider the law's end or defining object, then the content of its duties and the manner in which they are discovered, and finally its very status as law or command.

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[4] II viii 2, I viii 8.

[5] I xvi 1, I viii 9.

[6] *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book Five, edited by Ronald Bayne (London, Macmillan, 1902), p. 594. I viii 3. *Cf. Works*, II, 539, 239. Sloth in the exercise of reason is the manifestation of man's original sin. I vii 7.

The end or final cause of the law of reason is salvation, which is to say immortal life together with literal union of the soul with God in both understanding and moral virtue.[7] Although this is a divine and other-worldly object, Hooker nevertheless held it to be the goal of reason's law, not of divine law alone. His argument is this: a divine end is appropriate to human nature as such and hence can be appropriately discerned by the guide of human nature, reason. To expand upon this particular point, let us consider Hooker's general treatment of the various objects appropriate to human nature.

Hooker, like Aristotle and Thomas before him, understands these objects as the goods to which men naturally incline, the things which men naturally desire. He presents two accounts of the desires, one in chapter v, a definitive second in the later chapter xi which speaks from the perspective of the "external" perfections man receives from God. The first distinguishes man's desires to continue in being, to perform his function well, and to proceed in virtue and knowledge. The second differentiates the things desired as "sensual," "intellectual," and those "spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them." Hooker elaborates this last object. Men seek something above "vital use," which "exceedeth the reach of sense," even "somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth." So attractive is this prospect that "all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire." "So that Nature even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned." Only God is sufficient to satisfy our desires and "therefore he [is] our felicity and bliss."[8]

It might be wondered whether man's natural desire for a divine end necessarily implies the existence of such an end for him. Hooker replies to this objection with an argument borrowed from Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. "It is an axiom of nature that natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate."[9] Since only a divine life satisfies man's desires, they would be frustrate without it. Hence it exists.

The difficulty of treating this argument as dependent solely upon premises discernible by unassisted reason, may be readily shown. Hooker's conclusion does not follow from his premises as literally stated. Suppose it be granted that men desire a happiness beyond that permitted by life on earth. Perhaps their nature, blended of earth's matter no less than a divine soul, renders them capable of only a qualified happiness, of only the "hidden exultation" accompanying "surmises" of divine happiness, and not of the divine happiness as such. It may be granted that natural desire may not be "utterly frustrate." Nevertheless, it may be somewhat frustrate. It may need to be contented with only a composite happiness not fully contenting the best desires of man's composite nature.

Moreover, if reason should teach the "surmised" object of desire to be impossible, desire would not be frustrate at all. "Let Reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the Will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest." Hooker himself asserted that the possibility of the soul's life after death was rarely susceptible to discovery by the unassisted natural reason and that bodily life after death had never been so discovered.[10]

Perhaps reasons also exist, apart from Hooker's own premises, for wondering if the existence of a provident deity providing divine benefits for men can be naturally proven. In any event it is enough here to say that Aristotle—whom Hooker classed as "the head of all philosophers," who has "alone . . . performed more very near in all parts of natural knowledge" than "the whole world" has since done in "any one part thereof"—seems not to have believed it could be proven. Aristotle seems to judge the belief in gods with human capacities as but a salutary opinion rendering the multitude more docile and men generally more law-abiding.[11]

This seems to imply not only that Aristotle's ethics is not pointed to a religious salvation, but also that it is intimately connected with a political way of life. And such an implication is surely true of at least the minimal level of "the philosopher's" ethics. Natural justice, that right which was available to men generally, seems to mean no more to Aristotle than the minimal principles of justice needful for the enduring existence of any polity and hence commonly present in all polities.[12]

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[7] I xi 3; *cf.* I ix.

[8] I vii 5.

[9] I xi 4.

[10] I xii 2; *cf.* III viii 8; I vii 5.

[11] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, viii; I vi 3.

Hooker's peculiar use of Aristotelian references disguises his variation from Aristotle. In fact, every passage from a great Greek or Roman philosopher, that Hooker uses in Book I to substantiate the truth of a provident deity, in its original context urges religious duties only as civically useful or speaks philosophically of only a non-providential divinity. Hooker's most charming distortion of a philosopher occurs in chapter iv, where Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is implied to be "plainly teaching" the way in which God moves the angels.

A more revealing example of Hooker's art occurs in the crucial proof that God punishes violation of the law of reason and rewards obedience. The proof itself consists in no more than an inference of divine reward or punishment from the common belief that even secret actions are rewarded or punished. In the course of this Hooker quotes in a footnote, without citation, a Latin passage which may be translated: "They will approach the gods in purity, bringing piety, and leaving riches behind. Whoever shall do otherwise, God himself will punish him." Keble locates this passage in Cicero's *Laws*. There it occurs as the very first of the laws on religion proposed by Cicero himself for *his* polity. In the preface to his laws, Cicero emphasizes only the political utility in inculcating beliefs that the gods rule all things, being "great benefactors of man, observing the character of every individual, what he does, of what wrong he is guilty." Cicero's particular commentary on the law mentioned is characteristic: "The provision that no human judge, but God himself, is to punish the disobedient would seem to strengthen the power of religion through the fear of immediate punishment."[13]

Hooker's own philosophic authorities, then, fail to confirm his contention that an immortal life in union with God is a good naturally knowable to man and thus a possible fruition of his natural desires.

Still, Hooker might have a reply. He might reject the philosophers' view that immortality cannot be naturally discerned. For practical purposes, indeed, sacred scripture is the safest authority for "such natural duties as could not by light of Nature easily have been known." In principle, however, an end beyond this life is naturally knowable. For the imperfections that philosophers think inseparable from man's composite nature—even the imperfections in man's ability to grasp with reason his divine future—issue only from nature's corruption, not from nature itself. Deficiencies in man's actions, as in nature's actions generally and even in speculative reason itself, originate in man's original sin.[14] This reply, however, has the decisive difficulty already suggested. The speculatively known cause of nature's manifest deficiencies is known only from revelation. In principle as in practice the law of reason is pointed to a perfection which is not manifest to reason unperfected by revelation.

From the religious object of Hooker's law of reason follows its distinctively religious content. Its two chief precepts might be summed up as "Worship God" and "Love your neighbor." To begin with the second, the love of each man or your neighbor which the law prescribes is a duty to men generally. The precept does not prescribe a duty principally to one's fellow citizens. It thus reminds of Biblical universality, not of the essentially particular polity to which Aristotelian natural right is attuned. The brevity and difficulty of Aristotle's thematic discussion makes it difficult to give examples of Aristotelian natural right. But there is good reason to follow Thomas Aquinas' *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* in inferring two illustrative maxims from a nearby passage. According to Aristotle, it is natural justice that a citizen peculiarly oppressed in the line of civic duty should be aided. Similarly, it is natural justice that the highest honors or sacrifices be paid to the city's heroes or to the city's gods. One might also add as an illustration, if with some qualification, the minimum principles of commutative justice which ensure a just reciprocal exchange of good for good and a just repayment of evil with evil. "The very existence of the polity," Aristotle emphatically asserts, depends on allowing men the opportunity to trade on the one hand and to obtain recompense for injuries on the other. It is clear that the spirit of Aristotelian natural right emphasizes the minimum requirements of a polity.[15]

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[12] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V vii. *Cf.* Marsilius of Padua, *The Defender of Peace*, trans. Alan F. Gewirth (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951), II xii 7; I iii 4, I xix 13. See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 156–64. It is a great pleasure to acknowledge that my interpretations of Aristotle, Marsilius, and even Hooker owe their best parts to Professor Strauss's instruction. *Cf.* his "Marsilius of Padua," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago, 1963).

[13] Cicero, *De Legibus* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928), II viii 1, x 25. Hooker, I ix 2.

[14] I xii 3, I vii 7, xi 5, iii 3. See editor's note in *Works*, I, 222–23.

The secondary status of political justice in even that precept of Hooker's law which concerns duties toward man can be more vividly demonstrated. In a manner foreign to Aristotle, Hooker distinguishes between "primary" and "secondary" precepts of his law of reason. While primary precepts are appropriate to man's true nature, secondary precepts are required only by man's fallen nature. Secondary laws of reason guide men with respect to potential evils rather than potential goods, evils of the state of corrupted nature. They include precepts that "men always knew," so that they might defend themselves from force and injury, and keep others from injuring a third party, and so that no one might decide his own case, or rule others without their own consent.[16] Among the secondary precepts alone does any concern for a polity appear. The natural primacy of the polity has disappeared and with it the primacy of the citizen's point of view.

The disappearance is even more striking in Hooker's account of the other and principal precept, prescribing love of God. Far from being set forth as part of political justice, it is deduced from the natural theology which has been discussed. Worship of God is primary because in the decisive respect God and not the polity governs. "Presuming some knowledge," Hooker remarks, "not only that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisdom, and other properties that God hath, and how all [benefits] depend on him [as their principal cause]," each man can be brought to perceive that God ought be honored. The religious tenor which results is apparent not only in the basic precepts but throughout those maxims which can be necessarily deduced from them. "That which is simply against [the law immutable of God and nature] . . . can at no time be allowable in any person, more than adultery, blasphemy, sacrilege, and the like."[17]

If Hooker's law of reason is distinct in its purpose and content from Aristotle's natural justice, it differs as well in the manner in which it is known. Since the principles of Aristotelian natural right comprise no more than the minimal foundations of justice needed for the maintenance of any polity, they are of a kind apparent to the sense and equity of most politically active men. To know them would require little more than a consultation of the common customs of polities. Perhaps the Averroist Marsilius of Padua catches the spirit of Aristotle when he remarks that the recognition of such principles comes "not as a result of profound inquiry, but solely by the common dictate of reason and a certain duty of human society."[18] But knowledge of Hooker's law of reason requires "profound inquiry," for its deduction rests on theological premises.

Indeed, when Hooker begins his account of the way reason discovers its laws, he seems to resign himself to a discussion premised merely on popular opinion. He distinguishes between "knowledge of the causes" of goodness and "observation of [its] signs or tokens." He largely forgoes the first for the second, "which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked." Of these mere signs of good action, the most certain is "the general persuasion of all men." Hooker's reason for putting such a premium on common opinion is important. " . . . For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught." Merely by use of his naturally acquired reason man can and does know the chief duties naturally required of him. Among these manifest principles are such as this, "that the greater good is to be chosen before the less," "God [is] to be worshipped," "parents [are] to be honored," "others [are] to be used by us as we ourselves would be by them."[19]

Soon, however, Hooker's account turns abruptly from "signs" to "causes." He turns from common opinion as the indication of what reason commands to be good, to speculative investigation into the true reasons for what is good. Whatever might be the principles that are apparent to men, they were "at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." Hooker dwells on the extent to which "the knowledge of every the least thing in the whole world" serves as "mother of all those principles" in the law of reason. He spells out the process of birth. In consequence of observations that the best things, unhindered, produce the best operations, and that the best thing in us is our soul and especially its "diviner part," "the soul then ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our minds the soul." This is the first law. Hooker then goes on to deduce the "several grand mandates" which the understanding faculty, its superiority established, imposes. Here, in chapter viii, he only "presupposes" some kind of discourse whereby "the minds even of mere natural men" have grasped God's providential power and our consequent dependence on Him. From this presupposition, the axiom directing honor, worship, and prayer to God has arisen. Similarly, "my desire to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection."[20]

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[15] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V vii. *Cf.* Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago, 1964), V L.XII C.1024.

[16] Secondary Laws of Reason are not explicitly expounded as such. Only some time after Hooker has stated them (Ix10) does he name them, and he never does call them Secondary Laws of Reason. Yet the principles of section 10, paraphrased in the text, cannot but be those mentioned in section 13. The fact that men have always known them is a sure sign they are Laws of Reason (see I viii 3, 9). Also, they could not be international laws or laws of polity and regiment, the other types of Secondary Laws mentioned in 4 end, 5 beginning, since they precede the establishment of the latter; the former, as well at the latter, are treated elsewhere in chapter x.

[17] VII xv 14, I viii 7.

[18] *The Defender of Peace*, I iii 4, I xix 3.

[19] I viii 5, 2, 3.

Two characteristics especially distinguish Hooker's account of the way reason knows the moral law. On the one hand, Hooker relies upon speculative reason to establish the very precepts of ordinary morality. On the other, these precepts are understood to be grasped by most men in a thoroughly calculating manner. To realize the peculiarity of Hooker's teaching, it is helpful to compare it with that of St. Thomas Aquinas, to whom Hooker's doctrines are commonly traced with only qualified accuracy.

With respect to the place of speculative reason in moral reflection, Thomas's views are not without subtlety. Nevertheless, his massive and conspicuous teaching holds that the practical or moral reason is self-sufficient. It is guided by naturally known basic principles of practical conduct, from which all the other precepts of the natural law may be in various ways deduced. These basic principles are grasped by a kind of natural "habit" or faculty of practical principles, *synderesis*, the application of which is conscience.[21] Crudely speaking, Thomas holds that a kind of natural conscience imposes the law of nature's basic principles on man's reason. This doctrine is not present in Aristotle, and it is absent from Hooker's teaching as well.

Hooker supposes no natural faculty of right principles—no *synderesis* or conscience in the Thomistic sense. I believe that the term "*synderesis*" is absent from Hooker's works; it surely is absent from Keble's index. Moreover, nothing in Hooker's teaching corresponds to *synderesis*. There is indeed certain language which reminds of Thomas's doctrine and which seems to have misled even such a close student of Hooker as J. W. Allen.[22] Occasionally Hooker will speak of "conscience," or of "that law which is written in all men's hearts," or of " . . . an infallible knowledge imprinted in the minds of all the children of men. . . ."[23] But Hooker seems to use the words "heart" and "conscience" only to refer metaphorically to what we call "feelings" and he called "affections." He asserts that the persuasion of hearts or consciences ought to depend upon probable or necessary reasons. And if he does refer to certain "seeds" of Godliness, they are of a kind "*sown* in the hearts of many thousands" by religious feasts.[24] While he speaks of the "imprinting" of knowledge of nature's law in two senses, neither implies that precepts are by nature grasped by the practical intellect. Usually, "imprinting" refers to the general manner in which knowledge is obtained by reason.[25] But the term also indicates the impression upon man of his natural faculties—reason, for example. Only the faculty of reason is the "infallible knowledge imprinted in the minds of all the children of men, whereby both general principles for directing of human actions are comprehended and conclusions derived from them." The Law of Reason is imprinted only in the sense that the faculty of reason is imprinted, by whose light the law's precepts may be discovered.[26]

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[20] I viii 6, 5.

[21] *Summa Theologica*, in *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York, 1945), I II, Q. 94, A. 2, 3; Q. 90, A. 3, ad 3, 4 ad 1; Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2, 3, ad 2; Q. 51, A. 1, 2; Q. 63, A. 1, 2, ad 3; Q. 100, A. 2; *cf.* I, Q. 79, A. 11, *Truth*, XI, 1.

[22] J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London, Methuen, 1941), pp. 188ff. See also F. J. Shirley, *Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas* (London, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1949), p. 80.

[23] II viii 6, III vii 2.

[24] V lxxi 2. *Cf. Summa Theologica,* I II, Q. 63, A. 1, 2 ad 3; Q. 51, A. 1. Preface, i 3; *Works*, III, 613. Preface, vi 6; *cf.* vi 3.

[25] "The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book, wherein nothing is and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge." I vi 1.

[26] II viii 6. "The Apostle St. Paul having speech

In all this I do not mean to slight Hooker's opinion that men generally sense the beauty and appropriateness of actions according to the law of reason and, moreover, recognize the law's prescriptions as apparent once they have been suggested for consideration. Indeed, the laws have been "generally known." The question concerns the way in which these laws are generally known and, especially, first suggested. That suggestion does not originate in the prompting of a practical faculty which has grasped the first practical principles, but rather in the grasp by speculative reason of human nature "and other things in relation to" man. "Notwithstanding whatsoever such principle [of the Law of Reason] there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." Probably Hooker's quite explicit preference for the term "law of reason" over "natural law" can be traced to his law's ultimate dependence on a discourse of reason rather than an inherent natural prompting.[27]

If Hooker's deduction of his moral precepts from speculatively known premises distinguishes him from St. Thomas, it distinguishes him from Aristotle as well. Indeed, it seemed essential for Aristotle to introduce at the beginning of his *Nicomachean Ethics* an argument establishing the superiority of soul to body, the beginning copied almost literally by Hooker.[28] But the Anglican divine then departs from Aristotle by proceeding also to deduce the specific practical duties from speculative premises. Whatever the Aristotelian relation between proper moral action and man's distinctive rationality, in no simple sense does Aristotle deduce either moral virtues or minimal natural duties from speculatively given premises. It would seem that this difference may be traced to the theological basis required for Hooker's primary precept.

To some extent the distinctly calculating cast of Hooker's law of reason also may be explained by his concern for a salvation above and beyond the happiness of this life. The object of Hooker's law is finally individual or private, and hence it is to be discovered not by consulting what is good for the community but rather what is good for the individual soul. The law's practical precepts are deduced from each man's desire to obtain all good, coupled with a calculation that he will not be benefited by either God or his neighbor unless he treats each rightly. "My desire therefore to be loved of my equals in Nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection."[29]

Moreover, the chief duties of this life are in good part, if by no means solely, means to happiness in another. "We labor to eat, and we eat to live, and the good we do is as seed sown with reference to a future harvest." Hooker has distressed some of his closest admirers because he never tires of the refrain that divine happiness issues in part as a reward for "such duties performed as are rewardable."[30]

Probably the key to the law's calculating cast, however, is its stature as law which men generally can know, coupled with the peculiar manner in which Hooker finds it to be known. To the few who love fine things for their own sake, who come nearest to God's perfection in their own understanding and virtue, no need for calculation exists. The finer men desire the finer things naturally or spontaneously. "The greatest part of the world" are, however, "better able by sense to discern the wants of this present life, than by spiritual capacity to apprehend things above sense, which tend to their happiness in the world to come."[31] And the law of reason with its elevated aim must nevertheless cater to the capacity of that "greatest part." Now it might be possible to resolve this difficulty without emphasizing the usefulness of duties here to obtaining another life there. St. Thomas managed to do it with his doctrine that all men are spontaneously guided to the most necessary duties by naturally known principles in the reason. Hooker rejected that doctrine. He sought instead to deduce the law of reason from man's desires. Unable to deduce

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concerning the heathen saith of them, 'They are a law unto "themselves." ' His meaning is, that by force of the light of Reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is; which will himself not revealing by any extraordinary means unto them, but they by natural discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those Laws which indeed are his, and they but only the finders of them out." I viii 3.

[27] I viii 1, 5; *cf.* 6, 7.

[28] *Cf.* I viii 6 with *Nicomachean Ethics*, I vii 13–16.

[29] I viii 7.

[30] I xi 5, 1. See I x 6, I xii and *Works*, III, 598ff., 609, and editor's note, 626–7, 641. R. W. Church notes that " . . . the doubtful explanation of the *shortest and easiest way* is a favorite one with Hooker." *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, ed. R. W. Church (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1905), p. 121.

[31] V xxxv 2.

it from man's better desires which perhaps few men share, he deduces it from the most reliable desire characteristic of all men—the desire for eternal life. "It is the demand of nature itself 'What shall we do to have eternal life?' The desire of immortality and the knowledge of that whereby it may be attained, is so natural unto all men, that even they which are not persuaded that they shall, do notwithstanding wish that they might, know a way how to see no end of life." "There never was that man so carelessly affected towards the safety of his own soul, but knowing what salvation and life doth mean, though his own ways were the very paths of endless destruction, yet his secret natural desire must needs be, not to perish but to live."[32]

This solid basis of the minimal duties in Hooker's ethics receives a certain illumination from comparison with the philosopher who systematically grounded his whole politics on the most solid and minimal basis possible. That philosopher was Thomas Hobbes. Searching for a law effective among all men, Hobbes was led to found men's duties on the strongest and steadiest natural passion, the fear of death and especially of violent death. By no means does Hooker ground his minimal law of reason on a mere repulsion from pain nor his politics on minimal duties alone. There is a useful analogy nevertheless. Hooker's search for a natural law effectively prescribing man's relation to God leads him also to base man's most necessary duties on the desire to continue in being eternally, a desire common even to the most "desperate despiser of God and godliness living."

I have dwelled on the manner in which the end, the content, and the knowledge of Hooker's law of reason distinguish it from its Aristotelian equivalent. But it is also distinct in its very legal form. Hooker set forth not merely principles of reason but laws of reason.

This differs decisively from the Aristotelian teaching. Aristotle speaks of natural justice or right in his thematic discussions, but not of natural law. He even emphasizes that all right among men is changeable, whatever may be the situation among the gods.[33] Interpretation of this passage is not easy, but it seems to mean that all rules of political justice need be qualified in extreme cases in order to preserve that very polity whose justice is their object. The rescue of a citizen from undeserved suffering on his country's behalf might entail a potentially disastrous war. To repeat, the principles of natural justice are means to preserve a just community and therefore dispensable when their application might endanger that community or its justice.[34]

For Hooker, however, the laws of reason are indispensable means to an object superior to all earthly considerations. They are therefore superior to all exceptions here on earth. "Natural laws direct in such sort, that in all things we must for ever do according unto them." The precepts' unequivocal generality cannot be due to the grand dignity of the acts they prescribe. It will be remembered that the laws of reason concern only things of a "mean . . . degree of goodness." Rather, it is owing to the fact that these duties, ordinary in themselves, are nevertheless the necessary means prescribed by God to the greatest good. Thus the generality distinguishing Hooker's "law" is occasioned by its stature as God's command. Law as distinguished from counsel implies mandatory counsel, advice that is in some way enforced by sanctions in the counsellor. Hooker holds that a provident God rewards man with a happiness far more perfect than that available in this life only if man strictly performs what "the law of nature and God" prescribes. "The light of nature," Hooker assures us in chapter xi of Book I, "is never able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of bliss, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness."[35]

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[32] *Works*, III, 511, 615–16. "That sovereign good, which is the eternal fruition of all good, being our last and chiefest felicity, there is no desperate despiser of God and godliness living which doth not wish for. The difference between right and crooked minds, is in the means which the one or the other do eschew or follow." *Works*, III, 599; *cf.* I, 648, 697, 511.

[33] *Nicomachean Ethics*, V vii.

It is true that Aristotle in Book II, vi, 18, remarks that certain acts such as adultery are always "extreme," which implies that they are absolutely wrong. But is is not certain that this brief remark represents Aristotle's developed doctrine as presented in Book V. Compare the treatment of adultery in *Politics*, VII, 1335b, 38.

It is also true that Aristotle does speak in the *Rhetoric*, I, 13, of laws "based upon nature." His bare references there, however, occur but incidentally to his task of providing materials useful for persuasion—especially when positive law is against the advocate. In addition, neither of his illustrations occurs in his own name, but rather as a quotation from other writers. Neither illustration, moreover, seems free in the original from an association with divine, rather than natural, origin. At least one implies a doctrine—all slavery is unnatural—with which Aristotle elsewhere expressly disagrees.

[34] See Leo Strauss, "Marsilius of Padua," in *History of Political Philosophy*, p. 243. *Cf.* Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, pp. 156–64.

II. PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL VIRTUE

The demands of divine justice decisively condition Hooker's treatment not only of the necessary qualities but also of the finer ones. Indeed, Hooker writes frequently that the performance of "virtuous duties" is all that "the gospel of Christ requireth" even from fallen nature in order that immortal happiness be obtained. Those who commend the "love of equity and right itself," for its own sake, "though they speak not of religion, do notwithstanding declare that which is in truth her only working."[36] Perhaps this partly explains the "rationalism" which some have observed in Hooker's teaching; it surely accounts for his reliance upon philosophers such as Aristotle. In them can be found both an exposition of the virtues fitting man's nature and a speculative account of nature generally. But Hooker's reliance on the philosophers is qualified, just as the adequacy of their views on virtue and speculation is qualified. For the philosophers did not recognize the unqualified perfection of which nature is capable, especially the literally divine end possible for man. This culminating knowledge occasions the differences distinguishing the place of philosophy and moral virtue in Hooker from their place in the ethics of "the head of all philosophers," Aristotle.

To begin with, philosophy itself is depreciated. Indeed Hooker celebrates speculation, but this is not inquiry by the unassisted reason. It is inquiry whose difficulties and doubts are resolved and decisively enlightened by revelation. The queen of the sciences is not philosophic reason but "theological reason, which out of principles in Scripture that are plain, soundly deduceth more doubtful inferences."[37] What Aristotle saw as queen serves the King of Kings. It might be said that the theoretical perfection of philosophy becomes ultimately inferior to the moral virtue of justice, to divine justice which commands obedience to its laws and essential beliefs. This is only to say again that divine justice leads where philosophy alone does not go: to an immortal and divine happiness.

With respect to moral virtue proper, the chief effect of Hooker's theology is a depreciation of the more or less aristocratic manliness praised by Aristotle, in favor of a somewhat less political and more dutiful Christian righteousness. I do not wish to overstate this. Hooker's doctrines are fervidly Aristotelian compared to the powerful attacks on aristocratic morality and politics launched by Machiavelli, followed up by Hobbes and Locke. Hooker surely follows Aristotle in taking his ethical bearings from the gentlemanly excellences, no less for their "beauty" than for their "fitness for use." To his readers he counsels "the cherishing of those virtues . . . , wherein if nobility do chance to flourish, they are both an ornament and a stay to the commonwealth wherein they live."[38] And thus he praises among the virtues not only the courage, moderation, and prudence which are politically necessary, but also the more splendid Churchillian virtues of liberality and grandeur of soul less closely tied to utility. Liberality and even magnificence befit great men. They "always know that great things are at their hands expected. . . . For actions which must be great, mean instruments will not serve. . . . " Even in matters of religious worship "devout magnificence" is a fitting tribute. If charity to the poor is a necessary work, the splendid raising of churches is even in God's eyes "an honorable work." Hooker's words seem to point toward the peak of moral virtue for Aristotle: magnanimity or greatness of soul. Knowing its own excellence, noble pride pursues only what Hooker like Aristotle calls "the chiefest" of "earthly blessings," "reputation" or "honor."[39]

But if Hooker prepares a celebration of magnanimity, he does not consummate it. His writings include no discussion of noble pride comparable to that in Book IV of the *Nicomachean Ethics.* The reason seems to be the equivocal place of pride occasioned by Hooker's Christianity.

Magnanimity presupposes an unflawed excellence of character and a proud awareness of that excellence. But this disposition is at variance with the Christian's insistence that all men are flawed by sin and that fallen man's well-doing proceeds fundamentally, if indirectly, from God's providence. This insistence implies that man's disposition ought always to contain an element of humility, of subservience to his true superior, God. The status of pride is then doubtful. It is quite striking that Hooker does not, like Aristotle, treat vanity as merely one kind of vice. Hooker calls vanity the crowning "mother" of "all" vice. His readers are exhorted repeatedly to "meekness and tenderness of heart." "God doth load with his grace the lowly, when the proud he sendeth empty away," he writes, and then interprets a Biblical parable.

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[35] I xi 5, *cf.* ix 1, II viii 2; *Works*, III, 599, 619. I viii 8, 11, III ix 1, VII xv 14, V ix 1, lxxxi 4, IV lx 5, 6, 7.

[36] V i 2, 3, lxxi 2, II i 2.

[37] *Works*, III, 594–95. *Cf.* II iv 7, vii; III viii 7–10, esp. 11, 12–17.

[38] VII xviii 10, *cf.* xxiv 5.

[39] V lxxvi 2, 3, lxxvii 14; VII xxiv 18; V xv 3, 4; V xv 5 lxxix 14.

> The Pharisee and publican having presented themselves in one and the same place, the temple of God, for performance of one and the same duty, the duty of prayer, did notwithstanding, in that respect only, so far differ the one from the other, that our Lord's own verdict of them remaineth (as you know) on record, "They departed home," the sinful publican, through humility of prayer, just; the just Pharisee, through pride, sinful. So much better doeth he accept of a contrite *peccavi*, than of an arrogant *Deo gratias*.[40]

Similarly, Hooker's praise of liberality and magnificence is qualified by his view that virtue's importance depends essentially on one's intention as perceived by God, rather than on the grandeur of one's means. " . . . The meanest and the very poorest amongst men yielding unto God as much in proportion as the greatest, and many times in affection more, [may be assured] that in his sight from whom all good is expected, they are concerning acceptation, protection, divine privileges and preeminences whatsoever, equals and peers with them unto whom they are otherwise in earthly respects inferiors."[41] In short, the more splendid and aristocratic virtues culminating in magnanimity are kept from their Aristotelian place by the Christian tendencies in Hooker's thought which advance patience, humility and dutifulness. Greatness of soul is somewhat presumptuous in the light of divine justice.

The preeminence of divine justice depreciates not only the magnanimity which crowns the fine man, but also the more or less aristocratic distributive justice which crowns the fine polity. These two are inextricably combined in Aristotle's thought, in fact, for the claims of the outstanding man justly extend to political rule, if not to unqualified political rule. If the flooring of Aristotle's ethics is attuned to the necessities of politics, the ceiling is attuned to the best in politics, the best regime. The peak of aristocratic virtue is matched by the peak of distributive justice, an appropriate distribution of office and privilege to the finer man. While the manner of distribution or the form of government is crucial to the consummation of Aristotle's ethics, it is not so crucial to Hooker's. " . . . The kinds [of regiment] being many, Nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary."[42] It is perfectly characteristic of Hooker that his only thematic elaboration of justice passes up human justice (briefly summed up as "distributive, commutative, and corrective") to dwell upon divine justice. Justice is considered as "the bond" of the very "world," whereby each thing benefits from the rest. God's distributive justice "yields unto each person that which is due according to the difference of their quality." God's corrective justice punishes sins. No commutative justice is mentioned, perhaps because there are no transactions in divine justice between parties sufficiently equal so that each can benefit the other.[43] God's goodness cannot be increased by man; man's goodness comes as the free gift of God. Thus justice consists fundamentally in dutiful righteousness. If its manifestation lies partly in helping other men according to law, its fundamental tenor consists in righteous obedience to God's law. Human justice is but a reflection of the dictates of divine justice.

The substitution of divine for political justice yields a tone of dutiful resignation to Hooker's politics which further distinguishes it from Aristotle's. For the excellence of political justice is never unqualified in Aristotle's teaching, whereas Hooker's divine justice is in an important sense always perfect. Apart from its general inferiority to philosophy, political justice is so rarely perfect in practice that its very stature in Aristotelian principle is somewhat questionable. It prescribes the most excellent kinds of action and character only in the best regime. In all others—in the overwhelming majority of cases, that is—justice prescribes goods inferior to that of which the fine man is capable. The good citizen and the good man are rarely identical. For Hooker, however, divine justice is always perfect, and that perfection conditions his treatment of all human justice. Even that which may appear as chance or evil falls under the law of God—if it be only his first and unknowable eternal law. Even the faults of earthly justice are in a decisive way the dictates of divine justice. Perhaps no other part of Hooker's ethics indicates so graphically the distinction between his Christian Aristotelianism and Aristotle's own political philosophy.

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[40] *Works*, III, 702. Hooker expands upon all the evils occurring in "private families," "greater societies," and the Church. He then says that by " . . . naming pride, we name the mother which brought them forth, and the only nurse that feedeth them. Give me the hearts of all men humbled; and what is there that can overthrow or disturb the peace of the world? wherein many things are cause of much evil; but pride of all." *Works*, III, 606, *cf.* 647, 614. *Cf.* Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1240^b, 21–24.

"The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment of his act, like the incontinent, nor the later with the earlier man, like the penitent, nor the earlier with the later, like the liar."

[41] V lxxix 8.

[42] I x 5.

[43] *Works*, III, 615ff.; *cf.* I ii, iii.

To conclude, Hooker's ethics is given its decisive tone by his Christian understanding of man as finally a spiritual animal, not simply a rational and political animal. The religious content, the elaborately calculated derivation, even the strict legality, of Hooker's law of reason reflect its important stature as a providential deity's command of the necessary means of salvation. Similarly, the aristocratic and political tone of Aristotelian moral virtue is qualified by Hooker with a tenor of humility and a-political dutifulness befitting obedience to a justice not human but divine. The distinctive basis of Hooker's political philosophy is obtained not by philosophy alone, but only with the decisive assistance of revelation.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON *THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION*

To the Editor:

Joseph S. Murphy, in his review of *The Crisis of Political Imagination* in your June, 1965 issue, p. 460, has handled my main ideas with considerable carelessness. Most of the views he attributes to me I do not recognize as those I tried to set down in the book; and his main criticism seems to me patently fallacious as well as misleading concerning my argument. Some of the fault here is undoubtedly mine. If I were rewriting the book now I think I could be clearer; and there may be faults in the book which he has sensed but has not succeeded in bringing into focus. Nevertheless, more sympathetic readers have gained a very different impression of the book than the one described in the review. Hence the same intention which led me to write the book constrains me to attempt a brief clarification and rejoinder.

1. The reviewer states that the book's chief theme is "the alleged failure of political theory to do away once and for all with all the world's ills and to rectify the tragedy of the human condition." In contrast, my own notion of the book's chief theme is that it concerns the failure of political theory to attend with sufficient fidelity to those ills which *cannot* be rectified. I dwell particularly on the primary and unrelievable gravity (as well as relevance to political theory) of death and of sin. What I tried to argue is that politics, with its responsibility for the general setting of life, must be concerned with trying to assure such a setting that these insuperable ills can be confronted with dignity and composure. I am perhaps in error on this matter; but if so, my error is certainly not that of suggesting that political theory can "do away once and for all" with death and sin.

2. Murphy asserts that alienation is an "exceptive" concept and that it would be senseless to assert that "everyone, everywhere and always," is alienated. To begin with, this is certainly not true. None of the main concepts through which we envision man—rationality, freedom, and the like—are "exceptive"; otherwise, they would not serve to characterize man as such. By way of analogy he asserts that it would be senseless to assert that all men, in all times, are selfish. But it is not, as Christian arguments concerning original sin show. These arguments may be false; men may be less universally selfish than the more pessimistic Christians suppose. But the doctrine of original sin is not senseless. Likewise it is not senseless—although it may be false—to assert that man as such is an alienated being.

In suggesting that this was my point Murphy seriously oversimplifies the view I was trying to present. I did try to show that alienation is present in a great many aspects of our lives today; and I argued too that present-day estrangement characterizes human life as such. Alienation, as well as death and sin, is among the ills which I argued could not be completely rectified. But surely it is reasonable to hold that there are degrees of alienation and that man is more alienated now than he has been at some periods in the past. This seems to me a rather complex matter, but I do not think I am guilty of quite so unqualified and indiscriminate an application of the concept as he charges.

The reviewer implicitly acknowledges that I draw some limits in applying the concept when he imputes to me belief in a past "veritable Golden Age of Fulfillment." But here he misconstrues my viewpoint in the other direction. I did not intend to put forth such a notion and I really cannot see how a reasonably conscientious reader could think that I did. I do have the impression that life in the Athenian *polis* or the medieval town often involved less estrangement than does life in a modern city or suburb. But I do not know how I could have made clearer my belief that no "Golden Age of Fulfillment" is possible within history nor my conviction that even the best of earlier societies have suffered from the radical flaw of class conflict and exploitation. Indeed, one aspect of my chief theme is that, because of the poverty which has always afflicted mankind, no earlier societies have had our opportunities for achieving community.

3. Finally, the reviewer states that "it is sheer folly to suppose that a possible solution to these problems lies in the resurrection of ancient and well interred religious institutions." While "sheer folly" is a little strong, I share his conviction that such a view would be seriously in error, and ask, who indeed holds it? Some Anglicans and some Catholics, perhaps. But I certainly do not. Again he has made my argument seem something very different from my intention. I was trying to pose the question as to how religious truths can be recognized by a society in view of this very fact: that the ancient religious institutions *cannot* (and I think I pretty clearly said *should* not) be re-established.

Further, I devoted many pages to distinguishing between the religiously significant but undogmatic insights of artists, philosophers, and various secular figures—many of whom may be professed atheists—and the revelations on which religions are built. I explicitly stated that only the former, free of all dogma and orthodoxy, should in any way be officially supported. I confess that I am still not satisfied with this argument and am convinced only that the problem is serious, and that I am on the right track. But when a critic implies that I desire to resurrect the Holy Roman Empire I can only feel that he ought to pay more attention to what I said.

The Crisis of Political Imagination is centered upon these hypotheses: that man is properly and inevitably concerned above all with questions concerning eternity; that serenity and dignity in personal existence depend on achieving an intuition, even if unformulable, of the answers to these questions; that one's sense of the meaning of his existence is not derived mainly from dogmas or even from churches but from the whole society in which he lives; that government, as the present administration in Washington has clearly acknowledged, is necessarily and increasingly concerned with the quality of the whole society; and that consequently the simple and extreme secularism of the modern democracies, while embodying some important truths, cannot be an historical resting place. These hypotheses seem to me to state some of the main conditions of community. The crisis of political imagination I see as lying in our loss of serious and deep concern for community. I readily admit that these are vast issues, which I have by no means mastered. I had hoped, however, in writing *The Crisis of Political Imagination,* that we might discuss them.

GLENN TINDER
University of Massachusetts (Boston)

MATCH TO TINDER

TO THE EDITOR:

I very much regret that Glenn Tinder finds my review of his *The Crisis of Political Imagination* careless. I am certainly inclined to agree with his assertion that "some of the fault is undoubtedly" his own in failing to make his arguments clear. My quarrel, however, is not with the clarity of his writing, but with the intellectual utility of the concepts which constitute the heart of his arguments.

It may be, as he complains, that he does not recognize the views attributed to him, a circumstance about which there is little to say; that my main criticisms are "fallacious as well as misleading," is a somewhat more grave charge and requires examination.

He denies that it is senseless to use the concept of alienation in the way he does. He argues that my objections to the use of 'alienation' would apply equally to 'rationality,' 'freedom,' and the like. I quite agree. If these concepts are used, as they often are, in the same fashion as he uses 'alienation' they are indeed meaningless. I fully understand his desire to have such statements characterized as, at the very least, false, rather than meaningless. For then his talk about alienation would have the appearance of empirical legitimacy. After all, the denial of a false proposition is a true proposition. My objection is that he has asserted no propositions, but rather a host of meaningless statements which can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed. Saying, as he does, that the doctrine of original sin, though it may be false, is not senseless, does not make the doctrine of original sin meaningful—and the same holds for alienation and other similarly misused concepts. It is a simple rule of thought that a property, quality, or condition which can be predicated universally is uninformative—it tells us nothing about the world or its contents.

I agree, in this context, that talk about varying degrees of alienation is a complex matter. It becomes all the more complex in the absence of a clear and unambiguous statement about what sort of condition the alienated condition is supposed to be.

As to the rest I can only ask: How does one go about confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis that "man is properly and inevitably concerned above all with questions concerning eternity"? What is one to do with the statement: "Serenity and dignity in personal existence depend on achieving an intuition (*sic*), even if unformulable of the answers to these questions"? I do not know. I do not know how one *can* know.

Tinder mentions at several junctures what his intentions were. I am, of course, pleased to know something about these, though it must be clear that I reviewed what I took him to be saying in his book, not what he intended to say.

The pity of this exchange is that what separates Tinder from my own position is what separates political theory, at least as it is done in some quarters, from political theory as it is done in others. Yet we have done little to narrow the breach.

JOSEPH S. MURPHY
Brandeis University

ON ELECTORAL MYTH AND REALITY

To the Editor:

One item, at least, in the article by Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clauson and Warren E. Miller: "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election" (this *Review*, June, 1965) deserves comment.

In attempting to explain the Goldwater loss in 1964, the authors offer some strikingly original observations. In their effort to explain the Goldwater strategy, they construct a rationale (pp. 332–6) which is supposed to reveal what might have served to mislead the Goldwater forces into thinking that they could win the contest against President Johnson. The authors suggest, in effect, that practically everyone in the country knew that Senator Goldwater had little chance of winning in November. Therefore, there must be some explanation as to why Goldwater and his aides were so badly misled. There is an explanation. But it cannot be obtained by employing the theory of games, which in this case would place victory as the sole or major objective of all participants.

According to the authors, Goldwater was misled by the intensive efforts of his supporters which led him to believe that he had a larger base of support than actually existed. In their words, " . . . the large bulk of letters to public officials or the printed media come from a tiny fraction of the population, which tends to write very repetitively. . . . [and] as these few people write more and more letters over time, they are counted again and again . . . " (p. 333). We are thus to conclude that inasmuch as "public opinion is a protean thing," (p. 332) the Goldwater forces committed a most understandable error: they simply failed to realize how weak their base of support really was.

But 1964 was not an orthodox election year. The quest for winning elections, which had always serve to guide the decision-making process in the past, was absent to a large degree from the 1964 Republican nominating convention. How could such a thing happen? People dominated by ideological considerations and dedicated to Senator Goldwater captured control of the delegate-selection process. For them, being "right" was far more important than winning the contest for the presidency. To paraphrase one of them: they had won with echoes but they much preferred a choice.

In these circumstances, the standards used by the authors to try to explain what probably took place in the minds of those advising Goldwater were not necessarily the standards employed by the Goldwater people. The Goldwater forces may have been comforted but were not misled by their own fan mail. When one is called to duty, one goes without regard to cost or consequence. How else does one explain the uncompromising and ideologically "heavy" tone of the Goldwater acceptance speech? "Southern strategy" notwithstanding, a man eager to win does not snub party leaders and millions of the rank-and-file.

Moreover, we have had benefit of the type of analysis offered by Richard Neustadt in *Presidential Power* long enough to realize that our *ex post facto* analyses of political events often impose a degree of order to the happenings which the participants wouldn't recognize. Even the 1964 Republican nominating convention and campaign, filled as they were with examples of great single-mindedness, were nonetheless the products of decisions and events which were at times disparate and isolated. Senator Goldwater probably did feel an obligation to his dedicated followers who had long been begging him to run. His original plan was set in motion before the assassination of President Kennedy and although this plan may have depended upon his running against Kennedy, it was still allowed to continue after November, 1963. And, what ideologue wouldn't jump at the chance to present his case before a nation-wide audience? In the meantime, Goldwater supporters worked hard lining up delegates who would not stray from the fold in the face of threats, including that of almost certain defeat at the polls in November. This last factor was the key to the Goldwater nomination. His followers may not have won more than temporary control of a major party, but they did gain command of the delegate-selection machinery. And as they showed us so clearly, this *can* mean much more than what members of the Gallup panel say.

William C. Baum
Creighton University

ERRATA

The Review regrets two editorial mistakes resulting in the misidentification of men named in Avery Leiserson's article on "Scientists and the Policy Process" in the June issue. On p. 412, in the acknowledgement footnote to Table I, the correct name is David Z. Beckler. On p. 415, in the second paragraph of footnote 19, the correct name is Edward C. Wenk, formerly on the staff of the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. James C. Davies 695

Bluhm, Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. Neal Riemer 696

Hartz, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, and Australia. J. Roland Pennock 697

Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. John C. Wahlke 698

White, Home Place: The Story of the U.S. House of Representatives. Robert L. Peabody 699

Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda. John A. Armstrong 700

Fischer, The Life of Lenin. Vernon V. Aspaturian 701

Cottam, Nationalism in Iran. Frederick W. Frey 702

Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. 703

Iklé, How Nations Negotiate. Norman D. Palmer 705

Ranney, Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. James B. Christoph 706

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology 708

American Government and Politics 720

Comparative Government and Cross-National Research 735

Comparative Public Administration 755

International Politics, Law and Organization 757

BOOK REVIEWS

The Symbolic Uses of Politics. BY MURRAY EDELMAN. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. 201. $5.00.)

This is one of those lucid, tightly reasoned books that are an intellectual pleasure to read, because its argument—and its virtues and defects—are so pellucidly visible. The book discusses how symbols affect political action generally and how political symbols influence what people specifically expect out of government. As the title implies and as the content verifies, it is not a book about the relationship between what people individually want and how these wants are collectively, politically symbolized. Rather, the subject matter is verbal and non-verbal symbols, in the sense in which Pavlov or J. B. Watson analyzed them: as cues which are received by the brain and produce conditioned responses. The subject matter is not the food fed to the dog but the bell or other stimulus to which the dog responds in order to get the food. Occasionally and only peripherally, the author considers the political hungers that relate political responses to symbolic cues, but his candid, central concern is with the symbols of hunger and of food and not the elusive reality of hunger and food.

Edelman analyzes a variety of symbolic activities, including the ritual of leader-follower relationships and of authority. He nicely describes the rituals involved, for example, in law enforcement, collective bargaining, and in the practices of regulatory agencies. He persuasively argues that these rituals are a basic characteristic of these political practices in America. Law enforcement in this book becomes a ritualistic game in which both citizen and government test enforceability of legal rules by symbolic acts probing the limits of coercion and compliance that lie just this side of force. Collective bargaining becomes a verbal exchange in which each party tests the willingness of the other to demand and concede—and in the process symbolically reassures the public (which will likely pay the bill in the form of higher prices) that the end of bargaining has achieved the best interests of labor, management, and the public. Regulatory agencies similarly limit and are limited by the demands of the regulated industry and similarly reassure the public that its interests have been served.

Leadership is analyzed in terms of a public official's availability, his conspicuousness, and above all his ability to give the impression of being able to cope with the great problems which confront the polity. A major goal of the leader is to maximize acquiescence. To achieve this he must establish the symbolic and artificial semblance of coping with these problems. The test of his effectiveness is the establishment of a consensus on norms. The occurrence of the dissensus that in extreme form is called rebellion is an ambivalent response to a variety of political value symbols.

The book contains the virtues and vices of reducing political analysis to the symbolic, to which semanticists and stimulus-response psychologists at times tend to reduce human action. To establish agreement on the meaning of the symbols of loyalty and dissent is difficult but it is far easier than to establish agreement on the ways that concrete acts abstractly labeled, for example, identification and alienation affect loyalty and dissent. Purely verbal units of analysis are more readily demonstrable and manipulable than those which include non-symbolic origins of behavior. It is indeed unnecessary to consider non-rational roots of behavior to be able to demonstrate what the author has so cogently shown: that our political actions are to an enormous degree amenable to symbolic analysis and people do act politically in response to symbols. It is similarly unnecessary to probe deeply into the meaning of meaning, for semanticists to point out how bound people are by their words. And stimulus-response psychology has produced a wealth of highly valuable research with specific, discrete, demonstrable units of analysis like the conditioned stimulus of Pavlov's bell.

The defects of symbolic analysis relate to the excessive emphasis on symbols, which in this book is symbolized by Edelman's bold assertion that we can learn more about the behavior of elites and masses from esthetic theory than from anthropology and social psychology. In his frank uneasiness about symbolism, he keeps peering over the edge of the symbolic into the, to him, obscure world of human wants and other mental processes. Rebellion, he says, correlates with a bimodal value pattern and he seems to say that this bimodality causes rebellion. But he declines to let things rest with the symbolic: particular wants of people must be satisfied to produce "political contentment." And he does not quite argue that the stage settings and ritual actions of policy makers and administrators are sufficient conditions for contentment. Dramaturgy is not enough: popular anxiety about ultimate consequences remains.

But Edelman shies away from this obscure, non-symbolic, non-rational world whose existence he seems to acknowledge anxiously. Symbolic satisfactions are not enough, but what the real needs are he does not seriously discuss. He treads over the psychology from which he says we can learn so little with the uneasy awkwardness of a city-slicker suffering from agoraphobia and muddy feet as he steps into these vast, well-tilled, and fertile fields of scientific endeavor. To let rebellion be symbolized as an ambivalent response to signs and as a bimodal value pattern, leaves much to be said about not only revolution but also about more orderly political conflict.

What people mean when they say "you can't eat the constitution" remains verbal in this book. Hunger and the lack of food remain not quite brazen sound, but they are regarded as little more than tinkling cymbals. The actual state of the stomach is not deemed very relevant to the discussion. This limitation of the book delimits its contribution, which in its own terms indeed is very worthy of our attention.—JAMES C. DAVIES, *University of Oregon.*

Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis. By WILLIAM T. BLUHM. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Pp. vi, 502. $7.95.)

This stimulating book is an imaginative and bold attempt to relate the classics of political thought to modern political analysis. Bluhm seeks, in this way, to build a bridge (1) between the traditional masters of political philosophy and modern political scientists, and (2) "between the varying tendencies with political studies today." He seeks to demonstrate the continued relevance of the classics to the approaches, problems, and ambitions of the modern political scientist. Hopefully, the outcome may be the synthesis of classic and modern, "noumenalist" and "naturalist." In this synthesis justice would be done to philosophy, science, and statesmanship, to the good life, empirical politics, and prudential judgment.

Bluhm supports his argument in a provocative series of critical essays in which he compares classic and modern. The illuminating, heuristic juxtaposition is best captured, initially, in his chapter titles which also reveal the book's contents, most of the men treated, and clues as to the meaning of such terms as "naturalist," and "noumenalist": "Naturalistic Political Science: Thucydides and Snyder;" "Noumenalist Political Science: Plato and Strauss;" "The Aristotelian Bridge: Aristotle, Lipset, Almond;" "The Augustinian Bridge: St. Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau;" "Thomas and Neo-Thomism: St. Thomas and Maritain;" "Naturalistic Prudence: Machiavelli and Neustadt;" "Mathematics in Naturalistic Political Science: Hobbes, Downs, and Riker;" "From Political Science to Ideology: Lockean Theory;" "Naturalistic Political Science as Interest Group Theory: Harrington and Bentley;" "The Theory of Democratic Virtue: Rousseau, Friedrich, and Burns;" "Conservative Immanentism: Burke and Lippmann;" "Marxian Theory: Marx, Engels, Mills;" "Scientific Liberalism: John Stuart Mill and Christian Bay."

Bluhm argues that a critical, comparative review of classic theories and certain modern analogues will (1) greatly enhance our methodological sophistication, (2) help transform ideology into knowledge, and (3) advance the building of a general political theory which will accommodate partial insights and illuminate the whole discipline. Bluhm urges a fruitful dialogue among contending schools, classic and modern. He believes that such a dialogue would lead to that synthesis which would do justice to an integrated political science, one in which the integrity of individual approaches would not be sacrificed in the resulting union. In such a science, "political ethics would not swallow up descriptive science, nor would ethical questions be reduced to behavioral ones." The "Socratic dialectic of the Platonists would not be outmoded," but would "work with more elaborate and sophisticated data." The desirability and possibility of democracy, communism, and other systems and theories, would be tested in the light of broader ethical and scientific inquiry. Moreover, there would be room for many approaches: of decision-making, group process, conditions of democratic stability, the structure of freedom. Bluhm's disposition to relate ethics, science, and statesmanship is reflected in his critical acceptance of these approaches. Thus, "Neustadt's recipes for power would not be outlawed but would be combined with, and perhaps modified by, a theory of the uses of power." Similarly, "game theory, from which the students of political ethics can learn canons of clear and precise reasoning about ends and means, could no longer be criticized as a science of sharp practice but would become one aspect of a science of the human political good." And, ultimately, "the mathematical vocabulary which has been developed by the game theorists and some of the other decision-making theorists might become a vehicle for expressing the principles of the entire unified discipline, both in its ethical and behavioral dimensions."

What can be said of this ambitious, stimulating, very suggestive book? Two main points need to be stressed. First, this book should be welcomed as another major effort to reconcile the normative, empirical, and prudential components of the discipline of political science. It will unquestionably be an exciting book for students in political theory who are interested in exploring the possibilities of constructing a grand theoretical design. They will be encouraged to read the classics with an eye to universal ideas; they will see in the classics most of the methodologies and assumptions that underlie the "discordant variety" of modern political science; and they will be helped to weave together the diverse threads of the discipline's several fields into a more meaningful theoretical fabric.

Second, one hopes that the partisans on both sides of Bluhm's bridge will not shoot him down without seriously examining his thesis and argument. If the traditional theorist or modern empiricist attempt to discredit him by sniping at what they consider his faulty interpretations of the men treated, they will be missing his main point: the continued relevance of the classics for modern political science, and the need to develop a more "catholic" political theory for modern men. In those places where Bluhm's exposition and analysis may be incomplete or questionable, let those concerned not rip the bridge down but constructively assist in its completion—or at least suggest an alternative bridge. Happily, we are now far along in the task of clearing the air of the often stultifying smoke produced by the extremist guns in the behavioral-traditional battle. As a result, we can now see better the remaining problems that face us as we seek, in our respective ways, to advance the five major tasks of the discipline: unity, clarification of the good political life, illumination of empirical political behavior, prudent guidance, and significant research. To the more intelligent accomplishment of these tasks Bluhm has made a major contribution. I venture to predict that this book will be the most widely discussed theory book of the year.—NEAL RIEMER, *The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. BY LOUIS HARTZ. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Pp. xi, 236. $6.50.)

Professor Hartz has undertaken a difficult if not impossible task. By elaborating on the thesis of *The Liberal Tradition in America,* he has sought to propound a general theory of the principles governing the development of "fragment" societies—that is, societies that have grown out of a fragment of an older culture. At the same time he has tried to combine his general treatment with specific studies of four countries, each written by a different person. (Hartz himself contributed the study of the United States.)

Almost every paragraph of this impressive book bristles with challenging ideas, with insights, and with difficulties. Take its opening sentences. "There is a problem of traditionalism and change common to the societies studied in this book, and it derives from the fact that all of them are fragments of the larger whole of Europe. . . . For when a part of a European nation is detached from the whole of it, and hurled outward onto new soil, it loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides. It lapses into a kind of immobility." (p. 3) One wonders whether the problem of immobility and change is not common to almost every nation on the face of the earth, including the countries of Europe. Moreover, has the United States been more afflicted with immobility than has the United Kingdom? Perhaps the author is thinking of ideology rather than of events; but (whether or not that would solve the difficulty) this seems to be only partly true.

Professor Hartz's style, often poetic and somehow Hegelian, also adds both charm and (frequently) obscurity. The following passage is perhaps typical of the best of his writing: "When fragmentation detaches [the European ideology] from this context, and makes it master of a whole region, all sorts of magic inevitably take place. First of all, it becomes a universal, sinking beneath the surface of thought to the level of an assumption. Then, almost instantly, it is reborn, transformed into a new nationalism arising out of the necessities of fragmentation itself." (p. 5) (Incidentally, Professor Rosecrance later tells us that "one of the strange outcomes of Australian history . . . is that social and political reform did not lead to the consolidation of a nation-state in the mid-nineteenth century." (p. 291)

The fragments, Hartz argues, are not cross-sections; they are horizontal cuts. In one place they may be feudal (Latin America), in another liberal (the United States), and still elsewhere radical (Australia). They do not reproduce a likeness of the original, but the transplanted element proliferates the ideology it brought with it. Today however the fragments are at the end of one era and the beginning of a new one. Just why it should come at the same time for all of them or what is the reason in each case is not always clear, although it appears to be the race problem that explains why the mechanism of rigid conservatism is producing insecurity rather than security in South Africa and in the United States and which will therefore, with a new revolution, bring to an end the "fragment" phase of history. Indeed, Hartz declares that the new era is already "igniting again a spark of philosophy" that had long been dead.

The author finds the lack of ideological conflict in the various fragments the most significant factor in determining the development of ideas (and events?) in those countries, although he also recognizes, secondarily, the role of more concrete factors. The latter, incidentally, are uniformly accorded much more significance by his collaborators.

Professor Leonard M. Thompson, for instance, declares that the "primary phenomenon" in South Africa is that the two European fragments which settled there "have been established amidst more numerous peoples of non-European origin." (p. 179) Interestingly enough, the word "fragment" escaped my eye, if indeed it appeared, in Richard M. Morse's interesting chapter on Latin America. Professor Rosecrance, struggling manfully to bring his enlightening discussion of Australia into accord with the Hartzian theory, finds support in the fact that "Australia's various schemes for meeting the problems of the Great Depression were far less radical in relation to the social context in which they were evolved and applied than were the parallel policies of the New Deal in the American context." (p. 312) The statement would appear to be equally applicable to Britain and many other non-"fragment" societies.

Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with the attempt to spread a theoretical net so wide is that the theory tends to become so complicated that it can explain anything. "The American fragment absolute," writes Hartz, "comes out then in many ways: civil rights, economic life, the intricacies of political alignment. It is a jewel of many facets." (p. 116) Indeed it is. It includes the absolutistic polarity by which we can switch from keeping the Negro in subjection to insisting on the most absolute equality; and at the same time it also includes pragmatism. (p. 115) It is remarkable that the latter term appears so seldom in a discussion of American political philosophy; but it does appear, and by its inclusion in the explanatory scheme, in addition to what has gone before, it would seem that the theory receives a saving flexibility that would render disproof impossible.

Many of my remarks have been critical. Perhaps I have indulged too freely the scholarly penchant for picking on the flaws and taking the gems for granted. Primarily, I would stress, however, that this book's value lies in its insights, its comparisons, its richly textured relating to each other of ideas and tendencies seldom contemplated together. From this kind of experience the reader may draw his own fruitful conclusions without accepting those of the author.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College.*

The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life. BY JAMES DAVID BARBER. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 314. $5.00.)

Professor Barber's study can be read with profit by any interested student of government, layman or professional. With an understanding and sympathetic feel for the day-to-day life of the freshman state legislator, it explores imaginatively the patterns of recruitment into and adjustment to legislative life. The results of this exploration are a worthwhile contribution toward understanding the psychology of legislative behavior. This contribution is rare, however, in that the work attempts not merely to describe and account for certain types of political behavior and attitudes but also to relate the findings to questions about the functioning of the legislative sub-system in the larger political system. It is also of more than usual methodological interest in that it analyzes coherently three varieties of data not often combined in one research operation—pre- and post-session mail questionnaires (to 150 freshman Connecticut legislators of the 1959 session), intensive interviews with a sample (27) of the ninety-six legislators returning either or both of the mail questionnaires and basic documentary data such as legislative records and census reports.

The book's substance can be readily described. On the basis of a legislative-activity index, calculated from legislative records, and a willingness-to-return-to-legislature index, derived from answers to questions about such willingness, legislators are classified as Lawmakers, Reluctants, Advertisers, or Spectators. Attitudes and behaviors associated with each category are delineated by a series of tabular "profiles" and analyses of interview materials and further amplified by extended discussion of three case-typical individuals of each sort. Each of the four types of legislator is examined with respect to the character of community and nominating processes which seem to produce the type, the personal reactions of the new arrival in the legislature, his perceptions and conceptions of self, his strategies for managing the personal stresses and strains of adapting to legislative life, the implications of that type of behavior for the working of the legislative system, and the probable political future for legislators of a given type.

Critical readers, especially those tending to be skeptical of behavioral research on principle, will find some likely targets for criticism in this work. The basic assumption "that the individual's political behavior represents a collection of adjustive techniques or strategies by which he attempts to maximize the satisfaction of his needs" (p. 213) will seem weak to some because it is "too psychological," and to others because it is too eclectic psychologically. Similarly, the inference of diverse psychic needs and complex psychic states from relatively scanty interview data will be unconvincing to many readers besides those who are cold to psychoanalytical approaches in general. More specifically, it is difficult to explain or justify in terms of any body of psychological or political theory the enormous weight put on the two particular variables which serve to put each of the subjects into his proper typological niche. Skeptics and more friendly critics may both question the happy accident that all the Procrustean beds for Barber's data seem to be of the same size, that, in Barber's own words, "The world begins to arrange itself in fourfold tables." (p. 261) For example, it is remarkably convenient that there are exactly four types of legislator and exactly four alternative strategies by which legislators can adjust to legislative life. Critics may also be made uneasy by the fact that each type of legislator is described mainly, so far as proportionate allocation of space is concerned, through excerpts from case-typical interviews, so that the reader has no way of knowing just how general or typical the illustrative data really are.

These are all legitimate methodological queries. But one should not make more of them than they deserve. The author is well aware of the limitations of his methods and his objectives, and makes no exaggerated or misleading claims for his wares. He knows and explicitly recognizes the character of the psychological foundation on which his work rests. He is by no means claiming, as careless critics might erroneously assume, that each legislator is wholly and fully accounted for as a person or as a legislator by classifying him into one of the four categories described. His typology is an analytical distinction intended to account for limited classes of legislative behavior, not to account once and for all for everything about the legislators classified. More specifically, one should not overlook the fact that substantial independent and objective validation of the typology is provided in the tabular profiles of each type of legislator, although for some reason the author does not exploit these data as fully as it appears he could. Moreover, the typology seems to point to patterns of behavior which have been found by other means in other studies, although the author makes little effort to relate the patterns he found to patterns or typologies used in other works. Finally, the work is not a test of hypotheses drawn from a specified theory but an effort to infer speculative hypotheses for future testing from a body of empirical data not organized into any particular theoretical mold.

Indeed, one of the book's most attractive features is the author's constant effort to speculate well beyond his data, to do more than just describe what he has found. More than most research reports and certainly more than most doctoral dissertations, Barber's never loses sight of the body of knowledge to which it is supposed to be ultimately relevant. He has chosen to emphasize the bearing of his data and findings on the problem of recruiting personnel into legislatures more than their bearing on the problem of operating a legislature after they are recruited. As a result, despite lip-service recognition of the institutional utility of Advertisers, Spectators, and Reluctants, there is no doubt that it is the Lawmakers who are Barber's legislative heroes. The concluding discussion of improving the caliber of legislative bodies therefore sounds suspiciously like the naive pleas of some civic reformers of an earlier age. But even if one is unsympathetic to such pleas, he must applaud the effort to keep research relevant to such problems.—JOHN C. WAHLKE, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

Home Place: The story of the U.S. House of Representatives. BY WILLIAM S. WHITE. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Pp. 175. $4.00)

Perhaps it was inevitable that William S. White would get around to writing a companion volume to *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate* (1957). The result is disappointing. White, former chief congressional correspondent for the *New York Times* and now a nationally syndicated columnist and confidant of President Johnson, has been away from the House of Representatives too long. Instead of analyzing basic differences between the two institutions, he pontificates on the ways in which the Senate is better than the House. Many of the common myths about the House are perpetuated. White adds a number of misinterpretations and inaccuracies of his own. *Home Place* consists of a series of partially developed themes, impressions of the House as of the 1940s and 1950s as viewed by a congressional correspondent, who, almost from the beginning, "was unable to bring himself to go to the House when anything at all was doing in the Senate" (p. 43). Most of the book's themes are grand oversimplifications. The House is dominated by senior members from small-town and rural America. In essentials it is no different than it was a century ago. Its primary concern is domestic policy. Foreign policy is left to the more sophisticated Senate. The Senate can always outthink the House, although never outwork it. Occasionally, the House stampedes, but, fortunately, the Senate, in its wisdom, comes to the rescue. Nevertheless, the House has its virtues. It is the home place in our government, a forum, above all, for the average American.

Many of these themes, when developed at all, are based upon misinterpretation, if not errors of fact. For example, take White's contention that the House is dominated by senior members from small-town and rural America. This is so, White argues, because "one rarely finds [safe one-party districts] in any essentially urban areas of the country, although they do turn up occasionally in states like New York and Massachusetts . . ." (p.

32). In fact, there are over 100 urban congressional districts, the great majority of which consistently return Democrats to office. Many of these members rise to positions of considerable authority in the House—to mention only a few, Speaker McCormack of Massachusetts, chairmen such as Celler and Powell of New York, and influential committee members such as Kirwan of Ohio, Keogh and Rooney of New York, Bolling of Missouri, Thomas of Texas, and Shelley and Roosevelt of California. At the time when White was covering the House, one would also want to include Sabath of Illinois, Buckley of New York, and the late Tom O'Brien of Chicago and William Green of Pennsylvania. There is, of course, a partial truth in White's simple thesis about rural domination, but the far more interesting questions are barely touched upon. He says very little about the working relationships between big-city, machine Democrats and rural southern Democratic chairmen which have long controlled the organization of the House. He says even less about challenges to this control since 1958 by a younger, different type of northern liberal organized into the Democratic Study Group. Furthermore, White's simple thesis obscures the fact that there are at least ten Republican "safe" urban districts and an even larger number of suburban districts which consistently return Republicans to the House.

A sampling of the more obvious errors and inaccuracies illustrates White's failure to do his homework. He has the party leaders rather than committee chairmen controlling floor time on legislation (p. 25). He asserts (p. 85) that "never in all history has a topmost House National reached the Presidency, save for James Madison . . ." (Polk? Garfield? McKinley?). The Committee on Education and Labor is incorrectly assigned jurisdiction over pensions and medical-care legislation (p. 90). The Republican Committee on Committees is not "composed of the senior Republicans in the House from each of the fifty states," and cannot be said to come under the influence of the Ways and Means Committee (p. 96). The appellation "Judge" is not "bestowed by the House upon chairmen of the Rules Committee with no known past judicial distinction . . ." (p. 114). Both the late Adolph Sabath of Illinois and the current chairman, Howard W. Smith of Virginia, were judges for more than eight years prior to their election to the House of Representatives.

Irritating as such blunders are, it is even more aggravating to find White perpetuating distinctions between foreign and domestic policy and arguing that the Senate reigns supreme in the former and the House dominates the latter. In the process of supporting this dubious thesis, defense policy becomes a home affair, House involvement in questions of foreign aid and the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities is largely overlooked, and the crucial roles of House Appropriations subcommittees on defense and foreign operations are barely acknowledged in passing.

White is at his best in his character sketches of House "Nationals," the members who rise above local interests and concern themselves with nation-wide and world policy. Yet even after these intimate glimpses of the men who stayed—Rayburn and Mahon of Texas, Mills of Arkansas, Judd of Minnesota, Curtis of Missouri, and Smith of Virginia—and the men who left the House—Garner, Dirksen, Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson—*Home Place* is singularly thin. The last four or five chapters, in particular, are curious fragments of themes, hurriedly presented, as if the author, pressed by his publishers and longing to return to viewing the Presidency and the Senate, had all but given up on this book.—Robert L. Peabody, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. By Frederick C. Barghoorn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. 329. $6.00.)

Probably this book attracted more initial attention than any other published by a university press last year, for it appeared less than three months after its author had been secretly held for seventeen days by the Soviet security police. Professor Barghoorn, like many less involved observers, believes that his arbitrary imprisonment was designed to interfere with communication between Soviet and Western intellectuals; it was a kind of "propaganda of the deed." Considering the fact that Barghoorn has devoted his scholarly career to the study of how ideology and tactics are related in the Soviet system (his earlier works examined the Soviet propaganda image of the United States, the mixture of Russian nationalism and Communism in Soviet ideology, and Soviet manipulation of foreign cultural contacts), his victimization by the security police was at least symbolic of the Soviet desire to maintain a kind of iron curtain. The present volume is an attempt to describe how the Soviet regime, despite its essentially defensive attitude, has maintained an offensive posture in the world-wide competition for public support.

It is fair to call *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* a description, for Barghoorn's treatment consists primarily of detailed coverage of the content of Soviet propaganda themes rather than analysis of the communication process. The central chapters of the book are devoted to the themes of nationalism and anti-American propaganda which Barghoorn treated in his earlier books, but this time the subjects are examined as part of the continuing Soviet international propaganda campaign rather than as elements of domestic indoctrination. In this part of the book Barghoorn also discusses the extremely important "peace" theme in Soviet propaganda abroad and the advocacy of the Soviet model for modernization. The first part of the book is devoted primarily to a discussion of Soviet concepts of the role of propaganda. While this subject has been treated many times, Barghoorn points out significant new developments, such as the virtual discarding of the distinction between "propaganda" and "agitation" in Soviet terminology. The last three chapters, which deal with techniques, organization, media, and effectiveness, are the weakest. Even in a purely descriptive approach, one would have hoped for a more detailed discussion of such highly important themes as the organizational and physical divisions between foreign broadcasts to Western and to Asian countries (*e.g.*, the role of Radio Tashkent) and recruitment and training of propaganda personnel. While the author has skillfully utilized some of the published surveys designed to assess the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, he has not pursued such investigations himself nor has he exhaustively examined the available journalistic reports.

In a book of this kind, however, one certainly cannot expect depth analysis of all aspects. Only a scholar with Barghoorn's long personal familiarity with Soviet life and with a full command of Russian could have produced what is a veritable encyclopedia of the subject. One can expect that future monographs by students who necessarily lack Barghoorn's special qualifications will build on his solid foundation by relating Soviet propaganda activities to communications theory and especially by systematic investigation of why, as well as to what extent, this propaganda has really succeeded. In the meantime, Barghoorn has presented an extraordinarily balanced overall judgment of the success and limitations of Soviet propaganda efforts, which he believes have often been overrated and are now diminishing in effectiveness, at least in the advanced countries.—JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Life of Lenin. BY LOUIS FISCHER. (New York, Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. viii, 703. $10.00.)

Fischer's biography of Lenin is a monumental study of a historical figure whose full impact on the course of human destiny and civilization has not yet been exhausted or expended. Imaginatively conceived, excitingly written and thoroughly documented, *The Life of Lenin* is authentic biography in the classic mold. The author admirably refuses to cater to the prurient, the sensation-seekers, or the demonologists. He demolishes myths intended to exalt or degrade, traces rumors to their source, unearths new data, creatively synthesizing and integrating familiar information with new material released by the Soviet authorities. Scrupulously faithful to the facts, he has scoured libraries, research institutes, and archives; he has consulted scholars, specialists and experts; but above all he has called upon his own incomparable and unique experience as a correspondent in Russia during the formative years of the Soviet experiment. It is something of a tribute to Fischer's scholarly impartiality that in spite of the vicissitudes of personal ideological traumas and transfigurations he has been able to describe personalities and events with a detachment that is not wholly deceptive. Although he was ideologically engaged, disengaged, and outraged, knew personally and intimately many of the characters in his biographical drama, and was an observer and semi-participant in many of the events, he surveys the terrain with a remarkably determined aloofness and wholly unnecessary diffidence.

As a consequence, Fischer's book is genuine biography, not iconography. Neither is it an exposé, searching out the seamy side of Lenin's life, breathing false life into groundless rumors or outlandish fabrications, catering to the sensational and prurient. He focuses on Lenin the man, the revolutionary, the statesman, the husband, colleague, friend, boy, son, and brother, not Lenin the prophet, the philosopher, the messiah, scoundrel or demon. *The Life of Lenin* is obviously a magnificent labor of love, not love for Lenin or his ideas, but love for Lenin the subject. It is likely to remain the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment for many years, although it is unlikely to receive an enthusiastic welcome in that third of the world ruled by Lenin's followers. The study falls just short of being definitive, but only because of the secretiveness of the Soviet regime and through no fault of the author. Some of the most basic facts concerning Lenin's life, such as his precise ethnic origins, remain locked in the Soviet archives. Fischer surmises on the basis of available data, that not only Tartar blood, but Jewish as well, flowed through Lenin's veins. "The Kremlin's secretiveness," Fischer writes, "may be explained by the wish to create a nationalistic image of Lenin as a one hundred per cent Great Russian without infusions of non-Russian blood." But, according to the author, "Reliable facts to prove Dr. Blank [Lenin's maternal grandfather] was or was not a Jew have not been made public," although the records are undoubtedly available in "Russia's bulging archives."

Lenin was a man of seemingly inexhaustible energy, a massive intellect, and a complicated personality, whose mysteries Fischer attempts to unravel with the aid of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, not always with happy results. Lenin's written output alone is sufficient to stagger the imagination and paralyze the neophyte. From 1893 to 1923, Lenin wrote an estimated 10 million words, nearly all of them preserved in millions of volumes in more than a dozen languages. The deathless character of Lenin's prose, however, is not a tribute to his literary genius, but a hieratic monument to his success as a revolutionary prophet. As Fischer aptly puts it, "Lenin wrote endlessly, but he was not a literary man.".

In Fischer's biography, we see Lenin in all his guises and moods: the compulsive revolutionary, the dedicated fanatic, the artful conspirator, the quarrelsome politician, the expedient statesman, and the devoted but not always faithful husband. We live with Lenin the fugitive, in hiding and in exile; we see him at home, in his office, at the ramparts, on the soapbox, at war and at peace. We hear his boisterous laughter, his shrill invective, and we see him with Trotsky and Stalin, alternately insulting, praising and despairing. We witness Lenin at the height of his mental and physical powers, the prototype of the virile intelectual *condottiere*, and we also see him crippled by a debilitating infirmity.

What is Lenin's proper place in history? Fischer hardly raises this question, yet it is obviously both an embarrassing and burning question for Western historians. If historical greatness is to be measured in terms of lasting impact, imprint and influence on the course of human destiny, then surely by any standard Lenin must be accounted among the most monumental figures not only of this century, but in all recorded history. Western historians are understandably reluctant to place Lenin in the historical pantheon of greats while his ubiquitous eponymous followers are still frantically dedicated to preempting both the future and the past in his name. Yet Lenin almost certainly will join the company of Alexander the Great, Mohammed and Napoleon rather than that of those ephemeral flashes of destructive and malevolent genius like Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Adolf Hitler. Already one-third of the world is ruled in his name, another third is animated and motivated by his theory of colonialism and imperialism, while the remaining third alternately quakes and thunders before his battalions distributed everywhere.

Thus, Fischer is rightly more concerned with the man of action rather than the man of thought. Lenin resembles Alexander the Great more than he does Aristotle, in spite of his prolific and often prolix output. He is more properly the founder of an empire-civilization than a philosophical system, and his successors are more like *diadochi* and *epigoni* than apostles or disciples, but he is even more than this. He has been reincarnated as a God, whose philosophical exegeses have been transmuted into Holy Writ and whose utterances have been converted into aphorisms and beatitudes. "The iconoclast," writes Fischer, "is now a modern Russian icon."—VERNON V. ASPATURIAN, *Pennsylvania State University*.

Nationalism in Iran. BY RICHARD W. COTTAM. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 332. $6.00.)

Probably as many crimes have been committed in the name of nationalism as in the name of religion—particularly in modern times. Among these offenses, though hardly conspicuous, lurk the academic. Library catalogues bulge with titles like *The Paradox of Nationalism, Nationalism: The History of an Idea, Nationalism and After, Essays on Nationalism,* and even *Modern Nationalism and Religion.* Yet, despite the proliferation of publications, very few useful empirical studies of the phenomena of nationalism exist. This book is to be placed among those worthy few.

The subject has an importance only slightly exceeded by its complexity. As nationalism seems to be setting in the West (save, perhaps, in the 5th Republic—better labeled the 3rd Empire), it is rising in the East. In the West it has recently been most strongly associated with Hitler, Mussolini, racism and international violence. In the contemporary East it is more likely to have the aureole of nation-building, integration and sorely needed consensus. One worries how to damp it in Europe and encourage it in much of Asia.

Actually, no paradox is present here. In developing societies, extending the social and political units with which the individual is *acquainted,* with which he feels *involved,* and with which he *identifies* is a basic problem. In the absence of identification with far more comprehensive units than the traditional family, clan, village and tribe, valued developmental programs have bleak prospects. Consequently, political scientists search keenly for those factors which induce expanded horizons of political allegiance. But we also recognize grotesqueries that are aspects of the same phenomena. Nationalism becomes jingoism, patriotism becomes chauvinism, and identification degenerates into xenophobia. As part of our quest we must also discover the when and why of these aberrations.

Other vital queries also abound. For instance, at times it seems as if there is a fixed capacity for change in an individual's political attachments. He seems to exhaust his affect on the first new unit he learns and thereafter refuses to extend himself again. At other times it appears that the initial extension of political allegiance is the hardest, and that each subsequent extension is easier.

Certainly we do not at present have a definitive grasp of these problems of political identification, including nationalism. But it seems no less clear that well planned empirical investigations—surveys, experiments, and case studies—are the stuff from which the necessary theory must arise.

Professor Cottam, formerly a foreign service officer in the U. S. Embassy in Tehran, has given us a case study of Iranian nationalism, which he regards as a "major key" to fathoming intricate Persian politics. His theme is the impact of nationalism on Iranian political behavior, and he presents it through historical analyses of a number of crucial actors on the Persian scene. After a very sensible introduction and after three excellent background chapters, the author inspects in turn: the tribes, including the Kurds; the non-Muslim minorities; the localities and regions; foreign influences; and the "Nationalist" movement (*i.e.*, Mossadeq's National Front). In this process he also offers many astute comments on other actors, such as the Pahlevi Shahs, the landowners, the military, the Tehran mob including the chaqukeshan (bully boys who are semi-professional rioters), and the mollahs (religious leaders).

Particularly perceptive are the comments on prevailing myths that orient Iranian political attitudes—especially the legacy of the frustrating 1906-1917 period in which the early constitutional impetus petered out. In fact, the British presence in Iran, well discussed by Cottam, is a telling illustration of the more subtle but durable disasters of foreign interference. The British narrowly pursued the goals of short run internal stability for Iran and protection of British economic interests. The contrast between this policy and avowed British principles strongly impressed the Iranians. Like other Near Easterners, they attributed it mainly to duplicity, and they created the exaggerated image of insidious British intrigue that students of the Near East know so well. But the tragedy of the encounter was its long run internal effect on Iranian politics. The easy charge of treason, refutable only through nationalist extremism, was tossed at nearly all prominent politicians and found plausible by a conditioned, already insecure public. Furthermore, all failures could be attributed to some sort of foreign manipulation, adding to the prevailing disillusionment, but getting some politicians off the hook. As a result, the practical sense of national responsibility that is so essential for inter-group cooperation and domestic strength seems to have been retarded.

Many facets of this story should sound familiar to students of American foreign policy. Indeed, Cottam strenuously urges that the United States misread the dynamic of the Mossadeq movement and lost its best chance to promote an escape from the perilous political juggling act that has been going on in Tehran for over a decade now. Though Cottam would seem, *retrospectively*, to have a strong if oversimplified case, its implications for the current political situation are far from clear.

The political scientist interested in nationalism will find in this book many fascinating observations. However, he must formulate their broader theoretical significance for himself. Cottam leaves his work at the observational level or, at best, at the level of interpreting the specific import of his findings for the Iranian political system. More general implications are rarely discussed. At the same time, it seems to me that Cottam's work offers the best political history of modern Iran now available, despite the fact that its focus on nationalism and several critical group actors compels a more compartmentalized and repetitive treatment than a conventional history. His comments on many salient power relationships in Iran are quite acute. For example, the ability of the bazaar merchants to paralyze portions of the economy, the power of the mollahs to arouse South Tehrani masses, the lack of unity among religious leaders, the attentiveness with which the British scrutinized intra-tribal wrangles to control the tribes, and Reza Shah's strategy of isolating his enemies are all sharply depicted.

The book would be even more useful if it had a bibliography and a less capricious index, if Persian titles had been translated into English, and if certain words like "prescience" and "atavistic" had been less worked. More disturbing is the author's lack of reference to the discussions of nationalism by Deutsch, Doob and others and his failure to consider several relatively recent major contributions to the analysis of Iranian politics. Though Leonard Binder's important *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* came out too late for reference, there are many points where the recent works of Banani, Upton, and even Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi are relevant to the author's concern but are unnoted. All the same, these are minor flaws and, it is gratifying to observe that, with works such as this, we are at last being given some basic, probing, empirical political studies of one of the most academically neglected and intriguing polities in the world.—Frederick W. Frey, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy. By Raymond Aron. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1965. Pp. 265. $4.95.)

If proof were needed that Raymond Aron ranks among the ablest students of international affairs, it is supplied by his latest book, appraising the national defense implications of the thermonuclear age for governments on both sides of the Atlantic. Planned initially as an attempt to explain American defense policies to the French society, the work has been re-written and broadened into a thorough and searching analysis of strategic doctrines advocated by the Pentagon, of General de Gaulle's concept of the *force de frappe,* of Soviet defense capabilities and dogmas, and of other issues intimately related to the maintenance of international security in an environment dominated by the threat of nuclear devastation.

Aron's work serves as a model of succinct, tightly organized, and forceful expository writing. He gives us more food for thought in less than 300 pages than other commentators sometimes give us in two or three times that space. With a kind of relentless logic, Aron supplies one insight after another, as he evaluates the complexities inherent in concepts like massive retaliation, deterrence, and the "rationality of irrationality" (the term he employs for the assumption that a French nuclear force could actually "deter" Soviet aggression). Thanks in no small measure to the successful labors of translator Ernst Pawel, Aron emerges as an epigrammist. Nearly every page has its *bon mot.* Deterrence, we are told, is "in essence, a form of diplomacy" since never in the history of diplomacy "have unused weapons weighed so heavily"; the transition from the atomic to the thermonuclear age "was at least as radical as that from so-called conventional chemical explosives to atomic . . . bombs"; "maximum deterrence does not necessarily coincide with maximum security"; "one cannot use joint suicide as a constant threat"; in nuclear strategy it "is impossible, by definition, to ward off one danger without thereby automatically increasing another"; (in reference to developments like the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow) "the meaning of messages remains equivocal up to the very last moment"; and the "entire American theory" of thermonuclear deterrence is "based on rationality," while the "risk of irrational decision increases with the number of countries acquiring nuclear arms."

Aron's analysis challenges hallowed doctrines in Europe and in America. In surveying technological developments during the fifteen year period after 1945, for example, he attacks the long-standing assumption that, save for American possession of nuclear weapons, the Red Army would have swept across Europe after World War II. Moreover, he asserts that in the period 1945-50, the American monopoly of nuclear weapons played a minimum role diplomatically—far less than unilateral possession of weapons of this magnitude might have led observers to expect. In his examination of the strategic doctrines underlying NATO, Aron advances many ideas which we have now come to associate with General de Gaulle. At the heart of the continuing debate over NATO's future lies a dilemma that has existed since its inception: "leaders were not too clear about the differences between a strategy of deterrence and a strategy of use [of thermonuclear weapons] following failure of deterrence." Yet his analysis of recent American nuclear strategy—and particularly his appraisal of Secretary Robert McNamara's refinements—will gladden more hearts in Washington than in Paris. Aron credits Mr. McNamara with possessing a subtlety of mind in perceiving a number of deficiencies in the American defense posture, and the leadership capacity required to correct many of the *lacunae.*

At the same time, Aron is equally forthright in discussing continuing defects in American nuclear strategies, particularly as they appear to European eyes. Many American defense experts, he charges, are more concerned with arms control and safeguarding military communications than with the military "susceptibility of their European allies." McNamara's doctrinal innovations "left Europeans more troubled than convinced" about the soundness of the Pentagon's strategic assumptions. Europeans were rightfully apprehensive "that war could be fought on European soil and devastate that continent while the territories of both the United States and the Soviet Union were spared out of a desire, strategic or moral, to prevent extreme escalation." McNamara's concept of "graduated deterrence" in effect minimized "the risk of a big war that might involve the continental United States at the price of putting up with little wars (little, that is, when viewed from across the ocean) in which only Europeans would be killed."

These reservations about American policy do not, however, add up to a defense of Gaullist strategic contentions. If anything, Aron is even more searching in his appraisal of Gaullist, than of American, defense postulates. After examining all the arguments advanced in support of the *force de frappe,* he concludes that the Gaullist case "postulates a highly implausible situation in which, moreover, the French deterrent would be absolutely worthless." De Gaulle's nuclear strategy represents nothing more than a "fatal rehash of the massive retaliation concept, and it is a miniature version ten years behind the times." If Paris actually endeavored to deter a hostile Soviet thrust (not already deterred by the American arsenal), then its action would convey to Moscow "nothing but a convincing impression of its own insanity."

In the last section of his book, Aron is at pains to supply a dimension to his treatment which is not infrequently neglected in earlier pages, an omission which leaves the reader to wonder how applicable his (and other experts') extremely rationalistic strategic models are to the real world of policy-formulation. In the concluding pages, Aron emphasizes the importance of "psychological understandings," of human emotions, of mind sets, and of deeply held convictions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Here he notes, for example, that the French *force de frappe* may be even more a *psychological* instrument of French power than a needed addition to the Western military arsenal. Here, he discusses the prospects and implications of defense concepts resting upon a foundation of paradox and irrationality, such as the possibility of highly rational responses by the nuclear giants in an age when global warfare itself approaches a form of human madness. And here he evaluates the likely characteristics of a world in which the revolution in military technology has "abolished traditional forms of peace as well as conventional war. . . ."

Aron's appraisal is a challenging, readable, and significant work—ranking perhaps as the most indispensable treatment available for anyone seeking to understand the impact of thermo-nuclear weapons upon military strategy and diplomacy.—CECIL V. CRABB, JR., *Vassar College*.

How Nations Negotiate. BY FRED CHARLES IKLÉ. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xii, 274. $5.95.)

Diplomacy is still more of an art than a science, but perhaps, in the nuclear age, a systematic analysis of one of its prominent techniques, namely negotiation, may be useful as a supplement to the standard works on diplomatic practice and the memoirs of practicing diplomats. Such an analysis might well be undertaken by a scholar trained in behavioral research, rather than by a professional diplomat. The volume under review admirably meets these specifications.

Professor Iklé has effectively combined research in the records of diplomacy in recent years, interviews with persons who have had extensive experience in negotiation (mostly Americans and Europeans), and clinical analysis. His research has been supported by the RAND Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, under whose auspices the book was written. His study is therefore the work of a behaviorally trained political scientist and a keen observer, not of a professional diplomat or a longtime student of diplomacy. It has the virtues and the weaknesses of the author's background. It lacks the flavor of a diplomat's memoirs and the authority and the grace of style of the classic works on diplomacy. It cites historical examples in bewildering numbers, but because most of these examples are drawn from current diplomatic experience, the treatment lacks real historical dimensions. Almost all the illustrations are taken from the recent diplomacy of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Most of the rest of the world (including all of the new nations) is almost wholly neglected; yet many of the new dimensions and characteristics of contemporary negotiations arise from the entrance of so many new nations into the diplomatic arena.

The author is well aware of the limits as well as the possibilities of negotiation. He warns against the common cliché, frequently heard at the present time, that "the act of negotiating is in itself meritorious" (p. 54). He points out that negotiators face a "continual threefold choice": to accept "available terms," to choose no agreement, or to continue the bargaining process. His longest chapters deal with the "Rules of Accommodation" and "How the Parties Come to Terms." He gives due heed to the effects of domestic pressures and concerns, and to the role of personalities.

In a study which concentrates largely on the diplomatic as well as the political cold war between the Soviet Union and the West, it is not surprising that the book's greatest practical value, and its most impressive insights, lie in the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union. In this area the author finds the main differences in negotiating styles. (If he had also studied the diplomacy of the new states, he might have found other interesting examples of differences in negotiating styles.)

Iklé maintains that "Western fortes show up mainly in negotiations with other Western governments but are of little value with Communist opponents" (p. 236). In a long "inventory of Western weaknesses" in negotiating with the Russians (pp. 238-253) he emphasizes "letting the opponent determine the issues," being "shy about counter-demands," being "afraid of making unacceptable proposals," and "denying oneself available threats." Soviet negotiators, on the other hand, have certain advantages over their Western counterparts. They are "backed by an authoritarian government"; they "need not feel constrained by domestic public opinion as much as Westerners do"; they can "support their long-term strategy and day-to-day tactics with fully coordinated propaganda machinery" (pp. 226-235).

But "the shrewd and skillful negotiating style of the Soviet government turns out to be a myth" (p. 234). Soviet diplomats commit many blunders. They often fail "to take advantage of Western vulnerabilities"; "they often ask for a whole loaf where they could get half a loaf—and wind up with nothing"; "they fritter away the credibility of their threats and the value of their promises"; "they cannot find the right dosage of demands and inducements"; "they are bold rather than shrewd, brazen rather than cunning" (pp. 234-235).

The contemporary negotiator, in short, is often lacking in the qualities most needed in the "compleat negotiator," notably realism, flexibility, and patience. Thus Professor Iklé, after his long clinical analysis of negotiation under contemporary conditions, ends by emphasizing the qualities of a diplomat prescribed in Sir Ernest Satow's *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* or even, as he recognizes, in "seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manuals on diplomacy" (p. 253). The conditions under which international relations must be carried on have greatly changed, but apparently, for better or for worse, successful diplomacy in the nuclear age calls for essentially the same qualifications as in former days.

This book, which is also available in a text edition, will be useful as supplementary reading in courses in international relations and diplomacy. Professional diplomats and other practicing negotiators could also read it with profit, although no doubt few of them will.—NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. BY AUSTIN RANNEY. (Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 298. $6.50.)

Ever since the renascence in the forties and early fifties of the case for greater "responsibility" in American political parties, scholars have been taking a longer and cooler look at the British system upon which the "responsibility" model seems implicitly to be based. The inquiries have revealed not only a much more complex and variegated pattern of relationships within and among British parties than had been assumed by the reformers; they have also served to cast into doubt the likelihood—even the desirability—of an easy replication elsewhere of the British model. Yet most of the recent studies have focused almost exclusively on the parties as national, parliamentary, policy-making institutions, and none has delved more than fitfully into the consequences for party cohesion of the pattern of local-national relationships. It is a welcome departure that the author of this book, who has already explored the doctrine and condition of party responsibility in the United States, should turn his attention to this neglected but important question in the reputed home of strong democratic parties. In doing so he has put in his debt students both of British politics and of parties generally.

Ranney begins with the assumption that candidate selection matters in the British system of government. Despite the prevalence of party voting by the electorate and the frequency of bloc voting in the House of Commons, the parties, he believes, are not so monolithic that it makes little difference who is selected by the constituency parties to stand for Parliament. That up to now the process of candidate selection has been cloaked in secrecy and neglected by scholars does not mean that it is either impossible to fathom or of marginal importance to an understanding of how British parties behave.

In producing the first really comprehensive study of candidate selection in Britain, Ranney has succeeded in bringing to the surface a very large part of the iceberg. His data are impressive. They consist of three main types: (1) his own interviews with national party leaders and workers, regional organizers, constituency association officers, agents and activists, M.P.s and candidates; (2) accounts in the press of controversies over the selection of candidates; and (3) information about candidates and their constituencies for general and by-elections from 1951 to 1964 punched on cards and subjected to various statistical analyses. This combination of sources has enabled him to derive explanations and inferences which reliance on any single type of data would have made difficult, and to invest his statistical tables with the flavor of political life.

The result is a rich mine of information about the kinds of candidates adopted, the process by which and the conditions under which they emerge, the comparative power of national leaders and local parties in the selection process, and differences on these questions within and among the three main parties. Much of the analysis tends to confirm pre-existing generalizations, but on several questions the data either add substantially to or throw into doubt standard interpretations. Three such deserve mention here.

First, Ranney's evidence rebuts the widespread view that the parties' central leadership tightly control the selection of candidates and use this power to discipline backsliding or recalcitrant M.P.s. Notwithstanding a few highly publicized cases of Transport House vetoes and expulsions, the findings indicate that central control of candidate selection—and in over two-thirds of the constituencies adoption is tantamount to election—makes only a minor contribution to British party cohesion. It simply is not that strong, as Ranney's cases and statistics show. Not only have the impressive formal powers of the national headquarters fallen into desuetude; since 1945 far more Conservative and Labour M.P.s have been disciplined by their constituency parties than by national officers. To a much greater extent than commonly supposed, the *de facto* local control of candidate selection in Britain resembles the *de jure* local control in the United States—though the results for parliamentary cohesion remain different, for, as Ranney suggests, "the national leaders do not need to control local candidate selection in order to maintain party cohesion in Parliament; the local activists do the job for them" (p. 281).

Second, the data support the established belief that politics in Britain are elite-dominated. Not only in social status, outlook, and personality do the chosen candidates of all three parties resemble each other much more than they do their respective supporters. They are also selected in fact by a tiny minority of local activists, a few of whom control the gates to the short list. Much of the time this local elite shares the broad presuppositions of the national leadership, but Ranney's evidence also shows that what the locals look for in a candidate (more often than not demographic and personality rather than ideological traits) does not always square with the needs and preferences of the national leadership, and a certain amount of conflict between the levels is endemic.

Third, the data point to the conclusion that the two major parties in Britain do not diverge greatly in the way they select parliamentary candidates. While Ranney does find more differences between the parties at this level than someone like Robert McKenzie would likely admit, he comes down none the less on the side of those who view the parties as remarkably similar in the realities of organizational power. His discussion of the motives, procedures, and sensitivities of grass-roots activists is one of the strongest features of the book, but it also points up the need for much more knowledge of the process by which people are recruited into politics at this level.

This study, then, is first-rate in almost every respect. Admittedly there are a few places where the reviewer's eyebrows rose. The author's decision to eliminate all incumbent M.P.s from his statistical analysis of the identifiable characteristics of candidates adopted by the local parties may well have skewed some of his results, and the figures he has used to construct categories of "winnability" are not altogether convincing. And in view of his declared belief that the study may provide "some basis for estimating the extent to which British practices are exportable and constitute a model other democracies should follow," (p. xi) it is disappointing to note that he does little to follow up this theme. Nevertheless, as raw material for more genuinely comparative analysis his work is bound to prove useful and in this respect is an important contribution to comparative politics.—James B. Christoph, *Ohio State University.*

[The foregoing review, of a book written by the Book Review Editor of this journal, was commissioned by the Managing Editor.]

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications. By GEORGE E. G. CATLIN. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 118. $3.95.)

The title is misleading; this is not a manual of research methods but five light essays on weighty topics, presented with insight and verve in a style at once intriguing and irritating. Professor Catlin, who has combined a long scholarly career (*The Atlantic Community, Systematic Politics*) with practical operations to shape up the Western world (Prohibition repeal, Indian independence, building the Labour Party, advancing Churchill and Willkie), expounds on peace and war, democracy, and the First Amendment, the social sciences as a "Third Culture," and the existence of political science, in 118 pages.

Three themes recur in Catlin's exposition. One is the "Theory of the Political Market," analyzed at greater length in his *Systematic Politics*. "Men make certain demands for political goods, for which they are prepared to pay the costs, even in terms of abridgment of precedent freedoms. According to Marx-Engelism both demands and goods are ultimately material or economic. A profounder analysis is that they are demands of varieties of power to achieve, or to guarantee freedom to achieve, whatever we want. Controls and governments of all kinds . . . are concerned to adjust those goods to those demands, having reckoned the costs." A second theme is the need for Western self-criticism: "One half or more of the world is patently wrong-headed. Are we then, all of us, patently right-minded?" And a third is the tripartite division of the study of politics as art, philosophy and science, particularly as this bears on liberal education.

In the first of four chapters developed from lectures at the University of Washington, Catlin asks whether political science offers anything practical for problems of peace and war. After a call for political scientists to come "up from their cloistered caves of speculative doubt into the daylight of the common forum"—but not as anxious "for-God's-sakers," who "too often commit blasphemy against the scientific spirit," he asserts that social science "begins with practical needs and, when its pure theory moves over to application, makes a circle back to practical needs." In between, "an empiric political or sociological science is now in process of being constructed, cumulative in its conclusions." Much as modern economics has dispelled the myth that God wills unemployment, political science may replace the belief that wars are inevitable with practical advice as to how to end them.

What, then is the substance of political science's contribution? That "the days of the national powers are over and the day of the super-powers alone has arrived." Neither anarchism nor crude Marxist anti-imperialism is the answer, but the development and effective enforcement of law through world authority with "teeth and not afraid to use them." This will require first Atlantic (not just European) union, and then "some kind of understanding or adjustment in coexistence between the free world and the communist blocs." The blind alleys include too much and too little reliance on force, Gaullism, and irrelevant ideological arguments.

In the next three chapters, the author dashes about the political landscape, incinerating straw men and planting his flags. He does point to several crucial new developments in the character of democracy, although each is exaggerated. Mass communications and polling mean that leaders are in closer touch with followers, so that neither need depend for guidance on the inherent ambiguities of elections. "The authentic representative vision is to be found not so much in representative persons for all matters as in well-checked polls of all persons on particular matters." Political parties, increasingly manned by professionals, are the essential posers of alternatives for the public, but "what really matters is that each of these parties, if called upon to form the government, should be competent to put into power men who can produce efficiently the political goods which the majority of the public wants." Thus "the future, it may be, belongs to men of the McNamara and Beeching type. . . . Among the consumers there will be equality and among the producers quality."

The gist of the chapter on "Political Philosophy and the First Amendment" is that a moral code should be inculcated "directively" (primarily through education) rather than "coercively." The teaching of Marxism should be permitted and the *Analects* of Confucius required. The essay on "The Third Culture: The Role of the Social Sciences in Education" develops the idea that political science has a special part to play in linking those other two cultures, since it contains both a humanistic and a scientific dimension. The final chapter, "Political Science: Does It Exist?", contains a succinct summarization of the main features of Catlin's conceptual system. The list bristles with significant questions, some of which are probably researchable.

As a piece of witty gadflyery unencumbered with evidence, as an incitement to dig into Catlin's more thorough work, and as a collection of personal affirmations by an experienced "pious Erasmist," this book is worth reading. The discourse is often disconnected and it falls short of demonstrating how political theory applies to the big questions. But perhaps it was meant mainly to stimulate, and that it does.—JAMES DAVID BARBER, *Yale University*.

Tocqueville and England. BY SEYMOUR DRESCHER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 254. $6.00.)

This is a challenging and original study. It calls into question previous interpretations of the origin and meaning of Tocqueville's thought; it breaks new ground in its emphasis upon the critical importance of his English experience. This is not to say that its argument will be universally accepted; this reviewer found some of the book to be based upon inadequate evidence. Often the texts cited by Drescher do not fully bear the weight he puts upon them. Yet by assembling and analyzing so vigorously the materials thus far available on Tocqueville's visits to Great Britain, Drescher has made a genuine contribution.

The thesis of this book is that as the result of his British travels and friends, Tocqueville altered permanently the concepts and models he used to deal with society and politics. Abandoning the contrast between aristocratic and democratic societies that dominates *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, Tocqueville in his last and most mature work, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, placed his entire emphasis upon another dichotomy—that between those regimes that are free and those others that are not. Thus by the end of his life, so Drescher argues, Tocqueville had discarded the United States as the model he recommended to his French countrymen. England was far more suitable:

> England clearly presented a case in which the disintegration of medieval society had not led to the permanent alienation of its constituent classes, and it still afforded viable political machinery for the transfer of political power by peaceful means. England, more than America, proved that a nation could successfully combine national cohesion with a maximum of local self-government, and could remain free while sustaining the tremendous economic transformation that placed her at the forefront of the industrial revolution.

And from what he saw and heard in the British Isles, Tocqueville came to see the connection between the rise of democracy and that of centralized bureaucracy; the conditions determining the evolution of aristocracies; the reasons why revolutions occur in some countries and not in others; the necessity for certain political and economic reforms in France; and, finally, what ought to be a great power's goals and methods in its foreign and colonial relations. Thus Drescher claims that some parts of the *Démocratie* originated in Tocqueville's English experience, rather than his visit to America. It was from his view of the industrial revolution in England that Tocqueville came to write that famous chapter on how industrialists may come to constitute an aristocracy in an ostensibly egalitarian society.

Using the method first applied by Professor G. W. Pierson to Tocqueville's and Beaumont's visit to the United States, Drescher has given a thorough account of what and whom these same two saw on their travels in England and Ireland. What Tocqueville learned there impressed him with the significance of voluntary associations for the politics of a free society; with the differences between an aristocracy that performs real functions, such as administering justice, and another that does not. Such laissez-faire economists as Nassau Senior imposed their views upon their French friends. Tocqueville thus came to adopt mid-Victorian theories of economic liberalism and of punitive treatment of the poor. Finally, he was brought to see that laws of inheritance concerning land did not have the importance he had once attributed to them.

Many of these assertions are well substantiated by the evidence offered in this book. But Drescher goes on to make further and more dubious claims. He sees drastic discontinuties everywhere in Tocqueville's thought, and all of them are due to the impact of England. The assumption that underlies this book is that Tocqueville once held rigidly defined and systematically constructed theories and that he abandoned them for other and incompatible ones. But there are good reasons for rejecting such an interpretation. Tocqueville had a way of adapting his views so that they could be relevant to what was happening in French politics at a given time. Although his political values remained relatively constant, his emphasis did not. Thus he tended to refer to whatever foreign model seemed most likely, at that particular juncture, to realize his own political preferences. During the Second Republic, he once again placed great importance upon the Constitution of the United States. After the *coup d'état* that established the Second Empire, Tocqueville referred more often to England. But in neither case did such a reference prove a basic change in Tocqueville's ideas.

Equally relevant to such an interpretation is the question of Tocqueville's distinctive style of thought. He was not the sort of thinker who cared much for careful definition or internal consistency. There are striking incompatibilities between his successive treatments of even his favorite subjects. But such discrepancies were due to forgetfulness, lack of system, and a boundless fertility of intellectual imagination. This type of mentality Tocqueville shared with Montesquieu: both were aristocrats trained as magistrates rather than as professional philosophers or as university professors of the social sciences; both had penetrating but eclectic minds. Their concerns, to which they constantly returned, so far from being mutually exclusive, were interrelated—how may political regimes be classified in terms of the person or persons who dominate? how much and what sort of liberty is enjoyed by the citizens of such regimes? what is the distinctive spirit of the society? None of these questions ever received an overriding priority. Certainly, as Drescher states, liberty is a great theme in the *L'Ancien Régime*. But is democracy unmentioned in that volume? One has only to read the last chapter to see how much equality weighed on the mind of Tocqueville, both as a force that helped destroy the Old Regime and as a political value that ought to be reconciled with liberty, although, in French experience, it had not been.

Drescher's assertion that the different phases of Tocqueville's thought were based on quite discrepant themes is not always based upon close textual analysis. To take one example, Chapter III closes with the following sentence: "When the first part of the *Démocratie* finally appeared early in 1835, England was the contemporary example of the aristocratic principle and all its workings." The evidence cited is Appendix B to the first part of the *Démocratie*. Within that text, Tocqueville wrote: "However until 1832 the amount required to qualify as a voter remained what it had been during the fifteenth century, which proves that the English Constitution became far more democratic with time." [Tocqueville, *Oeuvres Complètes,* ed. J. P. Mayer (Paris, 1951), Tome I, p. 451.]

Despite such lapses, this is a book that deserves to be widely read. It is full of general hypotheses worth discussion; it calls attention to English influences upon Tocqueville, a subject previously little known or understood.—MELVIN RICHTER, *Hunter College of the City University of New York.*

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence. BY FELIX GILBERT. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 349. $6.50.)

This well written book by an able historian should be of considerable benefit to students and teachers of Western political thought. Professor Gilbert expertly employs contemporary source materials, in particular Florentine official documents and early sixteenth-century memoirs, to produce a persuasive portrait of the social and political environment from which emerged a new way of thinking about politics and history.

Concentrating initially on the explosive career of the short-lived Florentine republic (1494-1512), the author lays bare the source and character of its class struggle, which produced competing aristocratic and republican ideologies. Even more significant was a rapidly spreading disillusionment with then-customary ways of viewing and evaluating political life. The traumatic French invasion of Italy in 1494, the patently sham constitutionalism of the Medicis before and after the republican interlude, and the obviously self-interested claims of the disputants on both sides of the continuous debate over republican institutions, led many Florentines to doubt the traditional beliefs that the city's institutional structure had been ordained by God and that all political troubles were the fruit of individual sinfulness. The internal and external difficulties faced by republican Florence, leading eventually to the overthrow of that regime, contributed to a spreading conviction that only egoism and force are significant in politics; moral principles and individual goodness or evil seemed irrelevant to an apparently autonomous political life.

Professor Gilbert builds on this carefully detailed foundation his interpretation of Machiavelli's political thought, to which I shall return. In the second part of the book is presented a clear, concise discussion of Florentine historiography around the year 1500. The author indicates how Renaissance humanism's aping of classical historians gave way gradually to a more realistic approach to political history, reaching its culmination in the writings of Machiavelli's younger contemporary, Francesco Guicciardini.

Of perennial interest to students of political ideas are the many varying interpretations of Machiavelli. Professor Gilbert's treatment presents no radically new insights, nor does he claim to have found a key to the single true and definitive manner of understanding Machiavelli's intent as a theorist. But his presentation strikes me as among the most lucid, informative, reasonable, and well-substantiated treatments of this topic. In his view, Machiavelli's great originality lay not in his ideas, most of which had become common coin in Florentine political circles, but in artfully weaving them together in a manner so dramatic and forceful as to present a new vision of political life.

Unlike some intellectual historians, Professor Gilbert seeks to penetrate to the philosophical foundations of Machiavelli's thought and not merely to link his ideas to the context of his times. For example, Machiavelli's veneration of the Roman republic was shared by many of his fellow Florentines, but in his writings it did not represent Renaissance man's desire to imitate the ways of a great classical age; rather it was a call to return to living according to natural instincts for the sake of a truly efficacious political virtue. This meant that Machiavelli sought to be neither immoral nor amoral, nor even to create a new moral code. He simply presented in the most extreme and consistent form possible the growing conviction that politics is an autonomous realm of human endeavor, with behavioral laws and normative standards appropriate only to the political sphere.

On certain points that are constantly debated by commentators on Machiavelli, Professor Gilbert presents illuminating observations. In his view there is no contradiction between Machiavelli's championing of one-man rule in *The Prince* and his favorable attitude toward republican government in *The Discourses*. The two works were written as responses to differing external stimuli, and in both the problem of political leadership is a central concern. Further, it is erroneous to conclude from the final chapter of *The Prince* that Machiavelli was the forerunner of modern Italian nationalism; at most he sought a temporary league of Italian states in order to expel foreign invaders and had by no means given up on the prospects of the city-state in Italy.

My one regret concerning this book is that the author did not specifically subject to critical examination interpretations of Machiavelli that have been published by other scholars. In particular, I missed a consideration of what is perhaps the most audacious, controversial, and exciting of all such works, Professor Leo Strauss' *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Certainly Professor Gilbert is at odds with Strauss in many ways; for example the former says of Machiavelli that "he was not a man who builds a system in which every detail has an appointed spot and forms part of a whole" (p. 167). A more decisive entry into debate with Professor Strauss and with other interpreters of the great Florentine theorist would have made even more valuable for students of political ideas what must yet be considered a most distinguished contribution to our understanding of the matrix from which emerged so much that is distinctive of modern political thought.—FRED H. WILLHOITE, JR. *Louisiana State University.*

The Devine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan. BY F. C. HOOD. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 263. $7.20.)

Recent scholarship on Hobbes emphasizes the need to re-examine some common views of his work. One such view is that the extensive treatment of religious and theological matters in the *Leviathan* is a grand and ironic *tour de force.* Hobbes found it safest to proceed as he did because he wanted to undercut the challenge to civil authority represented by organized religion without, however, giving dangerous offense to the established orders. All Hobbes's protestations of sincerity, according to this view, are disingenuous and he is described as one of the founders of the new and secular politics.

Professor Hood calls this view into question. His book argues that Hobbes was a religious thinker whose political theory was a consequence of his Puritan belief in the primacy of Scripture. In so arguing, Professor Hood develops the idea, also considered by A. E. Taylor and Howard Warrender, that the concept of God is necessary to give coherence to Hobbes's political theory. But, while Taylor and Warrender treat the concept of God as a necessary (or useful) implicate of the political theory, Professor Hood holds that Hobbes's political theory flows from his religious beliefs and that the critical problems associated with the former are best interpreted by reference to the latter.

Hobbes's materialism seems to be a formidable objection to this argument; but Professor Hood suggests that Hobbes, in attacking "school divinity," was attacking an interpretation of Christianity rather than Christianity itself. It was the political uses of dominant modes of theology to which Hobbes objected. Christian "spiritualism" was used to intimidate and confuse the faithful. While Hobbes's materialism was incompatible with this spiritualism, it entailed an idea of God like Tertullian's: since God has being He necessarily has extension or body because the idea of being involves the idea of extension. Christian materialism was not, for Hobbes, a contradiction in terms.

Professor Hood's interpretation brings into new perspective old problems in the analysis of Hobbes's theory. Professor Hood is concerned, as all the important critics of Hobbes have been, with the logic of his doctrine of civil society and with the key aspect of that doctrine, the concept of obligation. Professor Hood finds that for Hobbes obligation means the obligation of conscience. But conscience is a moral or religious concept which, given Hobbes's view of the limits of philosophic (*i.e.,* scientific) thought, cannot be fully comprehended by Hobbes's new civil philosophy. Hobbes's analysis of the human passions and of the rational articulation of those passions in the new *a priori* science patterned after Euclid does not yield the doctrine of moral obligation which is necessary for the rational construction of the commonwealth. Conscience is necessary for politics but it is beyond politics or the science of politics.

Professor Hood regards Hobbes's teaching about the obligation of conscience as a "fiction" in his civil philosophy, like the idea of a point in geometry. Since obligation transcends the limits of the new civil philosophy, which is necessary in itself to bring order into societies marked by disorder, Hobbes must surreptitiously introduce supernatural obligation into his naturalistic theory concerning the human passions. He does this by importing obligation through a stipulated definition as Euclid would. Hobbes's problem is set for him by the fact that obligation always implies one who obliges. Within civil society the meaning of this is clear, on Hobbes's theory. But the obligation creative of civil society involves God as the One who obliges; however, Hobbes's science of civil society cannot accommodate God within its rubrics.

Professor Hood's study adds another dimension to the controversy in scholarship about Hobbes. He tells us that he came to this interpretation of Hobbes in an attempt to "make sense of his moral and political thought as a whole" (p. vii). While it is true that Professor Hood has given us a new examination of Hobbes, the old problems remain even though many of them are newly described. Previously we had to worry about getting Hobbesean man from the state of nature into civil society; now we must worry about getting him from the kingdom of grace into civil society. In either case, it is an arduous logical journey.

The presentation of Hobbes as a figure in the history of political piety may strain the credulity of some readers. His sensibilities, his judgments, and his definition of political (and thereby religious) truth would seem to make Hobbes indifferently disposed toward the inward dimensions of religious life. That he was interested in the political outcomes of religious positions there can be no doubt; that his argument proceeds out of such a position remains at issue even after the reading of so able a book as this.—J. A. SCHWANDT, *St. Olaf College.*

John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton. BY SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY. (New York: Macmillan, 1964. Pp. viii, 274, $5.95.)

Subtitled "Architects of the American Constitution," Professor Konefsky's work principally seeks to show modern American democracy—"grown" from a "living Constitution"—what it owes to two of its early republican founders. The book explores "the manner in which Marshall and Hamilton helped to mold the Constitution into the dynamic implement of government it has proved itself to be." Rightly observing some differences between these two architects, moreover, the author wishes also to give a "comparative study of the ideas of Marshall and Hamilton."

Simply confining himself to exposition and summary of these two statesmen's writings, Konefsky generally manages to portray the important and obvious essentials of their policies. He rightly points out that all of Hamilton's proposals for America were "republican," at least in the sense of resting directly or indirectly "on the solid basis of the consent of the people." Quite properly, too, he deduces the great Treasury Secretary's overwhelming anxiety for an "energetic and powerful national government" from his "pessimistic" view of the usual "interests" and "passions" of human nature. Great powers are needed to deal with "the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs." If the nation's powers are to be great and liberally construed, however, their objects are narrowly confined to the preservation of the individual and his property. To assure respect for individual rights sovereign power is separated and thus checked, with the Supreme Court as key check in our popular government on "the more popularly constituted branches." In a helpful review of *Marbury* v. *Madison* Konefsky shows this Hamiltonian understanding to be shared by Marshall as well.

Generally, Konefsky summarizes with some skill the great judgments of the Marshall Court, exhibiting the Chief Justice's devotion to "the sanctity of property," an independent national government of "great and sovereign powers," a domestic and foreign commerce unhindered by the states. He does make a mistake or two. It is not true, for example, that in *Willson* v. *Blackbird Creek Marsh Company* "there was no specific federal legislation" according to which Marshall might have decided the case differently.

This study is indeed useful, but it must be added that its utility is principally that of an introduction for the general reader. It lacks the reflective, subtle, and comprehensive investigations of statesmanship, of modern America, of the architects' thought, which would be required for an original treatment. That Hamilton "contributed" to a powerful economy, a great central government, a supervising judiciary, that Marshall made these unequivocally part of the country's basic laws, is true but well known. The book does not bring out more subtle traits of modern America whose connection with the framers is not so widely known: a pervasive concern for personal comfort and security, respect for law and order, a thorough-going organization of society in productive effort, anxious careerism, etc., etc.

The old founders are treated considerably better than our modern country, but still not satisfactorily. The book only sketches Hamilton's views. It does not clarify in a decisively helpful way most of the notions basic to Hamilton and Marshall alike—their "republicanism," for example, and their individualistic and capitalistic "liberty." If this study often brings in contrasting opinions like those of Jefferson and Justices Gibson and Holmes, it commonly slides away from an extended confrontation which might expose the deeper if more subtle strengths and weaknesses of the architects' thought. These interesting subtleties might also have been developed by a more extensive exposition of the architects' style of architecture: the liberal political thought of Blackstone, Smith, Montesquieu, Hume, and Locke.

The book is also rather unsuccessful in bringing out the differences between Hamilton and Marshall, a subject where an original contribution might easily be made. It is doubtful whether Marshall ever embraced the "high-toned" oligarchic or aristocratic republicanism advocated by Hamilton at the Constitutional Convention, even if he retreated from what perhaps he alone would call his "wild and enthusiastic democracy" of Washington's early adminstration. Similarly, Marshall was a stickler for law and proper procedures, while Hamilton's temper was of a bolder cast. Beveridge concludes that Marshall's constitutional scruples blocked the Federalists' Disputed Elections Bill of 1800. Hamilton, however, urged a blatantly partisan course on Governor Jay in the same year, to recoup the prospective defeat of Federalist electors by New York's Republican legislature. Marshall, moreover, would never have carried on what Julian Boyd calls Hamilton's "bold" and "devious" endeavors to shape American diplomacy by secretive correspondence with a British intelligence agent. Finally, Marshall expressly disavowed Hamilton's avoidance of the Constitution's enumeration of powers by deduction of plenary power from the "general welfare" clause. Only the last of these differences is noted by Konefsky, and that in a footnote not calculated to draw out a general comparison of the two statesmen. Unfortunately, the footnote is typical of the book's deficiencies for the scholar, whatever its merits for the general reader.—ROBERT K. FAULKNER, *Princeton University*.

Legalism. BY JUDITH N. SHKLAR. (Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 246. $5.95.)

This is an excellent study of selected ideas about law, primarily about legalism. Thus, it should be noted at the outset that the book is not a study of law. Nor is it—nor does it pretend to be—a balanced treatise on jurisprudence. The author wrote: "The object here . . . is not only to understand legalism, but also other ways of thinking about law." (p. 3) In thinking about law, not of law, she presents a skillful analysis and criticism of what legal scholar-philosophers—a number of whom were trained solely in civil law—have written in their textbooks and treatises. The common law as a base familiar to Anglo-American scholars is not emphasized.

It is possible that one may find implied in this study a reaching toward participants in a larger audience than that of theorists who content themselves with mere analyses and criticisms of what jurists and other theorists have written. The large mass of social scientists—excepting those who have immersed themselves in "numbers games"—need to cope with processes, procedures, and ends of law as they relate to scholarly work. So it is that such scholars must at least understand "about law." In their work they scarcely can avoid making effective use of such basic tools as statutes and judicial decisions, material that scoffingly may be characterized as "a plumbers' manual." (p. 32) But, as well, they must understand something of theories of law (including legalism) in order to employ fragments of law effectively. Broadly trained social scientists can hardly accept the idea that legal concepts are based on nothing more firm than the speculations of theorists.

In reading this volume one misses the "little" cases that contribute richly to understandings within common law systems. Indeed, the author of this book has stressed little more than a few so-called "big" cases, highly publicized politico-legal trials: the Rosenberg and Dennis affairs, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and propaganda shows in Moscow. Professor Shklar reviews and dissects these incidents with consummate skill. In doing so, she has been able to examine ideas of many legal philosophers as these men have concerned themselves with their conceptions of natural law, of higher law, of legal positivism. However, an examination of seemingly small but deeply meaningful actions in private law merits greater attention. The mass of such decisions may guide both lawyers and social scientists more effectively than can a few tenuously connected and widely publicized judicial actions. The little things that have "grown up without benefit of much ideology" (p. 139) might well become the head of the corner.

Legalism is not a textbook (p. vii), and fortunately so. Teachers and mature and intellectually disciplined students who have carried on studies in law will find Professor Shklar's study provocative—due to the author's directness, confidence, and clarity—for she offers more intellectual excitement than can be found in textbooks on jurisprudence. The author expressed the hope that this volume will "open a debate" (p. viii), and one anticipates that this hope will be realized.

Legalism is a finely planned study. It is certain to give pleasure to many and to irritate legalists and other newly found "adversaries."—CHARLES AIKIN, *University of California (Berkeley).*

The Politics of Bureaucracy. BY GORDON TULLOCK. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. 228. $4.50.)

Political scientists have been writing about the inter-relationships of politics and administration for more than a generation, but they have neglected the politics of administration itself. Gordon Tullock, an economist, has sought to remedy the gap in the literature in this volume. His approach is similar to that which he used in collaboration with James Buchanan in *The Calculus of Consent.* He is concerned with the individual "politician" in organizations and develops a model of rational behavior based upon the self-interest of the individual. He rejects mathematical or abstract speculation as well as empirical method in favor of what he terms "understanding." As he puts it, "For a number of the assertions that will be made in this book, the supporting evidence must be found in the mind of the reader. That is to say, instead of presenting concrete evidence, I shall simply try to convince the skeptical reader by appealing to his own intuition and experience." (p. 15)

Tullock starts with the premise that political relationships are those involving superior and subordinate status in contrast to economic relationships which are those among equals. All governmental units and many business firms are political in nature. The individual, or politician, in organizations is motivated primarily by advancement of his own goals, irrespective of the stated organizational goals. With this in mind the author develops his model of the organizational process from the standpoint of the individual politician. He divides his analysis into two parts. In the first he writes from the vantage point of the politician somewhere in the middle (hierarchically) of the organization. He examines relationships with superiors (sovereigns), peers and subordinates. In the second part he examines the same system from the standpoint of the individual at or near the top, describing relationships with subordinates and spelling out the problems associated with supervision, control and coordination. His analysis leads him to the conclusion that complex and centralized bureaucracy is essentially inefficient. In an economic setting, pursuit of self-interest is always functional to the organization. But in a political setting it is often dysfunctional, and the tools for control, coordination and supervision are inadequate to provide efficiency. His solution is to localize, decentralize, and reduce organizational size so that the limited tools of supervision available in a non-economic setting can be maximized.

Some readers might conclude that this is a sophisticated presentation of Barry Goldwater's *Conscience of a Conservative.* Perhaps it is, but I am satisfied that it is a serious attempt to develop an approach to the study of the administrative process. Unfortunately I think to some extent the author has failed in his mission.

The premise that the politician is moved by self-interest sounds reasonable, but as developed by Tullock, the politician is an overly simplified combination of Machiavelli's Prince and "economic man." As Robert Dahl has stated:

> What one views as his "self" depends on one's identifications, and evidently these vary a good deal. How one perceives the "self" is not wholly instinctive, it seems, but also a matter of social learning. Likewise, what one considers to be in the "interest" of the self is shaped by learning, experience, tradition and culture. Consequently, to attribute an act to self-interest does not explain very much. (*Modern Political Analysis,* p. 66).

An example of the shortcoming of Tullock's use of self-interest is found in his description of peer relationships. He sees the politician playing a zero-sum game in which it is essential for him to upgrade himself and downgrade his peers in the eyes of the superior. Even if this kind of activity is handled so subtly that no one else is aware of what is happening, it fails to account for the great number of situations in which self-interest is enhanced by the improvement of the status of many, if not all, members of the group. Even in the individualistic setting of the university organization (one of the two sources tapped by Tullock for most of his illustrations) the zero-sum game is probably becoming less and less consequential.

Tullock devotes a chapter to a discussion of culture, subculture, and general environment, but only in terms of their influence on strategy and tactics of politicians. There is every reason to believe that these phenomena are themselves among the important determinants of the motivations of politicians and Tullock's failure to deal with them in this context is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the volume.

Another particularly weak point in the work is found in Tullock's discussion of the inadequacy of the control system. He refers to a high frequency of what he calls bureaucratic free enterprise, by which he means that lower units in an organization become essentially autonomous of their superiors and are uncontrolled. What he fails to recognize, perhaps because of the peculiarities of an agency like the State Department from which his illustrations are derived, is the presence for most organizations of an elaborate system of relationships with individuals and groups in the external world including appropriation subcommittee members, professional peers, consumers of the service provided by the agency, etc. Each of these exercises controls and is a source of agency accountability. The irony of this particular failing in Tullock's work is that his analysis from the standpoint of the middle management politician rejects, quite convincingly, the Weberian notion of hierarchy, but his analysis from the standpoint of the top level politician retains the Weberian concept of hierarchy and encourages the blind spot described above.

Despite my disappointment in the work, I believe that Tullock has attempted a groundbreaking effort in an important area of study. His limited acquaintance with the literature of sociology, social psychology, and even political science has handicapped him, but this volume ought to stimulate individuals in all of these disciplines to pursue the study of the politics of administration. —ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN, *University of Michigan.*

Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others. TRANSLATED BY ALLEN GILBERT. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965. 3 vols. Pp. xiii, 1514.)

Students of political theory and other admirers of Machiavelli will welcome this new, three-volume translation of his works. Professor Gilbert has essentially retranslated even those works included in his 1941 collection, and has added a great many others. While not absolutely complete, the new collection is very extensive, ranging beyond Machiavelli's well known political books and his two comedies, to include a wide selection from his poetry, letters and dispatches. Finding that "most translators of *The Prince* and other works make little effort—to my ear—to bring over into their own tongue the qualities of Machiavelli's style," Professor Gilbert strives "to secure Machiavellian emphasis" in English. Each selection is briefly introduced by the translator, and there are illustrations and an index.—HANNA PITKIN, *University of Wisconsin.*

Statistical Concepts: A Basic Program. BY JIMMY R. AMOS, FOSTER LLOYD BROWN, AND OSCAR G. MINK. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965, Pp. 125. $1.75 paper.)

A useful elementary introduction to basic statistical concepts intended for students of the behavioral sciences with little background in statistics.—A. R.

Liberalism vs. Conservatism. Liberty vs. Authority. BY C. WILLIAM HUSHAW. (Dubuque, Ia.: Wm. C. Brown Book Company, 1965. Pp. 113. $1.40 paper.)

Definitions of "liberalism" and "conservatism" as the terms have been used historically and are curently used in American political debate.—A. R.

Data Processing: Applications to Political Research. BY KENNETH JANDA. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. 288. $3.45 paper, $7.50 cloth.)

Another in the Northwestern series of handbooks of research techniques in political behavior, this volume gives an elementary and clear introduction to the use of punchcard equipment for recording and processing data of various types, with some introduction to programming, using political data and illustrations throughout.—A. R.

Interviewing: Its Forms and Functions. BY STEPHEN A. RICHARDSON, BARBARA SNELL DOHRENWEND, AND DAVID KLEIN. (New York: Basic Books, 1965. Pp. 380. $7.50.)

A manual on interviewing techniques.—A. R.

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1. Real Estate Research Corporation, Chicago
2. University of Virginia
3. University of California, Berkeley
6. Florida State University
7. Johns Hopkins University
9. University of Chicago
10. Claremont Graduate School
11. Harvard University
12. Washington State University
13. Oxford University
14. University of Michigan
15. McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario
16. University of Southern California
17. Northern Illinois University
18. State University at Groningen, Holland
19. University of Illinois

20. United States Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California
22. San Diego State College
23. University of California at Los Angeles
24. System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California
28. University of North Carolina
29. Michigan State University
30. Ohio State University
32. West Virginia University
34. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
35. University of Texas
36. University of Kentucky
38. Emory University
39. State University College, Potsdam, New York
40. New York University
41. University of Minnesota
42. State University of New York at Buffalo
43. University of Washington
45. University of Wisconsin
46. University of Lund, Sweden
47. Columbia University
48. Yale University
50. National Institute of Mental Health
51. Brown University
53. University of Notre Dame
54. State University of New York at Stony Brook
55. Washington University
56. Western Michigan University
57. Purdue University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The National Guard in Politics. BY MARTHA DERTHICK. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 202. $4.95.)

The stated purpose of this book is to analyze group power through the examination of a single case. The case concerns the politics of the National Guard expressed by its organized interest representative, the National Guard Association. This organization is characterized by the author as one of the most successful pressure groups in our political system.

What distinguishes this work from that growing body of longitudinal studies of single organized interest groups is its unique concept of group power. According to Professor Derthick, a group's power is the ratio of its achievements to its goals. Goals are claims communicated to government. Achievements are actions taken by government in fulfillment of the claims. To establish that a group has power, however, it is not necessary to link specific governmental actions as responses to group activities. "An achievement is a goal fulfilled whether or not it can be established that the group "caused" the fulfillment by conscious effort beyond mere assertion of the claim." (p. 13)

In this formulation group power is at a maximum when achievements and goals are in "balance." Power increases as achievements increase if goals remain constant or as goals decrease if achievements remain constant. Power decreases as achievements decrease if goals remain constant or as goals increase if achievement remain constant.

To account for variance with this notion of power requires establishing magnitudes for goals and achievements. Professor Derthick proposes that the magnitude of goals is determined by the degree of resistance to them. Resistance to goals is a function of three factors: the number and range of political actors involved in processing claims (*i.e.* the more numerous the actors, the more resistance the group will encounter); the attitudes of the actors *i.e.* the more hostile the actors the more resistance the group will encounter); and the incidence and intensity of competing or supporting claims (*i.e.* the more numerous and intense are competing claims, the greater the resistance the group will encounter). The magnitude of achievements is determined by relating them to the magnitude of the expressed goals. "If all claims made are perfectly fulfilled, then the magnitude of the group's achievements equals that of its goals, and its power is at a maximum. To the extent that claims go unfulfilled, the magnitude of achievements falls short of the magnitude of goals (and power is accordingly less)." (pp. 13-14)

With this perspective on group power three major phases in the political experience of the National Guard are identified: a period of offense and success illustrated by such legislation as the Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916, both highly favorable to the Guard; a period of stability of claim and achievement lasting until 1950; and third, a period of decreasing success and increasing defense necessitated by such actions as the recent proposal by the Secretary of Defense to merge the Guard with the Army Reserves. While the conceptual statement deemphasizes the importance of group resources and strategies, the highly readable account of the National Guard's politics since 1879 places about the same emphasis on organization, leadership skill, and socio-economic bases as other case studies of interest groups. For the National

Guard, the author concludes, "In retrospect, the impression generally is one of power—of goals fulfilled; but for this fulfillment, the Guard owes as much to fortuitous circumstance as it can claim credit for on account of its own political activity." (p. 164)

This summary interpretation is representative of the limitations of the concept of group power as a system of general explanation. Power as conceived in this study is not necessarily related to group activity at all. As noted, the only link provided between the group and public policy is an "assertion" of a claim which is "communicated" to government. The terms "assertion" and "communicate" are not clarified further. All that is necessary is for the group to be satisfied with a governmental action which, as in the case of the National Guard, may well be the result of "fortuitous circumstance." This condition of group satisfaction is called achievement and achievement is equated with power. Few suggestions are offered to render the extraordinarily complex processes subsumed under the deceptively simple notion of group satisfaction amenable to empirical inquiry.

The problem of assessing magnitudes also is intriguing. Goal magnitude is held to be wholly a function of external resistance. Most other interest group theories make magnitude at least partially dependent upon the intensity with which a goal is supported by the group making the claim. But if goal magnitude can be thought entirely a function of external resistance, it might be as plausible to focus on the groups which cluster around an issue as to focus in detail on the activities of the single claimant group. A more precise statement of goal magnitude, crucial here to the determination of the power of the National Guard, would seem to require a closer analysis of the activities of such groups as the Department of the Army, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Resistance to goals might also be the function both of the kind of issue involved as well as the political setting in which the conflict takes place. Theodore Lowi suggests some very useful analytical categories in his important review article "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," in *World Politics* XVI (July, 1964) pp. 677-715.

Understanding of political life will be advanced mainly through careful empirical inquiry generated by precisely stated theory. *The National Guard in Politics* does provide a theoretical emphasis distinct from other single longitudinal studies. But unfortunately, it is not entirely satisfying as a formal guide to inquiry and the organization of information.—CHARLES R. GREEN, *Macalester College.*

Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area. BY WILLIAM C. HAVARD AND FLOYD L. CORTY. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 181. $5.00.)

Interest in methods of adapting local governmental arrangements to changing urban needs increases each time a proposed solution is adopted in a specific area. The recent consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, makes a study of the earlier (1949) consolidation of City of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish especially timely.

The book examines the results of the Baton Rouge consolidation in the light of more than a decade of experience in its operation. It is an "evaluation of the way in which the consolidated government has worked in practice . . by means of a survey of the organization of the city-parish government and of the administrative programs of the most important consolidated departments in the city-parish government," including a comparison of costs of the new plan of government with the costs of the old separate city and parish governments. The authors focused their inquiry on the effects of consolidation on the rural sector of the parish.

The political fragmentation in the East Baton Rouge Parish before 1949 was typical of the situation in many other metropolitan areas characterized by rapid industrialization and population growth—a parish government, the City of Baton Rouge, several small incorporated places, and a variety of special districts. The parish government in itself was diffused among a number of semiautonomous boards, commissions, and offices. The solution originally proposed was a consolidation of the city and parish governments. Pressures were sufficient to turn the original plan into a partial functional consolidation rather than a complete unification. Separate councils were continued for the urban and rural areas but with overlapping memberships and a single elected "mayor-president." The need for compromise necessitated the continuation of the parish constitutional officers.

In spite of the limitations imposed by the modifications designed to make the plan acceptable, substantial functional consolidation was achieved in planning and in the development of public works. The department of public works became an excellent example of "compound-functional consolidation" with administrative consolidation of supervision, purchasing personnel, central garage, and major works planning, but with a clear separation between urban and rural areas in budgeting.

If any lessons are to be learned from this account, one is that consolidation does not assure lower costs of government. Even when adjustments were made for changing dollar values, expenditures per capita were greater after consolidation than they were before. In a sense, it was through increased spending that the greatest benefits of the new plan were demonstrated to the inhabitants of the rural parts of the parish. The physical changes brought about by unified planning and construction of road, drainage, and sewer systems prepared the rural area for the increasing urbanization it was constantly undergoing and at the same time produced a favorable public reaction.

The authors believe that the most valuable object lesson in the Baton Rouge experiment is found in "its demonstration of the limits on what is possible in local government change." Herein lies the reason for the success of the plan—the willingness of its originators to make the kind of concessions to the interests concerned necessary to win their support. This pragmatism also may be an important element in what the authors find to be the system's "capacity for self-correction of weaknesses and possible adaptability to further consolidation."

The book has its rough spots. Typographical errors add to the difficulties inherent in comparing the text with the Tables in the Appendix.

A fitting sequel to this publication would be a study of the political factors involved in the adoption of the new government and a survey of the attitudes of both urban and rural residents toward the system in effect today.—Alice L. Ebel, *Illinois State University*.

The Negro and the First Amendment. By Harry Kalven, Jr. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 190. $4.75.)

One of the less happy incidences of the behavioral revolution in the study of public law has been a tendency on the part of the "rebels" to ignore legal doctrines in their analyses. This tendency undoubtedly represents an over-compensation for those years in which doctrinal analysis was the dominant staple of public law scholarship. But whatever its derivation, it is a tendency which should be modified. For studying the behavior of judges without the doctrinal outputs is as incomplete as studying doctrines as abstractions.

It is the virtue of this skillfully written book that it tries, however marginally, to focus on one of the many questions arising out of the relationship of doctrinal development to social forces impinging upon the judiciary. Professor Kalven takes as his main theme the impact of the civil rights movement on the First Amendment, with specific emphasis on the development of a "theory" of the free speech portion of that Amendment. His analysis also sheds considerable light on the other side of the same coin—namely on the responses of the Supreme Court justices to a major social movement. The analysis does not succumb to the establishment of an easily dichotomized relationship between judge and litigant. It does not suggest that the only relevant variables are the judges' attitudes toward the claims of such groups as the NAACP. Rather it assumes that the judges' responses to the cases involved are complex crystallizations of their attitudes toward many things, including the need for satisfactory doctrinal development, and a commonly shared sympathy towards the goals of the NAACP.

Professor Kalven uses three sets of cases to support his analysis. Each set focuses on a particular doctrine which has been invoked before the Supreme Court to protect the NAACP from different forms of harassment by state governments and their instrumentalities—the most frequent forms being public exposure of NAACP activities and membership lists and state encouragement of private discrimination in public accommodations.

The first of these doctrines, that of group libel and seditious libel, is of major importance to any theory of the First Amendment, but of minor importance to the civil rights movement, since, as Professor Kalven reluctantly concludes, the NAACP has shown no inclination to depend on this approach. The second doctrine involves the right of association, and poses for the Court some major problems of bothersome precedents. In order to extricate the NAACP from a variety of predicaments, the Court must establish a principle which would support the right of a state to regulate certain types of organizational activity, but would prohibit it from obtaining the membership lists of the NAACP; and to meet another challenge it must re-examine the states' traditional prerogative of regulating litigation under the common law rules of barratry, champerty, and maintenance.

The third set of cases is perhaps the most fascinating, for it deals with the Court's handling of convictions of sit-in demonstrators. Here the Justices were faced with two competing strategies—lawyers for the demonstrators and the Solicitor General were urging upon the Court a broadened view of the state action principle while lawyers for the southern states and communities were urging it to hold that state trespass laws could be used to enforce private discriminatory actions. It is fairly clear that it was the Court's purpose to protect the demonstrators as much as possible without endangering useful doctrines still needed for nonracial purposes, and it is a tribute to the Court's ingenuity that it was able to accomplish its goal.

Professor Kalven has whetted the reader's appetite with his descriptions of the impact of the civil rights movement on some aspects of the First Amendment. But he has also left considerable room for further scholarship. Some of the major variables have been identified, but others have not been explored. And the author's theme, while highly plausible, is the product of insight rather than strict empirical analysis. The former is useful; but the latter is also called for.

A final word should be added on what is perhaps the least satisfactory element of this book—the author's use of the term *theory*. The notion that it is necessary to formulate a *theory* of the First Amendment has become prevalent in law review circles, and Professor Kalven seeks to build upon it. But it is not clear from this book how the term *theory* is being used. It is certainly not being used in its empirical sense to describe and predict the relationship between two or more variables. And I doubt if it is being used here in the simpler sense of describing the meaning of the First Amendment as expounded by the Supreme Court. If it has any meaning for this study, it is a completely normative concept—*i.e.* a theory of the First Amendment being one's organized thoughts about what it ought to mean. But this is unsatisfactory, either for purposes of this study or for general use in modern scholarship, and is in need of further clarification.—Joel B. Grossman, *University of Wisconsin.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. By William E. Leuchtenburg. (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1963. Pp. xvii, 393. $6.00 cloth, $2.45 paper.)

Having been delayed in doing this review for nearly two years, I can console myself (and even more importantly, the editor) with the thought that I am in a position to write what is *indeed* a review, not simply a quick first impression. For I read this work in manuscript; I read it when it first appeared; I've been through it with care twice since; and I've dipped into it repeatedly.

As one who has spent so much time with this book, I can report that my first impressions were correct. Leuchtenburg has written a richly detailed, carefully balanced, and thoroughly reliable survey of the New Deal era. This is unquestionably the standard one-volume treatment of the period for this generation, far surpassing its only serious rivals, Basil Rauch, *The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938* (1944) and James M. Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (1956). Fortunately it has been, from its moment of publication, available in paperback, thanks to the happy policy of its publishers. It has been my pleasure, as a teacher of graduate students in recent American history, to see this book attract and hold an audience dissatisfied with the superficial glibnesses of Richard Hofstadter's interpretations of the New Deal in his *The American Political Tradition* (1948), and *The Age of Reform* (1955), and vaguely unhappy with Burns' treatment.

I cannot judge whether political scientists will find Leuchtenburg's book as satifying as political historians have judged it to be. Certainly those who still believe with Professor Burns that Roosevelt missed a great opportunity to reorganize American political parties along liberal-conservative lines will find little comfort in Leuchtenburg's book. Here the New Deal is seen as something essentially new, in spite of the Progressive-World War I era origins of many of its elements, and emphasis is given to how Roosevelt was able to change the essential nature of American politics by his reform of the Democratic Party. Leuchtenburg looks at his subject with sympathy and with concern, yet he never sees it through rose-colored glasses. He has many funny and telling anecdotes to relate—some of them never before in print—yet he never seems to be striving for mere literary effect. He is generous to other scholars. Thus he pays tribute to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s analysis of F.D.R.'s "administrative talent" in *The Coming of the New Deal* (1959); and he says that Carl N. Degler in *Out of Our Past* (1959) "has written the best analysis of the permanent significance of the New Deal." But he is also skeptical when he cannot find evidence to support a thesis, such as Rauch's contention that F.D.R. deliberately turned away from domestic reform in order to win the support of restive Southern Democrats for his foreign policy. On this Leuchtenburg says simply: "Little evidence has been cited for this view. The New Deal seems to have sputtered out for quite other reasons."

Leuchtenburg has based his work upon widely scattered archives, in addition to the enormous body of published materials on the New Deal. This is not merely a synthesis of what others have written about the New Deal, although that is certainly one of its most obvious characteristics. It is essentially a work of original scholarship, written with restraint and judgment. It is one of the best volumes in the somewhat uneven "New American Nation" series edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris. Like other works in the series, it has a full bibliography and it has footnotes where footnotes should be, at the bottom of the pages. No matter what a person's interest in the New Deal and F.D.R. may be, he can benefit from a reading of this book. As for political scientists, even those of the most advanced behaviorist persuasion could profit from a study of Leuchtenburg's book, for he shows how fine "traditional" political history can be when it is done by a man who combines a first-rate intellect with imagination, energy and a personal knowledge of practical politics.—ROBERT E. BURKE, *The University of Washington.*

The Higher Civil Service: An Evaluation of Federal Personnel Practices. BY DAVID T. STANLEY. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1964. Pp. 145. $3.50.)

Perhaps it is a mark of growing political maturity that we have become concerned about the quality of our higher civil service. Stanley's work is a useful addition to empirical studies of this problem. He centers on the background, performance, and morale of some 16,000 officials in grades 15-18 whose decisions touch so many aspects of American life. Generalizations are based on a sample of 559, two-thirds in headquarters jobs, the others in the field. Twenty-seven per cent are in the Defense Department; 34 in other Cabinet departments; and 38 in various other agencies. Almost 200 men are former employees, whose views, as might be expected, are less positive. Interviews, questionnaires, secondary analysis, and reviews of earlier studies provide the means of analysis. Valuable comparisons are made with earlier studies such as those by Warner and Kilpatrick. The material is nicely organized and the data clearly presented.

Regarding typical career lines, the theme is one of slow, steady advance at the rate of one grade every three years. No meteoric rises occur, and the initial rate gradually slows to one grade for every five years. Regarding occupational role, the largest proportion are in engineering, general administration, science-math-statistics, and law respectively. Continuous and focused federal service is the rule. Over eighty per cent had served in only two departments and in only two major occupational fields during their entire career, again indicating that rotation is fairly uncommon in the federal service. Five out of six had college degrees and one out of three had advanced degrees. Average age of the group was almost 50, most of whom plan to retire within the next 5-10 years, making the problem of replacing them compelling.

Data on the views of top management people are presented, based on interviews with 67 men. Following the caveat that responses of the group are likely to be biased in favor of a system which brought them to the top, Stanley concluded that about half of them feel generally positive about the higher civil service. One of their major criticisms (40 per cent) is the lack of any system for forecasting future personnel needs and meeting them. Here, apparently, is one area where some improvement can be made. Contrary to current reports from Washington about the difficulty of finding competent high-level administrators, almost half the officials said they had no trouble filling responsible positions. Those who did attributed it mainly to salary limitations, quotas on the super-grade jobs, and occasional rigidities in classification. Almost two-thirds of such jobs were filled from within the agency or department.

This happy picture is clouded, however, when we learn that getting rid of incompetents is an unsolved problem, even at the GS 15-and-over levels. More than half of the respondents feel that reassigning such men is the proper course, while the next most favored technique is to force them out. One-quarter concluded that nothing could be done.

When asked what changes they would like to see at their own level, most of the officials said they were satisfied with things as they are. Those who wanted change stressed higher salaries and more felicitous classification practices, including a "rank-in-man" system. They also wanted agencies to be able to make their own supergrade assignments. Greater mobility between agencies and departments was recommended.

Regarding general attitudes about the higher federal service, once again most officials are generally satisfied. The challenge and variety of work is the most common source of satisfaction, with "public service" third. Here, an interesting difference between scientific-technical men and generalists appears: public service is a poor third in the eyes of the former, yet ranks first among the administrative group. Regarding dissatisfactions, there is greater unanimity and indeed almost half of the entire sample cites "government complexity" as the major source of disenchantment. Second, again by a fairly wide margin, is timid or otherwise inadequate supervision. Here we find a nice similarity with Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings' broader survey which also stressed poor supervision and delays and complexity in the federal bureaucracy. Comparing their jobs with those in business, present federal officials believe the only advantage would be better pay. Those who had left the government, however, regarded their jobs in the private milieu as better on all counts.

Responses regarding the "advisability of a young person following a career leading to a position such as your own" are somewhat dampening insofar as satisfaction and the vital problem of recruitment is concerned. Combining former and present employees, less than half of this highly successful group give an unqualified "Yes." Scientists and engineers are the least positive, which is consistent with their tendency to regard "public service" as a less compelling work incentive and their significantly greater belief that "red tape" is a major frustration.

Stanley turns finally to a general analysis of his findings to determine what can be done to improve the higher civil service. Here again, as he notes, the usual recommendations appear: better forecasting of personnel needs; more imaginative and vigorous recruitment; better evaluation, with less dependence on subjective judgments; selective increase in training and development, particularly in long-term assignments; better selection with more recruitment from outside the service. One must wonder about the competitiveness of appointments when, as the survey data show, most of the officials received their present positions through personal associations and 71 per cent of them believed their own replacement would come from within their own agency.

In reading once again these various prescriptions, one must ask whether they really touch the heart of the matter. Perhaps the continued emphasis upon better recruitment, encouraging bright young people to enter the service, the advantages of rotation and training, etc., is really beside the point. Is not the essential problem the system itself? As Weber noted, only inspired charismatic leadership can overcome the castration of bureaucracy. As the careful study by Kilpatrick shows, among the more successful and brighter members of the general employed public and among students, federal employment is seen as personally restrictive and frustrating: "over and over again, variations on this theme were repeated: the government is a vast organizational machine in which the individual is in danger of losing his identity and autonomy." (p. 122) "The special stress on lack of self-determination and too much bureaucracy . . . is another way of saying there would be too many restrictions on the individual's autonomy in the work situation." (p. 123) The desire for autonomy, moreover, is highly associated with personal competence and initiative: "The evidence is strong that the occupational satisfaction offered by the federal service is *relatively* lower for the high-level federal employee than for his colleague of lower rank." (p. 118) And most sadly, "the appeal of federal employment is lowest among those kinds of employed adults for whom the government's qualitative needs are the greatest and for whom the competition will be keenest in the future." (p. 117) Such evidence suggests that more effort should be devoted to modifying the *system* to provide a milieu in which senior officials have more opportunity to use their skill and initiative and to which young people can come with better assurance that their talent will find an outlet.—Robert Presthus, *Cornell University.*

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Public Liberties in the New States. By David H. Bayley. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Pp. 152.)

India and Ghana both make use of preventive detention acts. How do these laws compare in their terms, in the use that is made of them, and in the validity of the arguments advanced in their justification? This book provides us with a welcome basis for answering such questions; or at least it gives us a start in that direction. It is not a systematic survey of public liberties in each of the new states; that would be a mammoth undertaking. But under the headings of "Personal Liberty," "Freedom of the Press," "Freedom of Association," "Freedom from Discrimination," "Economic Welfare and Human Rights," and "Agencies of Freedom," it does provide a large amount of descriptive material from many of the new states. Even more importantly, it discusses justifications, providing a considerable basis for evaluating, in the light of more evidence than can be encompassed within this slender volume, the state of public liberties in any given new nation and for reaching an intelligent conclusion as to whether the restrictions that are in effect can be justified. The author's own use of evaluative tools within the limits of the information available to him seems eminently reasonable.

Bayley is well aware of the difficulties; he sees no easy answers; yet he is not a defeatist. A few sentences will help to convey the flavor of his approach. "Since the dedication of the modernizing elite in the developing nations is often in question, democratic theory would lead one to the conclusion that democracy's homeostatic mechanisms are even more essential in the developing than in stable democratic situations. However, for the very reason that these mechanisms are needed, they are likely not to work. Indeed, precisely in order to create the requisites of democratic privileges widely enjoyed, the power of the court system and the effect of free elections may be curtailed." (p. 137) And again: "Those who sincerely try to utilize a measure of autocracy to tutor in freedom must realize that they must continually sow the seeds of their own demise. They are the new colonialists, and the measure of their achievement will be a second revolution of independence in the new states—the independence of the individual within a scheme of human rights." (p. 144) —J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*.

Sequel To Colonialism: The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia. BY WILLARD A. HANNA. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc. 1965. Pp. 288. $7.50.)

Mohammed Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism. BY JEANNE S. MINTZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1965. Pp. viii, 246. $6.00.)

These two books are quite different in scope and style, but both add, in their own way, to the gathering collection of material on two Southeast Asian protagonists, Malaysia and Indonesia. Willard Hanna's contribution is primarily a collection of his reports for the American Universities Field Staff on what was then Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. Written between 1957 and 1960, these on-the-spot reports present a panorama of events and places including party politics in Malaya and Singapore, rubber and tin development, early Indonesian-Malayan relations and a series of short descriptions of various places and problems in what became Malaysia. These include studies of Malacca, Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Kedah, Perlis and the Pangkor racial troubles of 1959.

Hanna's very style is personal, often journalistic and full of editorial asides. There is little trouble in ascertaining his biases, although from the observation point of this reviewer's own prejudices his position is usually correct. Each report is dated and there is a feeling of immediacy about them which adds to the pleasure of reading the book. However, this system also leads to a certain redundancy as different reports re-explain various events. A more serious problem in the compilation of AUFS reports is that events have outdistanced or explained actions or personalities described as of 1957-1960. The use of footnotes or postscripts to explain these changes and clarifications would be of immense use.

One must forgive these minor faults, however, as the author has presented a good deal of valuable material, available previously only to AUFS subscribers. The early chapters display interesting insights into the complicated politics of the area while the last chapters do that as well as providing local portraits comparable to those found in the better travel magazines. Of particular interest are the biographies of Malaysian leaders. Perhaps this book is not always for the scholar, but it is a pleasure to read.

The book of Jeanne Mintz is described as a study of the roots of Indonesian socialism. It is something more than that, including as well a general description of Indonesian history and the political process. The first chapters present a survey of the rise of socialist power and particularly the Communist Party (PKI). This section tends to go over material that has been covered by others such as Brackman and Hindley. There are a number of new insights and the author disagrees with some of the interpretations of others such as George Kahin. A second section deals with the post-independence political parties and the author argues that "neither the doctrine nor the programs of Indonesia's socialist parties are concerned more than peripherally with economic policies." (p. 125). The final section, a study of the growth and pattern of Guided Democracy is one real contribution to our understanding of contemporary Indonesia. This is the first extended description of the operation of Sukarno's scheme and it clarifies a number of points covered only tangentially by other writers.

The book presents a scholarly survey of several vital points of Indonesian politics. A number of the author's interpretations are open to debate, but she usually backs her position with a strong case. Fast-moving events in that country have made some of her points out-of-date while others, such as her remarks on Partai Murba, have been borne out by those events. In the latter case Miss Mintz argued that the strength of Murba was in its relationship to Sukarno. This was later evidenced by the continuation in power of Murba men after the party was suspended. One statement in the conclusion is not supported by the evidence presented in the book when the author states, "Put bluntly [guided democracy] is a cloak for a power struggle, a façade built out of myths and slogans to shield a system of autocratic personalized rule." (p. 225) This may be true but it needs more proof.

Both of these books deserve consideration by the serious student of Southeast Asia.—FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN, *University of Wisconsin.*

Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology. EDITED BY ERIK ALLARDT AND YRJÖ LITTUNEN. (Helsinki: *Transactions of the Westermarck Society,* Volume X. Pp. 463. 14.20 Finnmarks.)

After an introductory description of international cooperation in political sociology, by Stein Rokkan, this important mixed bag falls into two major parts—dealing with consensus and cleavage and with party systems and party organization—further divided into approximate halves. Under the first major heading, five authors deal with changing conditions of ideology and partisanship: S. M. Lipset on political cleavages in developed and emerging polities, Mark Abrams on British party politics after the end of ideology, Radomir Lukić on political ideology and social development, Yrjö Littunen on social restraints and ideological pluralism, and Erik Allardt's theory of solidarity and legitimacy conflicts. Still under the first heading, three additional papers deal with dimensions of political alignment: Erik Allardt on patterns of class conflict and working class consciousness in Finnish politics, Roger Girod on the geography of the Swiss party system, and Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen on regional contrasts in Norwegian politics. In the second major part of the volume, four authors discuss party systems and the division of political power: S. N. Eisenstadt on bureaucratization, markets, and power structure, Szymon Chodak on societal functions of party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, Jerzy Wiatr's analysis of one-party systems, and Juan Linz' account of the Spanish political system. The final section includes five papers on party organization and patterns of political recruitment: Warren Miller on majority rule and representative government in the United States, Ulf Torgersen on the structure of urban parties in Norway during the late nineteenth century, James Cornford on the adoption of mass organization by the British Conservative Party, Junnosuke Masumi's profile of the Japanese Conservative Party, and Martti Noponen and Pertti Pesonen on legislative careers in Finland.—MARVIN RINTALA, *Boston College.*

Russia after Khrushchev. BY ROBERT CONQUEST. (New York: Praeger, 1965. Pp. viii, 267. $5.00.)

The record indicates that all commentators on Soviet affairs were caught unaware by the sudden downfall of Chairman Khrushchev in October 1964. But some must have been more surprised than others. For since the removal of Khrushchev's major rivals from the ruling group in 1957, a lively dialogue over the nature of his power had occurred in various quarters. Some analysts deductively or intuitively contended that by 1958, Khrushchev had finally emerged as the absolute dictator of Kremlin policy, subject only to such restraints as he might care to impose upon himself. Others rejected this theory of the self-restrained dictator after they had inductively reasoned from contradictions in official conduct that certain associates of Khrushchev were disputing his viewpoint on important questions of policy and personnel, and occasionally thwarting his ambitions. The events surrounding Khrushchev's demise would appear to be more plausible in terms of an ongoing conflict situation like the one hypothesized by representatives of the latter-mentioned school of thought.

One such representative is Robert Conquest, whose *Power and Policy in the USSR* can profitably serve as a basic text for university courses on the subject. Several of the probabilities about past maneuvers in the Soviet system of closed politics which were stated in that work have, incidentally, been confirmed since its publication in 1961. The aim of Conquest's present book, completed in January 1965, is to offer a detailed appreciation of current-day Soviet realities and set forth the potentialities of national development. The most valuable chapter for purposes of instruction is the concise "Logic of Faction." Here the general laws of Soviet politics are clearly presented with well-deserved emphasis on the top bosses' utter ruthlessness, urge to supreme power, opportunities for negotiation of internal differences, and "general polarization on many essentials between a 'forward' and a 'conservative' attitude." This chapter should indeed be reflected upon by some post graduates in the field of Soviet politics.

The most controversial parts of this engrossing volume relate to political stability and prospects. While outlining numerous perspectives of the future, Conquest yet seems to believe that there are formidable limits to the adaptiveness of any Communist leadership in the USSR and its capacity to control the growing popular impulses toward democratic freedoms. He also has doubts about the leaders' ability permanently to calm their factional tempers. In conclusion, therefore, he does not exclude from the range of possibilities such notions as a breakdown of regime authority, the eruption of autonomous states from the Baltic to Kazakhstan, and a civil war featuring the spectacle of "a group of Central Committee members, like the minority of cardinals during the Great Schism, decamping to Leningrad or Kiev and electing an anti-Presidium!" This type of speculation at least has the merit of prompting discussion about the assumptions of less imaginative forecasters.

My biggest complaint about his writings is that by and large they always tend to minimize the importance of specific quarrels over policy matters in the Soviet hierarchy. Of course, "in general, power takes precedence over policy." But is not power sometimes jeopardized for the sake of imposing one or another policy conception? Concretely, I think misleading the assertion that the proposal of Professor Liberman on the use of a profit index for gauging the efficiency of industrial enterprises was opposed in 1962-63 merely because of "petty quasi-doctrinal habits at a rather superficial level." As spokesmen of the reformist wing of the CPSU argued at the time, Stalin, idol of the inner-party "conservatives," justified the practice of preferential development of heavy industry by making an ideological virtue of the chronic unprofitability of entire branches of that sector of the economy. We may hence infer that the implications of Liberman's profit scheme were disturbing to heavy engineering partisans at the highest level of the dictatorship.

Nonetheless, I respect Conquest's very serious approach to a difficult subject and recommend his latest work to both general readers and area specialists.—Sidney I. Ploss, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Republic in Suspense: Politics, Parties, and Personalities in Postwar Germany. By Klaus Boelling. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1964. Pp. 276. $6.50.)

The author, a well known former editor of the Berlin daily *Der Tagesspiegel,* has been the political commentator of the North German Radio Network for a number of years. In this book he presents his readers with a critical-analytical history of the Federal Republic. His commentary accompanies the state in the heart of Europe (*Herzland Europas*) from the year, nay, from the moment Zero—Surrender 1945—to the accession of the chancellor and architect of the *Wirtschaftswunder,* Ludwig Erhard.

Perhaps the first and principal fact in German attitude toward the new and certainly rather small state to which the author can point is the affirmative and positive basic element: quite contrary to the average German's position when discussing the much bigger and much less damaged Republic of Weimar of some four decades ago. The Germans of the *9th of November (1918)* had been able to pull their country away from the conquerors' grip, after the loss of her overseas possessions—which, by the way, the then victorious nations had since lost by granting independence, and of a few regions in Europe. It must be said, too, that eventually, in the Twenties and beginning Thirties, just before Hitler's coming to power, the Weimar Republic had reached an influence in the field of national and international *Kultur* Germany never had enjoyed since the days of the Weimar Olympians, Goethe and Schiller, whose great names were to protect the constitutional assembly of 1919—just as Beethoven and Bonn were to arouse kindly thoughts within and without Western Germany for the Federal Republic.

Of course, the defeat of 1945 was so absolutely complete, the country to such a degree *tohu wa bohu* (without form, and void) that any creative personality would have found a certain measure of adulation and admiration just because of that creative power.

Naturally, it would be an exaggeration to call the occupational authorities of the "allies" creative in—let us say—Nietzsche's sense who equated creativeness with, and even placed it above, moral righteousness. However, no lesser man than the great historian Meinecke applauded the allied endeavors and admonished his fellow Germans to assist the foreign occupiers in their attempt to root out the vestiges of nazism and to reestablish, as it were, to *recreate* Christian-Occidental morality within the boundaries of the Fatherland.

In the author's presentation, no doubt well justified by the events as they have evolved since, the second phase of German post-war history started with the famous speech that Secretary of State, James Burnes delivered at Stuttgart in September 1946. Boelling is of the opinion that by this speech the United States, with the western allies following, accepted Germany back into the community of the civilized Occident. Already future conflicts with the Soviet Union could be foreseen. Quite naturally, too, the doctrine of the general guilt of all the Germans had shown its weaknesses since the occupiers themselves found many thousands of the guilty nation in jails and concentration camps, although suddenly almost every German proclaimed his hatred for Hitler which he had to hide during the latter's evil reign.

There are arguments possible as to when the third phase of the Federal Republic started—a phase of recovery and prosperity which still is going on. The appointment of Adenauer, the creation of the new currency, the D-Mark, and Erhard's initiation of the *Wirtschaftswunder,* the joining of the NATO or the EEC:—each of those events enumerated and many others could be used as a starting mark. Yet, there can be no doubt that somehow Adenauer is to be regarded as the *Bundesgründer* just as Bismarck was to be regarded as the *Reichsgründer. Der Alte* had the almost charismatic quality of dwarfing all the other political personalities, including his successor. The early death of Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the socialist party, robbed that party and Germany of the only personality to rival *Der Alte*.

Boelling furnishes an excellent picture of conditions, parties and problems. The chief problem remains reunification which, of course, would close the third phase of the Federal Republic and that Republic itself insofar as it stands just for Western Germany. Reunification remains the loftiest aim of the Federal Republic: it is the latter's *raison d'être* and because of it Western Germany actually tries to be as democratic and as "western" as possible. It is the status of suspense which—a fascinating contradiction—many friends of Germany, and many good Germans, would like to see lasting as long as possible, practically for many generations to come. Suspense in permanence: it promises a Germany, firmly tied to the west and to western ideals and a peaceful coexistence in Central Europe.

A change in this status of suspense would assure dangerous uncertainty.

Boelling himself advocates a more perfect democratisation of the Federal Republic, a true and faithful adherence of its citizens to the western ideals so that one day both Germanies could be united in peace and liberty with the consent of all nations interested—even of the Soviets.

Here Boelling is carried away by his honorable patriotic feelings. The doctrine of the One Germany (Hallstein) is not backed up by the facts, and there is no doubt that the two Germanies have begun to live separately and go in different directions. The partition of the country is one of the prices the Germans have to pay for tolerating Hitler, adjusting to his reign if not actually backing him up, and enjoying the bygone super-greatness of Greater Germany. No peace treaty with either Germany has been signed yet. However, your reviewer thinks that its stipulations are already carried out somewhat like an effect before its cause.—ROBERT RIE, *State University College, Fredonia, N.Y.*

Ulbricht: A Political Biography. BY CAROLA STERN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965. Pp. xi, 231. $5.95.)

Among the men who control the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe Walter Ulbricht is unique in having held the top position in the DDR from the inception of the Communist regime in East Germany to this day. More than this: in the internecine warfare for position and leadership which went on in the German Communist party in the more than twenty years preceding his rise to power, Ulbricht likewise managed to be always in positions of influence, if not control. What manner of man is he? Is he a political genius, a born leader of men, or an opportunist who knows how to side with the mighty and profit from this?

The book under review, the first biography of Ulbricht in English, and the first political biography—as distinguished from East German panegyrics—in any language, answers this question with great clarity. What Hannah Arendt has called the "banality of evil" has found in Ulbricht its almost perfect Communist realization. Ulbricht is the apparatchik *par excellence*. He is not that opportunist who seeks power for power's sake; rather he goes for the jugular as "true believer" whose *Weltanschuung*—"narrow gauge Marxism," as the author calls it—was formed in the pre-World War I socialist educational environment of his youth. To this he has clung ever since. No doubt ever tempted him, and no supervening event, be it Nazism or Stalinism, the partition of Germany or the rise of nuclear powers, could affect his creed. By 1918/19, when the KPD established itself, he was the ready-made revolutionary bureaucrat. As East German boss he still believes that he puts unadulterated Marxism into practice. Whoever criticizes or opposes him is out of step and has to be destroyed. And if, as in 1953, the masses themselves rise against him, the masses must have been misled by "fascist agitators." As Bert Brecht put it at that time: "The people have lost the confidence of the government; therefore, the government dissolves the people."

It had always been like this. In the pre-Hitler period he rose to the top in the fashion customary with Communist parties: through the "apparatus" of the party bureaucracy. He went down to defeat with a party that consistently had taken "the fourth month of revolutionary pregnancy for the ninth," only to reappear, twelve years later, in the rear-guard of the victorious Soviet armies. In the meantime he again had chosen the right way to subsequent success, namely, exile in Moscow rather than in the West. More surprising than his eventual arrival at the top of the DDR leadership in the postwar period was his political survival of de-Stalinization, since he had been the most loyal of all the dictator's henchmen. But he apparently convinced post-Stalin leadership that they could rely on him, and, probably, that there was nobody to replace him. Surely the Moscow leaders are aware of the liabilities which his ruthless, oppressive, unimaginative, and often inept rule constitutes. They seem to be afraid that by sacrificing him they would risk their own control of East Germany. Thus, as the author points out, Ulbricht has always been the perfect "deputy", faithfully serving the precepts and policies of someone higher up, whether Marx and Lenin in the doctrinal sphere or Stalin, Khrushchev *et al.* in that of power. Only once did he kick, namely, when early post-Stalin leadership seemed to toy with the idea of "liberalizing" East-German rule in preparation for reunification; this is understandable since it would have involved Ulbricht's demise. But again he had placed his bets wisely, since Beria disappeared from the scene shortly thereafter.

Carola Stern's book is the model of a "political biography." It traces Ulbricht's political fate, and therewith that of German Communism, through all the often incredible shifts and tergiversations of the "line." That there are hardly any intimate, more personal data testifies to the drab, colorless character of a perfect bureaucrat, a "spiritually warped German petty-bourgeois who has been helped to undeserved power by the upheavals of this century." No outstanding—or even mildly original—statement of his remains, but perhaps his memory will survive due to a feature of his outward appearance, his goatee, which gave rise to the immortal ditty:

Ziegenbart und Brille
Sind nicht des Volkes Wille.

History sometimes goes in for bad jokes. A Walter Ulbricht the first to put in practice in Germany what the great German socialist dreamed of and hoped for? The incongruity must be clear even to most of those who sympathize with the DDR, and in this there may be some hope for a change.—JOHN H. HERZ, *City College of the City University of New York.*

Social Science Research on Latin America. Edited with a Preface and Introduction by CHARLES WAGLEY. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 338. $4.00.)

There must be some kind of law to the effect that the amount of academic concern which is devoted to a given subject varies in direct proportion to the inches of newspaper space directed thereto, and is in no way dependent upon or correlative with the scholarly insights which may be derived from its pursuit. In the case of Latin America, a few hardy specialists spent years trying to persuade a deaf academic world that their region of interest was rich in comparative data which might lead to the uncovering of important understandings about social phenomena. But it was not because of their cries that the community of scholars awoke to the existence of Latin America. It was because, in the spring of 1958, a vice president of the United States was assaulted by a mob; because, on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro's revolution overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista and began a headlong dash into the arms of the U.S.S.R.; and finally, because many Latin Americans seem quite determined that the rest of the Hemisphere should also join the Cuban descent into the Soviet sphere.

In the present book, editor Charles Wagley, anthropologist and Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia University, makes frequent allusion to the impact of political events on the development of scholarly interest about Latin America. Latin Americanists should be pleased that the foreign affairs of the United States have had this effect. One cannot but speculate, that so much was missed for so long. Must our academic interest always await the arrival of the morning paper? Is it not possible that valuable hypothesization and even theory may be derived from the comparative study of the political process of State Y, even *before* they spit on our vice president or threaten to join our opponents?

This volume provides a genuinely useful contribution to the rapidly expanding scholarly work on Latin America. There is an introduction by the editor, along with articles on scholarly literature about Latin American geography (James J. Parsons), historiography (Stanley J. Stein), anthropology (Arnold Strickcon), political science (Merle Kling), economics (Carlos Massad), sociology (Rex Hopper), and law (Kenneth L. Karst).

Wagley's publication statistics reveal that the strongest offerings on Latin America are made by history, anthropology, political science, and geography, in that order, with economics and sociology falling far behind. However, he persists in the belief, quite justified a few years ago, that the Latin-American interest of political scientists still falls behind that of geography. What was a fact now becomes a legend, and the legends die hard.

For the researcher who is concerned with new questions for examination, the book is full of valuable proposals. Almost every chapter contains a long list of rich suggestions for the development of significant research. There are certain topics that recur in each one, though with varying stress: (1) the impact of contemporary concern with methodology on Latin American studies, (2) the principal trends in writing on Latin America, and their proponents, (3) the work of Latin Americans themselves in the field, and (4) possible guidelines for the development of more meaningful research.

With exception of a few passages that are inevitable in a day when widespread misunderstanding of profound methodological proposals has led to the substitution of incomprehensible jargon for significant implementation of the proposals themselves, it is refreshing that this important bibliographical work is generally presented in a lucid style that demonstrates a balanced understanding of the need for scientific caution and care in the use of research tools, but still respects the contributions of older scholars. Most of the writers seem to appreciate that the older approaches to social science research were not so devoid of the virtues of scientism as we are sometimes led to believe; and that the new approaches may not always be so filled with scientific virtue or even so productive of final insight as they claim.

The book possesses a value that is peculiar to its type. It explores the present work of social scientists in a rather untrod field. To this more or less virgin Latin American territory it brings a review of contemporary behavioral method as well as a survey of the traditional literature. In this rather raw frontier of research, it enables us to compare the concerns of political science with those of sister disciplines. Partly because Professor Merle Kling is a Latin Americanist who is well schooled in our modern trends, and partly because scholarly work on Latin American politics and government is now undergoing significant expansion and improvement, the present volume should encourage gratification among political scientists regarding the state of their field in general and of their research on Latin America in particular.

Kling portrays contemporary political science as being aware of modern needs without being dogmatically critical of former contributions; and as having begun a meaningful application of that point of view to the Latin American scene. He omits mention of several works by authors who might have been thought significant; but his lists are not designed to be all-inclusive or exhaustive, and are certainly not intended to be the most important part of his contribution. His proposals for new research in Latin America are among the most potentially fruitful pages in the book.

The book, including Kling's article, is more useful as scholarly comment on a developing field than as bibliography. For that reason, all of its chapters should be extremely useful to all social scientists concerned with Latin America. The knowledge of the work of others in a common area of interest can provide a most signficant contribution to comprehension of the needs, shortcomings, and merits of one's own specialty.—JAMES L. BUSEY, *University of Colorado, Colorado Springs*.

Federal Government in Nigeria. BY EME O. AWA. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, Pp. vii, 349. $8.00.)

Education and Politics in Nigeria. BY HANS N. WEILER, ED. (Freiburg, Germany: Verlag Rombach, 1964, Pp. 294. $9.00.)

Eme Awa's contribution to the growing literature on African government involves a description and analysis of constitutional developments leading to independence, a description of the governments organized under the independence constitution of 1960, and an analysis of what he believes to be Nigeria's major political difficulties. It may be noted that much of the material has been covered elsewhere by the growing corps of Nigerian specialists, and by two Nigerian scholars in particular (see Kalu Ezera's *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria*, 1960, and Oluwole I. Odumosu's *The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development*, 1963). However, this is no more to be criticized than the constant appearance of new American government texts. The presentation does not always have the sharpness of other works on the same topics. The major points and the chronology are there, but their significance is often left implicit rather than made explicit. For instance, in dealing with the problems of the viability of the state, it is not emphasized that although British acquisition of territory began in 1862, it was not completed nor was unified administration established until 1914, nor that although independence came in 1960 most of the preparatory work was done during fifteen short years of worldwide tumult and change after 1945. Thus the work lacks some world and African perspective broader than the country itself.

Part I deals with the nature of politics, political parties, and particularly the constitutional development of the Federation of Nigeria. Emphasis is given to the number of ethnic groups, their jealous preservation of cultural and linguistic identity, the slow growth of a common nationalism, the retarded growth of national political parties, and the development of strong regional parties and leaders. The problem of unity is focused in terms of the disagreements over the number of major subdivisions into which the country should be divided. The author contends that it was the division of the country into three tremendous regions by the Richards constitution which was accepted by most Nigerians in the prelude to independence that is responsible for problems of constitutional development today. That tripartite federalism led to extreme regionalism and a weakening of the idea of central authority was evident in the national election debacle of December, 1964. Since this study was completed, however, a new constituent unit called the Mid-Western Region has been carved out of the Western Region bringing the present total to four. Awa gives a detailed analysis of the divisive forces but less attention to developments in national, political, and social integration and support for the central government.

Parts II and III, which in format resemble a typical American Government textbook, very usefully describe the organization, powers, and functions of the federal and regional governments. It is here that the author is at his best.

Part IV returns to the author's recurring theme, the federal relationship in terms of the fears of minorities, and the idea that the regions are too large for the development of national unity.

Hans Weiler's *Education and Politics in Nigeria* is a laudable bilingual effort to begin to come to grips on an interdisciplinary level with the reciprocal relationship between the development of political institutions and ideas, and the pattern and content of education in the most populous new African state. The editor points out that "a systematic analysis of this relationship under the specific conditions of a new state was considered premature . . ." and that it is a "rather random survey of the various ways in which the mutual relationship between education and politics in a new state may, and actually does, take shape" (p. 14). The book grew out of discussions of some research projects at the Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute at the University of Freiburg.

Phoebe and Simon Ottenberg and Rachel Yeld have looked into segments of Nigerian traditional society to investigate the social and political significance of education from the standpoints of anthropology and sociology. Political scientists Kenneth W. J. Post and James O'Connell examine the role of political groups and institutions in education. The relationship between education and the directions being taken by the new Nigerian elite are the concern of Hugh H. Smythe. Historian Helmuth Peets examines the role of education in British colonial policy and its impact in the present in Nigeria. Leonard John Lewis and Willfried E. Feuser devote their essays to the political implications of the educational system from the educationist point of view.

The essays in English by the Ottenbergs, Yeld, O'Connell, Post, Smythe, and Lewis are followed by summaries in German while English summaries are provided for the essays in German by Peets and Feuser. Also included are selected statistics on education in Nigeria and a selected bibliography on education and educational policy in Nigeria.

Both books are useful analyses of the problems of one of the world's more important new states. —Roy Olton, *Western Michigan University.*

East African Unity Through Law. By Thomas M. Franck. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 184. $7.50.)

"To those people who would wait until the countries [Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda] are separately independent I say that they do not know human nature. You must rule out the question of federation after we take our seats as sovereign states in the United Nations." With this prophetic statement by Julius Nyerere, Professor Thomas M. Franck closes a significant book on the development of federal institutions in the former British territories of East Africa. Nyerere's statement was prophetic because independence brought with it certain conditions that militated against the maintenance and establishment of federal institutions. The author explains that after these countries gained their independence, they began to harden "into the molds of their several sovereignties." In effect, the logic of national politics outweighed the logic of supranational institution and any proposed economic benefits that might derive from them.

Conflicting national interests over the creation of an East African federation were exacerbated by the opposition of Kwame Nkrumah to the scheme. For whatever reason, it appears that his blueprint for implementing the African desire for continental unity is more comprehensive than those of East African leaders such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Mboya. The author, utilizing the models ascribed to David Apter, places Nkrumah in the *mobilization* design (total mobilization of resources to tackle the continent's problems) and the latter three leaders into the *consociational* design (building story by story through regional cooperation to accomplish the pan-African mystique).

Opposition to federalism in East Africa was not due entirely to forces unleashed by independence. It was also an unfortunate legacy of the colonial period when federal institutions became equated by the Africans, and perhaps rightfully so, with European domination. A product of this era, too, was an equally persistent opinion held in Uganda and Tanganyika that Kenya would be the beneficiary, at their expense, of any federal union.

The impediments to establishing federalism in the area were many, but lest the impression be given that this is the major thrust of the book, it should be emphasized that the preponderant, and most significant portion, examines the building-blocks of federation. Indeed, Professor Franck's presentation of events in the colonial period might be best described as a teleological design for federalism. He shows how a common market, free movement of persons, statutory uniformity for such matters as licensing of professions, integrated public services, central banking and a common court of appeal provided the furnishings in this era for "a sophisticated federation." With such a foundation upon which to build federal structures, the writer feels that Britain should have applied pressure to bring about a federation agreement before granting independence to the territories. Certainly, Britain had demonstrated previously little diffidence about intruding into the politics of the area. Whether such pressure would have rendered a successful result is a matter of conjecture, but Britain "held a fairly strong hand in 1960" which would have enabled it to "synchronize the plunge to independence of the East African territories." Such synchronization would have presumably made federalism a more obtainable goal.

The American Society of International Law, under whose auspices the book was written, must be gratified by it. The book is unusual because of the comprehensiveness of its appeal. It is valuable for its historical content and will be a welcome addition to the growing number of histories of Africa. Its contribution to the literature of federalism is most important and should open interesting areas of comparison with the federal and supranational systems in the more developed countries. To the student of British colonial affairs it will be unusually impressive because of the lucid manner in which Professor Franck treats the intricacies of British colonial administration.—CLAUDE D. DAVIS, *Texas A. & M. University*.

Bantustan: The Fragmentation of South Africa. BY CHRISTOPHER R. HILL. (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 112. $2.25.)

As Colin M. Tatz so ably demonstrated in his penetrating work, *Shadow and Substance in South Africa: A Study in Land and Franchise Policies Affecting Africans, 1910-1960* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962), South African racial policy has been remarkably constant despite the variations in terminology and institutional arrangements. Professor Julius Lewin, the noted South African anthropologist at the University of the Witwatersrand (in Johannesburg), also came to the same conclusion in his unusually incisive volume, *Politics and Law in South Africa: Essays on Race Relations* (London: Merlin Press Ltd., 1963). *Apartheid*, for these two students of South Africa, is merely the continuation of traditional policies.

The Government of South Africa, naturally, rejects this point of view and points out that "separate development," a term which it now favors in preference to *apartheid*, is something altogether different, something better, than the previous policy that the international community found to be so abhorrent. This "new look" is clearly seen in a recent full-page advertisement the Information Service of South Africa placed in the March 31, 1965 issue of the *Washington Post* which declared that "In South Africa a great new social plan is at work. The creation of a community of politically independent, economically interdependent states. Basic to this plan is the right of self-determination for each of the different nations, which constitute the multi-national population of South Africa."

The Assistant Director of the Institute of Race Relations in London, Christopher R. Hill, has recently visited the Republic of South Africa and has reported in this slim book on the difficulties and future prospects of the "politically independent, economically interdependent states" for Africans known as Bantustans. Bantustans may be defined as those territories which, over the years, have been reserved for the exclusive residence of the various African tribes in the Republic and which have been, or are scheduled to be, groomed for some type of limited home rule that, at some indeterminate date, may conceivably be transformed into fully independent and sovereign states. They are the institutional devices which the leaders of Afrikaner nationalism and the architects of *apartheid* hope to use to meet the mounting challenge of African nationalism with its claim for self-determination. In 1963, the Transkei, an African reserve lying on the southeastern coast of the Cape Province, received its grant of self-government, thus becoming the first Bantustan and the pilot project of the whole Bantustan program. This Xhosa-speaking area has its own chief minister, legislature, cabinet, flag, and national anthem, although the locus of real power still resides in Pretoria and Cape Town.

Hill has included in his book a discussion of the theory of *apartheid*, the practice of *apartheid*, the economic aspects of the Bantustans, the separate South African universities for the non-whites, the Bantustan experiment in the Transkei, the outlook for similar experiments in the province of Natal, and the prospects of the Bantustan program. In a postscript he deals with the achievements of the 1964 session of the Transkei Legislative Assembly and in two appendices provides information about the system of registration and voting in the Transkei and about the program of the opposition party in the Transkei. The book also contains a map of the African reserves in the Republic and one of the Transkei, as well as a table showing the expenditures contemplated under the Five Year Plan (1961-1965) for the development of African reserves.

The book does have a number of attractive features. First, Hill is able to handle his subject matter in a calm, unemotional manner, which is not altogether easy to do nowadays considering the well-nigh universal distaste for South African racial policies. He is not, however, oblivious to the conspicuous grievances of and hardships endured by the African peoples of South Africa under the rigors of the *apartheid* system, which all too often has a de-humanizing effect upon such peoples. Second, he is fully cognizant of the economic forces at work which, in the long run, go counter to the aims and plans of the engineers of *apartheid*. He makes it clear (p. 109) that, over the long run, the new Bantustan program will not prove to be a viable one. Third, he is keenly aware of the interrelationship of this policy to external political forces, such as African nationalism outside the Republic which make their weight felt in the forum of the United Nations, the possibility of sanctions against South Africa, and the possibility of future independence for the three British High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Fourth, his survey of African development within the framework of "separate development" includes an absorbing account of the so-called African "tribal colleges" at Turfloop, Fort Hare, and Nygoya which are intended to educate the future élites of the Bantustans. Finally, Mr. Hill provides an interesting and concise description of the drafting of the 1963 Transkei Constitution by the Recess Committee of the Transkei Territorial Authority.

Unfortunately, the book is marred by a number of deficiencies which, in all probability, are due to the haste with which it was published. Some of these shortcomings could be overcome were a second edition of the work issued at a later date. First, the book is not tightly organized enough and should have included chapter sub-headings to enable the general reader to follow the descriptions and the arguments. Second, at several places charts and diagrams could have been used to clarify certain institutional patterns, such as the Bantu Authorities system and the governmental structure of the Transkei. Third, the inclusion of a relatively simple chronology of relevant South African history would have given the work wider appeal for the non-specialist reader. Fourth, although the text is adequately footnoted, no bibliography has been appended. Fifth, Mr. Hill failed to include in the appendices the text of the 1963 Transkei Constitution to which the reader could have referred while attempting to follow his description of that document in the text. Sixth, the writer devoted scant attention to the Five Year Plan for the improvement of the African reserves, to political developments in the Northern Transvaal Territorial Authorities, to the disturbances in Pondoland and Sekhukuneland, and to the extremely significant Odendaal Report (which envisages a Bantustan-type development for the Africans of South West Africa). Finally, his brief sketch of the theory of *apartheid* was altogether too shallow, as was his historical background of the land, labor, and franchise policies affecting Africans. For some unexplained reason, he did not appear to be familiar with some of the common secondary sources on these subjects, such as the one by Tatz mentioned earlier.

This book is not the first to appear on the subject, for it was preceded by Paul Ginewski's *Bantustans: A Trek towards the Future* (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1961) and possibly by W. A. Bellwood's *Whither the Transkei* (Cape Town: Howard B. Timmins, 1964), which the reader will find reviewed in *African Affairs* (London), October, 1964 and January, 1965, respectively. Probably the most comprehensive and authoritative book on the Transkei will be that written by Professors Gwendolen M. Carter, Newell M. Stultz and Thomas G. Karis of Northwestern University, Brown University and C.C.N.Y., respectively, which is to be published in the very near future.—RICHARD DALE, *Northern Illinois University*.

South Africa: Crisis for the West. BY COLIN AND MARGARET LEGUM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 309. $6.95.)

Colin and Margaret Legum are sensitive and perceptive writers of South African origin who are deeply committed to the fight for racial justice in their homeland. Now living in London, they have written a powerful plea for intervention to force the Afrikaner Nationalist Government to abandon its segregationist policy of *apartheid* before it leads to a disaster with world-wide repercussions. It is a volume of 200 pages of incisive political and economic analysis of the internal power structure in South Africa, followed by a 100-page critique of the arguments for and against the use of sanctions. The Legum's analysis of the power structure is a contribution of permanent value, while the plea for sanctions may soon appear dated.

The book must be judged not as a dispassionate treatise in political science but as a timely and intelligent commentary on a critical issue. As such, it is highly readable and well-informed, and full of illuminating insights. Since the authors are engaged in special pleading, however, their tone is occasionally dogmatic and they naturally tend to avoid qualifications that might weaken their generalizations.

In their analysis of the power structure of "Afrikanerdom," the Legums present a series of short but valuable sketches of the electorate, the Broederbond secret society, the Dutch Reformed Churches, the intellectuals, the Party and its press, financial and special interest groups and the Afrikaner worker. As a good example of how the Afrikaner power structure operates, the authors might have mentioned the way in which Professor N. J. J. Olivier and other reform-minded Afrikaner intellectuals were purged from the executive of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs in August 1961.

One of the highlights of the treatment of "English-Speaking South Africa," is the Legum's sharp analysis of the South Africa Foundation, an organization composed mainly of white business leaders who claim to be non-political but really buttress the Government by presenting to the outside world a one-sided version of a booming South African economy.

The authors have attempted to double check the accuracy of their facts, but the statistics on the number of "non-white students in university" (p. 165), in 1963 seem much too low. Although they do not say so, the Legums thereby imply that the official statistics of the Government are one hundred per cent too high (4837 non-white students vs. the Legum's 2400), which is not plausible.

When they turn to sanctions, the Legums state that they "share the general distaste for economic weapons as a means of settling international disputes," because the consequences of sanctions "cannot be easily foreseen or controlled." But, they contend, it is a question of alternatives—either international economic sanctions or a disastrous race war. The real issue, therefore, is to determine which of these alternatives holds the greater risks for the peoples of South Africa, the international community, and the West.

The argument of the authors contains several assumptions that cannot be substantiated. History may well prove them right, but the decision makers in the United States are not at present willing to employ sanctions on the basis of these assumptions. This is because of such factors as the natural limits of foreign policy in changing things outside our control; the higher priorities of the United States in Europe, Latin America and Asia; the built-in inertia of a giant bureaucracy; the official skepticism about the view that the South African imbroglio could escalate into a world-wide racial conflict; and the fact that the key words in the conservative American climate of opinion are "moderation," "stability," and "orderly progress" —concepts that are out of tune with the revolutionary realities of Africa today.

Africa changes so rapidly, however, that it may well build up unbearable pressures, forcing the United States to vote for sanctions sooner or later in the U. N. Security Council even though Washington still considers them impractical and unwise. The Legums have many allies in the continuing campaign to develop such pressures.—VERNON MCKAY, *School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.*

The South African Economy. BY D. HOBART HOUGHTON. (Cape Town, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 261. $4.10.)

As a member of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of South Africa, Vice-President of the South African Institute of Race Relations, former President of the Economic Society of South Africa, and Professor of Economics at Rhodes University (in Grahamstown, South Africa), D. Hobart Houghton is eminently qualified to discuss the economic structure of the Republic of South Africa.

An exceptionally well-written book, *The South African Economy* is tightly organized into ten chapters covering such topics as agriculture, African migratory labor, transportation, mining, the balance of payments, manufacturing, wages, the national income, standards of living, foreign trade, labor policy, banking, population, labor, and resources. The central concept around which his analysis of the factors of production in the Republic is structured is taken from Walt W. Rostow's well-known study, *The Stages of Economic Growth (A Non-Communist Manifesto)*, which depicts five levels or steps of economic development ranging from the traditional society to the age of high mass-consumption. The author avers that South African traditional society terminated in 1820, the date of the major wave of British emigration to the Cape. For approximately one hundred and ten years (1820-1933), South Africa remained in the second stage, meeting the variegated pre-conditions for its "economic take-off." The "take-off" into sustained economic growth lasted but a brief twelve years (from 1933 to 1945), and now South Africa has, in his estimation, gotten well into the penultimate stage known as "the drive to maturity," which he predicts will last until approximately 1993.

Professor Houghton is deeply concerned about this "drive to maturity" and elucidates the various obstacles South Africa faces in its search for greater affluence, such as the need to expand the manufacturing sector (to absorb not only the natural population growth but also those South Africans who, in the course of time, will leave mining and subsistence agriculture for other more promising sectors of the economy), to forge ahead with exports, to increase the productivity of the labor force, and, in general, to effect a more desirable allocation of economic resources. He is quite distressed, both as an economist and as a humanist, that ". . . racial attitudes and the political policies which they inspire will undermine the forces making for economic growth and destroy the momentum towards continuous progress. This would be doubly disastrous, because not only would it involve the sacrifice of higher standards of living so clearly within our grasp, but the possibility of peaceful racial co-existence would be greatly reduced by economic stagnation, poverty and unemployment, which must certainly increase social tensions." (p. 208)

What is the "solution" to these grave problems which this unusually thoughtful economist suggests? His "solution" represents an admirable and realistic synthesis of two schools of South African thought, the southern (or Cape liberal) and northern (or Transvaal, Orange Free State, and often Natal conservative) approaches, which have clashed time and again in South African history (usually to the detriment of the southern position). On the one hand, he endorses the southern position (expressed in part, at least, by the 1948 Fagan Commission Report) that the urbanized, detribalized, industrially oriented African is here to stay and that, in ever so many ways, he is in a pivotal position with respect to the future of South Africa. On the other hand, he does not reject completely the northern viewpoint (which is crystallized in part, at least, by the 1955 Tomlinson Commission Report) that the "true" home of the African is in his traditional tribal areas, such as the Transkei. He is aware of the potential benefits that the Transkei, for example, may offer to a *limited* number of its Xhosa inhabitants, and his attitude towards the Bantustan program is one of the most cautious optimism. Although he feels that this program can only deal with a relatively small percentage of the Africans in the Republic, it is nonetheless a feasible means of coping with the alarming poverty and inefficient subsistence agriculture of the African peasant.

The author would combine these two approaches by suggesting that the oligarchy of South Africa be gradually transformed into an achievement-oriented, rather than ascriptive-oriented, industrial democracy in which political decision-making power would be shared by all those South Africans, irrespective of race, who are fully committed to the modern exchange economy of the Republic. In addition to this "co-determination" policy, Professor Houghton suggests that the affluence of South Africa be utilized to provide for a more equitable distribution of the national wealth in terms of skills and productivity levels and implies that the "disinherited" of South Africa be extended the fullest opportunity to acquire and expand the necessary education and skills in order to participate in the modern sector of South African life. He realizes, of course, that such a transformation of the South African body politic would both give the modernizing African elites a direct stake in the viability of "their" mother country and would alleviate to no small extent the psychological disabilities (such as alienation or anomie) which beset the urban, Western-oriented African in the Republic. Such a "solution" appears to be practical, just, and remarkably farsighted. It will be interesting to observe the African response to such a proposal as well as that of the South African electorate.

In summary, then, Professor Houghton has done an admirable job of presenting an exceedingly complex subject with marked clarity. His book is undoubtedly one of the finest in the field of South African affairs and should be required reading for all those who are seriously interested in both the problems and prospects of this portion of Africa. *The South African Economy* is all the more valuable a work because of its complete index, solid bibliography, ample footnotes, numerous charts and graphs, and map. Indeed, it represents South African scholarship at its finest.—RICHARD DALE, *Northern Illinois University.*

Political Awakening in the Congo. BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. x, 357. $7.95.)

The stormy course of Congolese independence since July, 1960 has served to focus more than usual attention on the Belgian system of colonial administration with its strengths and with its many and glaring shortcomings. In the present volume, Professor Lemarchand sets out "To unravel the tangled skeins of nationalist developments in the Congo during the terminal phase of Belgian colonial rule," and to provide "at least part of the factual and analytical background necessary to an understanding of contemporary developments."

In one aspect, at least, the book succeeds admirably. The presentation of the Belgian colonial structure and, in particular, the organization of the "colonat" vividly outlines the conservative nature of the Belgian business community in the Congo and its absolute blindness to the growth of African nationalism in the surrounding territories. The author cites from a Leopoldville newspaper of 1944 the statement that, "The European element . . . repudiates the principle of democratic equality and the political organization of the colony cannot, therefore, be based on this principle." A decade later, de Maleingreau's proposals for wider representation in the Conseil de Gouvernement revealed an equal insensitivity to the political ambitions of the African élite in the pat statement, "The whites are the sole guides and carriers of the civilization of this country." It is an unfortunate commentary on the acumen of the white community of southern Africa still a decade later that these same words could be echoed by the leader of the white minority party in Rhodesia.

Lemarchand's succeeding chapters on the impact of Western economic forces and on educational policy in the Congo fill in the picture of the Belgian position in the colony in greater detail. His observations on the educational system are particularly apt. In trying to suit education to the special needs and conditions of the Congo he points out that the administration failed to create the supra-ethnic patterns which would have encouraged the growth of a unified nationalist movement whose presence might have prevented the disintegration which followed independence.

The chapters dealing with the genesis and emergence of Congolese political parties and with their organization and operation are less satisfactory. While there can be no question of the difficulty of trying to sketch clearly in a few pages the tangled interaction of parties and personalities in the months preceding independence, Lemarchand's valiant attempt to combine historical account with functional analysis tends to be somewhat confusing rather than illuminating. To sort out the major political attitudes prevalent among African leaders in the pre-independence Congo is a major task which the author has not been able to accomplish fully. There is a tendency, moreover, to cite the views of particular individuals and to assume, without further explanation, that these views necessarily represented those of a larger group. It would appear also that little use has been made of the detailed material on Congolese parties which has appeared over the past two years from CRISP in Léopoldville and which sheds some light on hitherto unexplained facets of political conduct in the Congo.

The volume ends on a note of pessimistic doubt of the ability of the central government to create any sense of national unity in view of the open revolts in the interior and the increasing inroads of subversive foreign influences. Events which have taken place since the book was completed lead to a somewhat more hopeful picture although the deficiences of administration in the Congo may take years to rectify. There appears to be growing acceptance of the Tshombe regime by the members of the African community; Ivory Coast President Houphouët-Boigny's comment that Tshombe is as good a nationalist as Lumumba ever was (and even better because he is "constructive") is indicative of the moderate African view. Internally, Congolese stability is being improved (ironically) by the return of some fifty or more Belgian administrators to their former posts.

In a book otherwise remarkable for its accuracy, there are a number of editorial lapses. Occasional Gallicisms creep into the translations and into the text. It is hard to believe, moreover, that Raymond Scheyven, then Minister of Economic Affairs for the Congo, really did say in commenting on the *loi fondamentale,* "We have presented the Congolese with a political system similar to ours . . . where the head of state is irresponsible."

All in all, Lemarchand's analysis of the colonial background to the contemporary Congolese scene is perceptive and original; his material on Congolese parties had already been superseded by more recent and more detailed studies.—L. GRAY COWAN, *Columbia University.*

Morrocco: Problems of New Power. BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 276. $7.95.)

Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society. BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 108. $3.00 cloth, $1.00 paper.)

After years of neglect by American scholars, North Africa is at last getting at least a part of the attention it deserves. Professor Zartman's two volumes are valuable additions to the growing list of analyses of Moroccan political development in the years before and after independence. In his *Problems of New Power,* Zartman has definitely adopted a methodological approach based on decision-making analysis; the second volume under consideration is in large degree composed of two further case studies in the organizational growth of Moroccan government. The latter two cases are more descriptive than those treated in *Problems of New Power* but the basic analytical structure remains much the same.

The method used in the longer book is to select five specific problems faced by the independent government of Morocco and to trace out in detail the decision-making process used in finding solutions to them. They cover major areas of governmental concern, diplomacy (the evacuation of American bases), the military (organization of the army), economic development (agrarian reform), education as a social problem (the Arabization of primary and secondary education) and politics (the organization of elections). Each of these questions is subjected to close scrutiny to determine not only who was responsible for decisions on them within the government but also the forces which were at work in Moroccan society which influenced those in whose hands the decision-making power lay.

Of the five cases studied, the first, evacuation of American bases, is the most successful in illustrating the complexity of the question and the limitations of choice, both internally and externally imposed, under which the Moroccan decision-makers were forced to operate. The second case, the organization of the army, is an excellent review of the elements present in the problem of the role of the military in the new state and of the personal role in the ultimate decisions played by the crown prince who, "rarely concerned himself with particulars, and when he did, it was with a characteristic impetuousness that was occasionally regrettable." The two cases dealing with economic and social problems are less successful as case studies because their subject matter is less susceptible of concrete delineation and the interplay of forces at work in the decision-making process is therefore less easy to evaluate.

The methodology employed by the author is of substantial help in pointing up the forces behind these decisions and the limited range of choice within which the Moroccan officials were forced to act. The method does not have quite the degree of originality claimed for it; it is hard to believe that, "This book is the first study to use the tools of decision-making analysis to examine an underdeveloped country's government." One has the impression, moreover, that despite the claims made for it, the methodology entails a great deal of purely descriptive writing which is sandwiched in between an opening and closing methodological comment for each chapter.

It is, moreover, somewhat difficult to reconcile the author's stricture in the introduction to *Problems of a New Power* that, "functional and institutional approaches are not only unhelpful; they are misleading, inappropriate, and suggestive of normative judgments about institutions not yet established" with the statement in the introduction to *Destiny of a Dynasty,* "It [Destiny] is an analysis of the state's deliberate search for institutions of government during the process of political development." If the institutional approach is really "unhelpful," as the author maintains, why does he contend that, "the approach used in this analysis . . . may even have relevance in a broader sense for studies of non-monarchical forms of government in the process of political development."?

In both volumes the methodological structure is useful, but it would appear to be only a secondary consideration compared to the value of the detailed information which has been assembled on Moroccan development. The study of the monarchy and its evaluation, as well as that of the formation of representative institutions in Morocco provides real insight into the struggle between tradition and modernisation and the value of the stabilizing force provided by the monarchy in a difficult period of transition. One might regret that other African states did not have a modernizing monarchy upon which to rely; it is clear that the charismatic nationalist leader is no substitute for a traditional ruler who can command the national respect given to the King of Morocco, at least in terms of the maintenance of post-independence stability of the regime.—L. GRAY COWAN, *Columbia University.*

Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: the Role of the Muslim Brotherhood. BY CHRISTINA PHELPS HARRIS. (The Hague, London, Paris: Mouton & Co. for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Pp. 277.)

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by an Egyptian provincial school teacher named Hasan al-Banna, a fundamentalist who believed that Islam was being fatally undermined by the spread of European ideas and practices in Egypt and that as in past centuries Islam, as a system of social as well as theological prescriptions, must be regarded as the basis of a self-contained civilization. As the Brotherhood grew rapidly in strength it expanded its activities from religious preaching into educational, social welfare, industrial, and eventually political fields. In the latter the ardor of its mass following, its conspiratorial organization, its totalitarian aims, and Banna's leadership enabled the Brotherhood to emerge after 1945 as a powerful revolutionary force in an ill-governed country demoralized by severe economic and social problems. After the Brotherhood had assassinated two Egyptian prime ministers and the chief of the Cairo police, Banna was murdered in revenge in 1949. His successors survived to challenge the military regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser after the 1952 revolution, until in 1954 an attempt on Nasser's life led to the forcible suppression of the Brotherhood. Six of the leaders were hanged and hundreds of others jailed.

Apart from brief treatment of the Brotherhood's ideas and activities in various book chapters and articles, there have been only two substantial western-language studies: J. Heyworth-Dunne's *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt,* admirably done but published four years before the Brotherhood's demise and long out of print, and the abominably translated English version of I. M. Husaini's detailed but one-sided apologetic, *The Moslem Brethren: the Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements* (1956). A Ph.D. dissertation on the Brotherhood written some years ago by Professor R. P. Mitchell of the University of Michigan, when eventually published, should become the definitive work on the subject.

In the meantime, while we wait for Mitchell's book, Professor Harris has provided an acceptable summary of some of the previously published research. Only the last 100 pages deal with the Brotherhood itself: the majority of the space is filled by three preliminary chapters. Two of these recount, along familiar lines, the main events of

Egyptian diplomatic and political history from 1798 to about 1930; the third describes several of the main currents and issues of modern Islamic reform. These chapters are intended to set the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in historical perspective, and to project it as the culmination of the growth of both political and religious sentiments of intransigeance against the western penetration of Egypt. This is an unexceptionable theme, but the diffusion of the author's attention in the first two chapters (competent though they are) and the lack of critical analysis in the third, tend to dissipate their relevance.

The most useful, though less well written, part of the book is the section on the Brotherhood itself, since here the material is not as widely familiar. These chapters present a good summary of Hasan al-Banna's career and describe the Brotherhood's organization, activities, and ideas. Here the author makes a number of sensible points. One is that the Brotherhood's economic enterprises and social welfare programs served to demonstrate their conviction that the Islamic religious commitment should inspire rather than retard material progress and social conscience. Related to this is her point that the Brotherhood and the military junta were natural rivals, not only as conspiratorial militants, but as purveyors of social and economic regeneration. But while the Brotherhood demanded a specifically Islamic form of government, they never made clear what they meant by this. Nor did they explain satisfactorily how a purely Islamic legal system could meet modern needs. Consequently, what was nominally a conflict of principles between them and the officers may better be viewed as simply a power struggle. The author stretches her point too far, however, in suggesting that it was anomalous for Muslim fundamentalists to use such western devices as printing presses and microphones. Finally, few will disagree with her that the Brotherhood's resort to terrorism was unconstructive.

The passages dealing with the 1952-1954 period appear to have been written no later than 1956, and much of the description and evaluation of Nasser's regime is badly out of date.—MALCOLM H. KERR, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom. EDITED BY WILLIAM JOHN HANNA. (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1964. Pp. 651.)

Thirty-two essays on various aspects of contemporary African politics by such authors as James Coleman, Thomas Hodgkin, David Apter, Lucian Pye, Edward Shils, Tom Mboya, and Julius Nyrere.—A. R.

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Yale University

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

The Atlantic Alliance. By ALVIN J. COTTRELL AND JAMES E. DOUGHERTY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 248. $5.50).

This book is a political guide to the politics of NATO. It is the fault of the reviewer that this report comes a year late. Neither Professor Cottrell's nor Professor Dougherty's feet can be held to the critic's fire for what has happened in the past twelve months. One suspects, however, that both would be game for the try. For both are on record that NATO has proved its worth and both insist that confidence and not panic is the order of the day. This is not to say that criticism of the Alliance is shrugged off or that the authors believe in "justification by faith alone". They simply present a sturdy defense of NATO as a concept and as a program and ask those who would place it in disarray to measure the faults against the accomplishments and count the short straws.

The authors start the reader off with a thorough and clear discussion of the nature and scope of the North Atlantic Treaty and its organizational structure. In so doing, they bring into sharp focus current debates about nuclear strategy and the limits and possibilities of waging conventional warfare. They remind the reader that NATO has not only contained the Soviet military threat to Western Europe, but that it has also quietly and effectively prevented any potential German unilateral moves, a point sometimes ignored by critics. A short critique is made of the various proposals for disengagement, all of them boiling down to the fact that after disengagement there would be no power in Europe capable of opposing Russian will. Left generally undiscussed is the point that NATO policy has emphasized armament rather than arms control.

The book then moves from discussion of military doctrines to analysis of the economic integration of Western Europe, showing how this has developed and in the process invalidated, before European eyes, the Leninist thesis of the "contradictions of capitalism." The shield for this development has been and remains the nuclear umbrella of America and the soldiers of NATO. The problems which arise because of conflicting national policies within the European Community, the intra-NATO disputes, are also treated, though in limited detail.

Neither author feels that General de Gaulle will bring the NATO tent down. Indeed, if there is a major weakness in this otherwise excellent book, it is the too easy dismissal of the General as but a passing irritation. As "realists" neither author can accept the possibility that de Gaulle is the reincarnation of Vercingetorix and is thus a couple of thousand years old. His mischief making is almost at an end, they argue. This reviewer is less sanguine.

Cottrell and Dougherty therefore conclude that the Alliance can weather its "time of troubles" and that it is already well on the way to being the force that will create a true Atlantic Community, and, thus, it deserves to remain the linchpin of progressive American foreign policy. Theirs is a reasoned argument and one that offers NATO critics a fair and open challenge. This reviewer knows of no better guide to the politics of NATO. —Milton Colvin, *Washington & Lee.*

China's Foreign Policy. By Vidya Prakash Dutt (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. 336. $10.75.)

This study concentrates on Communist China's foreign policy in the years 1958-62 since this is the period when China's policy changed from "sweet reasonableness" to the new "hard line." In the two and a half years which have elapsed since there is little evidence of any substantial change in China's foreign policy so that the author's observations and conclusions appear valid even as applied to contemporary events.

The author sees a close relationship between domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic field the "hundred flowers" movement, which began in April, 1957, and lasted barely two months, resulted in disillusionment and shock, and was followed by drastic economic experimentation. The Great Leap Forward and the organization of the Communes were in full swing in the Fall of 1958. These radical domestic policies were reflected in a more radical foreign policy.

Among the factors influencing China's foreign policy is Mao's hatred of the United States which stands in the way of almost all of China's major objectives, a place in the U.N., unfettered trade, recovery of Formosa. A burning desire to achieve status, after a century of humiliation at the hands of Western "barbarians", is a strong factor in shaping China's foreign policy. Mao's "sense of humiliation and frustration constantly erupts in manifestation of aggressive nationalism whether within the Communist bloc or outside."

Mao's antagonism toward the United States centers on our protection of Taiwan. He bitterly opposes the two-China policy. Fuel was added to the flames when the United States backed the U.N. resolution supporting Tibet in December, 1959, and when we signed a Security Pact with Japan in January 1960. Any accommodation by the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. such as Khrushchev's visit with Eisenhower in September, 1959, was considered a great mistake. U.S. imperialism is the "deadly enemy of the people of the world." Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan in June, 1960, engendered a "national denunciation of U.S. imperialism, mankind's public enemy number one." This theme was stressed in press, radio, cinema, theater, handbills, organized military demonstrations. The President of the All China Federation of Trade Unions referred to Eisenhower's visit as the "gangster trip" made by the "God of plague."

The Kennedy administration was considered worse than the Eisenhower regime "because it was more subtle and clever in pursuing the same ends." The difference in method came not because the "nefarious imperialist robber" had "turned into"—"a benevolent Buddha of Mercy" but only because he was "more cunning," his gestures "more sophisticated."

China's relations with Russia are, of course, a crucial factor in her foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950 committed Russia to aid China if she were attacked by Japan or by any power based on Japan. With Stalin's death the Chinese felt that his mantle belonged on Mao's shoulders. Since Khrushchev did not concede this, the Alliance weakened.

A new economic agreement between Russia and China, signed in February, 1959, provided for $1,250 million in trade between the two countries, China to supply raw materials and Russia to furnish machinery and technical aid, including the nation's first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron. At this time China did not stress her opposition to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy. After the Russian leader had visited Eisenhower the following Fall he immediately flew to Peking seeking to win Chinese cooperation for a more peaceful stance. His efforts were fruitless. The Chinese leaders seemed not to fear a nuclear war. Mao in a conference with Nehru in Peking in 1955 is quoted as saying he was not "so struck by the danger of nuclear war." "What are a couple million people?"

The following year, however, at the 43rd anniversary of the October Revolution, China went along with the joint statement issued by the leaders of 81 Communist parties, which endorsed in general the Khrushchev policy. The rest of the Communist world was not ready to follow Chinese leadership. The deplorable agricultural situation in China caused doubts, "the 'big leap' had turned into an agonizing fox trot."

The split between China and Russia widened. China gave increased support to Albania, which had defied Moscow, and she repudiated the Soviet Union's stand on the search for disarmament. In the words of Professor Dutt "The Sino-Soviet split has almost reached the point of no return."

Other chapters of this book deal with China's relations with her neighbors in Asia with emphasis on the unprovoked attack on India, the increasing friendliness with Pakistan and Indonesia and the attempts to woo Japan.

The author also details China's efforts to win the support of the emerging African nations by stressing the racial aspects of their common effort to oppose white imperialism. She blames the U.S. for the situation in the Congo and she stresses the need for continued revolution even in the nations which have obtained "nominal" independence.

In summary this book presents a thorough and well documented study of China's foreign policy in the years 1958-1962. It brings into sharp relief the militant stance which China has adopted, and analyses the reasons therefore and its significance for the world at large.—HAROLD A. VAN DORN, *Kent State University.*

Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years. BY GEORGE GINSBURGS AND MICHAEL MATHOS. (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. ix. 218. Guilders 23.25).

Professor George Ginsburgs and Mr. Michael Mathos have written a comprehensive account of the first dozen years of Communist China's relations with Tibet. Their compilation is not a wholly scholarly work, for it lacks necessary documentation, first-hand observation, and sufficient use of Chinese Communist sources. It is true that students of contemporary China are handicapped by the restrictions that have been placed in their scholarly inquiries. Furthermore, there is a dearth of reliable Tibetan materials. The authors have therefore made a valiant attempt at the reconstruction and analysis of a difficult and crucial period of Sino-Tibetan relations.

The clearest statement of the thesis of the book is found in Chapter VI, entitled *Epilogue: Peking-Lhasa-New Delhi,* which had appeared in the September 1960 number of the *Political Science Quarterly.* The present work represents an enlargement and elaboration of that early thesis. The authors' main argument is that Sino-Tibetan relations and their ramifications must be understood primarily in geopolitical terms. For China, Tibet has not been independent of her influence and concern for hundreds of years. For India, Tibet has been a center of contention especially since the time of the establishment of British rule. Tibet had survived as an autonomous theocracy due to a delicate balance of power: the British acceptance of the reputed Chinese suzerainty and the Chinese acquiescence in British influence. This relationship was disturbed when the Chinese People's Republic came into being. British withdrawal from India, and the subsequent inability of India to sustain her influence made the Chinese resurgence in Tibet inevitable. The general apathy of the outside world and the isolationist attitude of the Tibetans reduced the scope of conflict to a struggle between the emerging Communist state and the feudalistic monarchy of the Dalai Lama. The outcome of the confrontation was hardly unexpected.

What makes *Communist China and Tibet* a worthwhile study is the detailed depiction of the manner in which the Chinese People's Republic extended its influence, and later established its rule, in Tibet. Although lacking in sufficient documentation, the conclusions are convincing by virtue of their logic and creative insight. Within the context of Mao Tse-tung's known policies toward ethnic minorities in the border regions of China, as well as set in the light of long-standing Chinese popular feelings about Tibet, one must agree that the authors have not misinterpreted the Communists' programs for the subjection of Tibet.

Moreover, operating within the legal framework of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, Peking asserted an effort at strengthening Chinese military power in Tibet through a network of new roads and improved communications. It also executed systematically and adroitly political manipulations and social reforms that were aimed at weakening the resistance of the ruling elite and at gaining the support of the Tibetan peasants. Peking's willingness to do these things was the most important element fitting into the grand design of eventually transforming Tibet into an integral part of the Chinese state.

Skillfully the authors have shown that "the course of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1951 has passed through a number of distinct stages, differentiated by varying emphasis on alternate goals, changes in the modalities of operational strategy, shifts in the choice of tactics and executory instrumentalities." The retreat of the Chinese in 1957 and the response of Peking to the Tibetan uprising in March 1959 gave evidence of the Communist tactical flexibility and opportunism.

Besides adding to what is known about Peking's domestic and foreign policies, this work poignantly reveals the nature of international politics in Asia. Fittingly, the authors have placed the problems of Sino-Tibetan relations within the larger framework of the Sino-Indian struggle for Asian leadership. Finally, Ginsburgs and Mathos conclude by reviving the old proposition: "He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of South Asia within his reach and, with it, all of Asia." How valid this axiom is remains to be proved.—OTIS H. SHAO, *Florida Presbyterian College.*

The United States and the United Nations. EDITED BY FRANZ B. GROSS. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. Pp. 356. $6.95.)

From the first page of the Preface to the last speech in the Appendix, the overall analytical framework of *The United States and the United Nations* is abundantly clear, a relatively "hard-line" approach based on the concept of "protracted conflict" with Communism. Thus, the book equates a just world order with Western concepts of man and legality, and asks if the United Nations can help promote such an order, though it recognizes that most of the new states in the organization are non-Western and that few of them are now governed democratically. The Soviet Union is charged with continuing to seek a dictated universal peace by the ultimate destruction of nations opposed to Communism. Of Soviet behavior in the United Nations, it says: "Communists participating in any non-Communist organization seek to subvert it and thus bend it to their purposes or, failing that, to destroy it." Attributing to the Western democracies a view of the United Nations as a world organization for cooperation, peaceful settlement, and containment of aggression, it declares the United Nations is only an instrument of protracted conflict for the Communists. It suggests, therefore, that the United Nations must be an important battleground for the United States in that protracted conflict. It concludes, nonetheless, that Western survival depends less on the United Nations than on the development of regional political organizations to maximize the economic, military, and moral power of the Free World. Such a summary of the book's dominant theme is undoubtedly an over-simplification, but by eliminating verbal underbrush it may serve to clarify the point of view expressed.

In *The United States and the United Nations,* there is no consideration of any alternative analysis, no marshalling of pros and cons as is done so carefully on a variety of issues by Inis L. Claude, Jr., in *Swords into Plowshares.* A parallel summation of an alternative point of view is possible and not difficult to set down. To help build a just world order, the West may find it useful to be less insistent about acceptance of its own values and institutions and more aware of the values and institutions of others—and their interests, and ask if the United Nations can be of assistance in promoting a mutual exchange of ideas and increased understanding. It may be that most of the new non-Western states are not governed democratically for excellent reasons; that, in fact, the basic prerequisites of democracy—if such there be—are presently lacking in many of them. If the Soviet Union still voices Communist doctrines with vigor, it has adjusted with some degree of pragmatism its internal institutions and its external behavior. It is unlikely that the somewhat trite, symbolic utterances on either May Day or the Fourth of July should be taken at full face value. If the words are an echo of 1848 or 1776, they have a 1965 meaning. The Western democracies found the United Nations an exceptionally useful world agency in the organization's early days, not only because of their cooperative nature but also because their influence dominated its councils and its votes helped protect a world balance of power favorable to the West. The United Nations is indeed one instrument employed by the Soviet Union, if not yet by the Chinese Communists, in its attempt to alter the old balance in recognition of new power relationships. The United Nations is, therefore, an important forum for planning peaceful change to rationalize emerging realities in order to reduce the likelihood of over-frustration and the escalation of conflict beyond limited war. If Western interests must in the short run be partially dependent upon regional and functional groupings for survival, over time it is from the functional as much if not more than from the regional groupings that the broad consensus required for further steps toward world community is likely to evolve. The future is not necessarily one of "protracted conflict," but it is quite likely to be one of prolonged competition.

Whatever the assessment of the book's overall analytical theme, or of any possible alternative analysis, *The United States and the United Nations* is well worth reading, for it provides a look at the U.N. from an American policy perspective through the eyes of thirteen experienced, well-known, and even distinguished contributors. If most of the participants pay lip-service to the Cold War theme and to the concept of "protracted conflict", some of the individual analyses are considerably less constricted. Representative of a more flexible view which "surfaces" occasionally, but which is not carefully developed or considered in the book as a whole, is Norman D. Palmer's perceptive comment: "There seem almost no limits to what the United States can do by patience and persistence, coupled with a genuine desire to consider other countries' points of view and to reconsider its own policies in the light of these other viewpoints." After an "Introduction" by Robert Strausz-Hupé, Franz B. Gross explores "The United States National Interest and the United Nations"; Hans Kohn, "Nationalism in the United Nations"; Waldo Chamberlain, "Arms Control and Limitation"; William P. Kintner, "The United Nations Record of Handling Major Disputes"; Palmer, "The Afro-Asians in the United Nations"; Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Latin-American Bloc"; Gross, "Western Europe and the United Nations"; and Harold Karan Jacobson, "Economic and Social Matters." In addition, the Appendix includes addresses by President John F. Kennedy, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Undersecretary of State George A. Ball, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Professor William Y. Elliott.

As did Ernest A. Gross in *The United Nations: Structure for Peace,* this book tends to justify many if not most past American policies in the U.N. Though there is discussion of blocs and caucus groups, the book largely ignores the informal politics at Turtle Bay stressed by Andrew Boyd in *United Nations: Piety, Myth and Truth.* It does not deal with problems of staffing the Secretariat, raised by Boyd and discussed at some length in Sidney D. Bailey's *The Secretariat of the United Nations.* An American U.N. strategy for the future is less positively defined than by Lincoln P. Boomfield in *The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy.* These things are not said in criticism but to help define the nature of the approach and subject matter limits. The book has both the advantages and disadvantages of multiple contributors. Its authors write as experts in their areas of concern, but there is a less organized progression of ideas than in Bloomfield's thought-provoking earlier effort.—ROBERT E. ELDER, *Colgate University.*

The War—Peace Establishment. BY ARTHUR HERZOG (New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. xiii, 271. $4.95.)

Bewildered as are many other thoughtful people by the contradictions between governments' simultaneous pleas for disarmament and rearmament, by the mathematicians' recondite slide-rule-and-computer analyses of our defense policies, and by the numerous quarreling groups all of whom profess to have discovered the true road to world peace, Mr. Herzog decided to ". . . talk to the nation's leading theoreticians on war and peace of varying opinions, to see who they are, what they want and why, and ask them what hopes for permanent peace they foresee." Forearmed with preliminary acquaintance with their writings, he sought out one hundred or so of them for interviews in which he sought their answers to the fundamental questions of how to preserve the peace.

There follows a 260-page report about what he found, written in the easy style of the professional journalist. At least one thing emerged clearly from the survey: if war is too important to be entrusted to the generals, the avoidance of war is too important to be entrusted either to them or to the statesmen or politicians. In this overview of the myriad avenues to peace and security, one looks almost completely in vain for the names of senators, cabinet officers, and other men in official life: it is the scientists and other civilian intellectuals who are at center stage.

Herzog starts off with the "deterrers," men who seek to preserve the peace by maintaining various levels of deterrent force. Here are surveyed the ideas of Strausz-Hupé and Teller, among others. The "analysts" (Kissinger, Schelling, Wohlstetter, Kahn) come in for extended treatment; then the realists (Morgenthau, Niebuhr) and the idealists in the Department of Defense and elsewhere; next the experimentalists (Bethe, Wiesner, Riesman) who wish to try a variety of approaches and international cooperative forms in the effort to attain lasting peace; and finally the "survivalists" (Cousins, Melman) and the pacifists (Pickus, Muste). In each case one is given a thumbnail sketch of the ideas involved in the particular school of thought.

One wonders just what public will be served by the overview accomplished in this book; presumably it is the general public which wishes vignettes of a wide variety of ideas. It is doubtful that the serious student of defense and peace policy will be much enlightened, for the book skips over a wide range of ideas in minimum time and is deficient in analysis, criticism, and comparison of ideas. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject more deeply will be unhappy over the lack of footnotes or of bibliographic guides to further reading.

This reader for one would have relished a book which delved more deeply into the views covered and which provided analysis of their strong and weak points. As it is, with the exception of offhand editorial remarks here and there, the major burden of analysis falls on an all-too-short eight-page concluding appraisal in which the author, probably like most readers, concludes that there is greater wisdom and safety in a middle ground than in either extreme. Probably the general reader will be the one best satisfied by this book, and he will discover that the problems of war and peace are not to be as simply solved as some politicians aver at campaign time.—HOLLIS W. BARBER, *University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.*

The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. BY PHILIP H.

COOMBS. (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xvi, 158. $3.50. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations)

This brief volume, one of a series of policy books of the Council on Foreign Relations, is in part a report on the expanding emphasis on educational and cultural factors in American foreign policy, but it is also an appeal for a greater appreciation of the human aspects of foreign policy and for a doubling of efforts in this dimension of our policy. While not deprecating the political, economic and military components of policy, the author suggests that our long-range influence in the world might be enhanced by a further increase in emphasis on educational and cultural exchange.

Mr. Coombs is uniquely qualified to write this report. When President Kennedy established the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Coombs was the original appointee. He had previously served as educational program director with the Ford Foundation and is currently Director of the International Institute for Educational Planning in Paris. In preparing the book he was provided with a fifteen-member advisory committee and, in addition to sponsorship by the Council on Foreign Relations, he received aid and support from the Carnegie Corporation and The Brookings Institution.

The author reports on past developments and recent trends in educational and cultural exchange activities of the United States, and compares our efforts with those of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Soviet Union. He points out that private efforts in the United States have outweighed the governmental role, and that, relatively, we have given less emphasis to the human factor in foreign policy than have major European states.

In order to bolster his arguments for an expanded program in educational and cultural affairs Coombs has mustered the best objective evidence available. For this purpose he relies heavily on the report compiled for Congress in 1963 by the U. S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, known as the Gardiner Commission. The Advisory Commission's report is based on thousands of interviews with participants in educational and cultural exchanges and with U.S. foreign service and education personnel. The conclusions speak of abundant and conclusive evidence of the contributions of educational and cultural programs to the long-range goals of American foreign policy.

In spite of this evidence one must be aware of the limitations of our knowledge of the real efficacy of such programs and of the difficulties of gathering empirical data to prove contributions to the goals of foreign policy. The goals are admittedly long-range and the educational and cultural contributions are inter-mixed in their effects with political, economic and military factors. The persons involved in interchanges may find difficulties both in being detached observers and in assessing the role of exchanges in the total pattern of evolving policy. Coombs' book is replete with normative statements and his appeal may have to rest more on intuititive opinion (to borrow his own phrase) than on scientifically demonstrable results and probabilities.

Despite these difficulties the author deserves a hearing from those who determine the course of U. S. foreign policy. He concludes his book with a blueprint for strengthening and better coordinating our program in educational and cultural affairs. The available evidence, logic, and informed opinion support his suggestions. Since the costs of doubling the program are relatively low, and since the prospects for positive returns are as high as they are for many of our conventional aspects of foreign policy, Coombs' strong recommendations are worthy of full consideration by the Congress and the Administration.— A. LEROY BENNETT, *University of Delaware.*

An End to Arms. BY WALTER MILLIS. (New York: Atheneum, 1965. Pp. vi, 301. $5.95.)

Despite its title, this book is not about disarmament. Rather, in the words of the author, "it is an examination into the possibility of a demilitarized international society" in which disarmament and demilitarization are viewed as distinct if related processes. Sponsored by the Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, the subtitle claims that *An End to Arms* is a new vision of the end of the arms race and the beginning of a demilitarized world. That Mr. Millis has vision there can be no doubt; whether it is grounded in a sufficiently realistic and accurate framework, however, may be questioned by professional students of international politics.

The book opens with the familiar thesis developed by Millis and others regarding the end of the organized war system brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. The author then develops a succinctly written historical sketch of the rise of the militarized international system which is blamed for the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Millis argues that disillusionment with the militarized system began shortly after 1919 and was unfortunately interrupted by the emergence of military-populist dictatorships that revived the old system and precipitated World War II. In this connection, a most controversial assumption is advanced which forms the basis for his later vision of a demilitarized world: that the struggle for power at the international level arises primarily out of the breakdown of domestic order rather than from the clash of opposing national interests. While some correlation exists between domestic instability and international disorder, Millis propounds it as an absolute without recognizing that stable national states conflict over the allocation of international resources.

More controversial are the author's assumptions and data which form the bases of his vision of a fully demilitarized world. Arguing that the language of international politics is antiquated because it fails to reflect the increasing disutility of force, Millis calls for a new conceptual system to fit "observable facts." He is particularly critical of those who cling to the conceptual system of the arms-tensions dilemma. But suppose this system is a fairly accurate reflection of the problem? Millis insists that it is not and suggests a clarification based on a reexamination of the interrelationship between law, coercion, and power.

In several chapters he explores these concepts in the hope that the theoretical discussion will break the circularity of the arms-tensions dilemma and pave the way for the acceptance of his practical proposals for a demilitarized international system. These chapters are stimulating and incisive but they are also replete with questionable assumptions: that the diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional states will not materialize; that the major power centers of the world will continue to be stable indefinitely; that the power struggle among nations results from conflict over the control of the future rather than out of concrete rivalries of the present; that conflicts over contemporary tangible interests are reconcilable since they do not involve power competition; that both the United States and the Soviet Union genuinely desire general and complete disarmament.

On the basis of these and other assumptions the author describes his new vision of world order in the final chapter. It turns out to be a not particularly novel scheme for "limited" world government in which Millis projects an Orwellian glimpse of the international system of 1984, but with a utopianism that rivals the Clark-Sohn proposals. Through an intuitive prophecy of the course of world affairs to 1980, in which no major war occurs but armed forces establishments continue to menace world peace, we are informed that the nations of the world will become so dissatisfied with the dangers of the system that they will convene conferences in Moscow and Washington in 1980 to modify it.

A transformed United Nations equipped with a veto-free supranational police authority will be created to preserve more securely a demilitarized system which has existed since 1945; judicial machinery will be strengthened to resolve any future disputes; and a general and comprehensive program for disarmament will be instituted, leaving nation-states with only national police forces. National police forces, however, are to be the major coercive agencies in the demilitarized system since Millis assumes international conflict to be the result of the inadequacy of police to restrain revolutionary elements. As a consequence, the supranational police authority is to be small and relied upon only in those comparatively rare instances where intervention may be required to preserve domestic order.

The traditional pattern of idealistic arrangements for the control of international conflict and violence is thus reversed. In the Millis plan demilitarization of the international environment is assumed to be a reality as a result of the excessive costs of nuclear or conventional force by major powers; therefore the emphasis is not on disarmament but on preserving the nonviolent character of the international system through a coercive supranational authority buttressed by national police forces. Yet the interconnection between demilitarization and disarmament is recognized since supranational arrangements are to be followed by a gradual and general disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons.

This reviewer would argue that the gravest weakness of *An End to Arms* is the conception of power in military terms and in the consequent simplistic notion that armaments alone are the principal cause of the international power struggle. Many analysts emphasize in recent studies that the nature of international conflict should be approached eclectically on the assumption that its roots are multiple. Others would stress the necessity of political accommodation as prerequisite to disarmament and question the assertion that since nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 we are now in a demilitarized international system. They might cite as recent evidence the willingness of the United States to risk wider war through the employment of repeated and heavy conventional air strikes over North Viet Nam.

Even if it is admitted that the use of force as a means of attaining national objectives is less rational than in any preceding historical era, there may be a vital flaw in the author's prophecy of a transition from the highly armed system of 1965 to an incipiently disarming world of the 1980's. It could be plausibly argued that if the world is able to survive from 1945 to 1980 without nuclear annihilation, motivations among nation-states for drastically transforming the system, however insecure, may not be nearly so high as Millis predicts. —RONALD J. YALEM, *University of Southern California.*

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

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I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1964 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

Larry L. Adams, The Political Psychology of Edmund Burke. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Claude Ake, A Machiavellian Model of Political Integration. *Columbia.*

Howard Ball, Moral Responsibility and "Social Justice": An Examination of the Supreme Court's Ethical Valuations As Seen in Selected "Equal Protection" Cases, 1940-1964. *Rutgers.*

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915-19, 1921 and 1923-24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1964 list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Robert A. Heineman, Approaches to a Science of Politics and the Problem of Social Control: An Inquiry into the Thought of Some Representative Thinkers. *American*

John D. Holm, A Comparison of Marxism and African Socialism: A Study in Ideologies of Transition. *California*(Los Angeles).

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Norman Nicholson, The Political Effect of PL-480 Food Grain Assistance to India. *Cornell.*

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Sister Mary Grace Swift, OSU, Political Orientation in Soviet Ballet. *Norte Dame.*

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Donald R. Thurston, The Japan Teachers Union as a Pressure Group. *Columbia.*

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Additions

J. O. Akintunde, Nigeria and the United Nations. *McGill.*

William F. Ansberry, Arms Control and Disarmament: A Study of East-West Deadlock, 1950-1965. *Cincinnati.*

W. Badour, Factors Shaping the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China. *McGill.*

Nicholas O. Berry, The Rules of International Relations: A Study of the Philippines-United States 1962 War Claims Issue. *Pittsburgh.*

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Ibrahim Darwish, Factionalism in Revolutionary Elites. *American.*

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Isebill W. Gruhn, Functional Integration: The CCTA Experience. *California*(Berkeley).

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Abel Jacob, The Role of the Intermediate State in Developmental Cooperation: Israel's Role in Africa. *California* (Los Angeles).

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Gene E. Rainey, The Concept of Peace in United States Foreign Policy Since World War II. *American.*

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Denia W. Stairs, The Role of Canada in the Korean Crisis. *Toronto.*

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Ralph Stiewe, The United Nations and the Greek Question: A Study of the Handling of the Problem by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. *Columbia.*

C. Frederick Stoerker, The Church's Material Aid Program in India: A Case Study in Church-State Relations. *Missouri.*

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John J. Weltman, Technological Necessity and Technological Prediction: Studies in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Arms Technologies. *Johns Hopkins.*

Miles D. Wolpin, The Influence of the Cuban Revolution Upon Chilean Politics and Foreign Policy, 1959-1965. *Columbia.*

Muhammed Yakan, Lebanon's Politics in Inter-Arab Relations. *Michigan.*

John Yuan-shi Yin, A Comparative Study of Sino-Soviet Theories of War. *Southern California.*

Tony Yinger, Cuba—Core Interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R. *Claremont.*

Chong Kun Yoon, The Red Army in the Rise and Fall of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic. *American.*

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Herbert E. Cheever, Jr., Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction: The Case of Race Relations in South Africa in the U.N. *Iowa.*

Marian E. Krogmann, The Promotion of Human Rights Through the International Labor Organization. *Iowa.*

Ronald S. Pugsley, The United States and UNCTAD: A Study in Conflicting Pressures. *Michigan.*

Eugene D. Shapiro, Indian Foreign Policy: An Empirical Definition of Non-Alignment and the Indian National Interest. *New York University.*

Wesley B. Truitt, The Troops to Europe Decision: The Politics and Diplomacy of a Military Commitment. *Columbia.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Clark C. Abt; B.S., M.I.T., 1951; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1952; Ph.D., M.I.T., 1965. The Termination of General War. *M.I.T.*

Anwar Barkat; A.B., Forman Christian College, Punjab University, 1954; Leonard Theological College, 1958; S.T.M., Union Theological Seminary, 1960: M.A., Duke, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. The fellowship of Socialist Christians: A Study in Christian Socialism. *Duke.*

Helaine Blumenfeld; A.B., Michigan, 1955; M.A., *ibid.,* 1956; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. John Locke: A Science of Ethics. *Columbia.*

Adam Brimke; M.A., St. Andrews, 1950; Ph.D., Slavonic Studies (Montreal), 1953; Ph.D., McGill, 1964. Poland's Own Road to Socialism: A Study in Political Realism. *McGill.*

Joyotpaul Chaudhuri; B.A., Central State College, Oklahoma, 1958; M.A., Oklahoma, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. The Politics and Jurisprudence of F.S.C. Northrop. *Oklahoma.*

Glen D. Dealy, B.A., University of Washington, 1957; M.A., George Washington, 1958; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1965. Political Philosophy and the Latin American Tradition. *California* (Berkeley).

Mason Drukman: B.A., San Francisco State, 1958; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Community and Purpose in America. *California* (Berkeley).

John P. East; B.A., Earlham College, 1953; LL.B., Illinois, 1959; Ph.D., Florida, 1964. The Political Philosophy of Richard S. Childs: An Analysis and Critique. *Florida.*

Anne E. Freedman; B.A., Douglass College, 1959; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1960; Ph.D., Iowa, 1964. The Controlled Society. *Iowa.*

Gerald Friedberg; A.B., Cornell, 1960; Ph.D., Harvard, 1965. Marxism in the United States: John Spargo and the Socialist Party of America. *Harvard.*

Linda K. Gerber; B.A., Penn State, 1957; M.A., *ibid.,* 1959; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1964. Antidemocratic Movements in the United States since World War I. *Pennsylvania.*

John G. Gunnell; B.A., Tufts, 1955; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Political Philosophy and Time. *California* (Berkeley).

H. P. Habib; B.A., American University (Beirut), 1955; M.A., Fordham, 1957; Ph.D., McGill, 1964. A Case Study in Egyptian Conservation: Ismail Rasha Sidgi. *McGill.*

Franklin P. Huddle; BFA, Arizona, 1937; A.M., Brown, 1939; Ph.D. American 1965. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the United States Senate. *American.*

Isaac Kramnick; A.B., Harvard, 1959; A.M., *ibid.,* 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Lord Bolingbroke: Political Thought and the Augustan Age. *Harvard.*

Paul F. Kress; B.S., Wisconsin, 1956; M.S., *ibid.,* 1958; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1965. The Concept of Process in American Political Science. *California* (Berkeley).

James H. Lare; A.B., Occidental, 1955; M.B.A., Cornell, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. The New Democrats. *Cornell.*

Edward A. Leonard; B.A., Oglethorpe, 1961; M.A., Emory, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Theoretical Alternatives to the Violence Sanction, 1933-63: A Critique. *Emory.*

Charles H. McCall, Jr.; B.A., Indiana, 1957; M.A., Yale, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Paths to Political Participation. *Yale.*

Richard M. Merelman; B.A., George Washington, 1960; M.A., Illinois, 1961; Ph.D., Yale, 1965. Mass Culture and Political Ideology: The Television Western. *Yale.*

Dale A. Neuman; A.B., Kenyon College, 1958; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1964. Work, Leisure, and Political Behavior: A Study of the Interrelationships of Occupational, Leisure, and Political Time and Activity within Three Occupations. *Northwestern.*

Robert E. Newton; B.A., Iowa, 1956; M.A., Catholic University, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Judicial Self-Restraint in the Opinions of Felix Frankfurter in Non-Civil Liberties Cases Concerning Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Powers of Government. *Catholic University.*

Thomas C. Pocklington; B.A., Toronto, 1958; Ph.D., Indiana, 1965. Philosophy Proper and Democratic Political Philosophy. *Indiana.*

John M. Power; B.A., University of Melbourne, 1961; A.M., Harvard, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Individual Freedom: A Study in the Psychology of Political Theory. *Harvard.*

Nicolas Protyniak; B.A., Roosevelt University, 1957; M.A., *ibid.,* 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. The American Anti-Imperialism Movement: 1898-1912. *Indiana.*

Knud Rasmussen; B.A., University of Copenhagen; M.A., Cornell; Ph.D., Rutgers, 1965. The Political Philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard. *Rutgers.*

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Paul Roazen; A.B., Harvard, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Freud and Political Thought. *Harvard.*

Jane T. Schneider; A.B., Michigan, 1960; A.M., *ibid.,* 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Revolutions in the Making: 'Spontaneity' and 'Sophistication' in Italian Social Movements Up to 1922. *Michigan.*

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David C. Schwartz; A.B., Brooklyn College, 1960; M.A., *ibid.,* 1962; Ph.D., M.I.T., 1965. Political Recruitment: A Comparative Essay in Theory and Research *M.I.T.*

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Alma D. Sorensen; B.S., Utah State University, 1960; A.M., Illinois, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. Toward a Theory of Ideology in Political Life. *Illinois.*

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Walter E. Volkomer; A.B., Rutgers, 1955; A.M., *ibid.,* 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1963. The Political Philosophy of Jerome N. Frank. *Rutgers.*

Eduard A. Ziegenhagen; B.S., Wisconsin, 1957; M.S., *ibid.,* 1959; Ph.D., Illinois, 1965. Perceived Inconsistencies Regarding Self and Ethnocentric Political Leadership. *Illinois.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Robert L. Anderson; B.A., Florida, 1958; M.A., *ibid.,* 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Negro Suffrage in Relation to American Federalism. *Florida.*

Ronald B. Bailey; B.S., Florida A. and M. University, 1958; M.A., Illinois, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. The Admission of Alaska into the United States: Adjustments in the Federal System. *Illinois.*

Frank L. Baird; B.A., New Mexico, 1948; M.A., *ibid.,* 1951; Ph.D., Texas, 1964. Congress's Role in Regulation: Radio and Television Programming. *Texas.*

Philip F. Beach; A.B., University of Washington, 1959; M.A., Northwestern, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Natural Resources Policy and "The Public Interest." *Northwestern.*

Robert L. Casier; B.A., California (Santa Barbara), 1949; M.A., *ibid.,* 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1965. The Senate Filibuster: Its Procedural and Strategic Aspects. *California* (Santa Barbara).

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William O. Chittick; B.A., South Dakota State College, 1959; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1964. The Domestic Information Activities of the Department of State. *Johns Hopkins.*

Aage R. Clausen; B.A., Macalester, 1957; A.M., Michigan, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1964. Policy Dimensions in Congressional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis. *Michigan.*

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1966 ANNUAL MEETING

The deadline for papers to be submitted to section chairmen is November 1, 1965. (The June issue announcement of a December 1 deadline was incorrect.)

Commencing with Volume 60 (March 1966), AUSTIN RANNEY, of the University of Wisconsin, will become Managing Editor of this REVIEW, succeeding HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, who will relinquish the post upon the issuance of the December 1965 number. At the same time, JAMES W. PROTHRO, of the University of North Carolina, will succeed Austin Ranney as Book Review Editor.

Editorial correspondence relating to the September and December issues should be addressed to the Columbus office, as hitherto. After September 15, address such correspondence, touching later issues, to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.; and send books intended for review to James W. Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Southern Political Science Association at its annual meeting in San Diego in April, elected the following officers for 1965-66: president, George S. Blair, Claremont Graduate School; vice-president, Thomas McEnroe, California State College at Los Angeles; secretary, Richard Gripp, San Diego State College; treasurer, Richard Harvey, Whittier. Named to the executive council were: Frank Way, University of California at Riverside; Gerald Rigby, University of Southern California; Tom Trombetus, Long Beach State College; James Lare, Occidental College; Richard Longaker, UCLA; Gordon Baker, University of California at Santa Barbara; and John L. Groom, Redlands.

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy held its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., on April 24-25, 1965. Richard B. Brandt, chairman of the department of philosophy at the University of Michigan, was chosen president-elect. J. Roland Pennock of Swarthmore College and John W. Chapman of the University of Pittsburgh were named editor and associate editor, respectively, of *Nomos*, the annual publication of the Society.

It has been the practice of the Society to meet with philosophers, political scientists and lawyers. In the future, depending upon the topic selected for consideration at the annual meeting, the Society will meet in conjunction with the annual meetings of other social science disciplines.

Forthcoming volumes of *Nomos* will deal with equality, which was the topic of the Washington meeting, and with representation, the topic of the joint meeting with the American Political Science Association in September.

The department of government at the University of Texas sponsored a conference on the "Role of the Intellectual in Politics" in April. Papers were read by: Gunnar Heckscher, professor of political science at the University of Stockholm and parliamentary leader of the Swedish Conservative Party; Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Minnesota; Klaus Mehnert, professor of political science at the Institute of Technology, Aachen; Francisco Miro Quesada, Peruvian Ambassador to the United Nations; Representative John Brademas, Indiana; Sir Denis Brogan, professor of political science and philosophy at Peterhouse, Cambridge University; Daniel Cosio Villegas, Mexican delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council; and Merle Fainsod, professor of government at Harvard.

The first of a series of Socialist Scholars Conferences took place on the campus of Rutgers—the

State University, on September 11 and 12. Persons interested in future conferences should write to Professor Marvin Gettleman, Department of History and Economics, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 333 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201.

At its twenty-third annual meeting in April, the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists elected the following new officers: Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin, president; Orville Alexander, Southern Illinois University, vice-president; Stephen T. Early, Jr., DePauw University, secretary-treasurer; Merle Kling, Washington University, editor of *Midwest Journal of Political Science;* and as members of the executive council, Willard N. Hogan, University of Nebraska and William H. Flanigan, University of Minnesota.

The 1966 meeting of the Conference will be held at the University of Chicago April 28 to 30. The program chairman is S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, has received a grant from the Field Foundation to support an Oral History of Contemporary Mississippi Life. This project will be under the direction of Gordon G. Henderson, chairman of the department of political science. Transcripts of the interviews collected, including interviews of major figures in Mississippi politics, will be available on inter-library loan.

The first issue of the *New York State Political Review* will appear in September. It will include most of the papers presented at the meeting of the N.Y. State Political Science Association meeting in April.

Arizona State College will become Northern Arizona University in 1966.

New York University and the Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council sponsored a conference on "Social Growth and Democracy" in New York from May 27 to May 29. The conference brought together scholars and men immediately familiar with Turkish affairs to study the impact of social growth on politics. Kemal Karpat, New York University, was the director of the conference.

The Overseas Educational Service has received a $300,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The grant will enable OES to broaden its contacts with American faculty and administrators and to work with more institutions abroad. Although OES recruits educators for all the developing areas, the initial emphasis has been on Africa, where many new institutions are now being built and the need for expatriate staff is still the most urgent.

To develop its roster of potential candidates, OES works with many professional organizations and with other national and international groups of similar purpose, in addition to making contact with faculty members who register directly with OES.

OES is sponsored jointly by the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council on Education, and Education and World Affairs, with the cooperation of the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the Institute of International Education, and the Canadian Universities Foundation.

Qualified persons who are interested in serving abroad are invited to write to Overseas Educational Service, 522 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036.

The Society for Religion in Higher Education is offering a number of post-doctoral fellowships to encourage the growing interest in the relation of scholarship in religion to scholarship in other fields of study. These fellowships are made possible through a grant from The Danforth Foundation.

Grants are available to: (1) scholars in the humanities, social and natural sciences for a year of study in religion and (2) scholars in religion for a year of study in another discipline.

These fellowships are open to scholars in any institution of higher learning in the United States or Canada without respect to discipline, religious affiliation or non-affiliation. Scholars applying for the grants must have a Ph.D. degree or its equivalent plus at least three years of teaching experience. Preference will be given to scholars under 50 years of age.

The maximum stipend is $8,500. Stipends will be based on experience, present salary and availability of other resources.

Completed applications must be received by the Society by December 1, 1965. Application forms and additional information may be secured from: Lawrence P. DeBoer, Executive Director, The Society for Religion in Higher Education, 400 Prospect Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511.

Under the direction of Gerard J. Mangone, professor of political science and associate dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University, twenty members of the Second Maxwell Institute on the United Nations met at the Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio, Italy in August, 1965. Representing ten countries, the participants discussed the conduct of foreign policy through the United Nations.

Opportunities for overseas research by three scholars in the humanities and social sciences will be offered annually by the International Honors Program beginning in 1966-67. The program will field a small select group of American honor students and three preceptors for an academic year of comparative foreign study. The countries visited will be chosen by the preceptors. A division of responsibility among preceptors will enable each scholar to devote approximately two-thirds of his time to his own research. Interested scholars may contact Dr. Paul Conner, 401-1903 Hall, Princeton, N.J.

The University of Virginia Library and the Stettinius Fund, Inc., announce the microfilm publication of the State Department scrapbooks of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under-Secretary (1943-44) and Secretary of State (1944-45). These scrapbooks comprise more than 1500 pages of clippings from magazines and newspapers throughout the United States and encompass the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the transition in the State Department from Cordell Hull to Stettinius, the events of January and February 1945, the Yalta Conference, the Mexico City Conference, and the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Together these scrapbooks provide a unique source for the study of public attitudes toward American diplomacy 1944-45. The two microfilm reels are available for $15.00 each or $25.00 for the set. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to: Stettinius Fellow, Manuscripts Division, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Virginia.

The 1965 Legislature of the State of New York has established 90 fellowships in honor of former Governor Herbert H. Lehman. The annual awards are to be known as the New York State Herbert H. Lehman Fellowships in Social Sciences and Public and International Affairs. Applicants for the awards must be citizens of the United States, but need not be residents of the State of New York. The fellowships carry annual stipends of $5,000 if the recipient is matriculated for a doctoral degree and has completed at least one year of graduate study, otherwise the award will be for $4,000. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1965. Winners will be announced on March 15, 1966. For further information and application forms write to the Regents Scholarships and Examination Center, The State Education Department, Albany, New York 12224.

Morley Ayearst, New York University, visited Cairo in February for two weeks as a member of a team of university professors from the State of New York to investigate possibilities for student and teacher exchange and opportunities in Middle Eastern affairs.

Peter Bachrach has returned to his position at Bryn Mawr College after a sabbatical leave in England.

Hans H. Baerwald will be director of the University of California Overseas Study Center, Tokyo, Japan, September 1965-July, 1966.

Erwin W. Bard, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, has returned from eighteen months as senior adviser to the Institute of Public Administration (New York) at the National Office of Organization and Training of the Peruvian government in Lima. He also lectured at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Buenos Aires in the program for public administration assisted by Columbia University.

Henry Bienen has returned to the University of Chicago following a year of teaching and research at Makerere University College in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of the University of Chicago.

Bernard E. Brown, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York spent 1964-65 on research in Senegal and other West African countries.

Edward H. Buehrig, Indiana University, will be on leave during 1965-66. He has received an SSRC grant and will spend five months at UNRWA headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, conducting research.

Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland, has been elected chairman of the board of editors of *World Affairs*.

James Busey, University of Colorado, will be on leave from the University during 1965-1966. He will assume teaching responsibilities at the University of Colorado-Colorado Springs Center.

George A. Codding, Jr., University of Colorado, has been awarded a university faculty research fellowship for the academic year 1965-66.

Rita W. Cooley, New York University, has been awarded a Fulbright Lectureship at the Amerika Institut, University of Innsbruck, Austria, for 1965-66.

Frank Darling, University of Colorado, will be on leave 1965-66 under the Fulbright-Hayes Educational Exchange Act as a lecturer at the Lyceum of the Philippines.

James C. Davies, University of Oregon, attended a seminar on the formation of Latin American elites at the University of Montevideo, Uruguay, June 6-12, 1965.

David Derge, Indiana University, spent some time in Sierra Leone studying the effectiveness of Peace Corp training.

Roland H. Ebel, Newcomb College, Tulane University, will be on leave 1965-66 to conduct research in Guatemala under an SSRC grant.

Preston W. Edsall, North Carolina State University at Raleigh, attended the internship evaluation conference held in Puerto Rico in April.

Herbert Emmerich, University of Virginia, presided at the XIII International Congress of Administrative Sciences in Paris, France, July 19-24.

Joseph R. Fiszman, University of Oregon, will be on leave during 1965-66 to do research in Czechoslovakia and Poland on a grant from the Inter-University Travel Grant Committee.

Gisbert H. Flanz, New York University, will continue to serve as advisor to the Administrative Improvement Research Commission of the Republic of Korea. He spent the summer in Seoul.

William J. Foltz, Yale University, has received a Yale junior faculty fellowship, and will be on leave during the calendar year 1966.

Ellen Frey-Wouters, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York was on an SSRC research leave in Europe during the spring term.

Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, spent the summer in Europe under a research fellowship from the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.

Albert Gorvine, director of the Research Center for Comparative Politics and Administration of Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, served as delegate from the U. S. A. to a CENTRO Conference on The Role of Local Government in National Development in Ankara, Turkey, in February, 1965. He delivered a paper on "Local Government in National Development: a New Role and National Responsibility." In June-July, 1965 he served as consultant to the Philippine Executive Academy at Baguio.

Darrell P. Hammer, Indiana University, has been awarded an SSRC grant that will allow him to do research in the Russian area during 1965-66.

Gordon G. Henderson, Millsaps College, has received a post-doctoral fellowship from the National Center for Education in Politics which will enable him to serve on the staff of Governor Samuel Goddard of Arizona for a twelve-month period beginning September 1965.

Jerry Hough, University of Illinois, has received a research grant from the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. He will spend the year in Cambridge and later visit the Soviet Union.

Michael Hudson, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, will be on leave during 1965-66, as a research associate of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

John Hutchinson, UCLA, spent the summer doing research in Washington, D. C., under grants from the University.

Philip E. Jacob, University of Pennsylvania, participated in conferences held in India with other collaborators in the International Studies of Values in Politics, a program of cross-cultural behavioral research being conducted jointly by the University of Pennsylvania and social research insitutions in India, Yugoslavia and Poland.

Jack T. Johnson, Indiana State University, has been granted a one-year leave of absence to serve as special assistant to Earl McGrath at the Institute of Higher Education, Columbia University.

Robert N. Kearney, Duke University, has received an award from the American Council of Learned Societies for his study of "Communalism and the Language Problem in Ceylon."

Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., has returned to Bryn Mawr College after a sabbatical leave.

Malcolm Kerr is on leave from UCLA and is spending the academic year in Egypt.

James D. Kitchen has a year's leave of absence from San Diego State College and will teach at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan.

Edward A. Kolodziej, University of Virginia, has been awarded an autumn semester research grant by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Samuel Konefsky, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, pursued field study in Great Britain during the 1965 spring semester under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Wolfgang H. Kraus, The George Washington University, was elected vice-president for political science by the American Society of Political and of Legal Philosophy at its annual meeting. He also participated in the Fifth International Conference on World Politics which was held at the Hague in September, 1965. The conference was devoted to Eastern European developments.

Vukan Kuic, University of Alabama, is on leave with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, during the academic year 1965-66.

Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Duke University, conducted research in France during the summer.

Martin Landau, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, will be senior specialist in public administration at the Institute of Advanced Projects at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the academic year 1965-66.

Carl H. Landé, visiting professor, Ateneo de Manila, Philippines, has received an award from the American Council of Learned Societies, for his study, "A Study of Philippine Politics."

Robert E. Lane, Yale University, has received a senior faculty fellowship from the University, and will be on leave during the 1965-66 academic year.

Chong-Sik Lee, University of Pennsylvania, will be on research leave during 1965-66 under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Gertrude Leighton, Bryn Mawr College, who has been combining with her regular duties at Bryn Mawr a research appointment in law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania Law School during the years 1959-65, will be on sabbatical leave in 1965-66.

William F. Levantrosser, Rutgers—The State University, has been awarded a post-doctoral fellowship by the Mershon Center for Education in National Security at Ohio State University for the academic year 1965-66.

J. Gus Liebenow, Indiana University, visited Sierra Leone to investigate the effectiveness of the training given Peace Corps personnel. He also conducted field work in Ghana, Nigeria and East Africa under a summer grant from Indiana University.

Charles S. Liebman has been awarded a cross-disciplinary fellowship from the Society for Religion in Higher Education. He will be on leave from Yeshiva University (1965-66) and will serve as a visiting scholar in the Department of Religion at Columbia University.

John P. Lovell, Indiana University, did field work in Korea this past summer.

Serif Arif Mardin, University of Ankara, will spend 1965-66 at the Institute of Turkish Studies at Columbia University.

Lucian C. Marquis, University of Oregon, has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Turin, Italy, for 1965-66.

Martin Meadows, American University, served at the University of the Philippines during 1964-65 as the recipient of a Fulbright award.

Philip Monypenny will be on sabbatical leave from the University of Illinois during the year 1965-66. He will spend most of the year in Urbana in research and writing.

George E. von der Muhl, University of Chicago, is spending the current academic year in research and instruction at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda.

Stuart Nagel returned to the University of Illinois in September after a year divided between the Center for Advanced Study in California and the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Harold Nieburg is on research leave from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for the academic year 1965-66.

Gerhart Niemeyer, University of Notre Dame, taught at the Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy at Vanderbilt University.

David M. Olson, University of Texas, will be on leave during the 1965-66 academic year and will participate in the APSA's study of Congress, as well as conduct other research. He spent the 1965 summer in Sweden doing field work.

Norman J. Padelford, University of Pennsylvania, edited the special United Nations anniversary issue of *International Organization* which commemorated the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U. N. Charter. The issue carried 25 articles by scholars and authorities from the U. S. and abroad appraising the accomplishments and prospects of the United Nations.

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed a member of the Committee on International Education of the College Entrance Examination Board. He also participated in the annual Institute of World Affairs sponsored by the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs.

Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, will conduct research and teach at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda.

R. K. Ramazani, University of Virginia, won the 1964 prize for the best book manuscript in the competition held by the Association of Middle East Studies.

David C. Rapaport will be on leave from UCLA during the fall and spring semesters and will engage in research in England during the latter.

Donald R. Reich, Oberlin College, will be on research leave during 1965-66.

John S. Reshetar, Jr., University of Washington, was on leave during the spring.

F. W. Riggs, Indiana University, read a paper at a conference on problems of modernization in Asia at Korea University at Seoul.

Joseph S. Roucek, University of Bridgeport, has been elected president of Delta Tau Kappa, the International Social Science Honorary Society.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania, was awarded a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship for 1965-66 which permits him to undertake research in Yugoslavia.

Bruce M. Russett, Yale University, has received a Yale junior faculty fellowship and will be on leave for the 1965-66 academic year.

James R. Scarritt, University of Colorado, will be on leave during 1965-66. He has been awarded a faculty research fellowship for research in Zambia and Rhodesia.

Lawrence Scheinman, UCLA, will conduct research in Europe during 1965-66 under an SSRC grant.

Karl M. Schmitt, University of Texas, will be on leave during 1965-66. He will participate in and coordinate a study for the Department of State on political forces in Latin America.

Robert E. Scott, University of Illinois, attended a conference on Social Science in Latin America held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in March, 1965. The conference was sponsored by the SSRC.

Pressley S. Sikes, Indiana University, having reached the retirement age for administrative duties, has returned to full time duties with the department of government.

Richard G. Smolka, the American University, has accepted a faculty fellowship in state and local politics from NCEP and will be on leave for academic year 1965-66.

Richard F. Staar, Emory University, presented a paper at the International Symposium held at Munich, West Germany, on October 20-22, 1964. The subject was "The Impact of the Modern Military Resolution on Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy."

George Stambuk, The George Washington University, has been granted leave of absence to conduct research under an SSRC grant.

Richard N. Swift, New York University, attended an institute on "Nuclear Science and World Politics," sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Science at Oak Ridge, Tennessee in April. He also attended a conference on the United Nations at Bellagio, Italy, in August.

Henry Teune, University of Pennsylvania is spending the fall term in Yugoslavia, Poland and India under the auspices of the University's International Cooperative Studies of Values in Politics.

Tang Tsou, The University of Chicago, was awarded the 1965 Gordon J. Laing Prize for his book, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950*.

Richard L. Walker, University of South Carolina, will spend the academic year 1965-66 doing research at the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, on a Fulbright research grant and an SSRC grant.

Frederick M. Watkins, Yale University, has received a senior faculty fellowship from the University and will be on leave during 1965-66.

Frederic A. Weed, San Jose State College, will return to full-time teaching after six years in the post of department chairman.

H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University, will do research during 1965-66 at the Washington Foreign Policy Center in Washington, D. C.

David Wilson, UCLA, spent the 1965 spring semester in Thailand.

Benjamin F. Wright, University of Texas, has resigned his position as director of special programs in the College of Arts and Sciences and has returned to full-time teaching duties in the department.

Quincy Wright, consultant at the University of Virginia, attended the meeting of the Legal Committee of the World Federation of the United Nations Associations in Amsterdam, and the Institute of International Law Conference in Warsaw.

I. William Zartman, University of South Carolina, spent the summer doing research in Belgium, Morocco and Senegal on an SSRC grant.

Correction

The June issue incorrectly announced the appointment of Franz Michael as director of the Sino-Soviet Institute at Georgetown University. Professor Michael is the associate director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at the George Washington University. Kurt L. London is the director of the Institute.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

DAVID W. ABBOTT, assistant professor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ROBERT ABRAMS, instructor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ABID A. AL-MARAYATI, assistant professor, Arizona State University; formerly with the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard.

WILLIAM C. BAUM, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College, Michigan, September 1965; formerly of Creighton University.

HENRY BIENEN, instructor, University of Chicago.

RICHARD N. BLUE, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

PAUL N. BRASS, assistant professor, University of Washington, September 1965.

BERNARD E. BROWN, professor, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

ALLEN W. CAMERON, instructor, Bates College.

WILLIAM R. CAMPBELL, instructor, University of Rhode Island.

ROBERT K. CARLEY, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College.

DWIGHT M. CARPENTER, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

EVERETT CATALDO, assistant professor, State University of New York at Buffalo; formerly of the Ohio State University.

SHIRLEY CHAPMAN, assistant professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of Vassar College.

MARY CISAR, assistant professor, California State College at San Bernardino.

RICHARD P. CLAUDE, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

ROBERT E. CLEARY, associate professor, American University; formerly of George Peabody College.

HARRY CLOR, instructor, Kenyon College.

MICHAEL COHEN, instructor, State University of New York at Binghamton.

STEPHEN COHEN, University of Illinois.

JULES COHN, assistant professor, New York University.

FRANK COLON, assistant professor, Lehigh University; formerly of Villanova University.

MIRIAM CONANT, assistant professor, Columbia.

JAMES E. CONNER, instructor, Columbia College.

JAMES L. COX, lecturer, University of Maryland.

JOHN P. CRECINE, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

JOHN CRITTENDEN, associate professor, Indiana State University; formerly of the University of Buffalo.

MORRIS DAVIS, associate professor, University of Illinois; formerly of Tulane University.

LYLE A. DOWNING, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of California.

DON W. DRIGGS, associate professor, University of Nevada; formerly of Stanislaus State College.

MARTIN D. DUBIN, associate professor, Northern Illinois University; formerly of Roosevelt University.

MARTIN EDELMAN, assistant professor, UCLA.

EUGENE EIDENBERG, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

CHARLES F. ELLIOTT, assistant professor, George Washington University; formerly of the University of California.

ROBERT H. EVANS, assistant professor, University of Notre Dame, February 1966.

KUANG-HUAN FAN, assistant professor, University of Idaho.

A. BELDEN FIELDS, University of Illinois.

GEORGE FISCHER, associate professor of sociology, Columbia University; formerly of Cornell University.

MICHAEL GEHLEN, assistant professor, Purdue University; formerly of Oregon State University.

EDWARD B. GLICK, associate professor, Temple University; formerly of Bendix Corporation's Arms Control Projects office.

PAUL GODWIN, assistant professor, Washington University.

MARSHALL N. GOLDSTEIN, associate professor, University of Hawaii.

GEORGE GOODWIN, JR., professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston Campus.

Lawrence Graham, assistant professor, University of Texas.

Roderick T. Groves, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

John E. Guendling, assistant professor, Arkansas Polytechnic College; formerly of Purdue University.

David A. Gugin, University of Georgia.

John G. Gunnell, assistant professor, State University of New York at Albany.

Donald L. Herman, assistant professor, Grand Valley State college.

Klaus J. Herrmann, associate professor, Sir George Williams University, Montreal; formerly of American University.

S. Kenneth Howard, assistant professor and assistant director of the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina.

Chun-tu Hseuh, associate professor, University of Maryland.

John Hutchinson, associate professor, UCLA, July 1964.

Bernard K. Johnpoll, University of Saskatchewan, Regina campus; formerly of Hartwick College.

William C. Johnson, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

Ralph G. Jones, professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of the University of Arkansas.

David Jordan, assistant professor, University of Virginia; formerly of Pennsylvania State University.

Sungjook Junn, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College; formerly of Mercer College.

Mark Kesselman, assistant professor, Columbia.

William J. Kirsch, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

Allan Kornberg, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of Hiram College.

Richard Kraemer, instructor, University of Texas.

Yasumasa Kuroda, instructor, University of Southern California; formerly of Montana State College.

Sanford A. Lakoff, associate professor, State University of New York at Stony Brook; formerly of Harvard University.

Wiliam W. Lammers, instructor, University of Southern California.

Paul Leary, assistant professor, Dartmouth College; formerly of Rutgers.

Edward A. Leonard, assistant professor, Texas Western College of the University of Texas; formerly of Emory University.

Tilden J. LeMelle, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

Theodore J. Lowi, associate professor, University of Chicago; formerly of Cornell University.

Jack Lewis, instructor, Duke University.

Alden Lind, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of the University of Oregon.

Edgar Litt, associate professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; formerly of Boston College.

John H. Lunde, instructor, Valparaiso University.

Harvey C. Mansfield, professor, Columbia University; formerly of the Ohio State University.

William R. Marty, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

John D. May, assistant professor, University of Chicago; formerly of Yale University.

James P. McClellan, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of the University of Alabama.

Ruth A. Miller, instructor, Whittier College.

R. Stephen Milne, professor and chairman of the department, University of British Columbia; formerly of the University of Singapore.

R. Stephen Milne, University of British Columbia: professor and chairman of the department.

Ray Morey, assistant professor, Denison University.

George E. von der Muhl, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

Frank Munk, professor, Portland State College; formerly of Reed College.

Norman K. Nicholson, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

Nicholas D. U. Onyewu, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

A. F. K. Organski, professor, University of Michigan; formerly of Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

Gordon Platt, University of Iowa, February 1966; formerly of the University of South Dakota.

Sandra S. Powell, instructor, American University.

Kenneth Prewitt, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

Donald J. Puchala, associate professor and research associate in the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia; formerly of the University of New York at Buffalo.

Theodore Putterman, assistant professor, University of Washington.

Richard S. Randell, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

Robert F. Randle, instructor, Columbia.

John C. Ries, Jr., assistant professor, University of California.

Robert S. Robins, assistant professor, Tulane University.

Ira S. Rohter, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

Fred Rouch, associate professor, Arizona State University; formerly of Claremont Graduate School.

William Safran, assistant professor, University of Colorado; formerly of Brooklyn College.

Burton M. Sapin, associate professor, University of Minnesota; formerly Foreign Affairs Officer on the Politico-Military Affairs Staff of the Office of the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Edward V. Schneier, assistant professor, Princeton University; formerly of Johns Hopkins University.

Joel Schwartz, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

Walter A. E. Skurnik, assistant professor, University of Colorado, Denver Center; formerly of Pennsylvania Military College.

Allan P. Sindler, professor, Cornell; formerly of Duke University.

Bhekpati Sinka, assistant professor, Indiana State University.

Duane Smith, assistant professor, University of California.

Paul A. Smith, associate professor, State University of New York at Binghamton; formerly of Grinnell College.

Leo M. Snowiss, assistant professor, UCLA.

Allan A. Spitz, assistant professor, Washington State University; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

Donald Sprengel, University of Iowa.

Arthur B. Stein, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island.

Glenn E. Tinder, professor, University of Massachusetts, Boston campus.

Richard H. Ullman, associate professor, Princeton University; formerly of Harvard University.

John Washburn, instructor, Lehigh University.

Marvin Weinbaum, assistant professor, University of Illinois; formerly of Colby College.

Herbert Weiss, assistant professor, New York University.

G. Robert Wills, assistant professor, Arizona State University.

Desmond P. Wilson, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of M.I.T.

John C. Withey, assistant professor, Whittier College.

Albert Wohlstetter, professor, University of Chicago; formerly of the University of California.

James H. Wolfe, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

E. Victor Wolfenstein, assistant professor, UCLA.

Roy Young, assistant professor, San Jose State College.

George T. Yu, associate professor, University of Illinois; formerly of the University of North Carolina.

Temporary and Visiting Appointments

Richard E. Ashcraft, acting assistant professor, UCLA.

Richard D. Baker, University of Oklahoma: visiting assistant professor, Newcomb College, Tulane University.

Phillips Bradley, visiting professor, Berea College (Kentucky), 1965-66.

Henry Bretton, University of Michigan: visiting professor, University College, Nairobi, Kenya.

Ellis O. Briggs, San Francisco State College; visiting professor, University of South Carolina, spring 1965.

David Butler, Nuffield College, Oxford, England: visiting professor, University of Michigan, summer 1965.

Mary U. Carlson, instructor, Valparaiso University.

Wallace F. Caldwell, Kansas State University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Milton Colvin, Washington and Lee University: visiting professor, National War College.

Percy E. Corbett, visiting professor, Columbia University.

John A. Crampton, Lewis and Clark College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Jean Danielson, visiting assistant professor, Newcomb College, Tulane University.

Paul T. David, University of Virginia: visiting scholar, Brookings Institution, summer 1965.

Carlos A. Echanove T., Mexico City: San Diego State College.

Rupert Emerson, Harvard: visiting professor, UCLA, spring 1965.

Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Peter G. Fish, instructor, Oberlin College.

Ahmad Ghoreichi, visiting assistant professor, University of Colorado.

Maure Goldschmidt, Reed College: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Charles R. Green, Oregon State University: visiting professor, University of Washington, summer 1965.

Milton Hobbs, Indiana University: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois.

Paul W. Howerton, visiting professor, American University.

Robert S. Jordan, George Washington University: visiting professor, University of Sierra Leone.

Majid Khadduri, Johns Hopkins University: visiting professor, Columbia.

William Lewis, Department of State: visiting professor, University of Michigan.

Louis S. Loeb, American University: visiting associate professor, University of California at Davis, summer 1965.

Gordon Means, Gustavus Adolphus College: University of Iowa.

Lynn Miller, acting assistant professor, University of California.

Dean Meyers, acting instructor, Indiana State University.

William C. Olson, Library of Congress: visiting professor, and research associate in the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia.

Benjamin Rivlin, Brooklyn College: visiting professor, Columbia.

C. Neale Ronning, visiting associate professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Kenneth S. Sherrill, instructor, Oberlin College.

Leland Stauber, Indiana University: visiting lecturer, University of Illinois.

William P. Tucker, University of Puerto Rico: visiting professor, University of Colorado.

Urban Whitaker, San Francisco State College: visiting professor, University of South Carolina.

Rene de Visme Williamson, Louisiana State University: visiting professor, Duke University, summer 1965.

I. William Zartman, University of South Carolina: visiting associate professor, New York University.

Dina Zinnes, Indiana University: research associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Other Appointments

Peter Bachrach, Bryn Mawr: chairman of the department, 1965-66.

Hans H. Baerwald, UCLA: vice chairman of the department.

Burton R. Brazil, San Jose State College: chairman of the department.

JOHN C. BUECHNER, University of Colorado: assistant director, Bureau of Governmental Research and Services.

DWIGHT M. CARPENTER, Arizona State University: assistant director, Bureau of Government Research.

MURRAY EDELMAN, University of Illinois: chairman of the department, to replace Charles B. Hagan who will be on sabbatical leave.

PRESTON W. EDSALL, North Carolina State University at Raleigh: chairman of the new department of politics.

RUSSELL H. FIFIELD, University of Michigan: acting director, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies.

HARRY J. FRIEDMAN, University of Hawaii: chairman of the department.

LEONARD GOODALL, Arizona State University: director of the Bureau of Government Research.

ROBERT HORWITZ, Kenyon College: professor and chairman of the department.

PAUL H. HOWERTON, American University: director, Center for Technology and Administration.

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, University of Texas: acting chairman, fall semester, 1965-66.

RAYMOND A. MOORE, University of South Carolina: acting head of the department.

DONALD C. MUNDINGER, Valparaiso University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

FRED MUNK, Portland State College: associate director, Central European Studies Center.

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JOSEPH L. SUTTON, Indiana University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

C. S. WHITAKER, JR., UCLA: associate dean, Graduate Division.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

RONALD F. HOWELL, associate professor, resigned from Emory University.

FRANK MUNK retired as professor at Reed College.

R. W. VAN WAGENEN, professor, resigned from American University to become Chief of Training for the World Bank.

PROMOTIONS (WITH NEW RANK)

JABIR A. ABBAS, Marshall University: assistant professor.

PAUL W. CONNER, Princeton University: assistant professor.

PHILIP E. CONVERSE, University of Michigan: professor.

L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia: professor.

DAVID DANELSKI, Yale University: associate professor.

REV. RAYMOND DERRIG, St. Louis University: associate professor.

H. SYDNEY DUNCOMBE, University of Idaho: associate professor.

RALPH EISENBERG, University of Virginia: associate professor.

DARYL R. FAIR, Rider College: assistant professor.

RICHARD A. FALK, ALBERT G. MILBANK, Professor of International Law and Practices, Princeton University.

GISBERT H. FLANZ, New York University: professor.

THOMAS A. FLINN, Oberlin: professor.

A. LEE FRITSCHLER, American University: assistant professor.

IRWIN N. GERTZOG, Yale University: assistant professor.

MYRON Q. HALE, Ohio State University: associate professor.

JOSEPH HAMBURGER, Yale University: professor.

RICHARD B. HARVEY, Whittier College: associate professor.

MURRAY C. HAVENS, University of Texas: associate professor.

CHARLES F. HERMANN, Princeton University: assistant professor.

WALTER D. JACOBS, University of Maryland: associate professor.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON, University of Michigan: professor.

ELIJAH BEN-ZION KAMINSKY, Arizona State University: associate professor.

W. MARVIN KENDRICK, Yale University: assistant professor.

DAVID KETTLER, Ohio State University: associate professor.

JACOB LANDYNSKI, New School for Social Research: associate professor.

CHONG-SIK LEE, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

W. DUANE LOCKARD, Princeton University: professor.

LEO B. LOTT, Ohio State University: associate professor.

MARTIN D. MEADOWS, American University: associate professor.

ROBERT J. MORGAN, University of Virginia: professor.

WALTER F. MURPHY, Princeton University: professor.

STUART NAGEL, University of Illinois: associate professor.

BENJAMIN NIMER, George Washington University: professor.

GLENN D. PAIGE, Princeton University: associate professor.

SIMON D. PERRY, Marshall University: associate professor.

JAMES R. ROACH, University of Texas: professor.

J. DAVID SINGER, University of Michigan: professor.

ROY D. SLOAN, University of Nebraska: associate professor.

GEORGE STAMBUK, George Washington University: associate professor.

W. J. STANKIEWICZ, University of British Columbia: professor.

DONALD E. STOKES, University of Michigan: professor.

JOHN H. STRANGE, Princeton University: lecturer.

HENRY TEUNE, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

NORMAN C. THOMAS, University of Michigan: associate professor.

MYRON WEINER, MIT: professor.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD, Yale University: professor.

IN MEMORIAM

William M. Griffin, associate professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, died on May 24, 1965 after a long illness. He was graduated from the Jacksonville, Texas, High School in 1942, entered the Marine Corps in the same year and served until 1946. He received a B.A. degree in government from Sam Houston State College in 1949, the M.A. from the same institution the following year, and the Ph.D. from the University of Texas in 1951.

Griffin's professional experience included two years of teaching in high school, a year as instructor in political science and research associate in the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service at Florida State University, and three years at the University of South Dakota where he was Assistant Professor of Government and Research Associate in the Governmental Research Bureau. He joined the staff of the University of Virginia in July 1960 and, in addition to his Associate Professorship, served as Assistant Director of the Institute of Government, and Assistant Editor of the University of Virginia News Letter.—Weldon Cooper

Miguel Jorrin, professor of government and director of the Division of Foreign Studies at the University of New Mexico died suddenly of a heart attack, May 7, 1965.

Eugene D. Overstreet, associate professor of International Affairs and a member of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at the George Washington University, died of cancer in Washington, D.C. on May 17, 1965, at the age of forty. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and was a co-author with Marshall Windmiller of *Communism in India*. At the time of his untimely death, Dr. Overstreet was working on a new book, *Communism in the New States*, and a book of documents on Communism in the developing countries.

Before joining The George Washington University in 1963, he had taught at Swarthmore College, at the University of California, and at Michigan State University. From 1953 to 1955, he had held a Ford Foundation Research Fellowship to India. In the summer of 1960, and during the academic year of 1961-62, he was in the Soviet Union on a research grant to study Soviet Trade Unions under the auspices of the State Department's US-USSR Cultural Exchange Program.

The profession has suffered a serious loss through the early death of this able scholar.—The Political Science Department, The George Washington University

Reuben G. Steinmeyer, who, for most of his lifetime, dedicated himself wholeheartedly to the profession of teaching, died suddenly of a heart attack on April 25, 1965.

He was born in Bridgewater, South Dakota, on January 22, 1899. After attending public schools in Chicago, he graduated from Capital University and Theological Seminary in Columbus, Ohio, and became an ordained Lutheran minister. In 1929 he took the B.A. degree at The American University, and received his Ph.D. in international relations also there in 1935.

He was appointed at the University of Maryland in February, 1935. Since that time, except for a short period of service with the War Production Board during World War II, he devoted three decades to the development of its Department of Government and Politics. On two occasions—when that Department first was established, and again late in World War II—he was the University's sole Professor of Political Science.

He not only witnessed, but also contributed substantially to, the growth of the University of Maryland for more than a quarter of a century. He served it in many ways in addition to his classroom teaching. He participated in the responsibilities of many University, College, and Departmental Committees, including the Faculty Senate for five years. He became one of the major purveyors of good will by delivering more than 2,000 special lectures to professional, educational, civic, fraternal, and other associations, averaging nearly seventy such lectures a year. Finally, during the past decade and a half he directed to completion the studies of some thirty-five graduate students. Also, he was a member of the National Council of Pi Sigma Alpha and held office as well in the District of Columbia Political Science Association. His wife—the late Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, who preceded him in death by exactly two years—was equally well known in the profession.—Elmer Plischke

William H. Vatcher, Jr., professor of Political Science at San Jose State College, died May 18, 1965 of injuries received early in January during a visit to San Francisco. Professor Vatcher received his academic training at Stanford University, from which he received his Ph.D. in international relations in 1950. His interests in that field were widespread. His first book, *Panmunjom*, was concerned with the Korean truce negotiations. More recently, Praeger published his study of Afrikaner nationalism. At the time of his death he had completed another manuscript for a text on public opinion.

Dr. Vatcher was a congenial colleague and an influential teacher as well as a serious scholar. His loss will be felt deeply by the profession.—Frederic A. Weed

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
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

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

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